Justin Murphy and the Post-Academic Scholar: A Career on the Open Internet

Justin Murphy is an American political scientist who left a permanent lectureship at the University of Southampton in 2019 to build an independent intellectual career on the internet. He took his PhD from Temple University in 2014 and held the Southampton post from 2014 to 2019. During those five years he published on public opinion, ideology, and political behavior in journals including the British Journal of Political Science, International Studies Quarterly, and IEEE Intelligent Systems. His departure from academic employment marks the central biographical event of his career and the empirical premise of nearly everything he has written since. Grokipedia
Murphy entered political science through its quantitative wing. His early work used statistical methods on protest behavior, ideological sorting, and the structure of public attitudes. That training survives in his current writing as a habit of treating left and right as clusters of measurable dispositions rather than coherent moral identities. At the same time, his theoretical reading ran in another direction. He absorbed Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995), Felix Guattari (1930–1992), and Nick Land (b. 1962), and produced Based Deleuze: The Left-Wing Critique of Left-Wing Politics, a short volume that uses Deleuze to attack contemporary progressive activism. The book stands as the hinge between his academic publications and his post-academic output.
After 2019 Murphy built Other Life, a newsletter, podcast, and paid education platform that now constitutes his full-time work. He runs a private membership community for independent intellectuals called IndieThinkers.org, and funds his research through patrons, book sales, courses, and consulting. He leads cohorts of paying subscribers through close readings of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and Land. In 2026 he published The Independent Scholar, which presents internet-based intellectual life as a return to older archetypes: the pamphleteer, the salon host, the freelance philosopher. He treats audience patronage, decentralized protocols, and self-hosted infrastructure as the technical preconditions for scholarly autonomy.
His audience is narrow and recognizable. It draws from technically literate young men, founders, graduate students of heterodox temperament, and readers on the dissident right and post-left. He has cultivated this audience through Twitter as @jmrphy, long-form podcasts, and direct subscription. He lives in Austin, Texas, with his wife and son. He has developed close ties to the techno-capitalist milieu around accelerationism and to the network-state thesis associated with Balaji Srinivasan (b. 1980). Murphy conducted a rare long-form interview with Land during Land’s period of relative seclusion, which secured his position as a popularizer of Dark Enlightenment material for a more entrepreneurial readership. Grokipedia
His religious position complicates any easy placement on the standard map. Murphy identifies as Catholic, and his Catholicism does most of its work as a critique of media ecology. He argues that the constant stimulation of algorithmic platforms demands ascetic counter-discipline: fasting, liturgy, monastic structure, and refusal of the therapeutic vocabulary that dominates institutional life. He treats trauma talk and safety language as symptoms of the same managerial culture he left.
Murphy’s intellectual style fuses sources that rarely meet. Continental theory sits next to public-opinion statistics. Catholic devotional writing sits next to startup advice. Memetic compression for Twitter sits next to slow reading of Nietzsche. The result reads as deliberate violation of disciplinary boundary, and his critics treat it as the cover under which reactionary content travels into respectable feeds. His defenders read it as an attempt to keep older intellectual roles alive after their institutional supports have decayed.
His sociological significance runs larger than any single argument he makes. Murphy belongs to the first cohort to attempt a full intellectual career on decentralized digital patronage. The career form he occupies has no settled name. It is not journalism, not the academy, not activism, not consulting. It depends on audience loyalty, algorithmic visibility, and continuous online presence, and it exposes the scholar to platform incentives that reward speed and outrage over slow thought. Murphy writes about this exposure with some clarity and presents his own life as the test case. Whether the form he embodies produces a durable intellectual culture or fragments public discourse into small unstable publics is the open question of his project.

David Pinsof’s Alliance Theory

Pinsof, Sears, and Haselton argue that political belief systems are not philosophies but patchwork narratives that serve to mobilize support for allies and opposition to rivals. Applied to Justin Murphy, the frame helps explain a position that resists conventional ideological mapping.
Murphy’s stated views form an unusual cluster. He absorbs continental theory from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, two figures of the post-Marxist left. He reads Nick Land, who exited that left toward an accelerationist reaction. He defends Catholic asceticism against algorithmic stimulation. He aligns with Austin tech capital and the network-state milieu around Balaji Srinivasan. He attacks the professional-managerial class and its therapeutic vocabulary. He sells close readings of Nietzsche to software engineers and startup founders. Asked what moral principle ties these together, no clean answer emerges. Spiritual seriousness, intellectual openness, anti-conformism: each holds at one site and breaks at another.
Alliance Theory predicts this pattern. Murphy’s belief system runs heterogeneous because his coalition runs heterogeneous. The audience that funds him includes tech founders who want philosophical depth without PMC manners, refugees from progressive institutions who want company in their exit, Catholic traditionalists who want a smart younger spokesman, post-left readers who want a Deleuzean exit from identity politics, and graduate students of heterodox temperament who want a model for staying intellectually alive after the academy collapses. Each subgroup has its own moral vocabulary. The platform survives by holding them together.
The criteria Pinsof identifies for choosing allies all run through the case. Similarity: Murphy’s allies are people who left, or were pushed from, mainstream institutional life, who write online, who treat universities and legacy media as exhausted. Transitivity: the enemies of progressive institutional managerialism become allies, regardless of how poorly their stated views fit together. A Heideggerian translator of Dugin, a Catholic traditionalist, a transhumanist investor, and an ex-Marxist accelerationist share no philosophy, but they share a rival. Interdependence: Murphy provides his coalition with intellectual cover and a paid curriculum; the coalition provides him with patronage and audience. The arrangement runs reciprocal and material. Stochasticity: the configuration is contingent. A few different career events between 2015 and 2019 might have produced a different roster of allies and a different patchwork of beliefs.
The propagandistic biases described in the paper also show up. Perpetrator biases run heavy. When figures inside Murphy’s coalition produce controversial output, the framing he uses is intellectual openness, anti-conformism, or refusal of moral hypersensitivity. The same output, produced by a PMC figure with different allegiances, might get a different label. Victim biases run heavy in the opposite direction. The academic refugees, the canceled, the post-PMC dissidents, the heterodox podcasters: their grievances receive full weight. Attributional biases follow. Murphy traces PMC success to internal failings of the PMC, namely credentialism, sinecure, moral blackmail, and conformism. He traces his coalition’s struggles to external causes, namely censorship, platform throttling, and institutional capture. The same outcomes, switched between coalitions, might receive opposite attributions.
Pinsof’s prediction that egalitarianism is a flexible tactic also applies. Murphy’s egalitarian and emancipatory inheritance from Deleuze sits next to a willingness to defend hierarchy when the hierarchy is monastic, philosophical, or Catholic. Which equality talk surfaces depends on the audience. The Deleuzean phrasing comes out for the post-left listeners. The hierarchy-friendly phrasing comes out for the Catholics and the tech capitalists. The contradiction is real, but Alliance Theory says it should not embarrass anyone. The contradiction is the price of holding a heterogeneous coalition together.
One test of the frame is whether the same content gets different moral treatment from Murphy depending on the speaker. Take taboo speech. Murphy defends reading politically radioactive thinkers on grounds of intellectual openness. Were a left-coded academic to defend reading a comparably radioactive figure from the other direction, the openness frame might apply, but it might not, and the test is whether Murphy applies the principle symmetrically across coalitions. Pinsof’s framework predicts asymmetric application. Take therapeutic language. Murphy attacks it as PMC vocabulary. Were a member of his coalition to frame his own exit from academia in therapy-inflected terms, the same vocabulary might receive a pass. Take credential talk. Murphy treats PMC credentialism as moral blackmail. Yet his platform sells credentialed authority of a different kind: the PhD, the published academic articles, the citation network he carries with him. He launders the credential into anti-credentialism without diminishing its weight.

