Luke Ford

Some people can’t handle having brilliant friends because the IQ disparity is too painful for the comparatively dim. I hope I’m not like that. I want to believe that I am at ease with my brilliant and successful friends.

I go through life feeling like most people I know are smarter and more successful than I am.

I want to believe that I am below average in envy. I don’t want to lash out from a place of pettiness.

Please tell me this blog post is not petty.

Every time I’ve taken an online IQ test, I’ve never scored above 125.

By comparison, I suspect that my brilliant philosopher friend Nathan Cofnas is north of 140 IQ (just like Dennis Prager). My father tested at a 137 IQ.

When Nathan Cofnas tackles a topic, he usually does such a thorough job that I have nothing to add.

This time I have something to say because we’re not catching him at his best.

The best tennis I’ve ever played was against tennis players far better than me.

I’ve never shown athletic prowess. Only on the rarest of occasions has a girl I liked watched me play a sport, and the only one who stuck around for longer than two minutes was the woman who took my virginity and perhaps felt obliged.

I have a painful admission — I’m thirstier for validation than is good for me due to my lack of success and credentials. The self-made man usually comes with weaknesses that are readily apparent in my words and in my life.

Grok says:

The self-made man typically builds wealth, status, or success through entrepreneurial grit, resourcefulness, and determination, often without relying on inherited advantages or formal systems.

Overconfidence and Ego: Success can breed a belief in their own infallibility, leading to risky decisions or dismissal of advice. They may overestimate their ability to handle unfamiliar domains.

Difficulty Delegating: Having built their success independently, they often struggle to trust others with key responsibilities, leading to burnout or micromanagement.

Limited Formal Education or Systems Thinking: While practical and street-smart, they may lack exposure to structured frameworks or academic rigor, which can hinder strategic planning or scalability in complex environments.

Risk of Tunnel Vision: Their focus on immediate, tangible results can make them overlook long-term trends, ethical considerations, or broader societal impacts.

Isolation or Weak Networks: Many self-made individuals prioritize work over relationships, resulting in limited access to diverse perspectives or influential networks that could amplify their success.

Weaknesses of the Self-Taught Man

The self-taught man acquires knowledge and skills independently, often outside formal education systems, through books, online resources, or trial and error.

Knowledge Gaps: Without a structured curriculum, they may miss foundational concepts or advanced topics, leading to uneven expertise or blind spots in their field.

Lack of Feedback or Mentorship: Self-teaching often lacks external validation or critique, which can result in unchecked errors, bad habits, or overconfidence in flawed methods.

Inefficient Learning Paths: They may spend excessive time on less relevant material or struggle to prioritize what’s most valuable, slowing their progress compared to guided education.

Difficulty with Collaboration: Accustomed to solitary learning, they may struggle to work in teams or adapt to environments requiring formal credentials or standardized processes.

Imposter Syndrome or Lack of Credibility: Without formal qualifications, they may face self-doubt or external skepticism, which can undermine their confidence or opportunities in professional settings.

Shared Weaknesses

Resistance to Authority or Structure: Both types often value independence, which can make them dismissive of established systems, rules, or expertise, sometimes to their detriment.

Burnout Risk: Their relentless drive and self-reliance can lead to overwork, neglecting personal health or relationships.

Confirmation Bias: Without diverse input, they may cling to self-reinforcing beliefs or strategies, missing alternative approaches.

Context and Variation

These weaknesses aren’t universal and depend on the individual’s personality, environment, and adaptability. For example, a self-made entrepreneur in tech might struggle with delegation but excel at networking, while a self-taught programmer might master collaboration but face imposter syndrome in corporate settings. Both can overcome these weaknesses through deliberate self-awareness, seeking mentorship, or supplementing their skills with formal or informal learning.

The quality that bugs me the most about pundits and public intellectuals is that their every pronouncement pushes for their own self-advancement.

I don’t want to be like that. Why do I hate that stuff? Because I see it in my own words all too often and it embarrasses me.

Like my father, I often sound supremely confident when I pronounce on things I know nothing about.

If I have anything useful to say here, it is largely due to the excellence of my subject — the arguments of Nathan Cofnas.

I am but a simple Jew from Cooranbong. Look mate, I come from the land of the uncircumsized. I am dust and ashes. I am a humble servant of the truth. If God wants to channel divine truth through my flawed vessel, who am I to say no? If G-d tells me to marry a hooker, as he instructed the prophet Hosea, who am I to say no?

L-rd, if it be Thy will, please make me a doormat for other people to brush their shoes on. Make me the speck of dirt that the universe revolves around. I don’t mind. I’m just a vessel. It’s not about me. Glory to G-d.

Here I stand. I can do no other. So help me G-d.

The children are our future.

I’m all out of love.

Cofnas writes on Substack:

On April 17, researchers led by Nikku Madhusudhan at the University of Cambridge announced that they had detected dimethyl sulfide in the atmosphere of K2-18b, an exoplanet 120 light-years from Earth. On our planet, dimethyl sulfide is only produced by living organisms. It is emitted in large quantities by certain species of algae, and gives the ocean its special smell. The presence of this chemical on K2-18b might be the strongest evidence ever recorded for alien life.

Candace Owens is one of the most popular podcasters in America. On April 17, she also had an announcement to make. She did her own research on astronomy and concluded that the moon landing was “fake and gay.” She told her millions of followers: “You need to learn the history of NASA, of the Apollo programs, which were a cult and satanic….They just wanted people to believe in scientific advancement.” Owens has come to similarly unorthodox conclusions on many topics including WWII, the history of communism, and, of course, Jews and Israel.

Obviously, Candace Owens should have free speech to express her opinions. At the same time, a healthy society needs mechanisms to ensure that people like her don’t have an outsize cultural influence. When it comes to astronomy, for example, the voice of Madhusudhan, not Owens, is the one that should be amplified. In some ways it is. Madhusudhan is a professor at Cambridge, publishes his views in peer-reviewed astronomy journals, and gets covered in the New York Times. Twenty years ago, that’s all that would have mattered. But now, Owens, Joe Rogan, Bret Weinstein, or Russell Brand can go on Spotify, YouTube, or Twitter and reach a larger audience than the New York Times. They might even swing elections. Rogan & Co.’s support for Trump may have tipped the balance in his favor.

People who don’t trust “experts” now look to podcasters and other alt-media figures—many of whom (including Rogan and Brand) are comedians—to decide what to believe about everything from WWII to vaccines to Ukraine to tariffs. The result has been a proliferation of ignorance with disastrous consequences for our culture and public policy.

There’s a great essay on these topics inside of Nathan Cofnas waiting to come out. This isn’t it but it makes a modest contribution to stimulating a conversation among those tiny number of people who decide what is knowledge.

Knowledge, and the winning narrative, are not decided by popularity but by power. A tiny number of people in every area of knowledge decide what is knowledge. If you don’t reference the people with power in an area, you don’t join the elite conversation that decides what is knowledge. Elites have a lingo. If you don’t use their lingo, and if you don’t cite their work, you can’t join their conversation about what is knowledge.

Donald Trump is the most powerful man on earth, but he has been losing the narrative war over the past two months because his message has received universal contempt by those who decide what is knowledge. Trump’s representatives on the tariff war, such as Scott Bessent and Stephen Miran, have done an uneven job at representing Trump’s tariffs to the elite. On Liberation Day, Trump’s tariffs received withering universal contempt from elites. Now the elite reaction to Trump’s tariffs is more nuanced. The conversation has shifted, as I noted two weeks ago, from “tariffs bad” to “how to implement tariffs effectively.”

We are wired by evolution to want the esteem of the herd, but the esteem of the herd is not always correlated with excellence.

Crap has always received a wider audience than quality thought. People on average have average intelligence and they rarely love quality cognitive productions.

I’ve never heard of a quality thinker who descended into nonsensical thought because of podcasts.

Brilliant people sometimes watch porn, but they rarely change the character of their day job to match pornography.

Brilliant people sometimes take drugs, but they rarely hang out with their drug dealer.

Brilliant people sometimes bang hookers but they rarely introduce them to their peers.

Brilliant people have their guilty pleasures, but they rarely make these pleasures their primary pursuit in life.

Idiocy usually attracts idiots and quality attracts quality.

There are exceptions. As Saul Lieberman said, “Jewish mysticism is nonsense, but the study of nonsense is scholarship.”

Has there ever been a time when low brow culture attracted a smaller audience than high brow culture?

People who don’t trust “experts” still choose them when it is in their demonstrable vital interest such as when they have a pressing medical, legal, or accounting problem. Alt-media consumers want the best pilots and air traffic control system for their planes. They want the best engineers for their buildings and bridges.

You might say that people should want an expert theologian (or some other expert) because he is vital to their soul, but this is not a demonstrable argument in this life.

When average IQ people want entertainment, we shouldn’t be shocked when they go low in their choices. More people will watch porn than read great books.

People are hard to fool when it comes to their vital interests, such as where they live. Even those with an 80 IQ recognize the differences between a nice neighborhood and a dangerous one. People usually choose to live in the best possible place congruent with their interests.

On the other hand, people are not incentivized to think deeply about world events including politics and economics, because they have next to no influence in these realms. They have no incentive for thinking clearly about matters not vital to their survival.

I love trying to place people in their proper genre because once you do that, they rarely disappoint you.

It is an error to have the same expectations for Candace Owens as you do for Nikku Madhusudhan. Joe Rogan, Bret Weinstein, Stephen Miran, and Russell Brand operate in different genres and it is a mistake to have identical expectations for each of them.

Nobody tunes into Owens, Rogan, Weinstein and Brand as an act of optimizing for truth while otherwise thriving in life. If you think that Joe Rogan and Candace Owens are great sources of truth, you’re a loser. If you fall for some guru such as Dennis Prager, Jordan Peterson, or Tony Robbins, it’s because you are losing at some vital part of life that you think this guru can fix.

You shouldn’t expect a game of cricket to operate like basketball, and you shouldn’t judge a rabbinic sermon by the standard of stand-up comedy. You don’t judge the quality of your tax return by the same standard you use to select a show on Netflix before falling asleep.

Ben Shapiro became successful by talking online at maximum speed while taking the most conservative positions possible. It would be silly to judge him on the same standards of academic rigor that we use to judge Nikku Madhusudhan. Ben Shapiro has published many books but zero works of scholarship. Don’t judge him on scholarship just as you shouldn’t judge a pop song by the standards of great classical music.

A silly little love song has its own beauty within its own genre. It’s not bad for being a silly little love song. A podcast for a mass audience with an average IQ of 100 is not bad for failing to be as sophisticated as a Nathan Cofnas interview of law professor Amy Wax.

Sometimes great thinkers give up on producing great work because they can no longer do it (sometimes due to cognitive decline), or because the rewards of turning out nonsense are irresistible. Isaac Newton, for example, devoted much of his adult life to nonsense (the music of the spheres and religious speculation) because it gave him some internal reward that is hard to fathom in our secular age. Dennis Prager is brilliant (you can tell by how quick he is on his feet, reaction times correlate with IQ), but he has chosen to use his brilliance much of the time to bamboozle people.

I am not as smart as successful people, but I sometimes have something useful to add due to a combination of talent, experience and situation.

Sometimes the boss is the boss, sometimes the janitor is the boss, but always the situation (ala the event) is the boss. Here’s a bloke in Greenland who’s become an unlikely political influencer due to circumstance. NYT: “Trump’s No. 1 Fan in Greenland: A Bricklayer Turned Political Player”

Every dog has his day (people have sometimes remarked that I give off a stray dog vibe who gets collected by saviors such as Dennis Prager and Cathy Seipp and various cults) though the smarter dogs have more dominant days than the dumber dogs.

Statistician Andrew Gelman wrote September 12, 2012:

[A]cademia has what might be called the John Yoo line: the point at which nothing you write gets taken seriously, and so you might as well become a hack because you have no scholarly reputation remaining.

John Yoo, of course, became a hack because, I assume, he had nothing left to lose. In contrast, historian Niall Ferguson has reportedly been moved to hackery because he has so much to gain.

