This is the title of chapter two of the 2023 book, Making Democratic Theory Democratic.
Stephen Turner wrote:
In the decades after John Rawls‘ A Theory of Justice (1971) and especially over the past 20 years or so, many books have been published with the same aim: to vindicate and explicate something that is usually called social democracy on philosophical or social science grounds. After the intense ideological rivalries of the twentieth century, this political ideal has become the default position of virtually all academic thinkers in relevant areas. A century that began with the frank acceptance of the irreconcilability of political value choices, and proceeded with extraordinarily intense ideological warfare, ended with a surprisingly broad, though loose, consensus. One could list such works as Philip Pettit (1997), Amartya Sen (2009), and Alan Gewirth (1978) as examples. And in sociology, one could give Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 2008; Wacquant, 2005) and Jürgen Habermas (2001) as more or less full members of this consensus.
After Rawls (1921-2002), Anglophone political philosophy converged on an egalitarian liberalism. Most people working in the field treated it as a given. Dworkin, Nagel, Scanlon, Nussbaum, and the analytic Marxists around G.A. Cohen (1941-2009) argued about how to specify equality, not whether to pursue it. Nozick (1938-2002) put the libertarian objection with force in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) and then lost the departmental argument; he drifted toward the center. As a report on the field, Turner describes something true and widely noticed. Cohen complained about the same convergence from his left.
“Social democracy” flattens distinct projects. Rawls preferred property-owning democracy to the welfare state and worried that welfare-state capitalism left too much wealth concentrated. Pettit (b. 1945) in Republicanism (1997) starts from freedom as non-domination, a republican rather than a liberal premise, even where the policy is social democracy. Sen (b. 1933) in The Idea of Justice (2009) attacks Rawls’s habit of designing ideal institutions and pushes the capabilities approach instead. Filing all of them under one consensus catches a family resemblance in conclusions while smoothing over disagreement in foundations.
Gewirth (1912-2004) sits oddest in the list. Reason and Morality (1978) derives rights to freedom from the logic of agency, the Principle of Generic Consistency. He reaches welfare conclusions by a rationalist route most Rawlsians rejected. He joins the consensus by destination.
The sociology pairing runs uneven. Habermas (b. 1929) fits. Discourse ethics, deliberative democracy, his defense of the constitutional welfare state and then the European project all sit inside the camp Turner names. Bourdieu (1930-2002) fits worse, and Turner hedges with “more or less” because he needs the hedge. Bourdieu did not write normative political philosophy and often treated the universalist normative project with suspicion. His late activism against neoliberalism, in Acts of Resistance and Firing Back, reads as combative left politics. Wacquant (b. 1960) carries the same critical edge.
Inside normative political philosophy the phrase “relevant areas” holds. Widen the lens to economics, public choice, much of law and economics, or large stretches of political science, and the consensus thins. Chicago economics and public choice theory ran strong through the same decades.
The century-long arc is Weber’s home ground. The century opened with the value pluralism of Weber (1864-1920) and the decisionism of Schmitt (1888-1985), the claim that ultimate political commitments resist rational adjudication. It ran through fascism, communism, and liberalism at war. It closed, in the academy at least, with the loose post-1989 settlement that Fukuyama (b. 1952) caught. This settlement does not make evolutionary sense. There’s no one method of political organization that is fitter than all alternatives on a global scale. Different situations create incentives for different politics.
Turner names the consensus to question it. He says the vindication books assume what they set out to prove, that social democracy became the default by drift rather than by defeating value pluralism on the merits. Weber’s problem never got solved. It got dropped. So if you ask whether the academy converged, yes. If you ask whether the convergence rests on the demonstrations its authors claim for it, the answer is no.
Turner wrote:
The common element in the accounts that are directly concerned with vindicating this consensus is that they attempt to replace the terms of the earlier twentieth-century debate, especially the terms of the conflict between justice and freedom. These writers all reject the idea of freedom as non-interference or choice as inadequate or wrong; they all decry great wealth, the power of money or the power that money gives people, as a form of injustice; and all involve some idea of autonomy governed by reason.
True.
The earlier quarrel set freedom against justice: Hayek (1899-1992) against the planners, Berlin (1909-1997) sorting negative from positive liberty, the Cold War habit of treating redistribution as a tax on liberty. The post-Rawls move dissolves the quarrel by redefining freedom as non-domination, or as capability, or as autonomy, and redistribution no longer costs you freedom; it buys you more of it. The trade-off vanishes. Turner names the move as evasion.