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Richard Hanania and the Rise of the Independent Polemicist

Richard Hanania (b. 1985) is an American political writer, legal commentator, and institutional critic whose career illustrates the transformation of intellectual life under digital conditions. Born to a Greek Orthodox Palestinian father and a Catholic Jordanian mother, he immigrated to the United States as a child and spent part of his adolescence at Casa by the Sea, a controversial residential treatment program in Mexico, an experience he later credited with redirecting his life. He earned a B.A. in linguistics from the University of Colorado Boulder in 2009, a J.D. from the University of Chicago Law School in 2013, and a Ph.D. in political science from UCLA in 2018, where Marc Trachtenberg (b. 1946) and Robert Trager directed his dissertation on moral psychology and the use of force. He then held a postdoctoral position at Columbia’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies before founding the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology, an independent research outfit funded through private donors and tied to the heterodox right.
His intellectual identity forms at the intersection of legal realism, behavioral social science, internet polemics, and elite institutional critique. He does not come up through the standard pipeline of movement conservatism, religious institutions, or party politics. He belongs to the generation shaped by blogs, online forums, and long-form digital writing. His work pairs empirical claims drawn from political science, sociology, psychometrics, and economics with a rhetorical style closer to internet argument culture than to academic prose. Beneath the combative surface sits a coherent set of concerns: bureaucratic dysfunction, ideological conformity inside elite institutions, the incentives created by civil-rights law, the role of group differences in social outcomes, and the decline of state capacity.
His first wide audience came from writing on race, immigration, higher education, wokeness, and administrative power. He argues that contemporary American institutions answer less to formal constitutional principles than to a diffuse anti-discrimination bureaucracy operating through litigation threats, professional norms, and reputational pressure. The Origins of Woke: Civil Rights Law, Corporate America, and the Triumph of Identity Politics by Richard Hanania (2023). The book shifts the explanation for progressive cultural dominance away from purely ideological accounts and toward legal and administrative origins. In his telling, the expansion of civil-rights enforcement after the 1960s produced a large compliance and human-resources infrastructure that reshaped corporate behavior, schools, and professional norms. He treats “wokeness” not as a grassroots moral awakening but as the downstream consequence of administrative enforcement regimes combined with elite credentialing structures.
The argument places him within a tradition of institutional realism running through James Q. Wilson (1931–2012), Samuel P. Huntington (1927–2008), and at moments Michel Foucault (1926–1984), though Hanania approaches the material in a more polemical and data-driven manner. Like Huntington, he stresses institutional order and social cohesion. Like Wilson, he focuses on incentive structures and bureaucratic behavior. His style departs sharply from mid-century academic political science. He writes for the accelerated attention economy of online discourse, where intellectual influence depends not only on scholarly precision but on virality, controversy, and speed.
A second source of his notoriety comes from his willingness to discuss subjects associated with human biodiversity, IQ research, and group statistical differences. He argues that elite institutions suppress empirical inquiry out of reputational fear and ideological taboo. Critics accuse him of laundering racial essentialism into technocratic language. Supporters call him a candid observer of politically inconvenient data. The dispute hardened in 2023 when journalists at HuffPost uncovered pseudonymous writings from his earlier internet career, published under the name Richard Hoste on explicitly White-nationalist platforms, containing overt racist and authoritarian material. He publicly repudiated much of this earlier work and drew a line between his later institutional analysis and his teenage and early-twenties extremism. The disclosures shaped public perceptions of him permanently and placed him in a category apart from conventional policy intellectuals.
His career also illustrates a shift in the sociology of intellectual authority. He belongs to a cohort of writers who bypass traditional academic tenure while drawing heavily on academic literature. Most of his influence comes through Substack newsletters, podcasts, online essays, and social-media circulation rather than peer-reviewed scholarship. The environment rewards synthesis, speed, and rhetorical aggression. He thrives in it because he combines enough familiarity with technical literature to appear scholarly while writing in a register accessible to educated online audiences.
Much of his writing centers on elite overproduction and intra-elite conflict. He argues that modern societies produce large numbers of credentialed men and women competing for limited status positions in journalism, academia, nonprofits, and the bureaucracy. Under such conditions, ideological radicalization becomes a strategy for distinction and advancement. The argument echoes Peter Turchin (b. 1957) on elite competition and political instability, and Hanania extends it into analyses of media narratives, diversity offices, and institutional signaling.
On foreign policy he positions himself against both neoconservative interventionism and certain populist forms of nationalist romanticism. His orientation is broadly realist: he stresses state capacity, strategic interest, and institutional effectiveness over moral crusading. He distrusts large-scale ideological projects, whether progressive or nationalist, and rarely separates a policy claim from a question about measurable outcomes.
A recurring theme in his work is the gap between official ideological language and institutional incentives. He argues that organizations adopt public moral language not because leaders sincerely hold every doctrinal claim but because legal exposure, reputational management, and professional advancement require symbolic conformity. The argument shares affinities with public-choice theory and organizational sociology. Institutions, in his account, behave strategically under pressure from activist networks, regulators, media outlets, and professional-managerial norms.
Critics charge him with reductionism and selective empiricism. They argue that he treats contested social-scientific findings as settled when those findings align with his priors, and that he understates the historical role of structural discrimination. Others contend that his emphasis on IQ and group statistical differences risks turning contingent social patterns into deterministic explanations. Defenders reply that his willingness to discuss taboo subjects shows intellectual courage inside a conformist elite culture.
By the mid-2020s his thought shifts. He moves from a critique of elite institutions to a defense of a different elite. He aligns himself with the effective accelerationist current in Silicon Valley and argues that tech founders, venture capitalists, and engineers drive human progress. The pivot alienates him from populists on both the Left and the Right. He rejects populist nationalism as resentment-driven and low in human capital. He advocates instead a technocratic elitism: progress depends on freeing high-ability men from state regulation and democratic pressure.
The shape of his later career depends heavily on a funding and social structure centered in Silicon Valley. His rise shows that independent intellectuals no longer rely chiefly on individual Substack subscribers; they rely on an alternative patronage network of tech oligarchs. Peter Thiel (b. 1967) and Marc Andreessen (b. 1971) have built an intellectual ecosystem that insulates writers like Hanania from mainstream cancellation. The network supplies financial backing, social status, and platform promotion. Hanania has become an intellectual defender of this tech elite, arguing that technological advancement and market freedom count for more than democratic consensus.
His legal commentary focuses increasingly on the conservative supermajority of the Supreme Court. In The Origins of Woke he locates the modern compliance state in executive-branch and civil-rights enforcement. To dismantle it he points not to legislation, which he views as gridlocked, but to the judiciary. He treats the current Court as the one state instrument capable of rolling back affirmative action, disparate-impact doctrine, and administrative overreach. The view treats judges not as neutral arbiters of constitutional text but as political actors who must use state power to crush progressive administrative law.
Following the 2023 disclosures, Hanania attempts a further rhetorical move. He begins to position himself as a pragmatic moderate on selected issues, praising aspects of Biden-era foreign policy and criticizing the conspiratorial character of the contemporary conservative movement. He uses the move to rebuild credibility with mainstream centrist figures while holding his core views on demographics and institutional capture. The shift shows a deliberate effort to migrate from right-wing provocateur to a permanent fixture in elite policy debate.
The Hanania case bears on more than one writer. It reflects a broader struggle over who has legitimacy to interpret social reality in the digital age. Traditional gatekeeping institutions once policed the boundaries of respectable discourse through journals, universities, and major newspapers. Figures like Hanania emerge from the weakening of those monopolies. Online intellectual life has produced a new ecology where independent analysts acquire substantial audiences without institutional certification, and where the lines among scholarship, polemic, journalism, and personal branding grow harder to draw.
He may be remembered less as a systematic theorist than as a symptom and product of institutional transition. He belongs to the era when Substack, podcasts, and algorithmic attention systems fractured older consensus structures and produced new reputational economies. His career displays both the opportunities and the hazards of that transformation: the democratization of intellectual participation alongside the erosion of professional filters. Read as a dissident realist exposing institutional hypocrisies or as a sophisticated provocateur trading on controversy, he holds an important place in the early-twenty-first-century landscape of American political thought.