We did not evolve to be gullible when it concerns our vital interests. We can be gullible with regard to what we believe about the topics Candace Owens talks about without jeopardizing our survival. Having accurate beliefs about the accomplishments of NASA or the relative quality of Tolstoy vs Dostoevsky vs Batman comics doesn’t affect our evolutionary fitness.

Grok says:

Alt-media’s rise isn’t just blind ignorance; it reflects real failures by experts and institutions. When “experts” seem divided or when their predictions (e.g., post-2018 tariff impacts) don’t fully materialize, trust erodes. Add in academic jargon or perceived elitism, and it’s no shock people turn to Rogan’s plain talk or Brand’s outsider vibe. These figures fill a gap, offering explanations that feel intuitive, even if they’re thin on evidence.

The “disastrous consequences” Cofnas mentions depend on the lens. Misinformed trade views could lead to bad policy—like tariffs hiking consumer prices without delivering promised jobs. But alt-media can also amplify valid critiques, like how free trade hollowed out manufacturing towns, a point economists sometimes downplayed. The Ukraine conflict, another topic Cofnas cites, shows similar dynamics: podcasters might oversimplify or push conspiracies, but they also challenge mainstream narratives that gloss over NATO’s role or sanctions’ blowback.

The danger Cofnas sees isn’t just ignorance but the loss of a shared evidence-based framework. Yet dismissing alt-media wholesale ignores why people flock there: experts haven’t always earned trust, and comedians often connect better emotionally.

We did not evolve to be gullible when it concerns our survival. Nobody thoughtful is rotting their brain listening to Candace Owens, Joe Rogan, Bret Weinstein and Russell Brand. People who have lousy epistemics turn to people like Owens and Rogan to meet their needs for comfort or diversion. I’m unaware of any evidence that the podcast bros swung the election to Trump or created disasters for our culture and public policy. Where is the evidence that the podcast bros have proliferated ignorance? I’ve never met someone who was thoughtful prior to listening to these losers and then became an idiot. Overwhelmingly, idiots listen to idiots and the brilliant listen to the brilliant.

Grok says:

No clear data shows podcasters “swung” 2024 for Trump. A 2024 Pew study found voters still relied heavily on traditional media (TV, news sites), but 20% of young voters cited podcasts as a key source. Rogan’s Trump endorsement (Nov 2024) reached millions, and posts on X suggest it amplified MAGA enthusiasm, but exit polls don’t quantify its impact.

Cofnas’ “disaster” claim feels hyperbolic without granular data tying podcasters to specific outcomes. Still, their reach (e.g., Rogan’s 14M monthly listeners) means they amplify simplified takes on complex issues like trade, which could muddy public understanding.

You’re likely correct that thoughtful people don’t regress into idiocy from listening to podcasters. Cognitive psychology suggests critical thinkers are resilient to misinformation if they actively verify sources.

Cofnas overreaches by blaming podcasters for cultural collapse without clear evidence. People aren’t mindless drones; those drawn to Rogan or Owens often already distrust experts, as you suggest. Alt-media fills a trust gap left by flawed institutions, but it’s not a one-way ticket to ignorance. Thoughtful people, as you note, don’t just swallow it whole.

Hugo Mercier’s Not Born Yesterday: The Science of Who We Trust and What We Believe (2020) argues that humans are not as gullible as commonly assumed. His main point is that our cognitive mechanisms, shaped by evolution, make us naturally skeptical and discerning about the information we accept. Mercier suggests that if we were inherently gullible—especially on matters critical to survival, like identifying threats or choosing reliable allies—our species would not have thrived. Instead, we evolved “open vigilance,” a balance of cautious trust and critical evaluation, allowing us to navigate social environments where deception is a risk.

Mercier’s argument is compelling and aligns with evolutionary psychology. It challenges the narrative that humans are easily manipulated, pointing to evidence like our ability to detect inconsistencies, evaluate source credibility, and resist persuasion when stakes are high. For example, he cites studies showing people are more likely to reject misinformation if it conflicts with prior knowledge or comes from an untrustworthy source. This makes sense: a hominid who blindly trusted every signal would fall prey to predators or rivals.

Nathan Cofnas states his thesis: “Blind obedience to credentialed authority (associated with the left) or trust in a “marketplace of ideas” that rewards brain-rotting infotainment (associated with the right) are both failed strategies.”

Nobody argues for blind obedience to credentialed authority. The left-wing approach is more sophisticated. Similarly, nobody serious argues that high ratings equal winning in the marketplace of ideas. This is a bizarre claim from Cofnas that the marketplace of ideas is determined by the entertainment preferences of ordinary people. The marketplace of ideas, as I have understood it, has never revolved around popularity, it has revolved around the quality and influence of your ideas and their adherents. Neo-conservatives, for example, never had an electorate but they were influential for a time.

Normal people don’t care much about ideas and they don’t have much to say about ideas. Few people can articulate a worldview.

I’ve spent about eight hours of my weekend dissecting this Nathan Cofnas essay. That is not normal behavior.

Grok says:

The marketplace of ideas is a metaphor describing an open environment where ideas compete freely for acceptance through debate, discussion, and scrutiny. It assumes that the best ideas prevail through reason, evidence, and persuasion, much like products in a market. The concept, often tied to free speech principles, was popularized by thinkers like John Stuart Mill and later referenced in U.S. legal contexts, such as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s dissent in Abrams v. United States (1919).

Winning in the Marketplace of Ideas

While popularity can amplify an idea’s reach, other criteria often matter more for long-term success:

Reason and Evidence: Ideas grounded in logic, verifiable data, and coherent arguments tend to withstand scrutiny better. For example, scientific theories like evolution prevail because of robust evidence, not just public approval.

Clarity and Persuasiveness: Ideas that are clearly articulated and emotionally resonant often gain traction.

Resilience to Critique: Ideas that survive rigorous debate and counterarguments are stronger. This is why academic peer review, despite flaws, is valued—it tests ideas against criticism.

Adaptability: Ideas that evolve in response to new evidence or contexts often outlast rigid ones. For instance, economic theories like Keynesianism have adapted over decades to remain relevant.

Cultural and Social Fit: Ideas that align with prevailing values or address urgent societal needs can gain momentum.

Amplification Mechanisms: While not the sole factor, reach matters. Ideas spread faster with access to platforms (media, X, public forums) or influential advocates. However, amplification without substance often fades—think of viral fads versus enduring philosophies.

Ratings vs. Other Criteria

High ratings (e.g., likes on X or public polls) can signal short-term popularity but don’t guarantee an idea’s merit or longevity. Misinformation, for instance, often spreads rapidly due to emotional appeal or algorithmic boosts but falters under scrutiny. Conversely, ideas like heliocentrism (Copernicus) initially faced low “ratings” (widespread rejection) but won out through evidence and moral weight.

Real-World Example

On X, posts promoting conspiracy theories might get high engagement due to outrage or novelty, but they rarely “win” in the broader marketplace if they lack evidence and crumble under debate.

Conclusion

Winning in the marketplace of ideas hinges more on reason, evidence, resilience, and adaptability than on high ratings. Popularity can help spread an idea, but without substance, it’s fleeting. The marketplace rewards ideas that endure scrutiny and resonate deeply, not just those with the loudest cheers.

Sam Harris says: “When [Joe Rogan] brings someone on to just shoot the shit about how the Holocaust is not what you think it was, or maybe Churchill’s the bad guy in WWII, or he’s got Dave Smith being treated as an expert on Israel and Palestine, and the history of that conflict….[Smith is] a pure misinformation artist on top of many others….Our society is as politically shattered as it is in part because of how Joe has interacted with information….It’s…avoidable. He could actually take the responsibility that really is his to take at this point to get his facts straight.”

Dave Smith is primarily a comic. It’s not surprising that he falls short as an intellectual.

Where’s the evidence that these idiots talking to other idiots for an audience of idiots is shattering America?

Grok says:

Your skepticism is warranted: Harris’ claim is sweeping, and causation is murky. If Rogan’s show were “shattering” America, we’d expect clearer metrics—say, a spike in polarization tied to his listener base.

Harris, like Cofnas, overreaches by pinning societal fracture on Rogan without clear causation. You’re right to demand evidence—misinformation spreads, but “shattering America” needs more than anecdotes about Dave Smith.

Nathan writes: “[Douglas] Murray is the British face of Conservatism, Inc. He went to Oxford, writes books with footnotes, and hangs out with academics.”

I doubt there are many academics who hang out with Douglas Murray. There’s nothing remotely academic in Murray’s ouvre.

May 25, 2023, Dennis Prager called Douglas Murray his “favorite English thinker.” I largely agree with Douglas Murray and Dennis Prager, but only a fool thinks of these guys as great thinkers. They’re great talkers, but will their long-form conversations from the Relief Factor Pain-Free studio save Western Civilization? Count me skeptical.

Reddit user Koreanoir posted a compelling critique of Murray’s 2022 book The War on the West:

The book reads like a disorganized, amphetamine-driven rampage through a big folder of bookmarked webpages labeled “Woke Stuff”. Murray’s approach is to breathlessly recount one anecdote after another, usually dedicating just a paragraph or two to each, and then sneer at the people in the center of it, all the while complaining that criticisms of “The West” lack sufficient nuance and balance…

Polemicists of a feather flock together.

On a Patreon video called “The Confluence of the Gurosphere” released June 16, 2023, Decoding the Gurus hosts Chris Kavanagh (anthropologist) talks to Matt Browne (psychologist) about “the…energies that cause the gurus to swirl together.”

Matt: “They become intertwined. They find each other and a network is formed. When we covered all of the gurus, we covered them as isolated gems interesting in their own right. But then after covering them, and having identified them as fitting our Gurometer, they then inevitably seemed to find each other even with gurus with no apparent connection.”

Chris: “Jonathan Pageau just had Jordan Hall on to discuss AI.”

“What connects them is the narcissism, the belief that they have all these revolutionary insights. Jordan Hall enjoys that he can switch paradigms. He can run 70 to 90 paradigms at one time. If you want to talk about it in that kind of language, I can talk about it in terms of resurrections and graveyards… Your religious paradigms are just ten of his seventy.”

Matt: “Jordan Peterson tells James Lindsay that you can’t have science without the Logos. It’s all based on Christianity.”

Chris: “One of [Jordan’s] big ideas is that science is fundamentally Christian. It relies on Christianity because Christianity has at its heart that there is a Truth in the universe and if you have that orientation, that allows you to investigate the natural world. And if you don’t have that, science can’t develop. Richard Dawkins and all of them don’t realize that at heart they are deeply religious people.”

“For James Lindsay, the feminist glaciology paper is central to his whole thing. It should be just a footnote, just an example that he sometimes returns to, but he now presents that as a turning point in his life. After reading it, he curled up in a ball unable to leave his room for three days because of the shock to the system that such a paper could be published in a prestigious scientific outlet. It’s a random geography journal, Progress in Human Geography. People like him and Jordan. They create this mythos around things that happen to them. I think they genuinely do experience weird manic moments, but the way that they retell it, it becomes part of this hero’s journey. It’s not — I heard a Jordan Peterson talk and it annoyed me. It’s — I heard a Jordan Peterson talk and it awakened a fire in me that I needed to reveal the charlatan world. I don’t think the authors of the feminist glaciology paper are still talking about it as much as James has. He endlessly talks about how he knows all these literatures but he constantly focuses on this single paper.”

Matt: “If he has such a comprehensive understanding of all of that literature, why doesn’t he cite some other examples? There are millions of papers out there. He should be citing hundreds of them.”

Chris: “It’s their susceptibility to narratives that are going to give them attention and make them feel that they are looking at things in a deeper way than normal people. That little hook – they are so easily led around by it.”

Matt: “In the last 20 years, we’ve seen the rise of the political dimension you could call anti-institutional. You have lefty stuff like Occupy Wall Street and Russell Brand.”

Chris: “Tim Pool.”

Matt: “Just being against the current thing. You can frame it as globalism and international capitalism. Or you could frame it as the New World Order and the WEF (World Economic Forum). There’s a right wing version or a left wing one.”

