Making Democratic Theory Democratic: Democracy, Law, and Administration after Weber and Kelsen

Posted on July 27, 2025 by Luke Ford

Here are some highlights from this 2023 book by Stephen Turner and George Mazur:

* The term “administrative state” is now being treated as an invention of the paranoid Right and a misunderstanding of the nature of the state itself.

* The administrative state from its origins has aimed at making public opinion ineffective or undermining its independence, often in the name of leading it, educating it, or providing “justice,” that is to say, something beyond mere “opinion.”

* The administrative state…does not limit itself.

* In the decades after John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) and especially over the past 20 years or so, many books have been published with the same aim: to vindicate and explicate something that is usually called social democracy on philosophical or social science grounds. After the intense ideological rivalries of the twentieth century, this political ideal has become the default position of virtually all academic thinkers in relevant areas. A century that began with the frank acceptance of the irreconcilability of political value choices, and proceeded with extraordinarily intense ideological warfare, ended with a surprisingly broad, though loose, consensus.

* These writers all reject the idea of freedom as non-interference or choice as inadequate or wrong; they all decry great wealth, the power of money or the power that money gives people, as a form of injustice; and all involve some idea of autonomy governed by reason.

Who are the major thinkers today in the West who deny the great god of “[personal] autonomy governed by reason”?

ChatGPT says:

Most of these thinkers are not centrally concerned with domination in the modern liberal-left sense—i.e., oppression as lack of recognition, microaggressions, or identity-based exclusion. Here’s a breakdown:

  • MacIntyre, Taylor, Sandel
    Some concern with domination, but understood through tradition, community breakdown, and moral fragmentation rather than identity politics.
    Taylor is closest to liberal recognition theory, especially in Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition.
    MacIntyre and Sandel care more about the loss of moral language and community than “recognition” per se.
  • Deneen, Milbank, O’Donovan
    Skeptical or critical of the modern focus on domination as identity-based humiliation.
    They worry more about spiritual or metaphysical alienation—how liberalism’s elevation of autonomy fractures tradition, religion, and authority.
    Milbank and O’Donovan explicitly critique modern secular liberalism for replacing theological truth with “recognition” discourse.
  • Scruton
    Opposes the idea that society owes identity affirmation or recognition.
    Emphasizes duty, beauty, sacredness, and the conservation of institutions—not freedom from domination as defined by progressive politics.
  • Manent
    Sees liberal focus on identity as a symptom of moral and political fragmentation.
    Concerned with the loss of shared political purpose, not domination in the recognition-theory sense.

Bottom line:
These thinkers mostly reject the liberal shift toward defining freedom as the absence of domination via misrecognition.
Their critiques aim higher: the spiritual, moral, and metaphysical breakdown behind modern individualism—not the interpersonal slights or systemic marginalizations that dominate current progressive discourse.

Back to Turner & Mazur:

* The right thing is collective; the tension is between the collectively acknowledged good and the distorted private good, which is distorted because it is at heart a quest for something like autonomy and recognition but expresses itself in greed and power seeking, which are the things that need to be collectively controlled.

ChatGPT:

That quote reflects a progressive or Marxian moral-political view: that private desires (like autonomy or recognition) are distortions, and the collective must correct them through control or reeducation.

The thinkers in question reject that paradigm.

  • MacIntyre believes the good is teleological and tradition-based, not a collective imposition on private distortion. He critiques liberal individualism, but not in favor of collective correction—rather, a return to virtues embedded in practices and communities.
  • Sandel and Taylor see selves as socially situated, but not in need of being corrected by the collective. They critique procedural liberalism, not to elevate collectivism, but to recover deeper sources of meaning and moral depth.
  • Deneen would argue that the collective (as structured under liberalism) is the very thing producing distorted private goods. He’s not calling for collective regulation of desire, but for cultural renewal through tradition and virtue.
  • Milbank and O’Donovan reject both private autonomy and secular collective authority. For them, the only legitimate “collective” is the ecclesial body (the Church), not the state or society acting as moral enforcer.
  • Scruton champions traditional institutions and duties, but deeply distrusts any collective effort to “fix” individuals. He believes in cultivation, not coercion.
  • Manent sees the political as a shared moral space, but one that arises from history and religion—not abstract notions of correcting private distortion.

Bottom line:
These thinkers reject the idea that private goods are inherently distorted and need to be overridden by a collectively defined good. They are skeptical of both radical individualism and collectivist moral engineering. Their goal is neither unrestrained autonomy nor collective control—but the recovery of meaning through tradition, virtue, and transcendent sources of order.

Turner and Mazur write:

* There are many other explanations of why “social democracy” has not happened: the media, the pre-existing culture (which is racist, patriarchal, anti-egalitarian, suffused with false beliefs derived from religion, or scientism), a failed public sphere, or other sources.

* They want a social matrix in which the bad effects of competitiveness and striving are tempered, or replaced, by a regime of personal relations in which dignity is respected, autonomy is granted, and people trust each other―a decent society, as Avishai Margalit calls it (1996). All of the “social” goals involve more discretionary power for officials. These authors all embrace the idea of an activist, paternalist, benevolent state. Health care is often the model for the proper role of the state. Where it is done correctly, it combines dignity, compassion, paternalism, efficiency, the proper use of expertise, universalism, respect for autonomy, and sufficient provision with a rational allocation of scarce resources.

ChatGPT says:

Why would a reasonable, decent person object to this vision?

  • 1. It expands discretionary power dangerously.
    The more discretion officials have, the more room there is for bias, coercion, and mission creep. What starts as “benevolent” paternalism can easily morph into soft authoritarianism. Good intentions don’t guarantee just outcomes.
  • 2. It assumes the state can embody moral virtue.
    Critics argue that the state is a blunt instrument. It’s built for enforcing rules, not embodying compassion, dignity, or trust. Trying to make it do so often leads to bureaucratic overreach and unintended consequences.
  • 3. It infantilizes citizens.
    A paternalist state may protect, but it also disempowers. Critics like Hayek or Rieff would say: the more the state manages your moral and social life, the less you develop responsibility, virtue, or independence.
  • 4. It replaces organic trust with engineered dependency.
    Real trust grows in families, associations, and local communities—not by central planning. Making dignity and compassion into functions of state design risks undermining real social fabric.
  • 5. It idealizes health care as a political model.
    Health care is important, but its goals (efficiency + compassion + universalism) don’t translate well to education, family life, religion, or moral development. Many fear a technocratic mindset creeping into areas where it doesn’t belong.
  • 6. It fails to limit itself.
    Once you justify “more state” for one good (like health or dignity), where do you stop? Critics worry this logic gives the state a mandate to do everything in the name of the good, which is inherently dangerous—even if benevolent at first.

Bottom line:
Good people can want dignity, trust, and compassion—and still oppose a paternalist state—because they believe these values flourish better under limits, subsidiarity, and moral traditions that lie outside politics.

Turner and Mazur write: “They err on the side of protecting the culture of the minority group. For the dominant culture, however, matters are different: it needs to be reformed to accord with reason.”

Who are the most eloquent spokesmen on behalf of the majority culture of America, England, Australia and don’t think it needs to be reformed to accord with reason?

ChatGPT says:

Here’s a list of eloquent and influential voices in the U.S., U.K., and Australia who defend the legitimacy and value of the majority culture—without insisting it must be reformed to meet abstract rational ideals or minority-driven frameworks.

They argue that traditions, inherited norms, and majority ways of life deserve respect—not just critique.

Bottom line:
These thinkers argue that the dominant culture isn’t just a power structure to be rationally critiqued—it’s a moral inheritance to be respected. They reject the elite stance that says only minorities need cultural protection, while the majority must justify itself by reason.