Hanania has written so many things that on their own I would normally find disqualifying (such as that he can write as well as Shakespeare), that I cannot engage with him on more than a limited basis. I grant that he sometimes says things that are important, but for me they are not worth the price of what comes with the insight. The ratio of nonsense to merit is too high.
The grandiosity is not incidental to the work. It is part of the package he sells. The Shakespeare line, the running self-rankings against other writers, the public scorekeeping on who he has beaten in an argument, the announcements that he has been proven right about X, the comparisons of his own intelligence to that of his critics. These are not lapses in an otherwise sober output. They are a load-bearing piece of the brand. Take them out and a lot of the attention engine stops running.
The obnoxious ego works for him in the attention economy. Outrage and self-aggrandizement are cheaper fuel than careful argument. They produce screenshots. They produce quote-tweets. They keep him in feeds even when his claim is modest. Writers without institutional cover have to generate their own gravity, and one cheap way to generate it is to be insufferable in public on a schedule. He has chosen that path consciously.
Sustained exposure to a writer who positions himself as smarter than everyone he discusses corrodes the reader. Even when the underlying observation is sharp, the frame trains you to read the world as a series of contests he is winning. After a while the frame leaks into your own thinking. You start to evaluate ideas by who is dunking on whom rather than by what is true. That is a high tax on whatever insight you extract.
There is also a separate question about whether the grandiosity is evidence about the analysis. A man who sincerely believes he writes like Shakespeare is a man with weak reality-testing in at least one domain. That does not automatically discredit his institutional analysis, but it should make you slower to trust his calibration when he is confident. Confidence in him is not a reliable signal because the dial is stuck near the top.
My solution is to read him occasionally when someone I trust flags a piece, skip the social media, accept that I will miss some good observations, and treat the missed observations as the price of not absorbing the rest. That trade recognizes that attention is finite and that some writers come bundled with damage I do not have to take on.

Hanania reminds me of John Podhoretz, who is a great magazine editor and a great synthesizer of ideas who also seems like a horrible human being if you judge him by the 100 most obnoxious things he’s said on social media.
Both are smart men with things to say who have decided that public belligerence is part of the offering. Both punch down at named people in ways that read as personal. Both seem to enjoy the cruelty. Both have built audiences who come partly for the insight and partly for the spectacle, and both know it. Neither would be read as widely if he were polite.
John Podhoretz (b. 1961) carries a specific inheritance that Hanania does not. He is the son of Norman Podhoretz (b. 1930) and Midge Decter (1927–2022), and he grew up inside the neoconservative apparatus during its formative decades. His vitriol has a tribal logic. It is the vitriol of a man defending a movement, a magazine, a family lineage, and a set of alliances that long predate him. When he is ugly about someone, the ugliness usually tracks a coalition line that runs back through Commentary, the Committee on the Present Danger, the second-generation neocons, and the various wars they backed. You can predict who he will be cruel to by knowing whose side he is on. His nastiness is not freelance.
Hanania is freelance. His attacks are not in service of a movement he inherited. He has switched coalitions more than once in a short career. He punched at neocons, then punched at populist nationalists, then punched at his own former audience after the HuffPost disclosures, then aligned with the tech-accelerationist current. The vitriol is not in defense of a long-standing tribe. It is closer to the vitriol of a man who has decided that contempt is a personal style and a market position. That makes him harder to read by coalition map and easier to read as an individual psychological case.
Podhoretz operates inside the older magazine world. He has editors, a masthead, institutional reputational constraints, and people who can call him before publication. Even his worst pieces went through a process. Hanania operates outside that filter. Substack, podcast, tweet, repeat. Nobody is telling him to take a paragraph out. The ugliness is unmediated in a way Podhoretz’s is not.
With both men you pay an enormous emotional and ethical cost to extract the insight, and with both you have to decide whether the insight clears the price. The decision can come out differently for different readers.

If we were friends and I knew that you would forgive me saying something stupid, I’d say Podhoretz displays a Jewish cruelty and Hanania a Palestinian cruelty.
I can’t defend that statement. In fact, I’m dialing the Thought Police right now to turn myself in.
I’m gesturing at something here that, I know, is indefensible.
I do not believe in the truth of what I said. I do not believe in essentialism. I do not believe there is a Jewish essence and a Palestinian essence. I’m trying to gesture at something I can’t name.
I also believe that we can’t live without the heuristic of essence. If you have a strong in-group identity, you will tend to talk about out-groups as though they have an essence, and if this talk takes place among members of your tribe, you won’t give a fuck.
The Podhoretz texture is verbal, fast, performed in front of an audience that knows the references, and it draws on a long house style of polemic that runs through Commentary, the New York intellectuals, and further back into a tradition of disputation where cutting someone is partly entertainment and partly community maintenance. The cruelty assumes a shared room. It is meant to be witnessed by people who will laugh, who will remember the line, who will repeat it at the next dinner. Even when it wounds, it stays inside a recognizable form. There are rules. The target is usually someone inside or adjacent to the same world, and the cruelty is calibrated to that proximity. It is the cruelty of an in-group that argues with itself fiercely because the bonds are assumed.
What I am calling the Palestinian texture in Hanania has a different shape. It is colder, more solitary, less interested in the audience as a community of equals. There is less play in it. The grievance underneath is harder to locate because it does not attach to a defined people he is defending. The contempt is more global. It treats most other men as below him rather than as worthy sparring partners inside a shared frame. You do not get the sense, reading him, that he is performing for a room he loves. You get the sense that the room is instrumental and the contempt is the content.
Whether that maps cleanly onto ethnic inheritance is a separate question and the kind of claim that does not survive being written down without a great deal of careful framing. But the phenomenological observation underneath, that the two men are cruel in different keys and that the difference has cultural texture, is real. Podhoretz’s cruelty is social. Hanania’s is cold disdain. One assumes a tribe. The other operates without one.
The observation belongs to the kind of talk that happens between men who share enough background that shorthand works and who trust each other not to flatten the comment into something coarser than it was meant. Out of that setting it reads differently. Inside it the comment is a piece of social diagnosis, the kind of thing Jews and other members of intense in-groups have said about each other and about their neighbors for a very long time, with the understanding that the speaker is also implicated in what he is describing.

