Luke Ford

Economist Matt Lowe writes in a new paper:

Cultural beliefs usually evolve slowly, but during times of religious revival, beliefs change rapidly. During the two-year Welsh Revival of 1904-5, roughly 6% of the adult population converted to Christianity, after decades of stable religiosity. This religious shock was temporary, with church membership returning to pre-Revival levels five years later. I report three main findings. First, church growth during the Revival was higher in areas with more crime and more mining industry. Second, comparing Wales with neighboring England, the Revival led to a reduction in aggregate crime by 15%. The crime reduction is concentrated among violent crime, and drunkenness, considered a major social ill at the time. Third, despite temporary effects of the Revival on church membership, effects on crime persist, suggesting an enduring shift in social norms. Collectively, these results provide support for Fogel’s theory of America’s Great Awakenings: social crisis predicts religious revival and revival brings social change…

Societies can ensure social order through laws and through norms. Laws deter bad behavior through the state-led threat of punishment. Norms deter bad behavior through the social costs of deviance. This paper presents evidence for the norms channel. The Welsh Revival of 1904-5 was a large but temporary religious shock, with 6% of the population over the age of 11 converting to Christianity in only two years. This religious shock shifted social norms, reduced violent and public drunkenness crimes in Wales. While the shock was temporary, these crime reductions endure until at least 1913. In contrast, a landmark piece of anti-drunkenness legislation, the Sunday Closing Act of 1881, had no impact on drunkenness crimes. In this case, religion-driven norms trump laws at ensuring social order. And since the Revival itself was larger where there was more crime and more structural transformation, my results together suggest that societies may self-correct, with societal breakdown eventually stymied by an endogenous cultural response. Nevertheless, my paper leaves two main questions unanswered. First, on the origins of revival: while religion resolves cultural tensions in the case of religious revival, can other non-religious movements play the same role? Could populism and nationalism be a parallel to religious revivals in certain societies? Second, on the consequences of revival: how general are the effects of revivals? While I find similar effects of the Welsh Revival of 1859, did the American Third Great Awakening of the late-1800s, the Azusa Street Revival of the early-1900s, the Hebrides Revival of 1949, and the Toronto Blessing of the 1990s have the same effects?