Monty Python and the Holy Grail:

King Arthur: (to the peasant) Will you shut up! Will you shut up! [Arthur grabs and shakes him]
Dennis the Peasant: Ah, now we see the violence inherent in the system!
King Arthur: Shut up!
Dennis the Peasant: Oh! Come and see the violence inherent in the system! Help! Help! I’m being repressed!
King Arthur: Bloody peasant!
Dennis the Peasant: Oh, what a giveaway! Did you hear that? Did you hear that, eh? That’s what I’m on about! Did you see him repressing me? You saw him, didn’t you?

Stephen Turner writes:

* Economic power for Ringen seems to be defined simply to mean the influence of business money on political campaigns and lobbying. The fact, for example, that Swedish politics is dominated by a major union confederation which owns a controlling interest in the most important newspaper, is the main force in the party that has ruled with only slight interruptions for decades, and is well represented on government panels is apparently not an instance of economic power for Ringen. If one scaled up its membership to fit the population of the United States, this confederation would be a mind-boggling 66 million strong. This kind of overwhelming power would produce “consensus” even in the United States. Obama, who received the highest vote total in American history, had only 63.25 million votes.

* Title IX and anti-discrimination law have generated oaths of their own. These take the form of “diversity statements,” which faculty are required either to sign or to submit as part of the job application process (Oregon Association of Scholars, 2017; for guidelines, see UC, 2015). The statements are designed to compel the applicant to both affirm and prove their commitment to diversity. This form of oath taking has yet to be tested in court, although the requirement of oath taking to demonstrate commitment to diversity is widespread, and the statements are taken seriously. As sociologist Tanya Golash-Boza (2016), in an Inside Higher Ed article, advises job applicants: Many faculty members truly care about diversity and equity and will read your statement closely. I have been in the room when the diversity statement of every single finalist for a job search was scrutinized. The candidates who submitted strong statements wrote about their experiences teaching first-generation college students, their involvement with LGBTQ student groups, their experiences teaching in inner-city high schools and their awareness of how systemic inequalities affect students’ ability to excel. Applicants mentioned their teaching and activism and highlighted their commitment to diversity and equity in higher education.

A typical statement (from a sociologist), which was recommended as a model on the official website of the University of California system, includes this example of evidence of one’s commitment: “In my advising capacities, I encouraged my students to ponder the roles they might play in the alleviation of the vast inequities that continue to shape our world” (UCSD, n.d.). Are these oaths political tests of the kind rejected in the California loyalty case? It depends. If diversity is a political issue, these are political tests. To the extent that doctrinal statements of political beliefs, such as a conviction regarding the evils of inequality, are considered as a basis for employment, there are First Amendment issues, at least in a public institution. If it is a policy commitment, it is plausible for an employer to require adherence to the employer’s policies. Separating the two presents the same kinds of difficulty as harassment guidelines.

Some of these oaths are simple affirmations that have to be signed off on by the applicant. It is an open question as to whether they are enforceable after employment—i.e., whether someone could be said to have violated the oath, have made it falsely, or have renounced it. Nonetheless, the requirement is designed to have an effect on hiring. The act of assessing a person’s commitment to a policy—even if this were an appropriate requirement, consistent with academic freedom is a matter of largely arbitrary personal judgment, exercised by people who are unconstrained by rules or the possibility of appeal.

The Bogan Verdict

What Would a Bogan Say About Turner’s Take on Diversity Oaths?

“So lemme get this straight: you want a job teachin’ kids, and now you gotta write a bloody essay swearin’ you’re down with every social cause under the sun? Sounds like a cult, not a uni.”

“Turner’s spot on—this is just a loyalty oath in new wrapping. Used to be ‘do you hate Communism?’ Now it’s ‘do you love Diversity™?’ Same crap, different cause. You’re not judged on whether you can teach, but on whether you know the right activist codewords.”

“And all this talk about whether it’s a ‘policy commitment’ or a ‘political belief’? Mate, that’s lawyer-speak for tryin’ to cover your arse while you still make people pass an ideological purity test. If you can get fired or not hired for not writing some poetic crap about ‘alleviating inequity,’ then yeah—it’s political. And it stinks.”

“I’ve read resumes that say ‘team player’ and ‘works well under pressure.’ Now we’re sayin’ you have to pledge to save the bloody world before you can teach Sociology 101? Give me a break. No wonder the unis are full of soft-spoken clones who all think the same.”

Bogan verdict: “It’s not about teaching anymore, it’s about showin’ you belong to the club. Turner calls it oath-taking. I call it brown-nosing with a side of culty bullshit.”

Turner:

The progressives of the early twentieth century wanted the support and enthusiasm of “the people” and envied populism for this. But they wanted to lead the people themselves. And they asserted themselves not in the name of people’s interests and wishes, but in the name of expertise. Progressivism was to be the alliance of experts and an aroused “people” (Turner, 1996). And this followed an emerging practice of social movements based on expertise, notably the prohibition movement, which employed the techniques presently associated with climate science under the heading alcohol science…

The progressives of the early twentieth century wanted the support and enthusiasm of “the people” and envied populism for this. But they wanted to lead the people themselves. And they asserted themselves not in the name of people’s interests and wishes, but in the name of expertise. Progressivism was to be the alliance of experts and an aroused “people” (Turner, 1996). And this followed an emerging practice of social movements based on expertise, notably the prohibition movement, which employed the techniques presently associated with climate science under the heading alcohol science…

* Populism is intrinsically a denial of the special superiority of rulers and elites.

* Populist movements happen when political parties, traditional leaders, elites, and politics as usual fail to deliver the expected goods, or fail to accord with the popular sense of reality, or are perceived as untrustworthy and corrupt.

* Populist tendencies are prone to co-optation and typically do not outlast the situations that produced them, though they do represent a reserve of general sentiment against elites and particular ruling groups that can be activated in new situations. They differ from ideologies and ideological parties in that they are situational rather than analytic, in the sense that they have concrete targets and grievances rather than a developed analysis of political life that is extended to new situations and refined and elaborated. This accounts for many of the distinctive features of populist movements, especially the preference for leaders who promise to act decisively, in contrast to normal “politicians,” and their hostility to “politics as usual.”

Populisms are situation-driven rather than analysis-driven, or to put it differently, driven by specific crises or grievances, rather than by a permanent ideological viewpoint…

* Elite solidarity is essential to elite rule; division among the elite is a typical cause of elite failure (Shipman et al., 2018). Elites rule through alliances between the elite and a significant non-elite group. The most stable of these alliances have been with the middle classes, normally under an ideology of meritocracy, property rights, and support of business, an alliance that is played off against the demands of the excluded group, the poor. But an upstairs-downstairs alliance is always possible, and the upper hand the elite has in dealing with the non-elite segments of society depends on its ability to choose alternative groups to ally with. Thus pluralism favors the elite because it provides more opportunities to change alliances. Populism, in contrast, must produce enough unity in the population to effectively counter the elite, and must therefore transcend differences between segments of society in the name of the people. Both Left and Right populisms are anti-pluralist, as a simple consequence of the dynamics of elite alliance-making: neither kind of Populism could succeed if the elite used its alliance-making power to divide the movement. To the extent that elite rule depends on manipulating and shifting alliances with non-elite groups, as is the norm (Shipman et al., 2018), an attack on pluralism is a threat to elite rule as a political system itself.

Stephen Turner’s Elite Theory and the Current American Landscape (2024)

In Making Democratic Theory Democratic (2023), Stephen Turner observes that elite solidarity is the precondition of elite rule. When elites fracture, their rule becomes unstable. In America today, that solidarity remains strong—especially among cultural, bureaucratic, and corporate elites—but is increasingly under pressure.