David Pinsof’s Alliance Theory

Hanania’s alliance structure has shifted several times in a short career, and his stated views shifted with it.
In his early pseudonymous period he writes under the name Richard Hoste on White-nationalist platforms. The coalition is small, ideologically explicit, and ethnically defined. The propagandistic biases run in the predicted direction. White people are framed as victims of demographic change. Perpetrators of past harms get rationalized through circumstance. Disparate outcomes are attributed to internal traits in his allies and external causes in his rivals.
In the second period, running from the late 2010s into the early 2020s, he builds the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology and writes for a wider heterodox-right audience. The coalition broadens. He keeps the substantive views on group differences and institutional capture but drops the explicit ethnic framing and the pseudonym. The propaganda calibration changes. The civil-rights bureaucracy becomes the perpetrator. Ordinary unprotected men become the victims. The attributional pattern shifts from race-explicit to credentialism-explicit. He still attributes ally advantages to internal traits, but the allies are now “high human capital” men rather than a named ethnic group. Same biases, broader coalition, sanitized vocabulary.
The third move follows the 2023 HuffPost disclosure. The earlier coalition becomes a liability. He repudiates the pseudonymous writings, and the coalition pivots toward Silicon Valley tech capital. Thiel and Andreessen and their orbit become the new patrons. The substantive views on group differences and institutional capture survive, but the rivals and victims change. Populist nationalists, useful allies against the woke center a year earlier, become rivals. He attacks them as resentment-driven and low in human capital. The Court replaces the legislature as the chief weapon. Mainstream Democrats become acceptable interlocutors. Praising parts of Biden-era foreign policy is the kind of move Alliance Theory predicts when a writer probes entry into a centrist coalition. It does not represent a change in his foreign-policy thinking. It signals availability for new bedfellows.
By Alliance Theory’s lights, this is not three different intellectual positions. It is one alliance psychology adjusting to three opportunity sets. The propagandistic biases run the same direction each time. The targets change because the allies change.
Apply the three biases to the current period.
Perpetrator biases. Tech founders get rationalized for what their products do at scale. The harms of recommendation algorithms, of attention extraction, of labor displacement, of platform-mediated political crisis, are minimized as growing pains, externalities the market will correct, or consequences of forces no individual founder controls. The hostility he aims at DEI officers for institutional harm gets suspended when comparable institutional harm comes from a founder he likes. The structural signature shows up in the prose: harm gets described, when it gets described at all, in passive constructions and abstract nouns. The agent disappears.
Victim biases. Current-coalition grievances get amplified. Founders cancelled by Twitter mobs, executives pushed out by HR departments, engineers reprimanded for off-platform speech, investors whose portfolio companies face regulatory scrutiny, all draw sympathetic coverage. The same coverage does not extend to victims outside the coalition. When a working-class town gets harmed by a tech rollout, the harm becomes a story about Luddites and adjustment costs. When a tech executive faces criticism, the criticism becomes a story about mob justice and elite capture. Symmetrical hostile coverage of the working class and sympathetic coverage of the executive class is the prediction; the prediction holds.
Attributional biases. Tech success is internal: founder genius, technical ability, willingness to take risk, refusal to obey norms. Tech failure is external: regulatory burden, woke harassment, media sabotage. Rival success (humanities professors with prestigious posts, journalists with influence, civil-rights lawyers with leverage) is external: rent-seeking, captured institutions, credential cartels. Rival failure is internal: low IQ, bad judgment, resentment. The self-serving attributional asymmetry that Pinsof and colleagues document at the mass level is plainly visible in his prose at the individual level.
Choice of allies tracks the criteria the theory specifies.
Similarity. He shares with the tech coalition a quantitative orientation, contempt for credentialism unmoored from output, comfort with rude argument, and a preference for empirical-sounding claims about group differences. The similarity is not ideological in the conventional sense. It is stylistic and epistemic. Alliance Theory predicts that this similarity will read, from inside the coalition, as a shared philosophy. From outside, it reads as a shared posture.
Transitivity. The accelerationist current fights the same parties Hanania fights: the regulatory state, the legacy media, the DEI bureaucracy, the academic humanities, the populist right that wants to break up large platforms. The enemy of his enemy becomes his ally. Once Thiel and Andreessen are in, anyone they fight becomes available as a target, and anyone they like becomes available as a friend. The transitivity runs one way and operates instrumentally. It does not rest on a shared theory of the good.
Interdependence. The tech network supplies what no Substack subscription base can supply on its own: insulation against mainstream cancellation, financial backing through donations and fellowships, platform promotion through retweets and podcast appearances, and access to the inner social world of Silicon Valley. He supplies intellectual cover, namely academic-language defenses of high-skilled immigration, of state-capacity policy, of the Court as a tool against regulatory overreach, of the founder as a civilizational asset. Each side provides what the other cannot produce alone. Alliance Theory predicts durable alliances when interdependence runs both ways, and his arrangement with tech capital has the structural features the theory associates with durability.
Stochasticity. The HuffPost disclosure was contingent. A different reporter might have missed the trail. A different editor might have buried the piece. The exposure pushed him into a coalition pivot that might not have happened, or might not have happened as fast, without the external shock. Alliance Theory predicts that alliance structures arise partly from accidents of this kind. The accident did not create the underlying tendencies. It accelerated the move from one coalition to another.
The Shakespeare-level grandiosity and the public scorekeeping read inside the frame as recruitment behavior. In an attention economy where independent writers must generate their own gravity, performed contempt toward outsiders functions as a coalition signal. It tells current allies he will not betray them to outsiders. It tells potential patrons he can absorb cancellation costs they cannot. It tells third parties watching the fight that he carries no fear. The grandiosity is not incidental to the work. It is part of the alliance maintenance, directed at an audience that prizes defiance as an ally trait.
The cruelty difference between Hanania and John Podhoretz, raised earlier, also clarifies. Podhoretz inherits a coalition. His cruelty polices boundaries inside a long-standing alliance and against its inherited rivals. The targets follow from the coalition map. Hanania’s coalition is built rather than inherited. His cruelty is broader, less rule-governed, and more entrepreneurial because the alliance itself is recent and the boundaries are still being negotiated. New coalitions generate more visible boundary-policing than old ones because the boundaries remain in dispute.
The “enlightened centrist” rebranding is the move Alliance Theory predicts when a writer tests entry into a second coalition without abandoning the first. He praises selected Biden-era foreign policy. He criticizes the conspiratorial style of the contemporary right. The substantive views remain. The propaganda calibration adjusts to admit a new set of allies, centrist policy intellectuals and mainstream foreign-policy realists, without expelling the current set, tech capital and the heterodox right. The move makes little sense if you treat his stated positions as a stable philosophy. It makes sense if you treat them as the coalition language he uses at a given moment.
The Origins of Woke: Civil Rights Law, Corporate America, and the Triumph of Identity Politics by Richard Hanania (2023) argues that progressive cultural dominance is not a values shift but the downstream effect of civil-rights enforcement, compliance infrastructure, and credentialing pressure. The argument is itself an Alliance Theory argument applied to American institutions: belief systems are coalition technology backed by enforcement, not the philosophical evolution of public moral sentiment. The argument has merit. The interesting question is why Hanania does not apply the same analysis to his own intellectual trajectory. Alliance Theory predicts that he will not. Reflexive application of coalition analysis to one’s own coalition is rare among coalition partisans because it destabilizes the coalition. The same writer can produce incisive coalition analysis of other formations and remain blind to his own. That is the prediction, and the prediction holds.
Read through Alliance Theory, then, Hanania looks more coherent than he looks read as a philosophical thinker. The philosophical reading produces a man who has shifted views three or four times in a decade. The Alliance reading produces a man with steady alliance psychology adjusting to three opportunity sets and one external shock. The current arrangement with tech capital has the structural features that predict durability. The next prediction, for anyone testing the frame forward, is that any future shift in his stated views will track a shift in his patronage rather than a shift in his arguments. The arguments are downstream.

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J. Otto Pohl: Historian of Soviet Ethnic Repression

Jonathan Otto Pohl (b. 1970) is an American historian of Soviet ethnic repression. His scholarship centers on the deportation, special settlement, and labor mobilization of Soviet minorities under Stalin, with particular attention to ethnic Germans, Mennonites, Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Koreans, and other peoples uprooted by NKVD decree between the late 1930s and the mid-1950s. He treats Soviet population management as a coherent administrative order rather than as episodic terror, and his books read as documentary reconstructions assembled from census records, NKVD files, transportation logs, and mortality registers.

Pohl earned a BA in history from Grinnell College and pursued graduate study at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, where he received an MA and a PhD. His intellectual formation coincided with the opening of Soviet archives after 1991, and his work belongs to the first generation of historians able to ground claims about Stalinist repression in newly accessible documentary evidence rather than émigré testimony or ideological inference.

His academic career has unfolded mainly outside the American university core. From 2007 to 2010 he taught international and comparative politics as associate professor at the American University of Central Asia in Kyrgyzstan. In 2011 he moved to the University of Ghana, first as visiting scholar and then as lecturer in the history department through 2016. He then served as assistant professor of social sciences at the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani from 2016 to 2019. This itinerant career, stretched across post-Soviet Central Asia, West Africa, and Iraqi Kurdistan, mirrors his scholarly attention to borderlands, displacement, and imperial fragmentation.

Pohl’s first book, The Stalinist Penal System: A Statistical History of Soviet Repression and Terror, 1930-1953 (McFarland, 1997), set the empirical tone of his subsequent work. The volume relies on quantitative reconstruction rather than testimony, marshaling tables of prisoner counts, sentencing categories, camp populations, and mortality figures. Reviewers responded according to taste. Michael Gelb called the book useful for making previously inaccessible Soviet-era scholarship available in English. Christopher Ward, writing in the Journal of European Studies, judged it a statistical handbook rather than a history.

His second book, Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949 (Greenwood, 1999), placed Soviet deportations inside the international vocabulary of ethnic cleansing. The title constituted an argument. Pohl took issue with historians such as Charles Maier (b. 1939) and Deborah Lipstadt (b. 1947), who held that Soviet citizens were not victims of ethnic deportation in the same register as victims of Nazi policy. He called this position willful ignorance and chronicled, people by people, the categories of Soviet citizens removed from their homes by collective decree. Brian Glyn Williams praised the book as groundbreaking. John Klier (1944-2007) called it a valuable chronicle of deported peoples but faulted Pohl for treating the different victim groups as too similar in experience.

In 2009 the American Historical Society of Germans from Russia published Catherine’s Grandchildren: A Short History of the Russian-Germans under Soviet Rule, a compact survey of the community whose history runs through most of Pohl’s archival work. He returned to the subject at greater length in The Years of Great Silence: The Deportation, Special Settlement, and Mobilization into the Labor Army of Ethnic Germans in the USSR, 1941-1955 (Ibidem, 2022). Slavic Review called the volume a detailed and informative account while criticizing its tone as overly opinionated.