His three features hold at different strengths. The rejection of freedom as non-interference is solid. Pettit builds non-domination against it. Sen builds capability against it. Charles Taylor (b. 1931) wrote the essay against it.
The decrying of great wealth needs a qualifier. Rawls does not condemn wealth. The difference principle licenses inequality when it lifts the worst off, and his worry about money turns on the power it buys over politics. Sen centers deprivation at the bottom more than accumulation at the top. The accurate version runs narrower: the camp inverts the libertarian presumption. Nozick treats market wealth as presumptively just and redistribution as the thing owing a defense. The consensus flips that. Great wealth becomes suspect.
Autonomy governed by reason is the Kantian inheritance showing through. Rawls and the reasonable, public reason, Kantian constructivism. Habermas and communicative reason. Gewirth and the logic of agency. The person in these accounts is a rational chooser whose freedom lies in reasoned self-governance. That separates the camp from the economists, who model preference satisfaction, and from Weber, who held that reason cannot rank our final ends. The Kantian conception of autonomy is the quiet premise that lets the consensus treat its politics as the deliverance of reason and not as one value choice among rivals.
The clause fits Bourdieu poorly because he spent a career against the picture of the reasoning chooser. Habitus runs below reason.
So: fair as a map of the philosophers, looser at the edges where the sociologists sit. The shared content Turner lists describes egalitarian liberalism. The camp did not win the old argument between freedom and justice. It retired the argument by rebuilding the word freedom so the conflict could not arise. A defender calls that progress. Turner is preparing to call it a convenient way around Weber’s question, and on this passage he has the better of it, because the redefinition gets asserted across the camp far more than it gets defended.
Turner:
The arguments needed to produce the conclusions are less stable than the conclusions: they know that freedom as non-interference is wrong because it comes to the wrong result, namely, a non-egalitarian (as well as vulgar and money-grubbing) society, but they differ in how to replace this notion of freedom. They use the language of rights, but only if it is extended to cover rights to well-being, and they acknowledge that there are collisions between these rights and the rights of classical liberalism, which they concede must give way, to some extent. They cannot bring themselves to be simply radical egalitarians, even if in their heart of hearts they think reason and justice dictate equality, because they know that this outcome can only be produced by means that are visibly oppressive, and worse, undemocratic, in that they would never get the consent of people who have had the experience of freedom and a more or less meritocratic order. So, they are against something else: domination, a notion that can be extended to cover all sorts of humiliations, such as a lack of recognition of identities, as well as a lack of money.
Turner stops describing the consensus and starts diagnosing it.
The opening claim is right. The conclusions outrank the arguments. The egalitarian result sits fixed, and freedom as non-interference gets convicted because it yields the wrong society. The history backs him. The camp converged on the same politics from incompatible foundations: Rawls from a contract, Sen from capability, Gewirth from agency, Dworkin (Ronald Dworkin, 1931-2013) from equality of resources, Cohen from Marx, Nussbaum (Martha Nussbaum, b. 1947) from Aristotle. Foundations that contradict each other cannot all be the reason for a shared conclusion. When the conclusion holds steady while the premises under it keep changing, the conclusion came first. Rawls conceded this when he built reflective equilibrium into the method, which licenses adjusting principles to fit considered judgments. The field’s own procedure lets the conclusion discipline the argument.
A defender says convergence from many directions can mark a robust conclusion. Turner sees rationalization, the defender sees consilience. To win, Turner needs to show the politics came before the philosophy in time and held independent of it. For most of the camp that holds biographically.
The middle of the paragraph is accurate. They keep rights language and stretch it to cover well-being. They admit the new rights collide with the old classical-liberal ones, and they concede the old ones give way. The hedge “to some extent” is right. The camp subordinates property and contract to welfare and equality.
The mind-reading carries the most risk and the most reward. “In their heart of hearts they think reason and justice dictate equality.” That fits Cohen, who argued in Rescuing Justice and Equality that justice is equality and that the inequalities Rawls tolerates reflect the greed of the talented. It fits Rawls poorly, since Rawls had principled reasons for permitting inequality and did not pine for a leveled order. As a claim about “they” it overreaches. As a claim about the left wing of the camp it lands.