Chris: “And sometimes they cross over. Gavin McInnes started as one of the founders of Vice and then became the reactionary leader of the Proud Boys. That seems like a helluva journey. It’s about the institutions are shit, we’re part of the edgy counter-culture. It’s not inevitable that people who aren’t part of the establishment get sucked to the extremes, but there is a greater vulnerability for people who like to style themselves that way. Focusing on the corruption of establishments can make people susceptible to swallowing conspiracism.”

Matt: “I know several people in real life who are fans of Jordan Peterson. Fans of Trump. [Kinda] fans of Putin. They’re not right-wing Christians. They are lost boys. That’s the common denominator.”

Lost boys are a big part of the guru fan base.

Chris: “There is money sloshing around in the right-wing for promoting certain views. Peter Thiel hired Eric [Weinstein]. Provided money to [Eliezer] Yudkowsky [the guy who claims AI will kill us]. He also gave up on Eric eventually… The reason that Peter Thiel and Eric came together was that their worldviews aligned. Peter Thiel doesn’t care so long as someone is a wrecking force for institutions. These are narcissistic people who are led by praise and reward.”

Matt: “It’s easy for them to align with their personal interest. They’re labile. It’s like Trump. He’d say anything for a round of applause and a million dollars. They do have a reactionary, anti-institutional worldview. And they’re self-interested narcissists.”

Chris: “That grouping of people who come together for long-form podcasts to share anti-establishment positions and backpat each other and focus on what the progressive left is doing to destroy society. That grouping re-emerges and reformulates and you’ll see Douglas Murray cropping up across all of them.”

Matt: “Why do they all accept the UFO story at face value?”

Chris: “Their epistemics are broken. The smarter ones tap danced on the edge. They wanted to say look at the official narratives collapsing but they were quick to say, it could all be just because they know it could all blow up. I heard Sam Harris taking victory laps — look at all those credulous fools for talking about UFOs. You were talking for months. You believed that someone had contacted you to release sacred information about UFOs.”

“Jordan Peterson praises James Lindsay constantly and occasionally James reciprocates. It’s this constant feeding of the ego. So you were studying maths? Why did you choose the difficult area? They both talk about how they are so principled and that is why they needed to leave academia. They could have been extremely successful if academia had retained its principles and recognized genius, but the fact that they are so successful outside of academia, doesn’t that prove they were right and they are better than all those irrelevant academics. Use your brains guys. It just means that you are selling something that can get you attention. Don’t you know there are lots of people in the world selling rank partisan conspiracy content who aren’t deep thinkers but can make a lot of money?”

“Jordan thinks that because lots of people watch his content, that’s an indication that it is good and fundamentally correct. He gave the game away when he said that something had seven million views and seven million people agreed with me. He counted views as indicating agreement.”

Matt: “Truth is not a popularity contest. Making money selling something that is attractive doesn’t make you a more virtuous person. Their egos are hungry and they’ll take it as evidence.”

Matt: “The orthodox position is tedious. It’s a hard sell. Public health. Boring. It’s not going to grab you. If you are an online commentator, you’re going to feel an inexorable pull to stuff that will get the juices flowing.”

Chris: “We’ll lose the attention ecosphere by saying stuff that people will agree with. It isn’t interesting to say that UFOs aren’t real. You have to add the hook to make it more appealing. We get feedback that if we want to add more listeners, we should touch on this topic. That way lies hell. That mindset of always getting bigger audiences and always jumping on the new thing makes you susceptible to take-itis.”

Matt: “The vast majority of people who produce any content are susceptible because they’re obsessed with growing their audiences.”

Chris: “Rebecca Lewis did a report [in 2018] saying there is an alternative influencer network [Alternative Influence: Broadcasting the Reactionary Right on YouTube]. It drove them all mad…that Sam Harris was on the same map with Stefan Molyneux and Gavin McInnes. But she was right. There are network effects. You can hear Sam Harris talk about them and wrestle with it when he says, it is hard to criticize people I go to dinner with. You hear Konstantin [Kisin] say to Matt Goodwin, you and I are at all the same parties.”

Nathan Cofnas notes:

There’s a reason why people became tired of so-called experts. The “expert” class face planted about five times in a row….

Joe Rogan wouldn’t platform a rando with no serious training in martial arts to talk about MMA. If someone passed himself off as an MMA commentator, and his only credential was that he watched some old kung fu movies, Rogan would have no interest in hearing his opinion. But suppose the guy who learned kung fu from movies started fighting in the UFC, and beat the top Brazilian jiu-jitsu experts to win the Championship Belt? Rogan would definitely invite him onto his podcast! The podcast bros believe that they are in the position of that kung fu master outsider. You couldn’t persuade Rogan not to interview the self-taught UFC champion by insisting that we need to honor the expertise of jiu-jitsu black belts.

Where precisely did the “expert” class face plant about five times in a row? Which “experts”? Were they experts or “experts”? An expert has valuable provable expertise. An “expert” is just a claim.

Rogan chooses guests for his show who are compelling to a 100 IQ audience. There’s no magic formula for getting on Rogan. It’s not easy to get that opportunity to speak to his vast audience. It’s not easy being a prole whisperer.

Nathan writes:

At the height of our society’s “expert” worship, credentialed technocrats told a bunch of self-serving lies, imprisoned people in their apartments for two years, and then said that anyone who questioned them was a racist conspiracy theorist. Almost the entire academic and media establishment covered for them. On top of that, we are told that people with PhDs in how smells are racist are also “experts” before whom we must genuflect.

But the fact that some people with fancy credentials are corrupt, fallible, and/or frauds doesn’t mean that expertise isn’t real. Some people have knowledge and training that make their opinion more credible and worthy of attention than the opinion of a rando comedian with a microphone.

Who worships “experts”? Do “experts” tell more lies than any other group? Did “experts” imprison people in their apartments or did politicians with popular support enact lockdowns?

Nathan would never have written this sloppily for an academic publication.

America has never worshiped experts but the left and the credentialed class put more weight on credentials than do conservatives, who put a higher value on common sense. Neither approach is clearly superior to the other. Sometimes common sense is superior to the claims of experts, and sometimes it is not.

As society becomes more complicated, some people with demonstrable real world expertise have more power because non-experts can’t understand what they’re doing but sense that they need them.

Most people want safe buildings, safe food, safe transportation, as well as clean air and water and we recognize there is a valuable expertise in these fields that we are glad to follow.

Overall, our public health leaders did a good job during Covid. They were right in their main points — socially distance before you get the vaccine and if you must be inside around people, wear a mask. Once the vaccine is available, take it as directed by doctors.

Nobody in America, and nobody in the world, was imprisoned inside their apartment for two years because of covid. Australia was far more stringent with lockdowns compared to America, and partly as a result of that, in 2020, coronavirus-covid-19-at-a-glance-31-december-2020_0Australia had about 1/40th the per capita death rate of America. But nobody in Australia was locked inside their apartment for a year let alone two.

Nathan writes:

But consumers of alt-media have largely given up on the notion of expertise, at least when it comes to politicized topics. When every credible economist on earth says that Trump’s tariffs are going to be a disaster, they say, “Nate Silver failed to predict the 2016 election, so maybe Oren Cass (a lawyer), Batya Ungar-Sargon (a Marxist English major), and Catturd are just as likely to be right about tariffs as people who know how to draw supply and demand curves (whatever those are).”

There is no practical reason why ordinary people should care about expertise in areas such as public policy over which they have nearly no influence. There’s no pragmatic self-interested reason that ordinary people should pay attention to politics because there’s nearly nothing they can do about it.

Grok says:

No, not every credible economist labels Trump’s tariffs a disaster, though a strong majority express serious concerns. Based on recent analyses, most economists highlight risks like higher inflation, reduced GDP growth, and trade disruptions.

However, some economists, like Arthur Laffer, a Trump adviser, see tariffs as a tool to negotiate freer trade, though he acknowledges risks if prolonged. These views are outliers, as most data-driven analyses (e.g., Tax Foundation’s $1,300/household tax hike estimate) lean negative.

I don’t think consumers of alt-media have given up on expertise. They still seek out experts in medicine or law or accounting when their life is at stake.

When it comes to podcasts for fun and comfort, they turn to different experts than the mainstream experts. Who do they turn to? Those who meet their needs for feeling right and superior.

If every credible economist said in 2016 that Trump’s tariffs were going to be a disaster, how did that prediction turn out? I don’t remember a disaster. Trump had a good economy prior to Covid.

If every credible economist said in 2025 that Trump’s tariffs are going to be a disaster, how’s that going? I don’t see a disaster. As of May 9, 2025, there is no empirical evidence that Trump’s tariff plans a disaster. The stock market, for example, is higher than it was before Liberation Day. The only way to declare Trump’s tariff plans a disaster is to speak from a position of faith unchained from reality.

I wonder if there are too many variables in foreign trade for any one academic discipline, including Economics, to be expert.

Grok says:

Foreign trade is a beast with countless variables—supply chains, geopolitics, currency fluctuations, cultural preferences, labor dynamics, and more—that no single discipline, including economics, can fully master. Economics provides rigorous tools like trade models (e.g., Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin) and data on tariffs’ impacts (e.g., Penn Wharton’s GDP projections), but it often leans on simplifying assumptions that miss real-world messiness. For instance, economists might predict tariff-induced price hikes, but political motives or unexpected supply chain shifts can skew outcomes.

Other disciplines—political science (for power dynamics), sociology (for cultural impacts), or logistics (for supply chain mechanics)—each catch angles economics misses. Even within economics, trade experts disagree because models can’t capture every variable, like how China might retaliate to tariffs or how consumer behavior adapts. Interdisciplinary approaches, blending economics with geopolitics or behavioral science, get closer to the truth but still fall short of total expertise.

The complexity suggests humility is warranted. No one field owns trade; it’s why policymakers lean on diverse advisors.

Nathan writes that “the virus posed almost no serious risk to otherwise healthy young people.”

Not true. Grok notes:

According to the CDC, approximately 2,000 Americans under age 18 died from COVID-19 from January 2020 through December 2024. This number is based on provisional data and may be subject to underreporting due to testing limitations and variations in death certification practices. For context, a 2023 study from the University of Oxford reported over 1,300 deaths among those aged 0–19 from 2021 to 2022, indicating that pediatric deaths were rare but significant enough to rank COVID-19 as a leading cause of death from infectious disease in this age group. Source Source

How many millions of American children have long negative health consequences from contracting Covid?

Grok says:

Approximately 2.2–9.1 million American children under 18 who contracted COVID-19 may have experienced negative long-term health effects, with a mid-range estimate of 4.35 million. Source Source

These millions of people do not strike me as insignificant. It is not true that covid “posed almost no serious risk to otherwise healthy young people.”

Nathan writes:

On May 16, 2021, after the Covid vaccine became available, Fauci went on television and said that it would provide “well over 90% [protection] against the disease,” “it is very unlikely that a vaccinated person…would transmit [Covid] to someone else,” and vaccinated people are “a dead end to the virus.” Around the same time, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) director Rochelle Walensky said: “Our data from the CDC today suggests…that vaccinated people do not carry the virus, don’t get sick, and that it’s not just in the clinical trials but it’s also in real world data.”

The government’s internal documents showed that there was no scientific basis for these claims. A report by the Food and Drug Administration published in December 2020 stated: “Data are limited to assess the effect of the vaccine against transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from individuals who are infected despite vaccination.” This was still the state of our knowledge in May 2021. Apparently, Fauci and Walensky exaggerated the known benefits of the vaccine in order to encourage people to get the shot. As it turned out, the vaccine lowered the risk of serious illness but had only a modest effect on transmission rates.

True. People in public health often need to promote policies that are understandable for varieties of IQ levels, and so they simplify and exaggerate and sometimes they lie. Overall, most of what Fauci said was consistent with the science at the time he said it. We shouldn’t expert scientific rigor from public health pronouncements any more than we should expect scholarly rigor when politicians appeal for votes.

Grok says:

Anthony Fauci’s statements during the COVID-19 pandemic were often grounded in the evolving scientific understanding available at the time, but this claim needs nuance. Science is iterative, and early knowledge about the virus was limited, leading to shifts in guidance as new evidence emerged. For example:

Masks: In early 2020, Fauci downplayed the need for universal masking, reflecting initial WHO and CDC skepticism about their efficacy for the general public, partly to preserve supplies for healthcare workers. By mid-2020, as studies showed masks reduced transmission, he strongly advocated for them.