Pohl co-edited Replenishing History: New Directions to Historical Research in the 21st Century in Ghana (Ayebia Clarke, 2014) with Nana Yaw B. Sapong during his Ghana years, and contributed essays to edited volumes on Eurasian migration and on Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972). His chapter on Nkrumah examined the 1966 coup and the CIA role in it, a piece written in the African phase of his career when he extended his interest in state power outward from Soviet population engineering toward postcolonial Africa.

His central conceptual contribution lies in his sustained attention to the spetspereselentsy, or special settler, system. Unlike Gulag prisoners, who carried individual sentences, special settlers were exiled by collective decree, frequently for life, on the basis of ancestry. Pohl shows how the NKVD Komendatura regulated marriage, movement, and labor for these populations, and how the system persisted as a permanent administrative caste well into the post-Stalin years. His emphasis on the Komendatura supplies a corrective to histories that fold Soviet ethnic repression into the Gulag without registering the legal and administrative distinctions that separated the two regimes.

His scholarship engages a historiographical field that emerged in the 1990s and split between competing accounts. Terry Martin advanced the Affirmative Action Empire thesis on Soviet nationality policy. Francine Hirsch examined the ethnographic labor that made populations classifiable in the first place. Pohl picks up at the point where classification turned into physical relocation, and his archival reconstructions document what the categorizing state did with the categories once it had built them.

His treatment of ethnic Germans is the heart of his oeuvre. Soviet Germans, settled in the Russian Empire since the eighteenth century under Catherine the Great‘s invitations, occupied a recognized minority status until the German invasion of 1941. The Soviet state then abolished the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, deported the population to Siberia and Central Asia, and mobilized men and women into the trudarmiia, or labor army, where they worked under military discipline in mining, logging, and construction under conditions of extreme privation. Pohl reconstructs the demographic, legal, and administrative architecture of this campaign across decades.

His work on Mennonites, a religiously distinct German-speaking community, follows a parallel logic. He locates Mennonites inside the broader history of imperial invitation, collectivization, anti-religious campaigning, and wartime suspicion, and he resists romanticizing minority communities as timeless victims. He situates them inside the structures that made them legible and therefore vulnerable to administrative violence.

Pohl differs from many historians of Soviet repression in his methodological austerity. His prose is functional and evidentiary rather than literary or theoretically dense. He builds his arguments from records, decrees, mortality rates, and settlement statistics, and the moral pressure of his work comes from accumulation rather than rhetorical denunciation. Critics have objected at times that his deployment of the categories of genocide and ethnic cleansing flattens distinctions between different campaigns of state violence. He has consistently held that Soviet repression targeted ancestry-defined collectivities and therefore belongs in the international vocabulary of ethnic crimes.

His geographical trajectory has shaped his comparative instincts. During his years in Ghana, he began drawing explicit parallels between Soviet nationality administration and British and French colonial governance, arguing that modern states across ideological divides have pursued similar projects of making populations legible for extraction and engineering. This comparative move broadened his framework from a strictly Soviet question into a wider critique of modern administrative state power.

Pohl is also unusual for a historian of his cohort in his early and sustained use of online publishing. His blog Otto’s Random Thoughts served, through the 2000s and 2010s, as a venue for commentary on post-Soviet politics, the historiography of genocide, the academic labor market, and what he describes as the Eurocentrism and adjunct dependence of Western universities. His expatriate career gave that critique a particular angle. He spent the years when many of his American-trained peers consolidated tenure inside elite institutions teaching instead in Bishkek, Legon, and Sulaimani.

Within the post-Cold War historiography of Stalinism, Pohl holds a position distinct from both modernization-theory accounts and purely ideological readings of Soviet violence. He treats Soviet ethnic repression neither as irrational barbarism nor as wartime accident but as a recurring feature of a state attempting to secure borderlands and reorder populations along lines of political reliability. The cumulative effect of his books is the recovery of histories long peripheral to both Soviet memory politics and Western academic discourse, and the documentation of one of the central operations of Stalinist rule: the conversion of ancestry into a permanent category of political suspicion.

David Pinsof’s Alliance Theory

Pohl's principal alliance runs through the deported peoples themselves, with ethnic Germans and Mennonites at the center, and Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Kalmyks, Koreans, and other targeted nationalities arrayed around them. His coalition extends outward to scholars and communities who hold that Soviet ethnic violence belongs in the international vocabulary of crimes against humanity at parity with Nazi violence. His principal rivals are Charles Maier and Deborah Lipstadt, named in Ethnic Cleansing in the USSR, 1937-1949, who hold that Soviet citizens were not victims of ethnic deportation in the register applied to victims of Nazi policy. Alliance Theory predicts that Pohl will apply victim biases to his allies, perpetrator biases to the Soviet state and to any historiographical position that softens its ethnic intent, and attributional biases that explain Soviet German suffering by external causes (Stalinist categorization) rather than by internal ones (the Wehrmacht's reception in some Soviet German communities, which the NKVD cited as justification).
The pattern holds. Pohl frames Soviet ethnic deportation as systematic and ancestry-targeted rather than as a wartime security reflex. He emphasizes the duration, scale, and intergenerational damage of the labor army and special settler regimes. He resists framings that fold ethnic Germans into a broader category of wartime suspect populations or that treat the deportations as a tragic but understandable response to invasion. These choices are exactly what Alliance Theory predicts of a historian allied with the victim community. The historiographical position is consistent. It also functions as advocacy for a coalition that has fewer chroniclers than the comparable Holocaust historiography.
The Maier-Lipstadt fight is the clearest test case. Pohl calls their position willful ignorance. Alliance Theory predicts that he calls it willful ignorance because they sit inside a coalition with reasons to maintain the singularity of the Holocaust, and that they reject his position because he sits inside a coalition with reasons to expand the ethnic-cleansing category. Each side advances principles that, applied symmetrically, give different answers. Maier and Lipstadt rest on intent and on the totalizing project of biological extermination. Pohl rests on collective targeting by ancestry, lifelong administrative exile, and demographic destruction. Each criterion picks out a real feature of one campaign and underweights features of the other. The evidence under-determines the categorization. The coalition settles it.
Pohl’s expatriate career fits Alliance Theory’s expectations about similarity and transitivity. He spent his teaching years in Bishkek, Legon, and Sulaimani, outside the American university core. His blog History and News served as a venue for criticism of Western academia for Eurocentrism, adjunct dependence, and insularity. A scholar whose coalition sits outside the dominant Western alliance structure will exhibit victim biases on behalf of the marginalized periphery and perpetrator biases against the centers. The Ghana years produced direct comparative work linking Soviet nationality administration to British and French colonial governance, which extends the coalition outward to postcolonial scholarship. The rivals of his rivals become his allies. Transitivity predicts the extension.
The frame also addresses why Pohl’s ethnic focus runs through Soviet Germans and Mennonites rather than, say, Crimean Tatars at the same depth. Similarity and ancestry are the most reliable bases for alliance formation. Pohl’s surname is German. His most sustained book-length work concerns the community whose name his own carries.
Pohl presents his work as evidentiary and quantitative, with the moral force coming from accumulation of records rather than from rhetorical denunciation. Alliance Theory predicts that this presentation is part of the propagandistic equipment. Statistical austerity carries rhetorical force precisely because it appears non-rhetorical.

Substack

J. Otto Pohl (b. 1970) is a real historian, not a crank with a blog. SOAS PhD, books with McFarland, Greenwood, and Ibidem, articles in The Russian Review and the Journal of Genocide Research. His core subject is the Soviet deportation and special-settlement system, with ethnic Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Koreans, and other diaspora nationalities at the center. The statistical reconstruction in The Stalinist Penal System and the documentation in The Years of Great Silence hold up. Reviewers in his field treat him as a serious if narrow archival historian.
The Substack is a different thing from the books.
Take the headline essay, the one arguing that Jews were not the ethnic group most persecuted by the Soviet regime. The empirical core is correct and well sourced. In the 1937-1938 national operations, Poles, Germans, Latvians, Finns, Estonians, Greeks, and Koreans suffered arrest and execution at rates many times their share of the population. Jews sat near parity. More ethnic Germans were shot than Jews were arrested, despite a Jewish population more than twice the size. Pohl cites Terry Martin (b. 1965) and his own archival counts, and the figures are real. As a corrective to a popular distortion, the argument stands. The Holodomor and the national operations did not target Jews the way they targeted diaspora nationalities with homelands abroad, and saying so is honest history.
Now the other layer. Look at what sits beside that essay. A piece foregrounding Yagoda, Berman, Belsky, Leplevsky, and Pliner as Jewish NKVD officials. A piece on Nolte and the Historikerstreit that quotes the 40-to-60 percent Jewish politburo figure. The recurring pairing is the tell: Jews were not the main victims, and Jews were overrepresented among the perpetrators. Each claim can be sourced. The pairing, repeated, is an old rhetorical package, and it recruits a particular reader. You can see who shows up. The comment thread on that very essay has a reader thanking Pohl for curing her of “Jewish lies” and praising Hitler as the man who did the most to protect Europe. Pohl lets it stand without a word. A historian who wanted distance from that reading would say something. He doesn’t.

