Mark Halperin argues that winning presidential elections comes down to winning daily news cycles. Neat theory, but is it true? Strong evidence?
Halperin’s Theory: Mark Halperin rose to prominence editing The Note at ABC News, a daily political digest that shaped how campaigns and journalists framed the day’s events. According to The New Yorker, campaigns deliberately leaked to him to steer the narrative. Halperin’s theory: control the narrative each day, and you control electoral momentum. But controlling the news cycle doesn’t necessarily mean winning votes.
What Research Shows:
1. Horse-Race Journalism Distracts, Doesn’t Decide
Studies on horse-race journalism show it reduces voter understanding and increases cynicism. A 2018 meta-analysis found that it depresses civic engagement and may lower turnout. Rather than convincing voters, it often alienates them.
2. Campaign Effects Are Minimal
A 2018 study in the American Political Science Review found that campaign efforts typically have minimal impact in general elections. Voter preferences are shaped more by structural fundamentals like party ID, the economy, and incumbency than by day-to-day campaign messaging.
3. Election Forecasting Relies on Fundamentals, Not Spin
Forecasting models such as those from FiveThirtyEight aggregate polls and economic indicators. But even Nate Silver’s model gave Clinton a ~71% chance in 2016—and was wrong. See The New Yorker. This illustrates that daily media narratives and model-driven forecasts both struggle when voter behavior shifts late or is misunderstood.
4. Media Buzz vs. Voter Psychology
Social media “buzz” has some predictive power early in cycles, but doesn’t determine outcomes. One study from Penn State suggested buzz can correlate with momentum, but not reliably shift results. Source: Penn State University.
5. Psychology and Narrative Resonance Matter More
Recent work analyzing Trump’s tone in late 2024—specifically rising optimism—suggests psychological framing matters more than media dominance. Source: New York Post.
Conclusion: Halperin’s idea that elections are won by dominating the daily news cycle reflects how campaigns behave—not what actually moves voters. The best available evidence suggests long-term fundamentals, voter psychology, and macro-conditions matter far more than narrative control. Winning the news cycle may shape press coverage, but it doesn’t decide elections.
Grok says: Mark Halperin’s argument that winning presidential elections hinges on dominating daily news cycles is an interesting lens, but it oversimplifies a complex process. The theory suggests that consistent media attention and framing—shaping the narrative each day through events, soundbites, or scandals—builds momentum that translates into voter support. Let’s break it down and look at the evidence.
Supporting Evidence
Historical Examples of News Cycle Impact:2016 Election (Trump vs. Clinton): Trump’s campaign thrived on dominating news cycles, often through controversial statements or media stunts. Data from the Shorenstein Center showed Trump received disproportionate media coverage (e.g., 15% more free media than Clinton across major outlets). His ability to set the agenda—whether through tweets or rallies—kept him in the spotlight, arguably overshadowing Clinton’s policy-focused approach. This aligns with Halperin’s view that controlling the narrative drives voter attention.
2008 Obama Campaign: Obama’s team mastered daily messaging with disciplined talking points and viral moments (e.g., “Yes We Can”). Studies, like those from Pew, noted Obama’s campaign generated more positive coverage than McCain’s, particularly in swing states, which helped frame him as a change agent.
Media’s Agenda-Setting Role:Research on agenda-setting theory (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) supports the idea that media coverage influences what voters think about, if not how they think. By consistently winning news cycles, a candidate can keep their issues (e.g., economy, immigration) at the forefront, sidelining opponents’ narratives. For instance, in 2020, Biden’s campaign leveraged COVID-19 coverage to frame Trump as mismanaging the crisis, per analysis from the University of Southern California’s media studies.
Momentum and Polling:Winning news cycles can create a bandwagon effect. Polls often reflect shifts after major media moments (e.g., debates, conventions). In 1988, George H.W. Bush’s campaign used daily attacks on Dukakis (e.g., the “Willie Horton” ad) to dominate coverage, correlating with a polling surge, per Gallup data.
Counter-Evidence
News Cycles Don’t Always Translate to Votes:In 2012, Romney won several news cycles (e.g., the first debate, where he was widely seen as outperforming Obama). Yet, Obama’s ground game and demographic advantages secured the win. This suggests news cycles are secondary to structural factors like voter turnout, per studies from the American National Election Studies.
In 2020, Trump again dominated media attention, but Biden’s steady, low-drama approach resonated with voters exhausted by chaos, per exit polls.
Diminishing Returns in Polarized Media:Today’s fragmented media landscape (cable news, social media) means candidates often preach to their base rather than swaying undecideds. A 2022 study from NYU found that news cycle dominance matters less in polarized environments, as voters consume media that reinforces existing beliefs. Halperin’s theory may have been stronger in the broadcast era.