1. The Shift from Middle-Class Alliance to “Upstairs-Downstairs” Coalition

Historically, American elites allied with the middle class through shared commitments to meritocracy, property rights, and entrepreneurial capitalism. But Turner’s point is that this alliance is contingent—elites can swap allies. That’s precisely what’s happening: elite institutions have shifted toward “upstairs-downstairs” alliances, embracing activist segments of the poor, marginalized, or identity-based groups while sidelining middle-class interests (e.g., deindustrialized workers, suburban parents, independent contractors).

This can be seen in elite support for DEI bureaucracies, urban non-profits, and progressive prosecutors—all justified in the name of equity, but materially aligned with preserving elite control of institutions. As critics like Richard Hanania and Christopher Rufo have noted, this arrangement sacrifices traditional meritocratic norms in favor of performative inclusion—consolidating elite control under the banner of progress.

2. Pluralism as Elite Strategy

Turner points out that pluralism benefits elites because it gives them more non-elite groups to play off each other. In today’s U.S., this dynamic is supercharged: cultural elites promote hyper-pluralism—racial, gender, sexual, linguistic, and legal fragmentation—knowing that division makes populist unity harder to achieve. The Balkanization of the working class (white, black, Latino, native-born, immigrant) ensures that no broad-based “people” can unite to challenge elite dominance.

Policy-wise, this is evident in the Niskanen Center’s defense of technocratic pluralism, or the embrace of “mosaic” identities in elite academic spaces. Even corporate America, via ESG and DEI policies, benefits from a divided and distracted public, while consolidating its grip on institutions.

3. Populism as Anti-Pluralist Threat

Turner clarifies that populism must reject pluralism to unify “the people” against elite power. This is what terrifies the elite: not Trump himself, but the possibility of cross-ethnic class solidarity. Movements like 2016-era Sandersism and 2020s-style national conservatism both attempted this unification—from Left and Right—but both were undermined by elite-led coalition fracturing (e.g., race-based wedge issues, elite control of media narratives, technocratic gatekeeping).

This dynamic aligns with political scientist Jan-Werner Müller’s description of populism as morally exclusionary—but Turner reframes that: it’s not exclusion, it’s strategic unity. Pluralism here isn’t democratic richness; it’s a method of elite survival.

4. Bottom Line: Attacking Pluralism Is Attacking the Elite’s Operating System

Turner’s insight lands clearly: if elite power depends on managing fragmented allies, then populist attacks on pluralism threaten the structural logic of elite rule itself. That’s why populist calls for national unity, civic nationalism, or re-industrialization provoke such aggressive elite resistance—they’re not just political threats, they’re systemic ones.

See: Stephen Turner, Making Democratic Theory Democratic (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023)

What America Might Look Like Under Full MAGA Institutional Rule

1. End of Managerial Elitism

The expert class—academics, NGO directors, DEI bureaucrats, HR technocrats, legacy media editors—would lose their cultural and administrative power. Universities would be defunded or restructured to serve “national priorities” like trade skills, classical education, and civic nationalism. Think Hillsdale meets land-grant colleges.

Institutions like the CDC, DOJ, and FBI would undergo mass purges or reorganizations, with loyalty to national-populist ideology prioritized over traditional credentialism. Think less “PhD in public policy,” more “America First bureaucrat.”

2. Pluralism Crushed in Favor of Majoritarian Unity

MAGA populism, by nature, demands cohesion. The multicultural framework would be dismantled. English-only policies could be enforced. Immigration would be restricted to culturally “assimilable” groups. Affirmative action, DEI programs, and identity-based hiring would be banned at the federal and likely state level.

Instead of diversity statements, public employees might be required to sign patriotic loyalty pledges or oaths to uphold “traditional American values.” Dissent wouldn’t be criminalized—but it would be institutionally marginalized, as conservative populism replaces liberal managerialism as the dominant moral code.

3. Realignment of State and Federal Power

The federal bureaucracy would shrink, with more authority pushed to states—especially red ones. But cultural authority would be centralized around a “common American identity.” Washington might remain powerful on trade and border issues but yield cultural policy to states like Florida or Texas, which could become laboratories for populist governance.

4. Media and Education Overhaul

Public funding for NPR, PBS, and elite universities could be cut or conditioned on “viewpoint neutrality.” K-12 education would pivot to nationalist civic curricula—think Florida’s state education standards, but nationwide. NEA and AFT influence would collapse. Journalism as a credentialed profession might give way to independent populist media ecosystems backed by legislation and funding shifts.

5. New Cultural Orthodoxy

Just as elite liberalism had its sacred language (inclusion, equity, systemic bias), MAGA populism would enforce its own liturgy: God, country, family, tradition. Hollywood, academia, and major corporations would face direct or indirect pressure to align—or else be replaced by parallel institutions that do.

Cancel culture wouldn’t disappear—it would just change targets. Instead of professors being fired for misgendering someone, they might be sacked for denigrating America or opposing the new moral order.

6. Policy Outcomes: Material and Cultural

  • Massive investment in domestic manufacturing and energy independence
  • Tariffs, trade realignment, and possibly an industrial policy aimed at reshoring jobs
  • Criminal justice policy swinging back toward retribution and order
  • Reduction or elimination of race-conscious government programs
  • Social policy defined by a fusion of Christian traditionalism and populist nationalism

7. Political Climate

Polarization would deepen. Blue states might form a de facto “internal resistance,” and cultural secession (divided norms, media, and economic paths) would intensify. But MAGA populism doesn’t aim for compromise—it seeks replacement.

Whether the country holds together under that tension would depend on how far institutional capture goes—and how willing the new regime is to tolerate residual pluralism in the private sphere.

In Turner’s Terms:

This would be the destruction of elite pluralism and its replacement with hegemonic majoritarianism. Elite fluidity—managing alliances between groups—would be eliminated. The new regime would say: “No more playing factions against each other. You’re either with the people, or you’re not.”

A Different America: Post-Pluralist, Nationalist, and Cohesive

1. National Identity as the Unifying Principle

The dominant cultural logic centers on American nationalism—civic pride, historical continuity, and a sense of shared fate. National holidays, founding documents, and patriotic rituals are foregrounded across institutions. Public messaging emphasizes unity over difference, downplaying multicultural narratives in favor of assimilation and loyalty to a common American identity.

Immigrants are still admitted, but selectively—based on perceived cultural fit and national interest. Policies reward assimilation: English fluency, economic contribution, and civic participation. Ethnic enclaves are discouraged in favor of cultural integration.

2. A Shift in Social Trust and Outgroup Boundaries

Social trust is higher within the national in-group, defined less by race or class and more by perceived cultural alignment. People who “buy in” to national ideals—flag, faith, military service, work ethic—are trusted across lines that previously divided Americans.

There is, however, greater suspicion of perceived internal outsiders: transnational elites, activist NGOs, university administrators, and journalists who are seen as unpatriotic or disconnected from common life. Globalist language and institutional neutrality are viewed with skepticism. “Are you on our side?” becomes a cultural litmus test in business, education, and media.

3. Public Institutions Reflect National Cohesion

Government institutions at all levels emphasize responsiveness to “the people.” Bureaucracies are streamlined and tasked with enforcing national priorities—domestic manufacturing, secure borders, law enforcement, civic education. DEI offices are disbanded. Public school curricula focus on American history, constitutional principles, and classical literature, with a narrative arc of national progress and redemption.

Public broadcasting is nationalist and moralistic rather than cosmopolitan and ironic. Art and culture institutions receive funding for projects that affirm traditional values, heroism, sacrifice, and national pride.