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Christopher Rufo and the Counter-March Through the Institutions

Christopher Rufo (b. 1984) emerged in the late 2010s and early 2020s as a consequential conservative institutional entrepreneur in the United States. He differs from earlier generations of conservative intellectuals who concentrated on elections, judicial appointments, or macroeconomic policy. Rufo built his reputation through targeted campaigns against bureaucratic language systems, educational doctrines, nonprofit networks, and public-sector managerial ideologies. His career marks a shift in American conservatism away from fusionist abstractions about limited government and toward direct conflict over institutional control, cultural legitimacy, and administrative authority.
His significance lies less in original philosophical production than in strategic synthesis. He operates as a translator between elite academic discourse and mass political mobilization. Much of his work extracts concepts developed inside universities, foundations, consulting firms, DEI bureaucracies, and educational nonprofits, then reframes them into politically legible narratives for governors, legislators, journalists, activists, and voters. Rufo functions less like a traditional public intellectual and more like a political opposition researcher operating at civilizational scale. His project rests on the conviction that modern governance increasingly occurs through semi-hidden administrative and pedagogical systems rather than through openly debated democratic legislation.
Raised in California, Rufo did not come up through the classic East Coast conservative pipeline of Ivy League law schools, movement journals, or Reagan-era think tanks. His intellectual development was eclectic and experiential. He attended Georgetown University and worked early on as a documentary filmmaker and journalist on poverty, addiction, social breakdown, and urban disorder. The background shaped his later political style, which retained the documentary instinct for vivid anecdote, visual framing, and emotionally legible storytelling. He learned to present structural arguments through human examples. His politics developed through narrative construction rather than abstract theorizing alone.
Many conservatives before Rufo criticized universities or progressive culture in broad moral terms. Rufo differed by focusing on organizational structure. He treated institutions not as neutral containers but as active ideological producers. His work returned to one question. How do elite ideas migrate from obscure academic discourse into public administration, corporate governance, school curricula, media language, and everyday life?
This emphasis made him an effective conservative interpreter of what one might call the managerial layer of American society. Rufo argued that power in modern America resides not merely in elected officials but in HR departments, accreditation systems, diversity consultants, nonprofit grant networks, civil-service training programs, teacher colleges, philanthropic foundations, and enforcement loops embedded inside large organizations. His campaigns against Critical Race Theory became nationally influential because he framed CRT not primarily as a law-school doctrine associated with scholars like Kimberlé Crenshaw (b. 1959) or Derrick Bell (1930-2011), but as a managerial ideology translated into mandatory trainings, bureaucratic vocabularies, and workplace rituals.
His rise accelerated during the racial protests and institutional upheavals of 2020. While many conservatives reacted defensively or rhetorically to the sudden expansion of diversity, equity, and inclusion programs, Rufo approached the phenomenon strategically. He saw that many elite institutions were implementing ideological programs that ordinary citizens neither understood nor could easily describe. His innovation was to compress diffuse academic concepts into a coherent political target. He treated Critical Race Theory as an umbrella covering anti-racist trainings, identity-essentialist bureaucracies, equity mandates, and institutionalized disparities frameworks. Critics accused him of oversimplification or deliberate semantic expansion. Supporters regarded the maneuver as politically clarifying. Either way, the strategy proved unusually effective.
The operational pattern beneath his campaigns deserves close description, since the pattern, more than any single controversy, defines his contribution. Rufo rarely launches an initiative with an abstract essay. He runs a sequence. First, he cultivates whistleblowers, using his digital platform to solicit internal documents, curricula, and webinar recordings from disgruntled employees inside corporations, school districts, and government agencies. Second, he debuts the material through a friendly high-traffic outlet such as City Journal or Fox News, framing the raw data with punchy, high-contrast language. Third, he coordinates with allied lawmakers to present the exposed material as a systemic crisis demanding state intervention through executive orders, statutory bans, or budget defunding. The sequence converts journalism from passive chronicle into active political lever.
Rufo grasped that political success in the digital age depends on controlling symbolic compression. Complex institutional processes have to be translated into emotionally intelligible narratives capable of repetition across television, podcasts, social media clips, legislative hearings, and executive orders. He therefore operates at several levels of discourse at once. He cites internal bureaucratic documents and academic terminology while also producing concise slogans capable of mass circulation. The technique mirrors, in reversed ideological direction, the long activist tradition of converting institutional grievance into media spectacle.
His alliance with conservative governors, most prominently Ron DeSantis (b. 1978), moved him from commentator to policy architect. In Florida, Rufo became associated with campaigns against DEI programs, gender ideology in schools, and what supporters describe as the restoration of institutional neutrality in higher education. His role in the restructuring of New College of Florida expresses his broader philosophy. Rather than denouncing universities from outside, Rufo argues that conservatives have to capture and redirect institutional power. The position departs sharply from older conservative assumptions that civil society and markets alone might counterbalance progressive dominance inside educational and cultural institutions.
The shift from dismantling toward substitution distinguishes Rufo from earlier critics of higher education. He does not merely want to defund progressive spaces. He wants to build counter-institutions. The project addresses what Peter Turchin (b. 1957) calls elite overproduction. The modern university system produces a surplus of credentialed, left-leaning graduates who staff the managerial state. By promoting conservative colleges, classical academies, and alternative credentialing pipelines, Rufo seeks a parallel ecosystem that can employ and deploy a counter-elite. This constructive complement to the dismantling work explains why his project cannot be reduced to negation.
Rufo extended the same critique from public schools to the Fortune 500. He recognized that the modern corporation no longer functions only as a market actor but as a social regulator through environmental, social, and governance metrics and internal diversity initiatives. By targeting corporate DEI programs, he drove a wedge into the older fusionist alliance between big business and the Republican party. He taught conservatives to view corporate HR departments as hostile administrative apparatuses rather than as expressions of free-market liberty. The result reorders right-wing priorities, placing culture-producing institutions above market-friendly tax policy.
Rufo’s critics often cast him as a propagandist or moral panic entrepreneur. They argue that he strategically inflates fringe academic concepts into universal social threats. They contend that his methods encourage ideological surveillance and political intervention into intellectual life. Some liberals compare his tactics to left-wing activist campaigns that pursued reputational punishment and institutional purification during earlier phases of the culture wars. Others accuse him of replacing liberal neutrality with conservative managerialism.
These criticisms often underestimate the coherence of his diagnosis. He holds that neutrality in elite institutions largely collapsed decades ago and that progressive actors used bureaucratic discretion, accreditation pressure, philanthropic funding, and professional norms to reshape public culture while continuing to claim procedural impartiality. From his vantage, conservatives remained trapped in an outdated liberal framework that assumed institutions were neutral arbiters rather than ideological actors. His project seeks to persuade the American right to abandon procedural passivity and engage directly in institutional contestation.
His worldview shares affinities with several intellectual traditions, though he reduces to none of them. Like James Burnham (1905-1987), he treats managerial elites as a decisive governing class. Like Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), he views cultural institutions as sites of hegemonic struggle. Like Michel Foucault (1926-1984), from an opposed ideological position, he sees language systems and administrative practices as productive of power. His work overlaps with newer postliberal and national conservative currents linked to figures such as Yoram Hazony (b. 1964) and Patrick Deneen (b. 1964), particularly in skepticism toward procedural liberalism severed from substantive cultural inheritance.
A further parallel sharpens the picture. The New Left activists of the late 1960s, including Rudi Dutschke (1940-1979), called for a long march through the institutions, a strategy of subverting society by capturing its cultural and administrative apparatus. Rufo reverses the formula and launches a counter-march to recapture those same spaces. His tactical sensibility also resembles a right-wing adaptation of Saul Alinsky (1909-1972). Alinsky’s rule to pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it describes what Rufo did to Critical Race Theory and DEI. He took a diffuse institutional tendency, gave it a name, and turned it into a clear political target.
Rufo differs from many academic conservatives because he is operational rather than contemplative. He shows little interest in metaphysical questions and great interest in institutional leverage. He studies how budgets, hiring systems, curricular mandates, certification requirements, and reputational pressures shape social outcomes. The practical orientation explains why he has gained traction among governors, trustees, activists, and donors rather than only among scholars.
His rhetorical style combines investigative journalism, activist framing, and managerial diagnosis. He rarely writes in the detached idiom of academic political theory. He constructs narratives of institutional capture, bureaucratic opacity, and elite ideological reproduction. His prose assumes that political conflict is unavoidable and that administrative systems drift toward ideological consolidation unless contested. He therefore rejects the older conservative aspiration to depoliticize institutions through procedural neutrality alone.
He also belongs to a recognizable media generation. Earlier conservative intellectuals depended on magazines, newspapers, think tanks, or university departments for prestige and circulation. Rufo came up through podcasts, social media virality, online donor networks, and decentralized ideological ecosystems. His influence draws from rapid coalition-building across journalists, activists, legislators, influencers, litigation groups, and digital audiences. He exemplifies the convergence of media entrepreneurship and political activism characteristic of twenty-first-century ideological movements.
His career also reflects the collapse of the boundary between journalism and political organization. He does not merely report on institutions. He intervenes in them. He publicizes internal documents to trigger legislation, reputational crises, donor revolts, or administrative restructuring. He resembles, in reversed ideological direction, the progressive activist-journalists who used investigative exposure to produce organizational change during earlier decades.
Rufo’s long-term importance might depend on whether his campaigns produce durable institutional transformation or only episodic political mobilization. Critics argue that his movement remains reactive and dependent on symbolic controversy. Supporters contend that he has already altered the strategic assumptions of the American right by showing that institutional politics is as decisive as electoral politics. Even many opponents implicitly acknowledge his success by adapting their rhetoric, softening terminology, or reframing DEI programs in response to public scrutiny.
He symbolizes a transition within American conservatism from market-centered liberalism toward institutional populism. Earlier conservative movements assumed that universities, corporations, media organizations, and bureaucracies might remain culturally liberal while economic policy remained the primary terrain of governance. Rufo rejects that settlement. He treats culture-producing institutions as the central battleground of modern politics. In his framework, administrative language does not decorate neutral systems from the outside. Administrative language is an instrument of social organization and elite power.
For this reason his influence extends beyond any particular controversy over race, gender, or education. He helped redefine how conservatives conceptualize the state, the university, the corporation, and the nonprofit sector. He shifted attention from abstract constitutional rhetoric toward the practical operation of institutional reproduction. Whether one regards him as a corrective to bureaucratic ideological expansion or as the architect of a new form of right-wing cultural management, his career marks a significant reorientation in the political history of the American right after 2016.