Other Factors Outweigh News Cycles:Economic conditions, incumbency, and campaign organization often predict outcomes better than media dominance. In 1992, Clinton’s “It’s the economy, stupid” strategy trumped Bush’s news cycle wins (e.g., post-Gulf War approval spikes). Statistical models from FiveThirtyEight consistently show fundamentals like GDP growth or approval ratings as stronger predictors than media coverage.
Nuance and Context
Short-Term vs. Long-Term Impact: Winning daily news cycles can create momentum but doesn’t guarantee victory. It’s more about agenda control than direct vote conversion. For example, Kamala Harris’s 2024 campaign (as of my last data) used viral moments to energize base turnout, but swing state polls showed fundamentals like inflation remained decisive.
Modern Media Dynamics: Social media (e.g., X posts) amplifies news cycles but also creates noise. A candidate can “win” a cycle on X but lose broader narratives if mainstream outlets or fact-checkers counter them. Data from MIT’s Media Lab shows that viral moments often fade within 48 hours without sustained follow-up.
Conclusion
Halperin’s theory has merit—dominating news cycles can shape voter perceptions and momentum, with evidence from campaigns like Trump’s 2016 run or Obama’s 2008 messaging. However, it’s not a universal rule. Structural factors (economy, turnout) and long-term strategy often outweigh daily media wins, especially in polarized times. The evidence suggests news cycles are a piece of the puzzle, not the whole picture.
Mark Halperin: What’s the connection between the director of national intelligence accusing Barack Obama of treason … and the Epstein story?
Batya Ungar‑Saron: Well … why does the DNI director choose this day to drop the bomb … leads a lot of people to wonder … timing certainly seems suspicious.
Mark Halperin: [laughs] Yes—
Batya Ungar‑Saron: I’m so confused. I have people who say Gabbard is acting on Trump’s orders … and others who say, “How can media not take Obama-led coup seriously?” … there’s a third: she truly believes it, and I think that’s where I landed.
Batya Ungar‑Saron: I have immense respect for her … I just don’t think she had the goods. The whole thing hinges on intelligence before Trump took office that said Russians didn’t alter tallies … the report replaced is similar … the smoking gun actually undermines the crime of Russiagate … calling Obama a traitor distracts from Trump’s accomplishments.
Mark Halperin: Let me pick up … To accuse a former president of treason … you don’t do that without the goods … you do a criminal referral to DOJ. I don’t understand what Gabbard is doing.
Dan Turrentine: Russia interfered in the election—that’s no dispute. They aimed to hurt Clinton and indirectly helped Trump.
Dan Turrentine: I understand Trump’s frustration. Investigations didn’t prove collusion. But frustration doesn’t justify exaggeration.
Dan Turrentine: I think it hasn’t been proven Russia actually impacted the outcome. Influence doesn’t equal outcome.
Mark Halperin: But you don’t need individual voters testifying. News cycles matter.
Mark Halperin: Losing news cycles correlates with losing. We know emails caused cycles.
Dan Turrentine: Inflation hurt Biden where people self-report voting over it, but no one said “I didn’t vote for Clinton because of the DNC leaks.”
Mark Halperin: Voters didn’t need that threshold. We reject premise you need that.
Dan Turrentine: I have evidence: email leaks hijacked media cycles and likely cost her.
This exchange embodies epistemic coercion: Gabbard, now DNI, accuses the Obama administration of treason without solid, publicly verifiable evidence. She relies on timing and selective intelligence—declared authoritative by position, not proven in public forums.
Gabbard’s allegations leverage institutional legitimacy over transparent proof. No whistleblowers, no peer-reviewed documents—just classified interpretations framed as undeniable truth. That aligns with Turner’s warnings about expert rule insulated from democratic oversight: when expert claims become political truth by decree, civic judgment is bypassed. Source: Stephen Turner, “Epistemic Coercion” (2014)
Batya Ungar-Sargon and Dan Turrentine express healthy skepticism: interference happened, but its practical impact remains unverified. Yet Gabbard frames it as proven fact. That’s post‑normal science—narratives built from incomplete data, made plausible by institutional authority.
The erosion of democratic legitimacy is clear: rituals of accountability (referrals to DOJ, claims of treason) are present, but substantive judicial or legislative processes are absent. Instead, public consensus is shaped by the assumed correctness of “intelligence,” even when its provenance is murky.
Turner’s framework sees this as not just politics, but politics by proxy—expert-driven narratives that replace democratic deliberation. And that, as Gabbard’s critics argue, is deeply undemocratic. Source: Stephen Turner, The Politics of Expertise