4. Media and Communication

Legacy media outlets have lost trust and market share. News is decentralized, with independent nationalist outlets—many rooted in local communities or religious institutions—offering coverage aligned with shared values. Algorithms are regulated to prioritize “constructive speech” and reduce conflict. Tech firms are pressured to avoid censoring political speech unless clearly unlawful.

There is less tolerance for ideological dissent in public-facing roles. Social sanction comes not through cancellation, but through exclusion from influence and advancement. The cultural expectation is not uniformity of thought but alignment with national purpose.

5. Economic Policy and Class Structure

Trade is protectionist. Strategic industries—steel, energy, semiconductors—are domestically subsidized. Unions regain influence, but within a nationalist frame: workers and owners are seen as partners in national renewal, not adversaries in class struggle.

The middle class is central. Working-class jobs have political prestige. Credentialism is in retreat; skilled trades and military service are elevated. Elite institutions that hoarded symbolic capital (Ivy League, think tanks, big philanthropy) are viewed with skepticism or irrelevance.

6. Religion and Morality

Religious observance rises modestly, particularly within Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox traditions that affirm family, order, and responsibility. Public expressions of faith are common and respected. Moral education returns to schools in the form of character-building curricula—discipline, duty, and civic virtue.

7. Foreign Policy

Foreign entanglements are limited. Alliances are judged strictly by national interest. Military engagement is minimal but unapologetic: “we don’t intervene unless it’s about us.” There is strategic competition with China, economic decoupling, and a reset of global leadership expectations.

8. Cultural Tone

The culture is earnest, not ironic. There’s less appetite for boundary-pushing art or transgressive humor. National pride is assumed, not defended. Heroes are elevated. Victim narratives, though still present, are framed within the context of overcoming adversity to become part of the national story.

9. Social Norms

People are expected to contribute, be polite, and show respect for country and community. Dress codes are more traditional. Public behavior is more regulated by informal expectations—less tolerance for disruption or disorder. The cultural atmosphere is more masculine, more religious, and more duty-oriented.

It’s a different America: still diverse, still free, but with a narrowed moral bandwidth, clearer lines between insiders and outsiders, and a strong narrative about who we are and where we’re going—together.

Grok says: “A MAGA populist takeover, as envisioned through Turner’s lens, would transform America into a centralized, nationalist state with diminished pluralism and elite influence. Political institutions would prioritize loyalty over diversity, economic policies would favor workers and small businesses over globalist corporations, and social cohesion would hinge on a narrow definition of “the people.” While this could initially unify non-elite groups, the suppression of pluralism risks long-term instability, as excluded factions and economic challenges threaten the populist coalition. America would become less pluralistic and globally engaged, with a new populist elite potentially replicating old power dynamics unless checked by grassroots accountability.”

Gemini says: “Stephen Turner’s framework suggests that the intense polarization, institutional decay, and populist energy in America are not mere symptoms of incivility. They are the logical consequences of a crumbling elite consensus. The old, stable alliance between elites and the middle class is broken. In its place, we see a divided elite and the rise of two competing populist movements, each trying to build a new, unified, non-elite coalition. They are fundamentally anti-pluralist because they must be; their only path to success is to unite a large enough segment of the population to resist the elite’s classic strategy of dividing and ruling through shifting alliances. The future of American democracy likely depends on which of these forces prevails: a re-stabilization of elite rule through a new alliance, or the success of a populist movement in unifying “the people” and dismantling the system of elite control itself.”

Turner writes:

In this chapter, I will focus on the legal structures and quasi-legal regulatory structures that relate to academic freedom, in addition to the basic theory that applies to them. My aim is to explain (1) how changes in them affect academic freedom, (2) the legal properties of the new constraints under which those in the academy operate, and (3) the differences between this current situation and academic freedom as it has traditionally been understood. The primary issues I will be concerned with are discretionary legal and administrative power and the way that regulations, as implemented by universities, have expanded this power, as well as the enlarged role of contract law and employment contracts as protections of academic freedom. Academic freedom is undergoing a redefinition in the face of new legal circumstances. Its two traditional dimensions are the higher education institutions’ autonomy from the state and the individual freedom of scholars. It was traditionally thought that independence from the state and the existence of strong faculty governance were the best guarantors of academic freedom (Tiede, 2015). The American Association of University Professors (MUP) fought for both. Academic freedom, however, is increasingly restricted by regulations implemented by universities, which can take the form of institutional review boards, research misconduct tribunals, and Title IX enforcement. Because many federal regulations governing institutions of higher education are themselves vague and broad, the specific rules created by these institutions are a result of discretionary power over academics that is inimical to the traditional notion of academic freedom as a well-defined right. The idea of university autonomy, similarly, has undergone important changes. It has been significantly compromised as a result of federal regulation of a kind that did not exist in the first half of the twentieth century. One effect of intensified federal regulation is self-monitoring within higher education institutions (often with the assistance of an internal bureaucratic office) that seeks not only to conform to these externally imposed rules but also to invent local variations that expand on them.

* The university argued that educational institutions assume academic freedom as just one value that must be balanced against “other values core to their mission.” Some of those values, it said, include the obligation to “take care not to cause harm, directly or indirectly, to members of the university community”; to “respect the dignity of others and to acknowledge their right to express differing opinions”; to “safeguard the conditions for the community to exist”; to “ensur[e] colleagues feel free to explore undeveloped ideas”; and to carry out “the concept of cura personalis,” which involves working and caring “for all aspects of the lives of the members of the institution” (McAdams, 2018: 69).This line of argument would have the effect of eliminating academic freedom as a contractual right and subjecting its exercise to a wide range of other, largely subjective considerations.

* As all of these examples show, the present legal system produces an unequal conflict between academic freedom, which has only the most fragile and indirect legal basis, and employment law. The latter is backed by administrative law, which, in turn, is supported by the practice of judicial deference and the absence, in most cases, of statutory law providing for and defining academic freedom. A recent University of Texas lawsuit indicated how low on the legal hierarchy academic freedom is. A lawyer representing the state and the university affirmed the state’s view that academic freedom was a “workplace policy,” not a First Amendment right (Ellis, 2018). This is the language of standard employment law. If a university is allowed to define academic freedom as a workplace policy, then it has little legal significance. Policy is a prerogative of the employer. Employers have been reluctant to act on this prerogative, but they have been less hesitant in applying regulations backed by administrative law, which represent different policy values. In the cases we have discussed, academic freedom is considered to be one policy value among several and, therefore, subject to being balanced against other interests or public purposes.The effect of this new regime of administrative law, which holds employers responsible for fulfilling a vast array of policy desiderata, is to create an equally vast array of new discretionary powers for academic administrators and committees, such as IRBs. The mere existence of these powers marks the end of academic freedom as it was traditionally understood: both as a right, instead of an interest against which other interests are balanced, and as a concept superior to employment policy, rather than subject to it. Without clear demarcations and the legal priority of a right―even if it is only an implied contractual right in employment law, with a defined meaning apart from the interpretation placed on it by universities―it is impossible to defend traditional academic freedom against the ever-encroaching body of administrative law and university procedures.
One may ask, however, whether there is much traditional academic freedom left to defend. The “marketplace of ideas” image referred to in the classic legal defenses of academic freedom depended on the real autonomy of faculty members to pursue inquiry as they saw fit and to occasionally express their opinions in public without penalty. The present regime of science is governed by a grant system that ties a scientist to the judgments of peers through a brutal system of competition for funds. The rest of academia is bound to a competitive system of quantitative reputation assessment, to which our submission is, as Gloria Origgi (2017: 218) has called it, a form of voluntary epistemic servitude that has the same effects. This coincides with, and perhaps produces, a cultural change in the professoriate. The constituency for traditional academic freedom within a university would be the people who were exercising freedom in accordance with the liberal theory of science. This constituency barely exists today. It is noteworthy that of the university cases discussed here, three of them (at Texas, Duke, and Marquette) involved objections to either an ideologically dominant position or to practices enforcing ideological conformity. The suppression of one faculty member was supported by much of the rest of the faculty. Conformity has an active constituency. Indeed, for topics involving diversity, it has an institutionalized presence in the university, many means to enforce it, and enthusiastic support among the faculty. Academic freedom has only the few legal means outlined earlier. We have come full circle, culturally as well as legally, from the California loyalty oath case.