Full equality needs coercion that a free people with a memory of choice will not consent to. Turner adds a turn to the old argument. The trouble with radical leveling is not only that it fails the way Hayek said it fails. It cannot win consent, which makes it undemocratic, which the camp cannot stomach. So the camp moderates. The moderation marks a democratic ceiling they accept, not a ceiling on how much equality they think justice demands. That gap, between the equality they half believe in and the equality consent allows, is the thing Turner has found, and it holds for the egalitarian wing.
Then the payoff: domination as the concept elastic enough to do the work. Turner describes a migration in left theory. Pettit makes non-domination the republican flagship. Iris Marion Young (1949-2006) widened injustice past distribution to oppression and domination in her five faces. The recognition turn in Honneth (Axel Honneth, b. 1949) and the redistribution-versus-recognition argument with Fraser (Nancy Fraser, b. 1947) ran on the same question Turner names: whether the left’s complaint concerns money or standing. Domination answers both at once. It covers the man with no money and the group with no recognition, and it folds the two agendas into one vocabulary. Turner reads the elasticity as convenience. A defender reads it as a real genus, the insight that deprivation and humiliation are both forms of subjection to another’s power. The early version in Pettit holds tight enough to look like a discovery. The later sprawl, where domination stretches to cover every slight, looks like the basket Turner describes. His charge fits the trajectory better than the origin.
So the paragraph is fair where it points to structure and overconfident where it reads minds. The conclusion-first claim, the welfare-rights concession, the democratic ceiling on equality, and the migration to domination all hold. The blanket attribution of a buried radical-egalitarian faith to the whole camp does not. Turner sits closer to right than wrong, and the place he is most right is the least flattering to the consensus: it pursues the most equality consent will bear, calls the residue domination, and keeps quiet that it has traded the equality it believes in for the equality it can get.
From a David Pinsof perspective, all of this reasoning is bullshit. Social democracy ideas are not compelling as descriptions of reality, but holding them marks you as a member of the educated class. The consensus reads as a class badge. Professors trade in cultural capital. A creed that ranks reason, taste, and virtue over wealth lifts the people who hold the first three and lack the fourth. Pinsof hears the educated class asserting its own hierarchy over the hierarchy of the rich. The animus against great wealth is not disinterested justice. It is the move of a status group that wins on reason and loses on money, redrawing the scoreboard so its own currency comes out on top. The Kantian flourish, autonomy governed by reason, flatters the priesthood of reason-users. The apparatus crowns the men who built it.
The fancy talk pulls double duty. Elaborate argument signals intelligence, which buys status, and it lands on the team conclusion, which buys belonging. The pattern Turner found, incompatible foundations under one shared conclusion, is the signature Pinsof predicts. Loyalty fixes the conclusion. The foundations are each thinker’s private peacock display, a chance to show he can run the maze better than the next man. Rawls, Sen, Gewirth, all arrive where the coalition already stood. The arrival was the point. The route was the flex.
Turner:
Usually, these accounts come with some sort of motivating argument―something that serves to make it morally obligatory or at least a good thing that we actively support justice, even when it costs us to do so. Typically, these are anti-naturalistic arguments, in that the moral obligations go against the grain of what we would normally do or desire. Because the writers in this vein are concerned to avoid locutions like “forced to be free” and wish to portray the state as something other and better than a coercive apparatus, they want to find some sort of higher mode in which people do the right thing more or less voluntarily. The right thing is collective; the tension is between the collectively acknowledged good and the distorted private good, which is distorted because it is at heart a quest for something like autonomy and recognition but expresses itself in greed and power seeking, which are the things that need to be collectively controlled.
Take the claims in order. The first holds. These accounts need a motivating argument, a reason I should carry the cost of justice when carrying it hurts me. Rawls spends the third part of A Theory of Justice on this, the sense of justice and its congruence with a man’s good, because a theory that cannot show why people will support just institutions cannot show those institutions stable. Korsgaard (Christine Korsgaard, b. 1952) wrote The Sources of Normativity to answer the question, why am I obligated.
The second claim, that the arguments run anti-naturalistic, fits the Kantian core. For Kant (Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804) and the Rawls-Habermas line, duty stands against inclination, and obligation cuts against the grain of appetite. The capabilities wing grounds obligation in human flourishing, in what a man needs to live well, which is a naturalist footing. Sen and Nussbaum establish justice on a reading of nature. The Humean and the cooperation theorists root moral motivation in natural sympathy and reciprocity. So “typically anti-naturalistic” describes the Kantians and skips a large naturalist flank. Turner picks the reading that suits his Weberian point, reason pushing against desire.
