Mark Halperin:
What circumstances have led us to this moment—economic, cultural, psychological? Why have we gotten here as a country?
Robert Pape:
There are social changes radicalizing our politics, which in turn are increasing support for political violence. As tragic as yesterday was, something like it was predictable. Our national surveys at the University of Chicago have, since summer 2021, shown rising support for political violence on both the right and the left—higher than at any time since we began quarterly tracking. That’s why I’ve been writing op-eds warning we’re on the brink of major political violence. We’ve crossed a threshold. If left to its own devices, this can get worse. Your audience is important because you reach multiple parts of the country, and the problem spans multiple parts of the country.
Halperin:
What, specifically, are people saying in your surveys? Are they telling pollsters that political violence is a good idea, a necessary evil, or inevitable because the other side will do it?
Pape:
We ask pointed questions, not just “Do you support political violence?” For example, in a nationally representative May survey with NORC (the gold standard), 39% of Democrats agreed that “the use of force” would be justified to remove Donald Trump from the presidency. You might ask what “use of force” means. Over four years of follow-up work—focus groups, probes, expert surveys—we’ve found that 55% of respondents who endorse “use of force” mean assassination, murder, killing, shooting, or a violent mob to remove someone. It’s not all the same modality, but it is physical violence. About 40% interpret “use of force” more softly (e.g., yelling). If you instead use the word “violence,” only about one in ten interpret that as physical acts like shooting; 90% shift to the softer meanings. So wording matters.
Halperin:
Historically, how does this compare—to the 1960s, or even the Civil War era? Is this unprecedented?
Pape:
There’s an analog. I call our era “violent populism.” I coined that term because between “civil war” and “nothing,” there’s a middle ground—and that’s where we are. Like the 1960s, major social change is producing radical politics. That social change makes political outcomes feel more fragile and more consequential, increasing support for political violence in the mainstream—not just the fringe. The reasons today aren’t identical to the 1960s, but globally it’s common: social change often correlates with political violence. I’ve studied this worldwide for 30 years; the last five I’ve had to focus on the U.S. because it’s become the critical case.
Halperin:
When you say social upheaval, is it mostly economic? Or issues like trans rights, gay marriage? What exactly is provoking the reaction on left and right?
Pape:
There’s one big social change, with others significant too. The big one: the U.S. is transitioning, for the first time in 250 years, from a white-majority democracy to a white-minority democracy. In 1990, the country was 76% non-Hispanic white. Today it’s 57%. In the next 10–15 years—by around 2035–2040, depending on deportations—we’ll be about 49% non-Hispanic white.
Halperin:
Has any country gone from majority white to minority white before?
Pape:
Not in those exact terms, but there are analogs—Lebanon, Yugoslavia—where demographic shifts interacted with who governs. For listeners wanting background, look at Donald Horowitz’s work from the 1980s. He wasn’t writing about the U.S., but the mechanism is familiar to experts: over decades, demographic change can create a disjuncture with political power, and that fuels instability.
Mark Halperin:
Let’s talk a little about solutions, because this is a grim picture you’re painting with the data. You advise policymakers. What’s required for this country to return to a societal sense that political violence is unacceptable—that we can make change at the ballot box, through Congress, through lobbying, more peaceful means? What’s required to reset people away from openness to political violence?
Robert Pape:
There are short-term things and longer-term things. Right now, because of the watershed moment of yesterday, millions of people who feel wounded and sorrowful over what happened—because Charlie Kirk was so beloved—may evolve from sorrow into anger, and then worse. We need to focus on the short term. The most important thing is for political leaders to condemn violence from their own constituents, their own side. We’re seeing this from Democrats. We’re also getting more evidence about the shooter’s motives as we speak. There also needs to be restraint from the targeted side’s supporters. This is tough. I’ve been calling for this for years in my op-eds.
Another idea I’ve put forward is that all the former presidents should attend Charlie’s funeral and make a big show of unity—issue a joint statement, maybe even a joint interview—to say that regardless of party, political violence is unacceptable.
Halperin:
Would that kind of symbolic move be significant?
Pape:
Yes. And to add to your idea, after the funeral they could come to the University of Chicago on October 6, where we’ve reserved a large forum. You could help moderate a discussion among the presidents that could be televised nationally. This is that level of importance. We haven’t seen this surge in political violence since the 1960s. We now understand the causes better. The internet plays a role, but de-platforming hasn’t stopped it—that’s because the internet is only a secondary factor. We’re navigating a historic change, and we need historic responses by our leaders.