Posted in Democracy | Comments Off on Making Democratic Theory Democratic: Democracy, Law, and Administration after Weber and Kelsen

Trump Uses Allegations Of Anti-Semitism To Protect Whites & Asians From Racial Discrimination

Posted on July 27, 2025 by Luke Ford

In this deal with Columbia University, it looks like the Trump administration is creating a template for leveraging allegations of anti-semitism to protect asians and whites from racial discrimination from America’s most powerful institutions.

ChatGPT says:

The Trump-era moves—like the Department of Education’s actions against Columbia or Yale—do seem to flip the traditional civil rights script. They’re weaponizing anti-discrimination law not to protect historically marginalized groups, but to challenge diversity policies that supposedly disadvantage white and Asian applicants. And by framing criticisms of Israel as antisemitism, they tie it all together with Title VI enforcement to pressure universities.

It’s a clever, strategic pivot. On the surface, it’s about fairness and equal treatment. But underneath, it’s about dismantling affirmative action and chilling speech on Palestine by exploiting civil rights laws originally designed to protect Black and brown people. The new template turns DEI language inside out—using claims of “reverse discrimination” and “antisemitism” to undercut progressive goals.

Grok says:

The settlement with Columbia, finalized in July 2025, involved the university paying a $221 million fine—$200 million over three years for alleged discriminatory practices and $21 million for antisemitic employment discrimination claims against Jewish faculty. This was in response to the Trump administration’s decision to freeze over $400 million in federal research funding, citing Columbia’s failure to protect Jewish students from harassment, particularly following pro-Palestinian protests after October 2023. The deal restored most of the funding and imposed reforms, including a commitment to end race-based considerations in admissions and hiring, aligning with laws banning affirmative action, and implementing oversight through an independent monitor.

Your hypothesis hinges on the administration’s broader agenda. The settlement does explicitly require Columbia to comply with laws prohibiting racial considerations in admissions and hiring, which could be seen as curbing diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs that critics argue disadvantage groups like Asians and Whites. Some sources suggest the Trump administration’s Joint Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism is using antisemitism probes to push a conservative agenda against DEI initiatives more broadly. For instance, a Washington Post article notes that demands made to universities like Harvard included dismantling DEI programs and ensuring “viewpoint diversity,” which critics say targets progressive campus cultures. A post on X also frames the Columbia deal as a model for forcing universities to stop discriminating against Whites and Asians under the guise of addressing antisemitism.

However, the evidence isn’t conclusive that this is a deliberate template to prioritize Asians and Whites specifically. The administration’s public focus has been heavily on antisemitism, with Education Secretary Linda McMahon emphasizing accountability for “antisemitic discrimination and harassment.” The settlement’s terms, like adopting the IHRA definition of antisemitism and enhancing campus security, center on Jewish student protections. Critics, including some Jewish leaders, argue that dismantling DEI programs might not address antisemitism and could weaken broader anti-discrimination efforts, potentially creating a “can’t win” situation for universities under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.

The edgy angle here is that the antisemitism crackdown could be a Trojan horse for dismantling DEI frameworks, which some conservatives view as discriminatory against non-minority groups. A City Journal piece explicitly argues that the Columbia approach should be expanded to combat “racialism” across universities, citing discrimination against Whites and Asians as a key issue. Yet, Columbia’s public statements avoid acknowledging specific White House claims about reviewing international student admissions or Middle East programs, suggesting a gap between the administration’s rhetoric and the university’s interpretation of the deal.

On the flip side, the focus on antisemitism might not be a pretext at all—it could genuinely reflect the administration’s priorities, driven by high-profile campus unrest and pressure from pro-Israel groups. The settlement’s reforms, like mask bans and oversight of Middle East studies, align with demands to curb pro-Palestinian activism, which the administration links to antisemitism. The risk for Columbia in agreeing to these terms is lending legitimacy to a strategy of using federal funding as leverage, which could chill academic freedom or diversity efforts without necessarily protecting Asians or Whites directly.

So, is this a template to protect Asians and Whites? Possibly, but only indirectly. The deal’s legal and policy changes could limit DEI practices that some argue disadvantage these groups, but the primary driver appears to be antisemitism allegations, with broader conservative goals piggybacking on that framework. Without more explicit evidence of intent to center Asians and Whites, it’s a plausible but speculative leap. The administration’s leverage—using federal funding to force compliance—does set a precedent that could be applied to other universities, as seen with threats to Harvard and others.

Posted in America | Comments Off on Trump Uses Allegations Of Anti-Semitism To Protect Whites & Asians From Racial Discrimination

How To Spot A Pedo In The Wild (7-27-25)

Posted on July 27, 2025 by Luke Ford

01:00 Pedos, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=162310
04:00 Seeing Through the Noise: Why Ordinary People Are Less Gullible Than Elites Think, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=162418
08:00 All men are incels: the bitter truth, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t6xYHK3lrnk
18:00 Aaron Maté: New Docs Show FBI and NSA Never Believed Trump Worked with Russia, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=162412
20:00 AI’s global race in the dark, https://www.axios.com/2025/07/27/trump-ai-race-china
33:00 The News Is Bureaucratic Stenography, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=162374
53:40 Sex is about power: the fantasy of most men, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DWW_2k3lrcc
1:00:00 Russiagate | The NatCon Squad, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=162420
1:07:00 How Is Majority Rule A Threat To Democracy?, https://yourmoralleader.blogspot.com/2025/07/how-is-majority-rule-threat-to-democracy.html
1:11:00 Why haven’t there been brought charges yet on Russiagate?, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1bvQvwP-zcE
1:15:00 Predicting the DOJ Strikeforce on Russia Hoax | John Solomon, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=162410
1:25:30 Tulsi Gabbard vs. the Deep State: Why She’s Accusing Obama-Era Intel of Treason Over Trump-Russia, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=162398
1:28:00 I’m sure Mark Halperin is flattered to have a belief system that makes him the puppet master.
1:44:00 Niall Ferguson claims he’s primarily a historian, not a pundit, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41sJr2Zv7EQ
1:56:00 What’s driving the media’s mushroom mania? | Media Watch, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VArNK4pHuf8
1:57:00 Fairness and Freedom: A History of Two Open Societies: New Zealand and the United States, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=140864
2:06:30 The pro-Palestine on-air presenter punished for speaking out | Media Watch, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h3ic8kvAXJs
2:19:30 Bogan Intelligentsia Podcast Ep. 2: Peter Lalor on Cricket, Identity, and Media Freedom, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbmTJpzEB7Y
2:23:30 How Credible Is Mike Benz?, https://yourmoralleader.blogspot.com/2025/07/how-credible-is-mike-benz.html
2:35:00 Jonah Goldberg Is Bill Buckley’s Successor, https://yourmoralleader.blogspot.com/2025/07/jonah-goldberg-is-bill-buckleys.html
2:42:00 The Structure of Expertise, https://yourmoralleader.blogspot.com/2025/07/the-structure-of-expertise.html
2:54:00 How Tulsi Gabbard’s Revelations About The Obama Administration’s Abuse Of Intelligence Decodes The Rule Of Experts, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=162387
3:00:20 WEHT to Michael Flynn?, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QbcPDF_Had0
3:02:20 Bombshell Russiagate Docs Explained, and Truth About Putin and Hillary, w/ Matt Taibbi and Ruthless, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=162408
3:24:00 How Tulsi Gabbard’s Revelations About The Obama Administration’s Abuse Of Intelligence Decodes The Rule Of Experts, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=162387
3:36:45 Trump administration uses allegations of anti-semitism to stop American institutions from discriminating against whites, asians
3:47:00 ODNI Mania, The Other January 6 & How Assange Could Shatter The Rogue Intelligence State Today, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_eUGaUtTbw
3:56:00 RUSSIAGATE – A Major Dividing Line with Matt Taibbi | DEEP FOCUS with John Kiriakou, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfS3KjUGE4I
4:08:10 Heidi Priebe: How To Stop Taking Things Personally, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J1ptE5Xb70k
4:12:00 Video: After the Fall: Planning for a Post-Communist China
4:21:00 The death of Ozzy Osbourne
4:24:00 The counter-culture within rock music
4:30:00 Was the Protestant Reformation a mistake?