Asymptomatic spread: Early on, Fauci and others underestimated asymptomatic transmission, consistent with initial data suggesting symptomatic cases drove spread. Later studies confirmed significant asymptomatic spread, prompting updated guidance.

Lab leak hypothesis: Fauci initially dismissed the lab leak as unlikely, aligning with early scientific consensus favoring natural origin. While he didn’t rule it out, his stance reflected the limited evidence for a lab origin at the time. The hypothesis remains unresolved, with no definitive evidence either way.

Vaccine efficacy: Fauci’s optimism about vaccines reducing transmission was based on early trial data showing strong protection. Breakthrough infections and waning immunity, especially with variants like Delta and Omicron, later showed vaccines were less effective at preventing transmission, though they remained effective against severe outcomes.

Critics argue Fauci’s communication sometimes lacked transparency about uncertainties or overstated confidence, like on vaccine mandates or school closures, where evidence was mixed or politicized. Supporters counter that he navigated unprecedented uncertainty, balancing science with public health pragmatism.

Nathan writes:

(2) The experts largely got it right—they just lied

Scientists, not Joe Rogan, sequenced Covid’s genome, developed a way to test for the disease, created an effective vaccine, derived the antiparasitic medication ivermectin from avermectin (a substance produced by a soil bacterium), and figured out that ivermectin doesn’t cure viruses. So why are we supposed to be impressed with Rogan but not scientists? Scientists told some noble and not-so-noble lies. That might be morally bad, but it doesn’t mean the scientists were wrong.

…From day one, many scientists knew—or at least strongly suspected—that Covid came from a lab. In the end, real evidence for the lab leak wasn’t discovered by Joe Rogan, who knows nothing about viral phylogenetics or furin cleavage sites. The first high-profile figure to publicly make the case for a lab leak was Nicholas Wade. Wade has a degree in natural sciences from Cambridge, worked as an editor at Nature and Science, and was a science editor and reporter at the New York Times for many years. He got his information about Covid’s origins from professional virologists.

Grok says:

The lab leak hypothesis for COVID-19’s origin remains divisive. Most virologists lean against it, favoring natural emergence due to evidence like SARS-CoV-2’s genetic similarity to bat coronaviruses and historical zoonotic spillovers (e.g., SARS, MERS). Studies, like the 2020 Nature Medicine paper by Andersen et al., argue the virus’s features are consistent with natural evolution, not engineering. Wet markets, particularly in Wuhan, are seen as plausible transmission hubs, supported by early case clusters.

Non-virologists, including some scientists and public figures, often cite circumstantial factors: the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s proximity to the outbreak, its bat coronavirus research, and gain-of-function studies. Declassified U.S. intelligence and FBI/WHO reports from 2021-2023 suggest a lab accident is plausible, though unproven. Public skepticism also stems from distrust in institutions, amplified by initial Chinese opacity.

Nathan writes:

(3) Podcast bros largely got it wrong—except when they had the relevant expertise

True.

Nathan writes:

I publicly stated that “It seems highly likely that the coronavirus leaked from a lab studying bat viruses” on April 17, 2020—five months before Rogan. But you didn’t need to be an expert in virology to make this call. You just needed to look at publicly available evidence, and have the social intelligence to see the hallmarks of a coverup. It took journalists a long time to catch on because most of them lack basic critical thinking skills, and their heuristic is to trust people in positions of authority (especially scientists) even when they have obvious conflicts of interest. Rogan may lack critical thinking skills, too, but at least he has a reasonable degree of social intelligence and skepticism—i.e., he has the qualifications needed to spot an obvious lie. Ultimately, neither Rogan nor I made a scientifically informed case for the lab leak…

It’s not that a (near) expert consensus can never be wrong. But, if it is, this will be discovered by someone who knows at least as much as the experts, not someone who is ignorant of basic facts.

…[Robert] Malone makes many claims that intelligent non-experts can evaluate, and he’s often wildly inaccurate. Since there is clearly something wrong with his reasoning ability, it’s rational to defer to the consensus of the experts whose minds are not obviously impaired. (I would make similar comments about the revisionist historian David Irving, who appears to be the source of many of Darryl Cooper’s ideas.) An epistemically healthy society would ignore Robert Malone.

…Experts in aeronautics have tangible accomplishments like airplanes that can fly, so you can be confident that aeronautics isn’t totally made up. On the other hand, critical theorists produce zero evidence that they have special insight into anything, and they make obviously wrong claims about observable reality (for example, about sex differences). Critical theory falls on the fake end of the spectrum. Most fields will occupy some intermediate position, perhaps closer to one end or the other.

…All things being equal, the non-expert should assign a higher probability to the dominant view, because that has a stronger pull on the majority of people who know what they’re talking about.

In a large community, it’s inevitable that there will be an occasional crackpot who acquires some credential and then veers off into la-la land. For example, there are perhaps several thousand Americans with serious economics bona fides. They include individuals from across the political spectrum. They disagree on many issues large and small. They vote Republican, Democrat, and libertarian. They have different views on gun control, tax policy, and immigration. However, virtually all of them say with one voice that Trump’s tariffs are moronic and will fail to achieve their aims. The two apparent exceptions are Peter Navarro and Stephen Miran, both of whom have Ph.D.s in economics from Harvard and support the tariffs. Navarro is notorious for being incoherent and angry during interviews. In six of his books, he cites a fictional economist named “Ron Vara” (an anagram of “Navarro”) for support because he struggles to find actual authorities who agree with him. Miran has a single, coauthored publication in a second-tier economics journal, and is not a genuine expert at all. In such cases, it is appropriate to dismiss the cranks….

We now know who is rewarded in an unregulated marketplace of ideas—at least on the right. It’s people who appeal to the intuitions of the lowest common denominator in the most entertaining way. Winning ideas include anti-Semitism, Holocaust denial, WWII revisionism, drinking unpasteurized milk, vaccine denial, moon landing conspiracy theories, fascism, the notion that Americans would be happier working in factories, and the theory that America is being “screwed” by Madagascar because we spend more on their vanilla beans than they spend on food and medicine from us. Some of these bad ideas are being implemented into policy by the Trump administration. Three-and-a-half months of what Alex Kaschuta calls “government by meme” has destroyed trillions of dollars in American wealth, irreparably harmed our global status and influence, and set the stage for a global left-wing backlash.

Where are the trillions of dollars in American wealth that have been destroyed? On what basis can you claim that Trump has “irreparably harmed our global status and influence”? America’s power rests upon having the strongest military in the world and the strongest economy in the world. They are both as dominant as ever. Where is the global left-wing backlash? Do you mean Canada and Australia? They both re-elected center-left parties after the right-wing parties were ahead in the polls before Trump took office. That’s hardly a massive global backlash.

Trump II is many things, but it is not government by meme. This new Trump administration is operating on plans developed over years by smart people (such as Project 2025 which accounts for about half of Trump’s current agenda). The hundreds of executive orders Trump has signed are not memes. Trump II is chaotic and messy (such as with tariffs). More than any other politician I can think of, Trump “weaponizes uncertainty.” Sometimes that works out in America’s interests and sometimes it does not and sometimes it is not clear.

Publishing in elite journals or failing to publish in them doesn’t do much either way to establish expertise. Plenty of what is published in elite journals is nonsense (think of the replication crisis) and plenty of experts focus on other things than publishing. The phrase “publish or perish” refers to getting ahead in academia, which is not co-equal with expertise.

Here’s Stephen Miran’s Wikipedia:

Stephen Ira Miran is an American economist, currently serving as chair of the Council of Economic Advisers since March 2025. He is a senior strategist at Hudson Bay Capital Management, a co-founder of the asset management firm Amberwave Partners, and an adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute. In December 2024, president-elect Donald Trump named Miran as his nominee for chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers…

Miran served as an advisor of economic policy for the Department of the Treasury from 2020 to 2021, during Steven Mnuchin’s tenure as secretary of the Treasury.

…Miran was critical of Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell’s recommendation of a major stimulus package in 2020.

In July 2024, Miran co-authored a paper with Iranian-American economist Nouriel Roubini accusing the Department of the Treasury of reducing the share of long-term notes and bonds, lowering yields, and prolonging inflation.

In November 2024, Miran published A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System, examining tools for reshaping international trade following Donald Trump’s reelection. The paper analyzes tariffs and currency strategies in the context of dollar overvaluation, presenting potential market consequences. Analysts have hypothesized that the tariffs in the second Trump administration could be following this paper to end in the so-called “Mar-a-Lago Accord”.

Miran’s views align with the protectionist economic philosophy of Trump, and he has espoused the use of tariffs as a tool to reduce trade deficits and induce currency revaluations against the dollar. Miran has asserted that the “economic consensus” against tariffs is “wrong,” and claims that most tariff models do not account for trade deficits.

Miran seems impressive to me even though he hasn’t published in elite journals.

How much respect does Miran command from economists?

Grok says:

Stephen Miran’s standing among economists is a mixed bag, shaped by his credentials, unconventional views, and association with Trump’s protectionist policies. His academic pedigree—PhD from Harvard under Martin Feldstein, a respected economist—earns him baseline respect for intellectual rigor. His roles as a senior strategist at Hudson Bay Capital, fellow at the Manhattan Institute, and former Treasury advisor during Trump’s first term add professional credibility.

However, Miran’s advocacy for tariffs and a weaker dollar, detailed in his 2024 paper “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System,” has drawn sharp criticism. Many economists view his tariff optimism as at odds with empirical evidence and free-market principles. For instance, Arnaud Costinot and Andres Rodriguez-Clare, whose work Miran cited to justify 20% tariffs, called it a “very bad idea” that would harm the U.S. Paul Krugman labeled Trump’s tariff plans, which Miran supports, “monstrously destructive.” A May 2025 Financial Times report noted bond investors at a closed-door meeting found Miran’s tariff defense “incoherent,” branding him “out of his depth.”

Miran’s ideas, like the proposed “Mar-a-Lago Accord” to devalue the dollar, are seen as bold but risky, earning admiration from some for challenging orthodoxy but skepticism from others who prioritize global trade stability. Critics, including Pictet economists, question his overvaluation theories and warn of destabilizing effects. His claim that other nations, not U.S. consumers, would bear tariff costs has been undermined by a declining dollar, contrary to his predictions.

Among Trump-aligned economists, Miran commands significant respect for articulating a protectionist vision. Among mainstream economists, his standing is lower, with many viewing his policies as misguided or politically driven. The divide reflects ideological differences more than a universal judgment of his competence.

How much does Wall Street respect Trump’s Treasury secretary Scott Bessent?

Grok says:

Wall Street’s respect for Scott Bessent has shifted from high enthusiasm in late 2024 to significant skepticism by May 2025. His initial appeal as a market-savvy, stabilizing force has been undermined by his alignment with disruptive tariff policies and inability to prevent market turmoil. While he retains admiration among Trump-aligned investors and those who value his debt focus and geopolitical expertise, many on Wall Street now view him as a disappointing ideologue who prioritizes political loyalty over market stability.

In contrast, Stephen Miran commands less respect due to his limited market experience and the broader rejection of his economic theories. Bessent’s deeper financial roots and ongoing role in high-stakes negotiations keep him a more respected, if polarizing, figure. For the latest sentiment, DeepSearch could analyze recent X posts or market reports, but the current picture suggests Bessent’s reputation hangs in a delicate balance, contingent on his ability to deliver results in tariff talks and debt management.

I love this point by Robert Lighthizer in his 2023 book No Trade Is Free: Changing Course, Taking on China, and Helping America’s Workers:

Rather than envisioning the type of society desired and then, in light of that conception of the common good, fashioning a trade policy to fit that vision, economists tend to do the opposite: they start from the proposition that free trade should reign and then argue that society should adapt. Most acknowledge that lowering trade barriers causes economic disruption, but very few suggest that the rules of trade should be calibrated to help society better manage those effects. On the right, libertarians deny that these bad effects are a problem, because the benefits of cheap consumer goods for the masses supposedly outweigh the costs, and factory workers, in their view, can be retrained to write computer programs. On the left, progressives promote trade adjustment assistance and other wealth – transfer schemes as a means of smoothing globalization’s rough edges.