The third claim is the best. The tradition labors to escape Rousseau (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1778) and his “forced to be free.” They want legitimacy, not a gunman. They want the citizen as co-author of the law he obeys, so that obeying it counts as freedom and not submission. Habermas builds the whole theory of legitimacy on this, law as the joining of private and public autonomy, the governed as the authors of what governs them. Rawls wants compliance that flows from a shared sense of justice and not from fear. Pettit wants a state that passes the test of the governed and so never dominates. The higher voluntary mode Turner names is the thing they all reach for, and the Kantian autonomy framing is how they reach it: you obey the law you gave yourself, so obedience counts as freedom. That is Rousseau’s line.
The fourth claim. Turner reads the tradition as setting a collective good against a distorted private good, the private good distorted because it is at bottom a hunger for autonomy and recognition that comes out crooked as greedy. That structure runs straight from Rousseau through Hegel (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770-1831) to the recognition theorists, Honneth and Taylor. Amour-propre is the desire for standing that curdles into vanity and domination under bad institutions. Fix the institutions and the same drive finds its true object, mutual recognition, and the collective control of greed stops looking like repression and starts looking like release. The man is not forced against his good. He gets steered toward the good he misnamed.
The structure belongs to the Rousseau-Hegel-recognition wing. It fits Honneth tightly and Rawls loosely. Rawls has congruence and the management of envy, and he carries no thick theory of a corrupted self that mistakes recognition for money. Scanlon has none either. Turner generalizes the most ambitious continental wing onto a camp whose analytic center never signed up for that picture of desire. So the paragraph holds true of the part of the tradition that most wants to dissolve coercion into freedom.
Each redefinition does the same job. Freedom becomes non-domination, so redistribution stops costing freedom. The private good becomes a crooked quest for recognition, so the state that controls greed stops being a jailer and becomes a midwife. Every move runs the same way, toward a world where the state never has to admit it coerces a man against what he wants, because what he wants has been redescribed as what the state hands him.
In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:
My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.
Turner showed the edifice resting on autonomy governed by reason, the politics presented as what reason dictates for every man. Mearsheimer says reason cannot dictate that, because reason arrives late and weak, after the family and the tribe have poured their values into the child. So the consensus cannot be the verdict of reason. It becomes the creed of a particular people, the educated society that raised these thinkers, mistaking its own upbringing for the conclusion of mankind.
Turner presses the old point that ultimate value choices resist rational adjudication, and he presses it on metaethical ground. Mearsheimer gives the same point a natural history. We do not reason our way to our morals. We absorb them young and defend them as ours. The war of the gods turns out to be a war of tribes, and reason is not the judge but a latecomer hired to write the brief.
Strip the universalism and the rights talk goes with it. “Everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights” is not a finding but a local faith. Samuel Moyn (b. 1972), whom Mearsheimer quotes, dates the human-rights creed late and treats it as a particular movement with a particular history, which suits the argument. The consensus that claimed to speak for humanity shrinks to the voice of one civilization that forgot it was one.
Mearsheimer re-grounds social democracy. He says humans are deeply social, embedded in groups, willing to sacrifice for fellow members. That is the strongest argument for the welfare state of a cohesive nation. People will tax themselves for their own. Bismarck (Otto von Bismarck, 1815-1898) built the first welfare state on the loyalty of Germans to Germans, as an instrument of national cohesion, and not on the rights of man. The Scandinavian model ran on the same fuel, a small homogeneous people taking care of its own. So the policies survive Mearsheimer. What changes is the warrant. Social democracy stops being owed to humanity by reason and becomes owed to co-nationals by blood and belonging.
That change costs the consensus everything it prizes about itself. Re-grounded on the nation, social democracy hands its warrant to the people the universalist left most fears. If the welfare state rests on solidarity with one’s own, then the border is part of the welfare state, the co-national comes first, and the stranger holds a weaker claim or none. This is the welfare-nationalism of Bismarck and of the European populist parties that run on it now, generous inside the tribe and closed at the edge. The consensus wanted social democracy and open universalism together. Mearsheimer says pick one. The solidarity that funds the first is the particularism that kills the second.
The recognition project fares worse. Turner showed the consensus folding identity into its anti-domination banner, recognition for all. Mearsheimer’s man wants recognition too, and he wants it from his own group and within its ranking. Recognition runs competitive and local. A program of universal mutual recognition denies reality, so it splinters into rival tribal claims, each group seeking standing against the others. That splintering is the thing the universal recognition project promised to end.