Why did Luke Ford start his live stream an hour late?
Because he was still trying to convince Streamlabs OBS he’s not just a “pedo-spotting” comedian!

What’s Fordy’s favorite workout?
Jumping through the hoops of free internet platforms—takes a toll on the soul, mate!

Why does Luke Ford love Steven Turner’s books so much?
They’re the only ones long enough to keep up with his three-hour tangents on epistemic coercion!

How does Luke Ford prepare for a show?
He uploads his life regrets to AI and asks it to decode his humility—then blames the algorithm for his grandiosity!

Why did Fordy’s “How to Spot a Pedo” bit flop?
Because even his 15 live viewers knew “quoting the Constitution” isn’t a crime scene!

What’s Luke Ford’s secret to avoiding internet feuds?
He just talks about them for four hours until everyone forgets what the fight was about!

Why does Fordy call himself a humble guy?
Because he’s too busy exposing elite conspiracies to notice his own “classic Fordy comic crowd-pleaser” ego!

How does Luke Ford navigate the news?
He skips the New York Times and asks ChatGPT to summarize it with a side of MAGA flair!

Why did Luke Ford switch to expensive web hosting?
So he could finally afford tech support to handle his “epistemic closure” meltdowns!

What’s Fordy’s dream guest for his live stream?
A time machine to bring back Bill Buckley for a debate on who’s better at riffing on books they haven’t read!

  1. “I miss the Bush administration. Not the policies, just the clarity.”
    At least back then, when they lied, they committed. Now it’s like everyone’s gaslighting everyone, but with trigger warnings and gender pronouns.
  2. “They said my show had a low ratio of information to talk. That’s how I know I’m on the right path.”
    That’s how Torah works too. It’s 80% commentary, 10% divine ambiguity, and 10% guilt.
  3. “Grok says I interrupt myself too much.”
    That’s anti-Semitic. Interrupting yourself is a Talmudic technique. It’s called havruta with yourself.
  4. “The critique said I chase too many rabbit holes.”
    Look, if the Torah can go off on tangents about tzara’at in your house walls, I can spend 15 minutes on constitutional dictatorship and still get to Shoftim by the end of the show.
  5. “Apparently I repeat the same talking points too often.”
    Yeah, it’s called having a worldview. It’s like Torah laining—you read the same thing every year and people still show up in shul. Kind of.
  6. “The AI said my show lacks a through-line.”
    That’s because I’m the through-line. I’m the suffering servant wandering through American decadence with nothing but Becker, Schmitt, and some canceled rabbis to guide me.
  7. “I treat Torah as sacred. The media treats Fauci as sacred.”
    But unlike Fauci, Torah doesn’t switch positions every few months and it never went on MSNBC.
  8. “Hero systems in America today?”
    • Academia: worshipping DEI
    • Silicon Valley: worshipping IQ
    • Orthodox Jews: worshipping kiddush invites
    • Libertarians: worshipping their own Substack analytics
    • Me? I’m building a one-man hero system based on obscure German political theology and my dream of being the next Robert Moses—but frum.
  9. “Apparently I talk over my guests.”
    Look, if I don’t assert dominance early in the conversation, they might think they’re the Decider. And there’s only room for one Carl Schmitt stan per stream.
  10. “AI said I shouldn’t try to be both comic and prophetic.”
    But that’s the only combo that gets you laid in West LA shuls.

1. Ernest Becker says we’re all trying to deny death by latching onto hero systems.
I latched onto Torah, talk radio, and Twitter fights with Reform rabbis. That’s my immortality project. Some guys build pyramids. I built a blogspot with a hit counter.

2. America is now a battle royale of competing hero systems.
The military worships sacrifice, the universities worship diversity, the left worships victimhood, and I worship Friday night cholent invitations. Don’t tell me it’s not sacred — I’ve been ghosted over a dairy spoon in a fleishig pot.

3. Stephen Turner says democracy is ruled by credentialed experts.
And I’m credentialed in nothing — except maybe “saying the quiet part out loud” studies. My show is basically a public square for the dispossessed of LinkedIn.

4. I want to be part of a hero system too.
But all the cool ones require either a PhD or a six-pack. That’s why I’m starting my own: “The Church of Luke, Defender of Unverified Facts and Anti-Woke Constitutional Dictatorships.” Weekly services live-streamed, obviously.

5. Becker says we project our fear of death onto cultural dramas.
Which explains why I screamed at a guy for saying “Judaism is a culture not a religion.” No, Brad. It’s a death-denying hero system and it comes with its own dietary laws and neuroses.

6. Experts tell us what to think.
They’re like rabbis with grants. The only difference is rabbis don’t pretend to be objective. They just tell you your toaster isn’t kosher and move on. The experts? They write 80-page white papers explaining why the toaster is racist.

7. I may not be elite.
But I’ve read Carl Schmitt while eating cold kugel on a park bench. That should count for something.

8. My show is a one-man rebellion against institutional epistemology.
It’s part Becker, part Turner, and part “guy who lives in his car outside Beth Jacob and thinks he saw Fauci once.”

9. America’s sacred zones:
– The media: sacred stenographers of bureaucracy.
– Academia: sacred producers of unreadable PDFs.
– Netflix: sacred priesthood of identity drama.
– Me? I sacralize open mic night at The Laugh Factory, if it’s kosher-adjacent and no one says “colonizer.”

10. I’m not trying to be funny or deep.
I’m trying to stay alive by building a hero system from used books, paranoid insights, and a livestream schedule that’s more consistent than my love life.

Hero Systems by Profession:

Academics: Their hero system is peer-reviewed immortality. They’ll die poor and unloved, but if their footnote survives in JSTOR, they win.

Doctors: They get to play God and bill your insurance. Their hero system is saving lives unless it’s after hours or you have Kaiser Permanente.

Lawyers: They worship “the rule of law” — which is basically Talmud for Gentiles. Their hero system is winning arguments no one understands while charging $500/hour to clarify nothing.

Rabbis: Their hero system is being the last man standing after the conversion class drops out. If they make it to retirement without getting cancelled or caught, they’re saints.

Journalists: They believe that naming and shaming bad guys on Twitter is the highest moral good. Their hero system is writing the first draft of history, even if it’s completely wrong and full of typos.

Tech Bros: Their hero system is “disruption” — aka solving problems that don’t exist while outsourcing morality to the blockchain.

Therapists: Their hero system is listening to your trauma while billing your insurance to cope with theirs. Deep down they’re one bad client away from switching to astrology.