Grok says:

Lighthizer argues that economists and policymakers often treat free trade as an ideological default, assuming its benefits (e.g., lower consumer prices, economic efficiency) justify its disruptions (e.g., job losses, community decline). He sees this as backward: trade policy should serve a predefined societal vision, not dictate it.

Strengths of Lighthizer’s Critique

Society-First Approach: Lighthizer’s call to prioritize a societal vision over trade dogma resonates with those who see globalization as eroding local communities and industries. By framing trade policy as a tool to serve the common good, he appeals to a pragmatic, values-driven governance model.

Bipartisan Critique: He effectively highlights flaws in both libertarian and progressive approaches. The libertarian reliance on market self-correction ignores real-world frictions, while progressive wealth-transfer programs often fail to restore dignity or economic stability to displaced workers.

Realism About Disruption: Lighthizer acknowledges that lowering trade barriers causes significant economic and social upheaval, a point often minimized in free trade advocacy. Studies, like Autor et al. (2016), show that China’s integration into global trade led to persistent job losses and wage stagnation in U.S. manufacturing regions, supporting his concern about disruption.

Weaknesses and Counterarguments

Vague Vision of the Common Good: Lighthizer’s proposal to align trade policy with a societal vision assumes consensus on what that vision entails. In a polarized society, defining the “common good” is contentious—does it prioritize industrial workers, urban consumers, or emerging tech sectors? Without clarity, his framework risks being subjective or politically manipulated.

Risk of Protectionism: Critics of Lighthizer’s approach might argue that calibrating trade rules to shield society from disruption leans toward protectionism, which can raise consumer prices and stifle innovation. For example, tariffs on Chinese goods during the Trump administration (where Lighthizer served as U.S. Trade Representative) increased costs for U.S. consumers and businesses, per studies from the National Bureau of Economic Research (2020).

Global Interdependence: Lighthizer’s focus on national interests may undervalue the benefits of global trade networks. Free trade has lifted millions out of poverty globally (e.g., in China and India) and fueled technological advancements through supply chain integration. A retreat from open trade could disrupt these gains and strain international alliances.

Broader Implications

Lighthizer’s argument reflects a broader populist and nationalist push to reassert control over globalization’s impacts, evident in policies like tariffs and “reshoring” initiatives. His critique aligns with a growing skepticism of laissez-faire economics, as seen in posts on X, where users debate the hollowing out of manufacturing towns and the cultural costs of cheap goods.

Nathan Cofnas concludes his essay:

…huge numbers of people are going to latch onto disastrously wrong ideas unless elites exercise some paternalistic control over their informational environment….

Social status on the right is determined mainly by how much attention you can generate, regardless of the quality of that attention. People who appeal to the lowest common denominator rise to the top. The right won’t be able to attract large numbers of cognitive elites—and therefore won’t be successful—if it doesn’t create alternative tracks for people and ideas to gain influence. Nietzsche says: “Far from the marketplace and from fame happens all that is great.” I think there are occasional exceptions to that principle. But, when it comes to ideas, the marketplace rewards “space is fake and gay” a lot more than “there’s dimethyl sulfide on the exoplanet K2-18b.”

There’s not one marketplace. There are marketplaces for humor and another for entertainment and another for ideas for people with IQs over 120. The ideas marketplace for the high IQ has no time for arguments that “space is fake and gay.” People who like that argument are looking for laughs, not scholarship. Getting upset about it is like getting upset about the movie Animal House. “The film is about a trouble-making fraternity whose members challenge the authority of the dean of the fictional Faber College.” (Wikipedia)

Intellectuals have always been dismayed by the wrong ideas of the masses. Has there ever been a society where elites exercised effective control over the information environment? I don’t think that is possible. Policing people’s information choices generally seems silly to me though I am all for restricting information about the production of dangerous weapons. Also, society has an interest in discouraging self-harm and anti-social behavior.

Social status is not determined only by popularity. Steve Sailer is as high status a thinker as you can find in certain circles even though most Americans have never heard of him. Status is domain specific. The great basketball player has high status in the world that loves basketball but his ball skills create no status for him in the world of economics.

People who appeal to the lowest common denominator can rise to the top of certain social hierarchies but they have no chance for status in high IQ hierarchies.

This version of Donald Trump has attracted far more high IQ support than Trump I. Precisely because the right was deplatformed from the social media oligarchy between 2016-2021, they created their own social media (Elon Musk bought X, and we had the rise of Substack and Rumble and podcasts).

Rarely has cognitive labor of any ideological stripe paid for itself. With few exceptions, the great artists and thinkers have always had to have day jobs to support themselves or they have had to depend upon a patron.

Nathan Cofnas is right that the right needs to fund more intellectuals. By moving the Republican party down market, Donald Trump won two of three presidential elections. Trump’s low-IQ message resonated with enough of the people to take power. Populists such as Trump win elections but they rarely govern effectively because effectiveness requires expertise.

The right needs to its own expertise.

Great TV such as The Sopranos contain scripts with appeal for many different levels of IQ. People with an average IQ can enjoy The Sopranos and people with a genius IQ can enjoy The Sopranos. The right needs to be like The Sopranos.

Trump at his best is like The Sopranos. He’s attracted some formidable talent such as JD Vance, Scott Bessent, Susie Wiles, and Stephen Miran. Trump needs to listen to JD Vance, Scott Bessent, Susie Wiles, and Stephen Miran.

Trump has shown the ability to grow. His 2024 campaign was far more professional than his previous runs.

I asked Grok to analyze Nathan’s essay:

Strengths

Clear Thesis and Timely Topic

Cofnas articulates a clear central argument: while expertise is real and valuable, the public’s distrust of experts—fueled by their failures and the rise of alt-media—has led to a proliferation of ignorance with significant cultural and political consequences. This is a timely issue, given the growing influence of figures like Joe Rogan, Candace Owens, and Dave Smith, and the essay effectively taps into broader debates about misinformation, trust, and authority in the digital age.

Engaging Use of Examples

The essay uses vivid, well-chosen examples to illustrate its points, such as the contrast between Nikku Madhusudhan’s dimethyl sulfide discovery and Candace Owens’s conspiratorial claims about the moon landing. These examples ground the abstract discussion in concrete, relatable cases, making the argument more accessible and persuasive. The discussion of Covid-19, including Fauci’s “noble lies” and the lab-leak hypothesis, is particularly effective in highlighting the complexities of expertise and public trust.

Balanced Perspective

Cofnas avoids a simplistic defense of expertise or a blanket dismissal of alt-media. He acknowledges the failures of the “expert class” (e.g., Fauci’s lies, the suppression of the lab-leak theory) while arguing that expertise remains essential. This balanced approach strengthens his credibility, as he engages with the arguments of both sides rather than preaching to one camp. His critique of both left-wing “blind obedience to credentialed authority” and right-wing faith in an unregulated “marketplace of ideas” is particularly incisive.

Strong Case for Expertise

The essay makes a compelling case for the value of expertise, particularly through analogies like Joe Rogan’s respect for martial arts experts. Cofnas effectively argues that while self-taught individuals can occasionally outperform experts (e.g., the hypothetical kung fu master), this is the exception, not the rule. His discussion of fields like aeronautics versus critical theory as a spectrum of “real” to “fake” expertise is a useful heuristic for evaluating claims.

Call for Institutional Reform

The essay’s conclusion, advocating for new institutions to enforce intellectual standards, is a constructive proposal that moves beyond mere criticism. By suggesting that figures like Sam Harris and Douglas Murray should build alternative platforms rather than rely on Rogan to self-correct, Cofnas offers a forward-looking solution to the problem of misinformation.

Weaknesses

Overgeneralization of Alt-Media Figures

Cofnas lumps together a wide range of alt-media figures—Joe Rogan, Candace Owens, Dave Smith, Bret Weinstein, Russell Brand, and Darryl Cooper—without sufficiently distinguishing their approaches or credibility. For example, Rogan’s platform is more about open-ended conversation than dogmatic assertions, whereas Owens often makes definitive, conspiratorial claims. This broad brush risks oversimplifying the alt-media landscape and weakening the critique by failing to account for nuances in their influence and methods.

Selective Use of Evidence

While Cofnas provides detailed examples to support his critique of alt-media (e.g., Dave Smith’s errors on Churchill and NATO expansion), he is less rigorous in scrutinizing the expert class beyond Covid-related failures. For instance, his discussion of economists’ consensus on Trump’s tariffs dismisses Peter Navarro and Stephen Miran as “cranks” without engaging with their arguments or acknowledging that economic consensus can be shaped by political or institutional pressures. This selective focus risks appearing biased toward establishment narratives on non-Covid issues.

Ambiguity in Defining Expertise

The essay struggles to define what constitutes legitimate expertise, particularly in complex, multidisciplinary issues like the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Cofnas suggests that opinions worth sharing require “intellectual seriousness” and “some claim to expertise,” but these criteria are vague. For example, he criticizes Rogan for lacking expertise on Gaza but doesn’t clarify who qualifies as an expert on such a multifaceted issue. This ambiguity undermines the practicality of his proposed standards.

Dismissive Tone Toward the Public

Cofnas’s argument that the public is too easily swayed by charismatic alt-media figures (e.g., citing the survey about the Black Plague) can come across as elitist. While he draws on Garett Jones’s work to argue for “less democracy,” this stance risks alienating readers who value democratic principles or believe in the public’s capacity for discernment. A more nuanced discussion of how to empower the public to evaluate information critically would strengthen the essay.

Underdeveloped Solutions

The call for new institutions to enforce intellectual standards is intriguing but underdeveloped. Cofnas doesn’t specify what these institutions would look like, how they would avoid the same biases as existing ones, or how they would gain traction in a media landscape dominated by attention-driven platforms. Without concrete proposals, the solution feels aspirational rather than actionable.

Additional Observations

Tone and Audience

The essay’s tone is polemical yet scholarly, blending sharp critiques (e.g., “podcast bros”) with academic references (e.g., Plato, Nietzsche). This makes it appealing to an educated audience but potentially alienating to readers who sympathize with alt-media figures. The use of phrases like “brain-rotting infotainment” and “government by meme” is rhetorically effective but may polarize readers who see value in alt-media’s challenge to establishment narratives.

Philosophical Underpinnings

Cofnas’s reference to Plato’s “philosopher kings” and “noble lies” adds philosophical depth but is underexplored. A deeper engagement with the ethics of lying for the public good (e.g., Fauci’s mask and vaccine claims) could strengthen the essay’s intellectual rigor, especially given its critique of both expert dishonesty and alt-media misinformation.

This bit by Nathan Cofnas is far outside of expert opinion and damages his essay: “At the height of our society’s “expert” worship, credentialed technocrats told a bunch of self-serving lies, imprisoned people in their apartments for two years, and then said that anyone who questioned them was a racist conspiracy theorist. Almost the entire academic and media establishment covered for them. On top of that, we are told that people with PhDs in how smells are racist are also “experts” before whom we must genuflect.”

What is a better and more expert way of making his point here? I think our covid experts were more right than wrong at the time and overall they did a good job and we should be grateful.

Grok says:

Nathan Cofnas’s critique in the quoted passage aims to challenge the authority of certain experts during the COVID-19 pandemic, but it does so with hyperbolic language and broad generalizations that undermine its credibility. His point seems to be that expert opinion can sometimes be flawed, self-serving, or overly dogmatic, and that public trust in experts was strained by perceived overreach or inconsistencies. However, his phrasing—dismissing experts as liars, exaggerating lockdown measures, and mocking academic credentials—lacks nuance and alienates readers who might otherwise engage with his argument. Below, I’ll reframe his point in a way that aligns more closely with expert discourse, acknowledges the complexities of the pandemic response, and respects your view that COVID experts were more right than wrong while still addressing potential shortcomings.