Halperin:
Was President Trump’s statement Wednesday night helpful—when he said, “We’re going to figure out who did this, and they’re going to be punished”? Did that tamp down political violence, or encourage it?
Pape:
Two things. First, for Donald Trump, that was a restrained statement. Second, he reflected the MAGA mood. His opening words were “sorrow” and “anger.” That sorrow will grow, and may evolve into anger. After 9/11, leaders swore we would never be angry, but 18 months later we invaded Iraq with 70% public support. We did it because we were angry.
Halperin:
So it’s not just presidents. Do governors, clergy, business leaders matter? Where do people get their signals about how to think about political violence?
Pape:
At all levels. All Democrats and Republicans—governors, members of Congress, former presidents—need to be involved. Presidents are the standard-bearers, but people also take cues from local leaders. That’s why I’ve worked with sheriffs’ associations. They’re trusted in their communities and carry significant weight. It’s not just one group. Your idea about the funeral is spot on, but we need more than a one-and-done event. Politicians must put as much energy into tamping down violence among their own constituents as they put into running for office.
Halperin:
What about deterrence through mechanics—more security, more shows of force at events?
Pape:
In the short term, yes, that will happen. But Charlie Kirk, while prominent, was not an elected official. There are many others who are visible. Over time it’s impossible to have perfect security, especially since personal addresses can be found online.
Halperin:
Isn’t there a big difference between “crazy people” and those with a rational political motive? Isn’t most of this just unstable individuals?
Pape:
These aren’t alternative explanations. The more public support there is for political violence, the more “volatile actors” on the edge will be nudged over the edge. The Secret Service did the best analysis of assassins in the U.S. in the late 1990s, covering nearly 100 cases. They found half had college or graduate education; about 40% had some degree of mental illness, but only a tiny fraction suffered hallucinations.
Halperin:
After Charlie was assassinated, some say let’s lower the temperature, others fear copycats or retaliation. Which does history suggest?
Pape:
Both pathways exist. Larger public support for political violence is one. Copycat or retaliation attacks are another. It’s difficult to disentangle because events are often separated by months or years. But attackers study each other, learn from mistakes, and plan for weeks. Yesterday’s attacker likely learned from prior failed attempts.
Halperin:
Last one—what gives you optimism?
Pape:
Seventy percent of the public abhors political violence and supports joint calls to tamp it down. That’s still a strong majority. Leaders can also see they have something at stake for themselves and their families, so their incentives align with the public. But we need them to act.
Robert Anthony Pape (/pæp/; born April 24, 1960) is an American political scientist who studies national and international security affairs, with a focus on air power, political violence, social media propaganda, and terrorism. He is currently a professor of political science at the University of Chicago and founder and director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST).
I can’t believe this charlatan is a highly respected expert.
John B. Judis wrote in the WSJ Aug. 29, 2021:
The most common reaction to the release of the 2020 census was summed up in the headline “Census Data show the number of white people fell.” The data show the number of whites declining by 8.6%. This observation was often coupled with a political projection: that while gerrymandering could benefit Republicans in 2022, the political future belongs to the Democratic Party, which commands large majorities among minorities.
But these conclusions about race and politics rely on misleading census results. Contrary to Democratic hopes and right-wing anxieties, America’s white population didn’t shrink much between 2010 and 2020 and might actually have grown.
“Races” are defined not by biology but by cultural convention. As late as the early 20th century, many Anglo-Americans didn’t identify Southern or Eastern Europeans as “white.” In 1918, 33-year-old Harry S. Truman, while visiting New York City, wrote his cousin: “This town has 8,000,000 people. 7,500,000 of ’em are of Israelish extraction. (400,000 wops and the rest are white people.)” After World War II, Jews and Italians became identified as “white.”
Something similar seems to be happening to many Americans of Hispanic and Asian origin. About 3 in 10 Hispanics and Asians intermarry, usually to a white spouse. According to a 2016 study by economists Brian Duncan and Stephen J. Trejo, 35% of third-generation Hispanics of mixed parentage no longer identify as Hispanic; and 55% of third-generation Asian-Americans of mixed parentage no longer identify as Asian. A 2017 Pew report found that among Americans of Hispanic origin who don’t identify themselves as Hispanic, 59% said that they were seen by others as white.
The racial identity of Hispanics is especially confusing because the census asks about “Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin” separately from race. In the 2010 census, 53% of those who said they were of Hispanic origin checked off only “white,” a 58% increase in numbers from 2000. That rise in white Hispanics helped account for the increase in the number of whites from the prior census. But in the 2020 census, a mere 20.3% of Hispanics checked off only “white,” contributing to the 8.6% decline in the total number of people identifying only as white.