Alliance Theory

Start with the alliance structure he serves. The Republican coalition he addresses in the 2020s is not the Reagan-era fusion of Chamber-of-Commerce business interests with foreign-policy hawks and religious traditionalists. It includes evangelical parents anxious about school curricula, White working-class voters who lost out to globalization, Asian-American plaintiffs pushed out of selective university admissions, Jewish students newly hostile to campus progressivism after October 7, gay conservatives skeptical of trans activism, libertarian donors fed up with ESG mandates, and Trump-aligned populists hostile to the credentialed managerial class. No philosophy ties these groups together. Alliance Theory predicts precisely this kind of patchwork. The coalition makes sense not as a worldview but as a historically contingent alliance structure with shared rivals.
The shared rivals do the binding work. DEI officers, university administrators, ed-school faculty, public-school teachers’ unions, foundation program officers, New York Times opinion writers, ESG consultants, and federal civil-rights bureaucrats form a perceived single bloc. By transitivity, anyone in conflict with one target becomes an ally of anyone in conflict with another. The enemy of my enemy is my friend. The libertarian donor and the evangelical school parent have little in common except a shared rival, and the shared rival suffices. Rufo’s strategic skill lies in identifying the perceived rival bloc with precision and giving it a name. Critical Race Theory was the most famous case. The phrase compressed a heterogeneous set of bureaucratic practices, training documents, equity mandates, and academic doctrines into one target. Once named, frozen, and personalized, the rival became available for coordinated attack by groups that share nothing else.
Alliance Theory predicts that political elites are not more philosophically consistent than ordinary partisans. Elites are merely better attuned to the alliance structure and better at running propagandistic tactics in service of it. Rufo fits the prediction exactly. His writing rarely defends an abstract first principle. It defends allies against rivals.
Consider the propagandistic biases in turn.
Perpetrator biases protect allies from charges of wrongdoing. When state legislatures defund DEI offices, fire tenured faculty, or restructure public universities, Rufo treats these acts not as ideological power moves but as restorations of neutrality, corrections of overreach, or returns to civic legitimacy. State power exercised against political opponents gets reframed as procedural housekeeping. Critics call it hardball. Rufo calls it accountability. Alliance Theory predicts the asymmetry of framing. The bias is not a flaw in his reasoning. It is the mark of a loyal partisan operating in conflict, and it appears just as reliably on the other side, where progressive writers describe identical pressure tactics from their own coalition as accountability rather than coercion.
Victim biases protect allies by amplifying their grievances. Rufo describes White students mistreated by anti-racist trainings, Christian families targeted by school librarians, Asian-American applicants discriminated against by admissions offices, parents whose children were transitioned without parental knowledge, and Jewish students harassed in dormitories. Each grievance might track real events. Alliance Theory does not deny that grievances are sometimes accurate. The pattern is that Rufo emphasizes grievances suffered by allies and minimizes grievances suffered by rivals. Progressive activists do the inverse with equal intensity. The symmetry is the theory’s prediction.
Attributional biases shape causal stories. When elite institutions skew progressive, Rufo locates the cause in deliberate ideological capture, donor capture, faculty hiring, and accreditation rules. The cause sits outside the rival coalition’s individual virtue, in structures and the work of identifiable agents. When his own coalition gains power, the cause becomes democratic legitimacy and the natural reassertion of public will. The mirror image runs on the other side. Progressive writers attribute conservative gains to dark money, gerrymandering, and disinformation, while attributing their own institutional dominance to merit and expertise. Alliance Theory predicts the symmetry. Each side credits its advantages to internal virtues and its rivals’ advantages to external manipulation.
Rufo’s diagnosis of progressive institutional capture, read through Alliance Theory, comes out partly correct. The authors accept that institutions are not neutral. They argue that no actor is neutral, because alliance psychology drives political behavior. Where Rufo and the theory part company is on the question of what comes next. Rufo presents his counter-march as a return to neutrality. Alliance Theory predicts that the counter-march is an alliance-driven operation that will produce a new patchwork of beliefs serving the new coalition. New College of Florida is not a neutral institution. It is the institutional expression of a particular alliance. Conservative classical academies are not neutral. They are the educational arm of a coalition. There is no institutional neutrality to return to, because no such state ever existed.
The same logic applies to his targets. He treats DEI as ideological. Alliance Theory agrees and adds that conservative-classical alternatives are equally ideological. The conflict is not between ideology and neutrality. The conflict is between two alliance structures competing for control of credentialing, curriculum, and cultural authority.
Strange bedfellows show up everywhere in his coalition once one looks. He defends religious traditionalists who oppose Sunday work alongside libertarian executives who want at-will employment. He defends parental rights against state schools while supporting state intervention to override local school boards. He defends free speech for conservative scholars while supporting legislative restrictions on what state-funded faculty teach. He defends meritocracy against affirmative action while supporting ideological screening of trustees and administrators. None of this is hypocrisy in any philosophically interesting sense. It is what Alliance Theory predicts. Moral principles are not principled. They are tactics deployed to support allies and oppose rivals in particular conflicts. The same partisan who demands speech freedom for one set of speakers naturally demands speech restriction for another set, because the principle was never the point. The ally was the point.
The mirror holds for his progressive opponents, and the theory’s insistence on symmetry is central. The same writers who denounced state intervention in university hiring during the McCarthy era now support state pressure to enforce DEI compliance. The same activists who insisted on faculty freedom from political litmus tests now demand diversity statements. The reversal is not a sign of bad faith on the left any more than Rufo’s reversals are signs of bad faith on the right. Both reflect alliance shifts. When the alliance structure changes, the rhetorical principles change with it.
His use of media also fits the theory. The authors describe how partisans on both sides claim that their side is motivated by altruism, impartiality, honesty, and love, while attributing selfishness, intolerance, dishonesty, and hatred to the other side. Rufo’s documentary instinct, his vivid case studies, his cultivated whistleblowers, his sequencing of revelation and legislation, these are tools for creating common knowledge that his side is moral and the rival side is immoral. The technique mobilizes third parties. It also emboldens allies to attack with impunity, which is one of the theory’s specified functions for moralized framing.
Alliance Theory holds that beliefs follow alliances rather than the reverse. If the Republican alliance structure shifts in the coming decade, if working-class voters drift back to economic populism, if evangelical engagement declines further, if Asian-American voters split, if a foreign-policy realignment cuts across current lines, then the doctrines Rufo champions will shift with it. His commitment to attacking DEI will look stable so long as DEI marks his coalition’s rivals. If the rival bloc reorganizes around a different center, the doctrine will follow. The theory predicts that his ideological footprint is more contingent than his rhetoric suggests.
A second prediction concerns the substitution project. Rufo wants to build counter-institutions. Alliance Theory predicts that these institutions will display the same alliance-driven inconsistencies he criticizes in their progressive counterparts. The new classical academies will favor some viewpoints and exclude others. The new accreditation bodies will recognize some standards and ignore others. New College’s restructured curriculum will reflect a coalition’s priorities. None of this constitutes failure. It constitutes ordinary alliance behavior. The mistake, if there is one, lies in describing the substitution as a return to neutrality rather than as the reconstruction of an institution under a new alliance.
Rufo’s loyal supporters say he is a truth-teller, an exposer of hidden ideology, a defender of common sense. His loyal opponents say he is a propagandist, a moral panic entrepreneur, a manufacturer of fake controversies. Alliance Theory predicts that both descriptions are propagandistic biases applied symmetrically by partisans on opposite sides. He is loyal to his alliance, runs the standard biases in its favor, and would be unrecognizable to his coalition if he did otherwise. His opponents are loyal to theirs, run the same biases in the opposite direction, and would also be unrecognizable if they stopped.