Revised Version

“During the COVID-19 pandemic, public health experts faced unprecedented challenges in managing a rapidly evolving crisis with limited data. While many of their recommendations, such as social distancing and vaccination campaigns, were grounded in the best available evidence and saved countless lives, some policies—like prolonged lockdowns or inconsistent messaging on issues like mask efficacy—sparked legitimate debate. The tendency of certain institutions to dismiss skepticism as misinformation, rather than engaging with it transparently, eroded public trust in expertise. Additionally, the elevation of niche academic fields as authoritative voices on complex social issues sometimes muddled public discourse. A more humble, transparent approach to expertise, one that acknowledges uncertainty and invites constructive critique, would strengthen public confidence in scientific guidance.”

Key Improvements

Acknowledges Expert Successes: The revised version credits experts for their life-saving work, aligning with your view that they were more right than wrong. It recognizes the difficulty of decision-making under uncertainty, which was central to the pandemic response.

Critiques Specific Issues: Instead of blanket accusations of “self-serving lies,” it points to specific areas of contention—like prolonged lockdowns or inconsistent messaging—where experts faced challenges or lost public trust. This is more precise and grounded.

Avoids Hyperbole: Terms like “imprisoned people in their apartments” or mocking PhDs in niche fields are replaced with measured language that critiques without dismissing entire professions or institutions.

Emphasizes Transparency and Humility: The critique focuses on how experts and institutions handled dissent, suggesting that greater openness could rebuild trust. This aligns with expert discussions on science communication (e.g., Nature’s 2021 editorial on trust in science).

Maintains the Core Point: The revision preserves Cofnas’s concern about overreliance on experts and the risks of dogmatic authority, but frames it in a way that invites dialogue rather than confrontation.

Supporting Context

Expert Performance During COVID-19: Most public health experts relied on evolving data, and measures like vaccinations and social distancing significantly reduced mortality (e.g., a 2021 Lancet study estimated vaccines prevented millions of deaths). However, policies like extended school closures or initial resistance to lab-leak hypotheses faced criticism for lacking flexibility or transparency (e.g., a 2022 BMJ article on lockdown harms).

Public Trust: Surveys (e.g., Pew Research, 2022) show trust in scientists declined during the pandemic, partly due to perceived politicization or inconsistent messaging. This supports Cofnas’s concern but requires a nuanced discussion of causes.

Niche Expertise: Cofnas’s jab at “PhDs in how smells are racist” likely refers to fringe academic fields. While some studies in critical theory can seem disconnected from practical concerns, dismissing them wholesale ignores the broader value of academic inquiry. A better critique would focus on how such fields are sometimes misapplied in policy debates.

This is a weak argument by Cofnas: “But consumers of alt-media have largely given up on the notion of expertise, at least when it comes to politicized topics. When every credible economist on earth says that Trump’s tariffs are going to be a disaster, they say, “Nate Silver failed to predict the 2016 election, so maybe Oren Cass (a lawyer), Batya Ungar-Sargon (a Marxist English major), and Catturd are just as likely to be right about tariffs as people who know how to draw supply and demand curves (whatever those are).””

Grok says:

The passage is flawed by its sarcastic tone, overgeneralization of alt-media audiences, and failure to acknowledge the nuanced reasons behind skepticism toward experts. A more accurate and effective version would recognize the selective nature of this skepticism, address its root causes (e.g., distrust in institutions), and engage with the tariff debate more substantively, while avoiding mockery.

Revised Version

“Some alt-media consumers have grown skeptical of mainstream expertise, particularly on politicized issues like trade policy, where they perceive biases or inconsistencies in institutional narratives. For instance, when economists widely criticize Trump’s proposed tariffs as likely to raise consumer prices and disrupt global trade, some dismiss these warnings, pointing to past failures of predictive models, like polling errors in the 2016 election. They may turn to voices like Oren Cass or Batya Ungar-Sargon, who, despite lacking formal economic training, offer compelling narratives that resonate with their worldview. This skepticism isn’t universal—many of these same individuals trust experts in fields like medicine or law for personal needs. The challenge lies in bridging this selective distrust by fostering transparent, evidence-based discussions that address public concerns without condescension, while emphasizing the value of specialized knowledge, such as the economic principles behind supply and demand.”

Why the Original is Weak

Overgeneralization: Cofnas implies alt-media consumers wholly reject expertise, ignoring that many selectively distrust experts in politicized domains while relying on professionals elsewhere (as you noted). This weakens his credibility by misrepresenting the audience’s behavior.

Sarcastic Tone: Mocking alt-media figures like Catturd or dismissing supply and demand curves as “whatever those are” alienates readers who might sympathize with skepticism about experts. It comes off as elitist rather than persuasive.

Lack of Nuance on Tariffs: The passage doesn’t engage with the tariff debate itself, missing a chance to explain why economists oppose them or why alt-media voices gain traction. This makes the critique feel shallow.

Strawman Argument: By citing Nate Silver’s 2016 polling error as the basis for rejecting economists, Cofnas exaggerates the reasoning of alt-media consumers, ignoring deeper issues like distrust in institutions or media.

Improvements in the Revision

Acknowledges Selective Skepticism: The revised version reflects your point that alt-media consumers don’t reject all expertise, noting their trust in fields like medicine or law. This makes the argument more accurate and relatable.

Explains Root Causes: It points to institutional distrust and perceived biases as drivers of skepticism, grounded in real phenomena (e.g., Pew Research 2022 showed declining trust in media and experts). This adds depth without excusing irrationality.

Engages with the Tariff Issue: The revision briefly explains why economists criticize tariffs (higher prices, trade disruptions), showing respect for specialized knowledge while acknowledging the appeal of alt-media narratives.

Constructive Tone: Dropping sarcasm makes the argument more professional and persuasive, inviting dialogue rather than confrontation.

Calls for Better Communication: It suggests experts address public concerns transparently, aligning with expert recommendations on rebuilding trust (e.g., Nature’s 2021 editorial on science communication).

Supporting Context

Tariff Debate: Most economists oppose broad tariffs due to evidence they increase consumer prices and disrupt trade (e.g., a 2018 study on Trump’s tariffs by the National Bureau of Economic Research estimated a $1,400 annual cost per U.S. household). However, figures like Oren Cass argue tariffs protect domestic industries, resonating with audiences skeptical of globalization’s impacts.

Alt-Media Skepticism: Distrust in experts often stems from perceived media bias or institutional failures (e.g., Edelman Trust Barometer 2023 showed 43% of Americans distrust media). Yet, as you noted, people still seek expert advice for personal needs, suggesting skepticism is context-specific.

Alt-Media Figures: Oren Cass (a policy analyst, not just a lawyer) and Batya Ungar-Sargon (a journalist) have nuanced views that Cofnas oversimplifies. Engaging with their actual arguments would strengthen the critique.

I think this is a weak paragraph by Cofnas. How would you improve it? “In a large community, it’s inevitable that there will be an occasional crackpot who acquires some credential and then veers off into la-la land. For example, there are perhaps several thousand Americans with serious economics bona fides. They include individuals from across the political spectrum. They disagree on many issues large and small. They vote Republican, Democrat, and libertarian. They have different views on gun control, tax policy, and immigration. However, virtually all of them say with one voice that Trump’s tariffs are moronic and will fail to achieve their aims. The two apparent exceptions are Peter Navarro and Stephen Miran, both of whom have Ph.D.s in economics from Harvard and support the tariffs. Navarro is notorious for being incoherent and angry during interviews. In six of his books, he cites a fictional economist named “Ron Vara” (an anagram of “Navarro”) for support because he struggles to find actual authorities who agree with him. Miran has a single, coauthored publication in a second-tier economics journal, and is not a genuine expert at all. In such cases, it is appropriate to dismiss the cranks.”

Grok says:

While the paragraph makes a valid point about the near-unanimous expert opposition to tariffs, it is weakened by several issues: its dismissive tone, personal attacks on Navarro and Miran, lack of substantive engagement with their arguments, and failure to explain why tariff opposition is so uniform among economists. These flaws make the argument less persuasive and overly combative, risking alienation of readers who might be open to a more reasoned critique. Below, I’ll revise the paragraph to improve its accuracy, effectiveness, and alignment with expert discourse, while addressing your concern that the original is weak.

Revised Version

“In any large academic field, a few credentialed individuals may hold outlier views that diverge from the consensus. Consider the case of Trump’s proposed tariffs, which aim to protect domestic industries but are criticized by nearly all economists—across political and ideological lines—for likely increasing consumer prices, disrupting global trade, and failing to achieve their goals. This consensus reflects decades of research on trade policy, including studies showing the costs of protectionism. Two economists, Peter Navarro and Stephen Miran, both with Harvard Ph.D.s, are notable exceptions in supporting the tariffs. However, their arguments have faced scrutiny: Navarro’s work often lacks engagement with mainstream economic evidence, and Miran’s limited publication record raises questions about his expertise in trade policy. While dissenting voices can sometimes spark valuable debate, the overwhelming evidence against broad tariffs suggests caution in prioritizing these outliers over the broader consensus. Engaging with their arguments critically, rather than dismissing them outright, can help clarify why the consensus holds.”

Why the Original is Weak

Dismissive and Inflammatory Tone: Calling Navarro and Miran “crackpots” or “cranks” and mocking Navarro’s use of a pseudonym (“Ron Vara”) undermines the argument’s professionalism. It shifts focus from substantive critique to personal attacks, reducing credibility.

Lack of Substantive Engagement: The paragraph doesn’t explain why economists oppose tariffs or address Navarro and Miran’s actual arguments (e.g., Navarro’s focus on protecting manufacturing). This makes the critique feel shallow and one-sided.

Overemphasis on Credentials: While questioning Miran’s expertise based on a single publication is relevant, it’s not enough to dismiss him outright. Similarly, Navarro’s Harvard Ph.D. and extensive policy experience deserve more nuanced consideration, even if his arguments are flawed.

Missed Opportunity to Explain Consensus: The paragraph notes the near-universal opposition to tariffs but doesn’t clarify why economists agree, missing a chance to educate readers on trade economics.

Fails to Acknowledge Dissent’s Value: By advocating for dismissing outliers, Cofnas ignores that minority views can sometimes drive progress, even if Navarro and Miran’s arguments are weak.

Improvements in the Revision

Professional Tone: The revision avoids inflammatory terms like “crackpot” or “moronic,” focusing on evidence and reasoning. This makes the argument more persuasive and respectful, aligning with expert discourse.

Explains the Consensus: It briefly outlines why economists oppose tariffs (higher prices, trade disruptions) and ties this to research on protectionism, grounding the critique in evidence (e.g., a 2018 NBER study on Trump’s tariffs estimated significant consumer costs).

Engages with Navarro and Miran: Rather than personal attacks, the revision critiques their work substantively—Navarro’s lack of engagement with mainstream evidence and Miran’s limited expertise—while acknowledging their credentials.

Acknowledges Dissent’s Potential: It recognizes that outlier views can spark debate, but emphasizes the strength of the consensus based on evidence, striking a balanced tone.

Encourages Critical Engagement: Instead of dismissing “cranks,” it advocates for evaluating arguments critically, which is more constructive and invites readers to think for themselves.

Supporting Context

Economist Consensus on Tariffs: Surveys (e.g., IGM Chicago Booth, 2018) show near-unanimous agreement among economists that tariffs harm economic welfare, based on evidence like higher consumer prices and reduced trade efficiency. Studies (e.g., Fajgelbaum et al., 2020) estimated Trump’s 2018 tariffs cost U.S. consumers billions annually.

Navarro’s Arguments: Navarro, a former Trump advisor, argues tariffs protect U.S. manufacturing and reduce trade deficits. Critics note his work often ignores standard economic models and empirical data, but his focus on industrial policy resonates with some audiences.

Miran’s Profile: Stephen Miran’s limited publication record (one coauthored paper) and role as a policy advisor rather than academic economist suggest less expertise in trade, but dismissing him solely on this basis oversimplifies his contributions.

Role of Outliers: Scientific progress sometimes comes from dissenters (e.g., Barry Marshall’s initially controversial work on H. pylori), but outliers must provide robust evidence. Navarro and Miran’s arguments lack this, but their views reflect real concerns about globalization’s impact.