That dramatic change probably stemmed not from a shift in social consciousness or demographics, but from a subtle change in the 2020 question about race. In 2010 the census asked respondents to check off whether they were white, black or African-American, American Indian or Alaska Native, various varieties of Asian or Pacific Islander, and “some other race.” They may check off as many race boxes as are applicable.
But in 2020 the census asked respondents who checked off “white” to specify their nationality: “Print, for example, German, Irish, Italian, Lebanese, Egyptian, etc.” No Spanish-speaking nationality was listed. That likely created the impression that Hispanic was another race, notwithstanding the previous question’s disclaimer that “Hispanic origins are not races.”
Thus, many Hispanics who would have checked off white alone in 2010 may have checked “white” and “some other race” in 2020. The number of Hispanics checking two or more boxes increased by 567% from 2010 and make up about two-thirds of those who checked both boxes. Seventy-one percent of the population checked white in 2020, either alone or with one or more other boxes—an increase of 1.9% from 2010. It is very possible that if the census hadn’t changed the race question in 2020, the number of “whites” might not have declined at all or declined only slightly. The number certainly wouldn’t have fallen 8.6%.
Over time, social mobility and intermarriage will likely further weaken the distinction between Americans identified as white and those with Asian and Hispanic ancestry. As sociologist Richard Alba has argued, census projections that the U.S. will become a “majority minority” nation by 2045 are likely to prove false.
To confuse matters more, the census introduced in 2020 a “diversity index” that filtered out Hispanics who considered themselves “white” by creating a quasiracial category of 57.8% “non-Hispanic whites.” This was the percentage most commentators reported as “whites.” It eliminated the 20.3% of people of Hispanic origin who still checked off only “white.” The authors of the census appear determined to fuel nativist fears that whites are being “replaced” and liberal hopes of a growing minority-based Democratic majority.
ChatGPT notes:
Here are the strongest counterarguments you’ll hear (or read) against Robert Pape’s claim that the U.S. is moving from a “white-majority democracy to a white-minority democracy.”
1. Census Categories Are Artificial and Shifting
Pape relies on the “non-Hispanic white alone” category, which has indeed fallen to ~57% in 2020 and is projected to dip below 50% around 2035–2045.
But as John Judis (WSJ) and Richard Alba (CUNY) point out, that’s a census artifact. In 2020, the race question changed, and many Hispanics who had checked “white only” in 2010 instead checked “white + some other race.” That created the illusion of an 8.6% decline in whites.
If you count all who checked “white” in any way (alone or mixed), the white share was actually 71% in 2020 — slightly higher than in 2010.
2. Assimilation and Intermarriage Undercut the “Minority” Framing
Intermarriage rates are high: ~30% of Hispanics and Asians marry whites.
Studies show that by the third generation, 35% of Hispanics and 55% of Asians with mixed ancestry no longer identify as Hispanic/Asian. Many identify (and are seen) as white.
In lived social reality, these groups often assimilate into the white mainstream, meaning the sharp “white vs. minority” divide is blunted over time.
3. “Majority-Minority Nation” Projections Are Misleading
The Census Bureau’s “diversity index” filters out Hispanics who identify as white, narrowing “white” to “non-Hispanic white.” That’s what fuels headlines about whites “shrinking.”
Richard Alba argues this framing is misleading because it assumes permanent, impermeable boundaries between groups. In practice, categories blur: Irish, Italians, Jews were once seen as nonwhite but became white. Something similar may be happening with parts of Hispanic and Asian populations.
As a result, the U.S. may never truly be a “white-minority nation” in the stark way Pape describes.
4. Political Behavior Doesn’t Map Cleanly to Census Boxes
Pape links demographic change directly to rising political violence and “radicalized” politics.
Critics argue that political coalitions aren’t locked to census identities. Second- and third-generation Hispanics/Asians are already trending more Republican in some areas (e.g., Miami, South Texas).
So the “threat” narrative tied to whites losing majority status may be overstated if assimilation and partisan realignment reduce the salience of racial blocs.
Bottom line: Pape’s warning about social upheaval tied to “whites becoming a minority” is based on the narrowest census measure and may overstate the demographic rupture. Critics like Judis and Alba argue the real story is more continuity than rupture: broad assimilation, fuzzy boundaries, and a slower, less dramatic shift.