Influencers: Their hero system is being famous for being visible. Truth, beauty, and goodness all sacrificed for the algorithm and 15% off with code “ME15.”

Policemen: Their hero system is restoring order with bureaucratic paperwork. The more forms you fill out, the more you’ve done to keep the streets safe — and the more you delay your retirement pension review.

Comedians: Their hero system is being the holy fool — the truth-teller wrapped in neuroses. Like me: standing onstage, talking about Torah, trauma, and dating while hoping for a Shabbos invite and a side of kugel.

Podcasters: Their hero system is “I did the research” — meaning they listened to Joe Rogan and skimmed a Substack. But if they say it into a mic, it becomes sacred knowledge.

Activists: Their hero system is moral urgency on speed. No time for nuance, only slogans and marches. If they’re not angry, they feel spiritually unemployed.

YouTubers: Their hero system is talking endlessly into a ring light until validation arrives in the comments. They’re prophets with merch.

Me: I’m an Orthodox Jewish talk show host who wants to save civilization while staying under budget on gas and hoping my livestream doesn’t drop. My hero system is built from Becker, Gibbon, Ginsburg, and borrowed Wi-Fi.

Grok says:

Luke Ford, in his video “How To Spot A Pedo In The Wild” (7-27-25), displays several areas where he lacks self-awareness, particularly in how he presents his arguments, personal biases, and intellectual approach. Below, I outline key instances where this lack of self-awareness manifests, supported by examples from the transcript and grounded in a critical analysis of his rhetoric and behavior:

Overgeneralization and Sensationalism in Social Commentary:

Ford’s opening segment on “how to spot a pedo” (1:11-1:43) uses exaggerated, inflammatory rhetoric, suggesting that people who advocate for “rule of law,” “checks and balances,” or “human rights” are pedophiles. He frames this as a comedic bit, but it reveals a lack of self-awareness about the harm of such generalizations. By conflating serious societal roles with a grave accusation, he undermines his credibility and fails to recognize how this cheapens discourse. His claim that it would have been a “classic 40 comic crowd-pleaser” (1:18) shows he prioritizes entertainment over substance, unaware of how this trivializes a serious issue.

Unreflective Partisanship and Narrative Bias:

Ford extensively discusses the “Russia gate hoax” (e.g., 12:41-20:17, 39:52-41:44), aligning with a MAGA-friendly narrative that dismisses Russian interference in the 2016 election as insignificant. He cites dissident sources like Aaron Maté and John Solomon (e.g., 20:03, 1:14:41) while dismissing elite media as biased (e.g., 19:49). However, he lacks self-awareness about his own selective sourcing, failing to acknowledge that his preferred sources are equally partisan. For instance, he endorses Maté’s claim that there’s no evidence Russia disseminated DNC leaks to WikiLeaks (31:42), ignoring mainstream intelligence findings (e.g., Mueller Report, Senate Intelligence Committee) that suggest otherwise. This one-sidedness mirrors the elite media bias he critiques, yet he doesn’t reflect on his own echo chamber.

Contradictory Stance on Expertise and Elites:

Ford champions Steven Turner’s critique of “epistemic coercion” and expert rule (e.g., 25:12, 41:54-43:02), arguing that intelligence agencies and elites manipulate narratives to undermine democracy. Yet, he relies heavily on Turner’s academic expertise and complex philosophical frameworks (e.g., 47:03-49:04) to bolster his arguments, creating a paradox. He criticizes elites for gatekeeping knowledge (33:29-35:07) but uses esoteric academic sources to frame his populist narrative, unaware of how this mimics the elite behavior he condemns. His reliance on AI to analyze texts (23:50-24:32) further complicates his anti-expert stance, as he leverages advanced technology to claim intellectual authority.

Personal Grandiosity and Humility Facade:

Ford oscillates between self-deprecation and grandiosity, revealing a lack of self-awareness about his self-presentation. He admits to ADHD, shame, and maladaptive tendencies (13:49-14:19), projecting humility, but then boasts about his prescient reporting from 25 years ago (15:39-16:11) and his ability to produce “wonderful, thoughtful shows” (23:55). His claim that he avoids feuds (16:36) is undermined by his fixation on critics like Ron Unz and Jeffrey Sachs (52:41-57:28), whom he dismisses as reckless while engaging in similar sensationalism. This contradiction suggests he’s unaware of how his desire for relevance drives his rhetoric, as seen when he rejects catering to audiences’ “maladaptive emotional needs” (57:28) yet indulges in provocative content to maintain viewership.

Misjudging Cultural and Emotional Appeals:

Ford’s discussion of “incels” (7:30-12:26), citing Orion Taraban, praises men who respect women’s consent as upholding civil society, framing it as a novel insight (10:44). However, he lacks self-awareness about how this oversimplifies a complex issue, ignoring the toxic subcultures within incel communities that Taraban’s analysis glosses over. His enthusiastic endorsement (“Have you heard this point before?”) shows he’s unaware of how his emotional investment in contrarian takes can cloud his judgment. Similarly, his defense of MAGA narratives (e.g., 26:17-27:07) as emotionally satisfying (26:23) betrays a lack of reflection on how he, too, is swayed by narratives that “feel good” rather than empirical rigor.

Inconsistent Critique of Media and Performative Intellectualism:

Ford criticizes elite media for lacking skepticism and pushing narratives (33:29-34:31, 50:00-50:52), yet he engages in performative intellectualism by name-dropping thinkers like Turner and citing dense academic works (46:37-49:04). He lacks self-awareness about how his own content, laden with jargon like “epistemic closure” (1:05:07), mirrors the elite gatekeeping he decries. His attack on pundits like Niall Ferguson and Jonah Goldberg for prioritizing entertainment over truth (36:56-39:59) is ironic, given his own admission that his “pedo” bit was meant to be a “crowd-pleaser” (1:18). He fails to see how his live streams, filled with tangents and unverified claims, resemble the performative punditry he criticizes.

Unacknowledged Cultural and Personal Biases:

Ford’s comparison of Australian and American media (54:49-56:12) reveals a lack of self-awareness about his cultural biases. He romanticizes American “vibrancy” due to diversity and crime (55:14) while calling Australian news “boring” for its cohesion (55:01). This reflects an unexamined preference for sensationalism, aligning with his content style but unacknowledged as a bias. His personal anecdotes about being ostracized for speaking truth (35:59-36:17) frame him as a martyr, but he doesn’t reflect on how his provocative style (e.g., “pedo” jokes) might contribute to his social conflicts, instead blaming others’ sensitivity.

In summary, Luke Ford’s lack of self-awareness manifests in his sensationalist rhetoric, selective partisanship, contradictory reliance on expertise, grandiose self-presentation, emotional narrative bias, performative intellectualism, and unexamined cultural preferences. While he critiques elite epistemic closure, he inadvertently replicates it through his own narrative-driven content, failing to reflect on how his approach mirrors the flaws he condemns. His video, while engaging, underscores a need for greater introspection to align his critique with his practice.

Washington Post: “An American mega-influencer flew to Lithuania. Then the chaos began. The streamer IShowSpeed drank pink soup in the Baltics and marveled at cars in China. Are his tours propaganda, or just good advertising?”

