I have two main intellectual interests at the moment — the political theology of Carl Schmitt and the Talmudic tractate Bava Kamma.
Bava Kamma 88A translated into English reads:
R. JUDAH, HOWEVER, SAYS THAT NO DEGRADATION IS PAID IN THE CASE OF [CANAANITE] SLAVES. What is the reason of R. Judah? — As Scripture says:2 ‘When men strive together one with another’ the law applies to one who can claim brotherhood and thus excludes a slave who cannot claim brotherhood.3 And the Rabbis?4 — They would say that even a slave is a brother in so far as he is subject to commandments. If this is so, would you say that according to R. Judah witnesses proved zomemim5 in a capital accusation against a slave would not be subject to be put to death in virtue of the words:6 ‘Then shall ye do unto him as he had purposed to do unto his brother’?7 — Raba said that R. Shesheth stated: The verse concludes:6 ‘So shalt thou put away the evil from among you’, implying ‘on all accounts’ — Would you say that according to the Rabbis8 a slave would be eligible to be chosen as king?9 — I would reply: According to your reasoning would the same difficulty not arise regarding a proselyte, whichever view we accept10 unless we suppose that when Scripture says ‘One from among thy brethren’,11 it implies ‘one of the choicest of thy brethren’?12 — But again would you now also say that according to the Rabbis, a slave would be eligible to give evidence,13 since it says, And behold, if the witness be a false witness and hath testified falsely against his brother?14 — ‘Ulla replied: Regarding evidence you can surely not argue thus. For that he15 is disqualified from giving evidence can be learnt by means of an a fortiori from the law in the case of Woman: for if Woman who is eligible to enter [by marriage] into the congregation [of Israel] is yet ineligible to give evidence,16 how much more must a slave who is not eligible to enter [by marriage] into the congregation [of Israel] be ineligible to give evidence? But why is Woman disqualified if not perhaps because she is not subject to the law of circumcision? How then can you assert the same In the case of a slave who is subject to circumcision?17 — The case of a [male] minor will meet this objection, for in spite of his being subject to circumcision he is disqualified from giving evidence.18 But why is a minor disqualified if not perhaps because he is not subject to commandments?19 How then can you assert the same in the case of a slave who is subject to commandments?20 — The case of Woman will meet this objection, for though she is subject to commandments she is disqualified from giving evidence. The argument is thus endlessly reversible. There are features in the one instance which are not found in the other, and vice versa. The features common to both21 are that they are not subject to all the commandments22 and that they are disqualified from giving evidence. I will therefore include with them a slave who also is not subject to all the commandments and should therefore also be disqualified from giving evidence. But why [I may ask] is the feature common to them21 that they are disqualified from giving evidence if not perhaps because neither of them is a man?23 How then can you assert the same in the case of a slave who is a man? — You must therefore deduce the disqualification of a slave from the law applicable in the case of a robber.24 But why is there this disqualification in the case of a robber if not because his own deeds caused it? How then can you assert the same in the case of a slave whose own deeds could surely not cause it?25 — You must therefore deduce the disqualification of a slave from both the law applicable to a robber and the law applicable to either of these [referred to above].26 Mar, the son of Rabina, however, said: Scripture says: ‘The fathers shall not be put to death through27 the children’;28 from this it could be inferred that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [persons who if they were to be] fathers would have no legal paternity over their children.29 For if you assume that the verse is to be taken literally, ‘fathers shall not be put to death through children’, meaning, ‘through the evidence of children’, the Divine Law should have written ‘Fathers shall not be put to death through their children’. Why then is it written ‘children’, unless to indicate that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [persons who if they were to be] fathers would have no legal paternity over their children? If that is so, would you also say that the concluding clause ‘neither shall the children be put to death through the fathers’ similarly implies that no sentence of capital punishment should be passed on [the evidence of] the mouth of [witnesses who as] children would have no legal filiation with respect to their fathers, and therefore argue that a proselyte30 should similarly be disqualified from giving evidence?
According to this thought, a Canaanite can never be a brother to a Jew. Not all men are brothers. Jews have enemies and their enemies are not brothers.
Like all tribal systems, Judaism has a dual morality. There’s one standard for how you treat your bother, your fellow Jew, and there is another standard for how you treat non-Jews. Christianity, by contrast, believes in one universal morality for how you treat everyone.
Judaism is based on kinship. WASP civilization is based upon reputation.
From a Jewish perspective, the idea that all men are brothers gets many beautiful evocations in the aggadic (stories) writings, but when it comes to Jewish law, there are two standards — one for your fellow Jew and one for the goyim. For instance, you may not lend at interest to your fellow Jew, but you can lend at interest to a goy.
From the above quoted practical perspective of Judaism (as opposed to its more flowery evocations of the brotherhood of man), not every person you meet is your brother. In fact, many peoples cannot be your brother. This seems like commonsense to me.
When it comes to the creation and maintenance of the present state of Israel, Muslims are not your brother. They are the enemy. On the other hand, in different circumstances, such as in domestic politics in the diaspora, organized Jewry and organized Islam usually want the same things — anti-Christianity, a maximum of immigration, lots of welfare, a multi-cultural society where minorities increase their power at the expense of the native majority, and stigmatization of the goyim (whites of Europeans ancestry) strengthening their racial, religious and national identity.
Judaism is profoundly rooted in this world whereas Christianity places more attention on the next world. Judaism understands the friend-enemy distinction is essential for national identity.
There’s a gentile thinker who also saw the importance of the friend-enemy distinction for organizing a nation — Carl Schmitt.
