Conservatives can’t use the long march strategy because the left isn’t dumb enough to let them penetrate institutions. Instead, conservatives need to do the equivalent of a private equity buyout and restructure institutions from the top down.
…ownership of Twitter marked the first time someone on the right actually acquired ownership of a major culture shaping institution and leveraged that ownership for political and cultural change. This arguably played an important role in Trump’s election, and Musk now plays a key role in the administration (for now at least). The Twitter ownership change is also probably one of the big factors in the recent “vibe shift” in the culture. And this was from controlling and fully leveraging just one institution.
The other interesting thing is that it is the left that chose exit from Twitter, largely leaving for the startup Bluesky app, which has become a low quality left wing echo chamber. They intentionally marginalized themselves from the discourse because by and large the mainstream, including most major journalists, stayed on X.
Musk’s Twitter takeover is the exact opposite of the typical pattern. Conservatives took over a liberal institution, and the left exited for a lower quality, culturally marginal platform.
DeepSearch says: “The right can take back institutions from the left through direct acquisition and restructuring, as Musk’s X takeover demonstrates, potentially influencing cultural and political landscapes. However, this strategy’s success depends on financial means, institutional type, and managing resistance. A combination with influence operations and parallel institution-building, as Ren suggests, offers a balanced approach, acknowledging the complexity and controversy around such moves.”
Grok says:
The Problem: No Long March for the Right
You’re spot-on that the left’s “long march through the institutions”—Gramsci’s slow grind of capturing academia, media, and culture—won’t work for conservatives. Renn echoes this: the left’s gatekeepers are too entrenched and too alert to let a conservative infiltration slide. Universities, for instance, aren’t just liberal by inertia; they’re actively policed by hiring committees, tenure boards, and cultural norms that screen out dissent. The right can’t sneak in the back door when the front’s bolted shut.
The Twitter Model: Buyout and Flip
Musk’s Twitter takeover, as you and Renn highlight, flips the script. It’s not infiltration—it’s acquisition. A billionaire with a vision bought a cultural linchpin and rewired it from the top. Renn calls it a “hostile takeover,” and that’s apt: Musk didn’t negotiate with the old guard; he fired them. X went from a left-leaning echo chamber to a chaotic free-for-all where the right found oxygen. Trump’s 2024 win likely owes something to this—X became a meme factory and a pipeline for unfiltered takes that bypassed legacy media’s chokehold. The “vibe shift” you mention, which Renn also nods to, reflects how fast a single institution can tilt the cultural wind when seized decisively.
The Left’s Retreat: Self-Marginalization
Your point about the left’s exodus to Bluesky is a key twist, and Renn doesn’t dive as deep here, but it’s worth unpacking. The left didn’t just lose Twitter; they abandoned it, betting on a boutique platform that’s turned into a digital cul-de-sac. X still has the juice—journalists, influencers, and normies didn’t fully jump ship. Bluesky’s a purity spiral, not a power base. This self-inflicted wound amplifies the Twitter flip’s impact: the right gained ground while the left shrank their own stage.
Scaling the Strategy: Can It Work Elsewhere?
Renn’s skeptical it can scale easily, and I lean that way too. Twitter was a unicorn—a public company with a clear price tag. Most institutions the right wants (universities, Hollywood, legacy media) aren’t for sale in the same way. You can’t buy Harvard’s board or CNN’s newsroom with a check. Renn suggests parallel institution-building (think PragerU or Daily Wire) as an alternative, but that’s slow and niche—it doesn’t hit the cultural jugular like owning a mainstream pillar does. Your private equity analogy still holds, though: the right needs high-leverage plays, not just grassroots grinds. Think targeted buyouts (a struggling newspaper chain, a floundering streaming service) or hostile moves (stacking boards, pressuring donors).
What’s Next?
Musk’s success hinged on three things: cash, timing, and guts. The right needs more of that trifecta. Renn points to the donor class as a weak link—conservatives have moneyed backers, but they’re too timid or unfocused. Imagine a coordinated fund targeting distressed media assets or tech platforms; it’s not crazy. X showed the proof of concept: one big swing can shift the board. But without more Musks—or at least more players willing to bet big—the right risks stalling out. The left’s not unbeatable; they’re just better at holding turf. The right’s got to learn to take it.