How Cofnas Could Further Improve

Cite Specific Evidence: Reference studies or data (e.g., tariff cost estimates) to strengthen the case against tariffs and show why the consensus matters.

Address Navarro’s Appeal: Acknowledge why Navarro’s focus on manufacturing jobs gains traction, then counter with evidence of tariffs’ broader harms.

Balance Credential Critique: Recognize Navarro’s policy experience while noting his divergence from economic orthodoxy, and avoid overemphasizing Miran’s publication record as the sole measure of expertise.

Highlight Expert Disagreement: Note that economists disagree on many issues (e.g., tax policy), but their tariff consensus reflects unusually strong agreement, underscoring its significance.

This revision makes Cofnas’s point more accurately by focusing on evidence, engaging with dissenting views, and adopting a professional tone. It respects the complexity of the tariff debate and the role of expertise without alienating readers.

Please compare and contrast this Nathan Cofnas essay with his other body of work. I don’t understand why he’s so sloppy here when he is usually thoughtful and careful.

Grok says:

Cofnas is a philosopher and researcher known for his work in moral psychology, race and intelligence, and critiques of ideological bias in academia. His publications span peer-reviewed journals, books, and public-facing essays. Key themes include:

Race and Intelligence: In articles like “Research on Group Differences in Intelligence” (Philosophical Psychology, 2020), Cofnas argues that genetic factors may contribute to group differences in IQ, challenging what he sees as dogmatic rejection of this hypothesis. These works are heavily cited, data-driven, and engage with empirical studies.

Critiques of Ideology: Essays like “Why We Need to Talk About the Science of Race” (Quillette, 2018) criticize academic censorship of controversial topics. These pieces are provocative but typically structured with clear premises, evidence, and responses to counterarguments.

Public Engagement: On platforms like Substack and Quillette, Cofnas writes for broader audiences, often addressing cultural or political issues (e.g., free speech, cancel culture). These essays are less formal but still aim for logical clarity and evidence-based claims.

His scholarly work is characterized by:

Precision: He engages with primary sources, cites studies, and anticipates counterarguments.

Provocation: He tackles taboo topics (e.g., race, IQ) but grounds claims in data or philosophical reasoning.

Clarity: Even in public essays, he avoids hyperbole, focusing on logical structure.

Comparison and Contrast

Similarities

Skepticism of Orthodoxy: Like his other work, “Podcast Bros” challenges established narratives. His critique of “fake and/or corrupt” experts echoes his arguments against academic dogmas (e.g., rejection of race-IQ research). Both reflect his belief that truth is obscured by ideological or institutional biases.

Cultural Commentary: The essay’s focus on media and public discourse aligns with his public-facing writings, such as Quillette essays on cancel culture or academic bias. He often analyzes how ideas spread and influence society.

Provocative Tone: The essay’s sharp language (“brain rot,” “uneducated podcast bros”) is consistent with his willingness to provoke, seen in his challenges to progressive taboos on race or free speech.

Differences

Argumentative Rigor:

Podcast Bros: The essay is light on evidence, relying on anecdotes (e.g., Hunter Biden laptop) and analogies (e.g., MMA expertise). It doesn’t cite studies or provide data to support claims about “proliferation of ignorance” or podcast influence. The term “brain rot” is catchy but undefined, weakening the argument.

Other Work: His academic papers (e.g., on IQ) are dense with citations, statistical analyses, and responses to critics. Even public essays like those in Quillette typically reference studies or specific events with clarity. For example, his 2020 paper on group differences cites over 50 sources, meticulously engaging with opposing views.

Tone and Style:

Podcast Bros: The tone is sarcastic and hyperbolic, with phrases like “magic shortcut to knowledge” and “face planted about five times in a row.” This contrasts with his usually measured, academic style, even in polemical essays.

Other Work: While provocative, his scholarly and public writings maintain a formal or semi-formal tone. For instance, his Quillette essays use sharp critiques but avoid slang or mockery, focusing on reasoned arguments.

Depth of Analysis:

Podcast Bros: The essay is broad, covering WWII, vaccines, Ukraine, and tariffs in a single sweep without delving deeply into any. It asserts that podcast bros “have not outperformed actual experts” on Covid but doesn’t substantiate this with data or examples.

Other Work: Cofnas typically focuses narrowly on specific issues (e.g., IQ heritability, academic censorship), providing detailed evidence. His book on moral psychology, for instance, builds a cumulative case over chapters, integrating evolutionary theory and empirical studies.

Audience and Intent:

Podcast Bros: Written for a Substack audience, it seems aimed at sparking discussion or virality. The casual, meme-like term “brain rot” and lack of citations suggest a focus on engagement over scholarship.

Other Work: His academic papers target philosophers and scientists, aiming for rigor and impact within scholarly debates. His public essays balance accessibility with intellectual depth, appealing to educated lay readers.

Why “Podcast Bros” Seems Sloppy

Your perception of sloppiness likely stems from the following:

Lack of Evidence: Unlike his data-driven work on IQ or moral psychology, this essay makes sweeping claims without substantiation. For example, asserting that podcast bros’ influence has “disastrous consequences” lacks specific examples or metrics. His scholarly work, by contrast, is meticulous, often preempting criticisms with evidence.

Hyperbolic Tone: The sarcastic, dismissive language (“uneducated podcast bros,” “brain-rotting infotainment”) is atypical. His usual tone, even in public essays, is assertive but restrained, avoiding mockery. This shift may feel careless or pandering to a populist audience.

Broad Scope: Covering multiple complex topics (vaccines, geopolitics, Covid) in a short essay dilutes focus. His other work tackles single issues with depth, making “Podcast Bros” seem scattershot.

Platform and Context: Substack encourages informal, timely commentary. Cofnas may have prioritized speed and engagement over rigor, unlike his peer-reviewed papers or carefully edited Quillette essays. The essay reads like a hot take, not a polished argument.

Possible Intent: The essay might be an experiment in reaching a broader, less academic audience. The catchy “brain rot” framing and polemical style align with viral online discourse, but they sacrifice the nuance of his typical work.

Critical Reflection

While Cofnas’ critique of podcast culture and expert distrust is consistent with his skepticism of institutional narratives, the execution feels rushed. His claim that podcast bros underperform experts on Covid, for instance, ignores cases where non-experts (e.g., Rogan’s guests like Dr. Robert Malone) raised valid concerns about vaccine mandates or lockdowns before mainstream acknowledgment. This omission undermines his argument and contrasts with his usual fairness to opposing views. However, his core point—that neither blind trust in experts nor charisma-driven media yields truth—aligns with his broader emphasis on critical inquiry.

Conclusion

“Podcast Bros and Brain Rot” shares Cofnas’ hallmark skepticism and cultural critique but diverges in its lack of rigor, hyperbolic tone, and broad scope. It feels sloppy because it prioritizes engagement over evidence, unlike his meticulous academic papers or structured public essays. This may reflect the Substack platform’s demand for quick, provocative content or an intentional shift to a more populist style. To align with his usual thoughtfulness, Cofnas could have narrowed the focus, provided data (e.g., podcast listenership stats, expert error rates), and tempered the sarcasm. If you’re puzzled by this departure, it’s likely because the essay sacrifices his typical depth for accessibility, a trade-off that doesn’t fully suit his strengths.

Please analyze Nathan’s output on X, contrast it with his academic rigor, and let me know if you think this medium suits his strengths and if it might lead him to be sloppy.

Grok says:

Contrasts with X Output:

Rigor:

X: Posts are brief, often asserting claims without evidence due to platform constraints. For example, his NYU comment on “wokism” lacks data or elaboration, relying on Substack links for context.

Academic Work: Papers and essays provide extensive evidence, such as statistical analyses of IQ data or historical records in his MacDonald critiques.

Tone:

X: Sarcastic and polemical (e.g., “wokism,” “brain rot”). This aligns with his Substack essay “Podcast Bros” but feels less controlled than his academic tone.

Academic Work: Assertive but formal, even when provocative. His Quillette essays critique ideology with clarity, not mockery.

Depth:

X: Broad, scattershot commentary (e.g., jumping from ivermectin to DEI). Posts lack the space for nuanced arguments.

Academic Work: Narrow, in-depth focus. His book on moral psychology builds a cumulative case over chapters, unlike the fragmented nature of X posts.

Does X Suit Cofnas’ Strengths?

Cofnas’ strengths lie in:

Analytical Rigor: His ability to dissect complex issues (e.g., race-IQ debates) with data and logic.

Provocative Clarity: Framing controversial topics accessibly while grounding them in evidence.

Interdisciplinary Insight: Combining philosophy, biology, and psychology to address ethical and scientific questions.

Suitability of X:

Strengths Leveraged:

X allows Cofnas to reach a wide audience, amplifying his critiques of academia, media, and ideology. His posts on DEI and podcast culture resonate with followers skeptical of institutional narratives, aligning with his public essays’ goals.

The platform’s immediacy suits his provocative style, letting him comment on current events (e.g., NYU hack) and promote his Substack.

Limitations:

Character Limits: X’s brevity (280 characters) restricts his ability to provide evidence or nuance, undermining his strength in detailed argumentation. Posts like his “wokism” comment appear as assertions, not arguments, contrasting with his academic depth.

Tone Amplification: X’s informal, combative culture encourages sarcasm and hyperbole (e.g., “brain rot”), which can overshadow his analytical clarity. This mirrors the “sloppy” tone of “Podcast Bros.”

Does X Contribute to Sloppiness?

Your concern about sloppiness in “Podcast Bros and Brain Rot” likely stems from its hyperbolic tone, lack of citations, and broad scope, which diverge from Cofnas’ academic rigor. X may exacerbate this in several ways:

Platform Incentives:

X rewards attention-grabbing, concise posts, encouraging provocative language over evidence. His “Podcast Bros” post uses terms like “brain rot” to hook readers, mirroring X’s viral style but sacrificing precision.

The platform’s fast-paced nature may pressure Cofnas to produce quick takes, as seen in his NYU comment, which lacks the depth of his Quillette essays.

Tone Shift:

X’s informal, combative tone (e.g., users calling out “wokism”) may influence Cofnas to adopt a more polemical style, as seen in both his X posts and “Podcast Bros.” This contrasts with his academic restraint, where even provocative claims are measured.

Fragmented Arguments:

X’s character limit forces Cofnas to fragment arguments across posts or rely on Substack links, leading to incomplete ideas. For example, his ivermectin comment in the “Podcast Bros” post lacks context without the full essay, appearing less rigorous than his academic work.

This fragmentation may carry over to Substack, where “Podcast Bros” covers multiple topics (vaccines, WWII, DEI) without the depth of his journal articles, contributing to perceived sloppiness.

Reduced Accountability:

Unlike peer-reviewed journals, X and Substack lack formal gatekeeping. While this allows free expression, it may enable Cofnas to publish less polished work, as seen in “Podcast Bros” lacking citations compared to his 2020 IQ paper.

Audience Expectations

X’s audience, often polarized and anti-establishment, may expect bold, simplified takes, pushing Cofnas toward rhetoric like “brain rot” or “wokism.” This aligns with “Podcast Bros” but departs from his academic nuance, where he carefully qualifies claims (e.g., rejecting “blacks are inferior” stereotypes).

Conclusion

Cofnas’ X output aligns with his provocative, anti-orthodox stance but sacrifices the rigor and depth of his academic work. The platform suits his ability to reach wide audiences and promote his ideas but doesn’t fully leverage his strengths in detailed, evidence-based argumentation. X’s incentives for brevity, provocation, and virality likely contribute to the sloppiness you perceive in “Podcast Bros,” as its hyperbolic tone and lack of citations echo X’s style. To better suit his strengths, Cofnas could use X to teaser rigorous arguments, directing followers to detailed Substack essays, and engage critics to refine his public work, as he does academically. While X offers visibility, it risks diluting his scholarly precision unless balanced with his usual care.

What typically happens when academics post regularly on social media? How does it affect their status and their intellectual direction? Are there certain temptations that might prove disastrous?

Grok says:

Risk to Professional Reputation:

Poorly judged posts (e.g., overly controversial or unprofessional content) can damage credibility. Academics are often held to higher standards of rigor and decorum, and missteps can be amplified online.