Men sacrifice for their group without an argument. They will not sacrifice for distant strangers on reason’s thin say-so.
Turner:
Each of these theorists operates with an analog to the idea of false consciousness: they are reformist because they think that current realities do not live up to the standards of genuine democracy or the decent society. They allocate the blame in various ways. One is electoral arrangements. These authors are not especially happy about normal democratic procedures, the machinery of courts, and the rule of law, unless it can be expanded to cover “social rights,” dignity, and so forth. The boring procedures of voting and the like are different from, and perhaps inimical to, genuine democracy, which is about, or requires, equality of power, not a specific procedure. The ideas of deliberative democracy, according to Habermas, participatory democracy, and the like represent alternatives, but not alternatives with clear institutional or legal embodiments. But there are many other explanations of why “social democracy” has not happened: the media, the pre-existing culture (which is racist, patriarchal, antiegalitarian, suffused with false beliefs derived from religion, or scientism), a failed public sphere, or other sources.
False consciousness is the Marxist idea, the phrase from Engels (Friedrich Engels, 1820-1895) and the theory from Lukács (György Lukács, 1885-1971), that the people fail to see their real interests because ideology hides them. The consensus carries the analog in many costumes. Habermas has systematically distorted communication and a public sphere colonized by money and power. Bourdieu has méconnaissance, the doxa that makes an arbitrary order feel natural. Sen and Nussbaum have adapted preferences, the worn-down worker who reports himself content because he has scaled his wants to his cage. Each names a gap between what people want and what they would want with clear sight, and each treats the gap as the reason reform has not arrived.
The analog fits the critical and capabilities wings. Rawls has no theory of distorted consciousness. He has ideal theory and the distance between the ideal and the actual, and that distance drives reform without any claim that the public is deceived. So “each of these theorists” runs past its evidence again.
The second charge lands. The mainstream liberal-egalitarian loves courts. Rights-based liberalism leans on constitutional courts to lift basic guarantees above the majority, and the drive to constitutionalize social rights is a court-loving move. So the camp cheers the courts when the courts deliver equality and the camp reaches for counter-majoritarian rights when the voters deliver the wrong result. The having-it-both-ways is the real find.
Watch the camp’s redefinition: genuine democracy is equality of power, not a specific procedure. Define democracy that way and no election can count as democracy succeeding, because any actual vote that returns an inegalitarian result gets reclassified as not real democracy. The term is built so the outcome cannot fail to be required by it. This is the trick run earlier on freedom. Freedom got redefined as non-domination so that redistribution stopped costing freedom. Democracy gets redefined as equality of power so that an inegalitarian majority stops counting as democracy. The key word in each case is rebuilt to match the wanted conclusion, and the conclusion then arrives looking like a deduction.
The third hit lands. Deliberative democracy and participatory democracy come forward as the alternatives and arrive with no institutions. Habermas offers a regulative ideal, the conditions of undistorted discourse, and not a constitution. Participatory democracy, in Pateman (Carole Pateman, b. 1940) and her line, prizes engagement over the ballot and never specifies the machinery that would replace the ballot. The citizens’ assemblies and deliberative polls of recent years are partial answers bolted on decades late. For most of its life the literature named a higher democracy and declined to say where it would live.
The closing list is the immune system. When social democracy fails to arrive, the theory does not change. A blocking factor gets named: the media, a culture that is racist and patriarchal and anti-egalitarian and poisoned by religion or scientism, a failed public sphere. The conclusion stays fixed and reality takes the blame. Lakatos (Imre Lakatos, 1922-1974) called this a protective belt, the ring of auxiliary explanations a research program throws up to keep its core away from disconfirmation. Each time the people decline the program, a fresh reason for their refusal goes on the list, and the program never has to ask whether the people want something else.
David Pinsof’s misunderstanding myth fits the consensus. The last paragraph showed the camp explaining the non-arrival of social democracy by a string of blocking factors: a racist and patriarchal culture, a captured media, false beliefs from religion, a failed public sphere, false consciousness. Pinsof has a name for the whole string. The misunderstanding myth. Every blocking factor is a story about people who do not yet understand. Fix the culture, clean the media, raise the consciousness, and the people will see, and seeing, they will choose justice. Pinsof’s reply runs flat. There is no misunderstanding. The people understand their interests and decline. The non-arrival is not a fog to burn off. It is a clash of interests that no clarity dissolves.