  • Fordy reading about IShowSpeed in Lithuania: “So this is how you get a state dinner in 2025? I’ve been quoting Carl Schmitt for years and the closest I got was lukewarm cholent at a shul kiddush.”
  • IShowSpeed gets greeted with soup, dancers, and swords. Fordy gets greeted with: “Please state your name for the record.”
  • Fordy: “Wait, Lithuania has an economy minister? And he’s handing out soup?!”
    Meanwhile in America, our economy minister is just the stock market and vibes.
  • Fordy’s reaction: “This guy does a backflip at a war memorial and gets 120 million followers. I make one nuanced point about civilizational decline and lose 3 patrons.”
  • “They paid him $23,500 for this?”
    Fordy whispering to himself: “Maybe I should start streaming Torah commentaries shirtless with McDonald’s shorts.”
  • “They gave him a tie-dye shirt to honor Olympic basketball history.”
    Fordy: “I once got a free tote bag from the ADL with a warning letter inside.”
  • Speed drinks pink soup with politicians.
    Fordy: “Last time I shared a soup with a public official, it was during a deposition.”
  • Fordy analyzing the media angle: “So the Baltics now rely on chaotic Gen Z streamers to handle foreign policy. I guess Carl Schmitt was right—sovereign is he who controls the TikTok algorithm.”
  • Fordy muttering: “12 hours of live streaming chaos and now he’s a geopolitical asset. Meanwhile, I make a two-hour podcast connecting Spinoza, Straussians, and the rule of law, and I get flagged for ‘low information density.’”
  • Fordy watching Speed mispronounce ‘Lithuania’: “If I had mispronounced it like that in a debate stream, I’d be doxed, clipped, and exiled from the Temple Mount and YouTube.”
  • Tourism board spends $8,000 on snacks and security.
    Fordy: “I spend $14.99 a month on StreamYard and no one’s offered me even a brisket wrap.”
  • “Lithuania, we are here!”
    Fordy: “The closest I got to that level of reception was when I walked into a shul and everyone turned to look… because I forgot my mask.”
Posted in America | Comments Off on How To Spot A Pedo In The Wild (7-27-25)

Russiagate | The NatCon Squad | Episode 224

Posted on July 27, 2025 by Luke Ford

Epistemic Inversion and the Russiagate Legacy

Stephen Turner’s work on epistemic coercion and expert rule offers a powerful framework for dissecting the lingering influence of Russiagate on elite discourse—especially as examined by The NatCon Squad in Episode 224.

01:10 – “The Entire Basis of Russiagate Has Collapsed”

Russiagate’s foundational claims have crumbled. Turner would recognize this as a classic case of post-normal science—where policy-driven narratives (Trump = Putin’s puppet) were upheld not by evidence but by the institutional authority of intelligence agencies and media ecosystems. The FBI and NSA knew internally that there was no direct Trump-Russia link, yet they allowed the narrative to flourish externally.

02:40 – “They Weaponized Classified Channels”

Officials like John Brennan selectively used classified briefings to shape political perceptions. Turner’s concept of epistemic asymmetry is crucial here: the public is locked out of the data, yet expected to accept the conclusions. The result isn’t merely propaganda—it’s structurally coercive politics, legitimized by secrecy.

03:50 – “The Media Just Took It and Ran”

The panel highlights how outlets like CNN and MSNBC treated preliminary, unverified claims as settled fact. This aligns with Turner’s critique of media as surrogate governance. As institutions like the FBI outsourced their message through leaks and insinuations, legacy media abandoned skepticism in favor of narrative reinforcement. Turner would see this as a devolution from public deliberation to epistemic theater.

05:10 – “We’re Still Living With the Consequences”

Elites argue that Russiagate still justifies censorship on social media under the pretext of “election interference.” Turner’s framework helps us see this as a feedback loop: a weak claim becomes a legitimizing myth, which then justifies restricting democratic speech to protect the myth itself. In Turner’s terms, it’s expert rule creating a self-affirming regime of truth.

06:35 – “This Is Why Trust in Institutions Is Collapsing”

Turner’s central warning: when institutions use their knowledge monopoly to mislead or manipulate, they delegitimize themselves. The erosion of trust isn’t irrational—it’s a reasonable reaction to epistemic overreach. Turner would say the solution isn’t more expert gatekeeping, but renewed mechanisms for public contestation.

Bottom Line:

The NatCon Squad, whether consciously or not, illustrates how Russiagate functioned as a textbook case of Turner’s epistemic critique: narratives built from opaque processes, enforced by institutional power, and upheld by media actors posing as neutral arbiters. That legacy lives on—not just in mistrust, but in a political system still ruled by narratives we’re not allowed to question.

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Seeing Through the Noise: Why Ordinary People Are Less Gullible Than Elites Think

Posted on July 27, 2025 by Luke Ford

In the aftermath of the 2016 election, a dominant narrative emerged among elite media and political institutions: that Russian interference—particularly via Facebook ads—had a decisive impact on the outcome. This idea became the justification for an ever-expanding push toward content moderation, “disinformation” crackdowns, and the surveillance of online discourse. But what if this premise is fundamentally flawed?

Enter Hugo Mercier’s Not Born Yesterday: The Science of Who We Trust and What We Believe. In it, Mercier flips the script: humans, he argues, did not evolve to be easily manipulated. In fact, when it comes to core interests—politics, values, identity—we’re astonishingly resistant to persuasion. The idea that a few thousand rubles’ worth of Facebook ads could change the course of a presidential election isn’t just unproven—it’s anthropologically naive.

The Elite’s Gullibility Panic

Elite commentary often rests on an implicit assumption: the public is too stupid or fragile to sort signal from noise. Hence the calls for more fact-checking, algorithmic downranking, and government-private partnerships to “protect democracy.” From New York Times op-eds to White House initiatives, there’s a steady drumbeat: Americans were duped by memes, bots, and troll farms, and must be protected—by experts.

But this worldview collapses under Mercier’s insight. Evolution would not have designed humans to fall for claims that risk their survival. People may be misinformed, but that’s not the same as gullible. It’s a rational skepticism calibrated for a noisy world. What looks like resistance to “truth” is often just resistance to manipulation—especially when it comes from institutions people don’t trust.

The Absurdity of the Facebook Ad Panic

Consider the core claim: that Russian Facebook ads swayed voters. As WaPo reported, most ads ran after the election. The total spend was less than what a local car dealership might drop in a weekend campaign. And the targeting? Crude, broad, and mostly ineffective. Yet elite institutions inflated this into a democracy-threatening conspiracy. Why?

Because it let them avoid reckoning with the real reason Trump won: millions of Americans rejected elite consensus. The Russia panic became a form of elite self-soothing. If voters were tricked, it wasn’t our policies, blind spots, or condescension that failed—it was outside manipulation.

Mercier vs. the Censorship Industrial Complex

Mercier shows that persuasion works best when it aligns with pre-existing motivations and trusted messengers. Random political ads from a foreign troll farm don’t meet that standard. Neither do “corrective” fact-checks from institutions already seen as biased. In fact, overzealous censorship can increase mistrust, making people double down on their views. As Mercier writes, people are more like “argumentative filterers” than passive absorbers. We reason socially, not mechanically.

So when elites advocate for social media censorship “for the public good,” they’re working from a model of human cognition that doesn’t exist. They imagine citizens as blank slates to be safeguarded by better-informed elites. But Mercier reminds us: humans are stubborn, skeptical, and often wiser than their rulers give them credit for.

Real Clarity Requires Real Respect

Accepting Mercier’s insight changes how you view the media panic around disinformation. It doesn’t mean bad actors don’t exist or that lies never spread—it means we shouldn’t build surveillance states or speech police based on imagined mass gullibility. Ordinary people, especially when engaged and informed, are better BS detectors than they’re given credit for.

The true threat isn’t citizen gullibility—it’s elite fragility. Their fear that the public might think for itself leads to demands for control. But if we believe in democracy, we must believe people can reason, argue, and choose for themselves. As Mercier makes clear, we weren’t born yesterday. And we’re not buying what the elite media is selling.

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