For instance, a 2018 case involved a professor whose inflammatory tweet led to public backlash and institutional scrutiny, affecting their career trajectory.

Effects on Intellectual Direction

Public Feedback and Idea Refinement:

Social media provides real-time feedback, which can sharpen arguments or spark new research questions. Engaging with diverse perspectives may broaden an academic’s intellectual scope.

However, the pressure to simplify complex ideas for social media can lead to oversimplification or dilution of scholarly rigor.

Shifting Priorities:

Regular posting may divert time from research, teaching, or publishing in traditional academic outlets. The instant gratification of likes and retweets can tempt academics to prioritize viral content over substantive work.

Studies (e.g., a 2020 survey in Nature) suggest that early-career researchers, in particular, feel torn between building an online presence and meeting traditional academic metrics like publication counts.

Echo Chambers and Polarization:

Social media algorithms often reward polarizing or sensational content, which can subtly steer academics toward more extreme positions to maintain engagement.

This can lead to intellectual rigidity, where academics cater to their audience’s biases rather than pursuing objective inquiry.

Temptations and Potential Disasters

Chasing Clout:

The lure of followers and influence can tempt academics to prioritize attention-grabbing content over nuanced scholarship. This may erode their credibility among peers if they’re seen as “selling out.”

Example: An academic who shifts from rigorous analysis to clickbait-style posts risks alienating their scholarly community.

Engaging in Online Feuds:

Social media’s combative culture can draw academics into public arguments that devolve into personal attacks, damaging their professionalism. A 2021 study in Higher Education noted that online harassment is a significant deterrent for academics on social media.

Example: A poorly handled Twitter spat can escalate, attracting trolls and creating a lasting negative impression.

Premature Sharing or Misrepresentation:

Posting preliminary research findings or unverified claims can lead to misinformation or premature criticism, especially if the work is taken out of context.

In 2020, several academics faced backlash for sharing COVID-19-related claims on social media that later proved inaccurate, harming their credibility.

Institutional and Legal Risks:

Controversial posts may conflict with institutional policies or attract legal scrutiny, especially on sensitive topics like politics or identity. Tenure doesn’t always protect against public or institutional backlash.

Example: A professor’s tweet criticizing a university policy could lead to disciplinary action if deemed to violate codes of conduct.

Mitigating Risks

Strategic Posting: Academics can focus on sharing peer-reviewed work, engaging in constructive dialogue, and maintaining a professional tone to balance visibility with credibility.

Time Management: Setting boundaries for social media use helps prioritize core academic responsibilities.

Media Literacy: Understanding platform dynamics (e.g., algorithms, audience expectations) can prevent falling into traps like polarization or sensationalism.

Institutional Support: Universities can offer training on navigating social media to help academics avoid pitfalls while maximizing benefits.

Conclusion

Regular social media engagement can significantly boost an academic’s visibility, influence, and public impact, but it comes with trade-offs. It can enrich intellectual direction through diverse feedback but also risks diluting rigor or skewing priorities toward popularity. Temptations like chasing clout, engaging in feuds, or sharing unverified claims can lead to reputational or professional disasters. Strategic use, grounded in scholarly values, is key to harnessing social media’s benefits while minimizing its risks.

Philosopher Stephen Turner wrote the book on expertise — Liberal Democracy 3.0: Civil Society in an Age of Experts (2003). Here are some of my favorite bits:

* If we imagine a historian in the distant future faced with the task of explaining, in a few lines, the significance of the twentieth century, and specifically the task of identifying what remarkable and consequential transformations occurred within it, two particular changes would stand out. One is the development of science and technology. It would be noted that, for the first time in technical history, science and technology became closely linked.

* Our imagined historian would see that the obvious questions to ask would be these: what are the connections between these two developments, and what were the consequences for science and liberalism of having their dramatic turns of fortune occur more or less simultaneously? To answer these questions she might first attempt to study the writings of influential political thinkers of twentieth century liberalism and democracy, especially in the period after the Second World War, to see what they had to say about the connections and about science and science-related technology. What would she find?

The Silence of Political Theory

Our historian would be astonished by the absence of any discussion of science.

* If one instead turns to the key documents of American liberalism, something equally astonishing can be found: the greatest single work of liberal political philosophy of the late twentieth century, John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971), is utterly devoid of any mention of science… Even the influential American critics of Rawls, such as Robert Nozick and the communitarians, find it possible to write passionately and seriously about contemporary politics as though science contained absolutely nothing of relevance to political life.

* In his classic formulation, The Torment of Secrecy, Edward Shils demonstrated how perplexing and ultimately insoluble was the problem posed by the fact that liberal democracies, which were premised on open discussion, were nevertheless also forced to defend themselves and, in the course of doing so, to keep secrets (1956). The detailed measures governing secrecy cannot themselves be subject to public discussion, without making them ineffective. But if people in authority use the legal powers given to them to classify as ‘secrets’ things that ought properly to be part of genuine ‘government by discussion,’ public discourse quickly becomes a sham, for all that is discussed is that which governmental secret-keepers permit to be discussed.

The parallels with expertise are clear: experts are needed by liberal democracy, but only experts understand what they are talking about and what is a matter of expert knowledge; to allow them to decide what belongs in the expert domain means that experts might place topics that should be subject to public discussion in the domain of ‘expert knowledge.’

* The Left has had, historically, a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward expertise.

* One assumption of meaningful discussion is some degree of mutual comprehension. But in the case of expert knowledge, there is very often no such comprehension and no corresponding ability to judge what is being said and who is saying it, and consequently no possibility of genuine ‘discussion.’ So expertise poses a problem that goes to the heart of liberalism.

* Expertise is a kind of violation of the conditions of rough equality presupposed by democratic accountability. Some activities, such as genetic engineering, are apparently out of reach of democratic control, even when these activities, because of their dangerous character, ought perhaps to be subject to public scrutiny and regulation, precisely because of imbalances in knowledge. As such we are faced with the dilemma of capitulation to ‘rule by experts’ or democratic rule that is ‘populist’; that valorizes the wisdom of the people even when ‘the people’ are ignorant and operate on the basis of fear and rumor.

* Scientific research on the genetic background of criminals has been denounced as ‘racist’ and government agencies have been intimidated into withdrawing support. Studies of race and intelligence similarly have been attacked as inherently racist, which is to say ‘non-neutral.’ A letterwriter to Newsweek wrote that ‘theories of intelligence, the test to measure it and the societal structures in which its predictions come true are all developed and controlled by well-off white males for their own benefit’ (Jaffe 1994: 26). This idea is commonplace, even a matter of consensus in some academic fields, while it is treated as absurd in others. The idea that science itself, with its mania for quantification, prediction and control is merely an intellectual manifestation of racism and sexism – that is to say, is non-neutral – is widespread. A more general problem for liberalism is this: if the liberal state is supposed to be ideologically neutral, how is it to decide what is and is not ideology as distinct from knowledge?

* The claims about the nature of intelligence to which the letter-writer to Newsweek objected, curiously, produced a similar kind of collective letter signed by a large number of prominent psychologists, designed to correct what they saw to be the alarming disparity between what was presented by journalists and commentators as the accepted findings of psychological research on intelligence and what psychologists in fact accepted, namely that there were persistent differences in scores. Here the issues were different: the accepted facts were simply not known to the journalists, who seemed to assume that the facts fit with their prejudices.

* Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (1944) was a classic of social science expertise. It was made possible by lavish funding by the Carnegie Corporation, which conceived the project and paid the researchers whose specialist reports were given to Myrdal to write the text. The promotion of the book was subsidized by the Carnegie Corporation. All this was concealed. Myrdal was chosen because he was not an American, and therefore could not be immediately dismissed as non-neutral, as either a northerner or a southerner. The aims of the funders were not neutral, but they were well-hidden.

* To treat experts as authorities in this sense requires us, in an act of faith, to believe that they do indeed possess some special cognitive powers analogous to those of charismatic leaders speaking prophetically of religious truths. In the case of prophets, of course, the ‘reasoning’ is hidden because it is God’s reasoning – the prophets simply pass on His commands. In the case of science, it is hidden because it is meaningful only to scientists, and, similarly, scientists report the results, not the grounds for them. The results are accepted as the sayings of the prophets are, as a matter of faith in the powers of the scientists or experts, not as a result of the reasoning that led to the results, which is not accessible, because it is not understandable.

* The evidence of risk of contracting HIV from ordinary heterosexual contact in the general United States’ population has always been clear both to epidemiologists and to health care professionals with substantial experience with AIDS cases. The risk level is negligible, in contrast to the risk level in relation to certain ‘homosexual’ practices and IV drug use. But the fear of political pressure from AIDS activists, and the desire of AIDS activists to prevent AIDS from being treated merely as a disease of homosexuals and IV drug users, led the Center for Disease Control in the United States to endorse propaganda about AIDS and about the possibility of contracting AIDS from heterosexual contact that was highly misleading. What is striking about this case is not simply that a respected institution would lie, but that it would lie for the higher purpose of preserving the appearance of neutrality.

* The neutral, objective, or scientific facts may be insufficient to be much of a constraint on decisions. However, the desire to move a topic out of political discussion and into the hands of experts may nevertheless be strong, because doing so may facilitate rational persuasion, and lead to a decision that is accepted as legitimate. Indeed, this is the logical core of the political phenomenon that will be discussed in subsequent chapters. One of the central devices of liberal democracy is to delegate discussion and remove issues from particular institutions of discussion and give them to others. In nineteenth century America, for example, discussions of public health measures against cholera were transferred, by acts of state legislatures, from the hands of city councils and the boards of health they appointed, to other boards and commissions. In the twentieth century, monetary decisions – an important topic of political debate – were delegated to the Federal Reserve Bank. In both cases, there was relevant expert knowledge. In neither case were the problems well-structured. They were problems in which the science or expertise at hand were necessary to full understanding of the discussions, but which were not structured in such a way that the science was sufficient to identify the solutions.

* The physician or expert is not simply acting within a domain of expertise, applying technical considerations in a scientific or objective way directly to the decision in question.

* Scientists were asked when it would be safe for farmers to return sheep to particular fields that had been polluted with radioactivity. Based on their empirical experience with, and understanding of, the causal process in a particular kind of soil, they estimated that the effects would dissipate in three weeks. In fact they were wrong. The kinds of soil that the sheep were grazing on contained a great deal of clay, and the clay retained the radioactivity much longer than the scientists had predicted (1996: 63-4). Wynne uses this example to make the point that scientists are often ignorant of the truth about the things that they confidently make pronouncements on.

* Climatologists select the variables in their models and analogize and simplify a real world which, it is certain, will behave differently than the model, just as the lawyer simplifies a complex situation to select those features which are legally relevant. It is a further decision – a decision to accept a casuistic extension – to accept these simplifications or their implications and to act politically on them.

* Delegating powers to a body that claims to represent, or is constituted to represent, is a familiar governmental device. Indeed it is a form of rule: in Rome, as Carl Schmitt pointed out, the institution of the dictator was a legal form, in which an individual was delegated dictatorial powers for a limited period to deal with a particular crisis. In this case the dictator’s commission was a means of preserving the form of state that gave the commission…

* Much of what governs our daily life is the product of commissions of various kinds. The labels on the food we eat, the standards for the air we breathe, and much else is the product of collective decision-making by bodies of this sort, and when the standards or practices are contested, they are contested by other bodies. To take a very simple example of the hidden power of these organizations, consider the simple artifact of the child’s playground. In the US, the standards for playgrounds were produced by a knowledge movement subsidized by the Russell Sage Foundation during the first part of the twentieth century. The standards it defined were made an issue in Social Surveys of various kinds promoted by reform groups, promoted by playground associations in each city, and taken up by civic betterment associations, and in a short time accepted by cities as normal (Sealander 1997). This led to a certain uniformity of product, and therefore of experience in the daily life of children – the life-world. Yet this movement was in large part a ‘Commission from Below’. No powerful governmental agency authorized it. Its political success depended on the acceptance and endorsement of local leaders and community activists, who pressured municipalities to live up to the standards…