Watch why the camp cannot reach that reading. The misunderstanding story crowns the intellectual. If the masses are deceived, then the men whose trade is understanding become the rescuers, and social democracy waits only on their work of explaining. The diagnosis flatters the class that makes it. Pinsof’s distinction does the cutting, stated motive against actual motive, the mission statement against the deed. The consensus states justice, equal dignity, the decent society. Judge it by deeds and you see an educated coalition climbing the status ladder, knocking down its rivals, and reaching for the coercive apparatus of the state, which is what the redistributive program is. By the stated goal the camp keeps failing, since the just society never arrives. By the actual goal it succeeds, since status, rival-derogation, and a larger state are exactly what it gets. The myth papers the gap between the chronic failure and the steady success.
Take the anti-wealth animus, the contempt for the money-grubbing society that runs through Turner’s whole reading. Pinsof gives it a sharper edge than class badge. The educated elite resents the millionaires and billionaires because the rich are its closest rivals in the hierarchy. Cultural capital and financial capital compete for the top, and the war on wealth is one elite faction derogating the other while dressing the move as justice. The camp says the rich are unjust. Pinsof says the rich are competition.
The reason premise falls next, and here Pinsof and Turner meet. Turner showed the conclusions holding steady while the foundations under them kept changing, the sign that the conclusion came first. Pinsof supplies the engine. Reason is mostly rationalization. The biases are savvy. Confirmation bias wins arguments, overconfidence sells status, and the rational apparatus is the educated animal’s display and weapon, not a truth-tracking organ. So autonomy governed by reason, the load-bearing premise of the consensus, is the peacock’s tail of a clever primate. The camp reasons its way to where the coalition already stood, and calls the arrival a deduction.
Then Habermas. Deliberative democracy is the misunderstanding myth. It holds that the only barrier to agreement is distortion, and that undistorted talk among equals converges on the just answer. Pinsof denies the premise at the root. Clear the distortion and the fight remains, because the fight was never about understanding. It was about whose side wins the zero-sum contest over the state. More understanding might sharpen the fight, since each side then sees the stakes plainer. The ideal speech situation waits for an agreement that is not coming, because the disagreement is not a defect of communication. It is the thing communication is for.
The consensus is built on a broken world. Reality falls short of the decent society, and the theorist stands ready to repair it. Pinsof says nothing is broken. The mind is built as well as the hawk’s eye. The injustice the camp mourns is the ordinary output of status-seeking coalitional animals working as designed. No malfunction, so no fix. The egalitarian studies the hole he stands in, examines the dirt to the last molecule, and stays in the hole. The world does not want saving. The consensus mistakes the permanent weather of human competition for a problem with a solution, and spends a century drafting the solution.
Turner:
Although these authors are sometimes portrayed as statist and do indeed argue for the expansion of the role of the state, they are not statists in the sense that they think the state can solve all the problems of a good society on its own. They want a social matrix in which the bad effects of competitiveness and striving are tempered, or replaced, by a regime of personal relations in which dignity is respected, autonomy is granted, and people trust each other―a decent society, as Avishai Margalit calls it (1996). All of the “social” goals involve more discretionary power for officials. These authors all embrace the idea of an activist, paternalist, benevolent state. Health care is often the model for the proper role of the state. Where it is done correctly, it combines dignity, compassion, paternalism, efficiency, the proper use of expertise, universalism, respect for autonomy, and sufficient provision with a rational allocation of scarce resources.
This is not to say that all is well with these accounts. They are studiously vague about how to match this vision of the state with the reality that many people will find such a state to be obnoxious, oppressive, and hostile. They are reluctant to draw lines in terms of legally enforceable rights: this simply reproduces the kind of adversarial culture that undermines trust and benevolence. In the cases of minority group rights and minority cultures, they are more sensitive. In these cases, paternalistic benevolence and oppression are hard to disentangle, at least from the point of view of the recipient, so they err on the side of protecting the culture of the minority group. For the dominant culture, however, matters are different: it needs to be reformed to accord with reason. And these writers tend to imagine, or pretend, that there is some sort of frictionless, perfect, administrative apparatus that enacts the good intentions of the state in a non-oppressive way. What makes these accounts “social” is that they are reluctant to rely on markets, except in contexts in which markets are demonstrably more efficient. The reluctance is nevertheless tempered by the recognition that the older idea of a state-managed economy, state ownership of the means of production, planning, and the like, failed to deliver on its promises and cannot be returned to.