The Set

Around him sit several rings. The closest ring is operational, the men who supply documents, reporting, and amplification. Christopher Brunet runs the Karlstack Substack and brought the early plagiarism research on Harvard’s president. Aaron Sibarium reports for The Washington Free Beacon, edited by Eliana Johnson, and broke most of the plagiarism stories Rufo then pushed into wider circulation. Bill Ackman (b. 1966) brought money and a billionaire’s megaphone during the Harvard fight. Elise Stefanik (b. 1984) brought the congressional theater. Rufo named these men himself. He described the campaign as a team effort with three points of leverage: narrative leverage from himself, Brunet, and Sibarium; financial leverage from Ackman and other donors; and political leverage from Stefanik’s performance at the hearings.
The next ring is institutional and political. Ron DeSantis (b. 1978) gave Rufo a state to work in. DeSantis appointed Rufo to the board of trustees of New College of Florida, and Rufo consulted on the drafting of the Stop WOKE Act and attended its signing in April 2022. At New College Rufo helped install Andrew Doyle, the British satirist behind the Titania McGrath character, to teach a course on wokeness. At the Manhattan Institute he shares a roof with Reihan Salam (b. 1979), Heather Mac Donald (b. 1956), and Ilya Shapiro (b. 1977).
Wider still runs the anti-woke commentariat that shares his targets and not his method: James Lindsay (b. 1979) of New Discourses, Richard Hanania (b. 1985), Chaya Raichik of Libs of TikTok, Robby Starbuck with his corporate DEI campaigns, and Stanley Kurtz. Bari Weiss (b. 1984) and The Free Press hold an adjacent station, friendlier to the liberal center, which Rufo eyes with suspicion. At the far edge sits IM-1776 and its editor Mark Granza, the dissident-right magazine Rufo has praised and written for, a tie his critics raise against him. Rufo has maintained a close relationship with IM-1776, a dissident-right magazine that praises authoritarian figures and attacks liberal democracy.
What they value sits close to the surface. They value institutional power as the prize, not the winning of an argument. They value documents: the leaked curriculum, the diversity statement, the webinar slide, the plagiarized passage. They value the demonstrated scalp, the resignation, the signed bill, the defunded office. They value the colorblind constitutional order as the stated end and the captured institution as the means. They distrust the conservative habit of complaint and prefer capture and reconquest. Rufo says the goal at New College is a top-down restructuring and a national model. Many in the set came from journalism or finance, and they value leverage over persuasion. They prize a kind of courage they define as the willingness to be called a racist and keep going.
Their hero system rewards the man who walks into the enemy’s house and takes a head. The hero is the one who pushes when the others flinch. The model runs Gramsci backward: the long march of the left answered by a counter-march of the right, capture for capture. Status flows to the man who produces a body, an ousted president, a banned program, a budget line struck out. The scalp is the coin of the realm, and Rufo’s own remark about taking credit states the rule plainly. Visible, attributable victory is the proof of a man’s worth.
Their status games follow from that coin. The first game is who owns the kill. Rufo claimed the Harvard campaign as a coordinated effort he led, and the reporters and donors distanced themselves, some denying any coordination at all. One critic argued there was no team and no coordination, only people who agreed the president should go and sometimes emailed each other. The second game is proximity to state power: a call from a governor, a tweet cited in an executive order, a seat on a board. The third is the purity contest, the “no enemies to the right” posture set against the respectability faction. Rufo plays both ends, courting dissident energy while keeping a Manhattan Institute address. The fourth is penetration: moving a story from the right press into the left press scores higher than preaching to the choir, which is the move he describes when he talks about forcing the mainstream to cover the story.
Their normative claims tell men how things should run. Institutions should be colorblind. Merit should govern admission and hiring. The state should defund and dismantle programs that teach racial guilt or gender ideology. Public trust in public schools should be drained so that choice can replace them. Rufo argues that universal school choice requires a premise of universal public school distrust. Conservatives should stop conserving and start governing. Power belongs to the men willing to use it, and using it is a duty.
Their essentialist claims tell men what things are. Critical race theory and DEI form a single ideological regime wearing many masks, which Rufo treats as the enemy’s true nature beneath each euphemism. He holds that renaming, where CRT becomes equity becomes belonging, hides one essence. He holds the universities carry rot at the core and not at the margin. He holds the left occupies the institutions as an occupying power, so the answer is reconquest rather than reform. The strongest move of this kind: beneath the language of inclusion sits a racial spoils system, so that exposing the language exposes the thing.
The set’s account of itself as a coordinated team reads in part as a story Rufo tells, because an attributable victory raises his market price. The reporters’ denials and the skeptical coverage point to loose agreement among men with a shared enemy, not a chain of command. The strongest thing about the set is the operation: find a document, compress it into a slogan, route it through friendly media, hand it to a lawmaker, then shame the mainstream into amplifying it. The weakest thing is the gap between the words and the work. The colorblind, merit, free-inquiry language sits beside a will to capture, purge, and defund that resembles the conduct they charge to the left. Rufo half-concedes this when he frames his project as a march through the institutions in reverse. The set runs a power operation dressed in principle, and the principle binds the targets harder than it binds the operators.

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NYT: ‘Commander of Iraqi Militia Accused of Plotting Attacks on Jewish Sites in U.S.’

The New York Times says: “The complaint said that Mr. al-Saadi planned to kill Americans and Jews in Los Angeles and New York City and that he had started planning an attack on a synagogue in New York City.”

ChatGPT says: What stands out about the Los Angeles dimension is that, at least from the publicly unsealed complaint, the alleged plot appears less developed than the New York synagogue component, but more geographically ambitious. The government says that Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi allegedly gave an undercover officer photographs and maps of Jewish centers in Los Angeles and Scottsdale, Arizona.

So far, federal authorities have not publicly identified which Los Angeles institutions were allegedly under surveillance or consideration. They also have not said whether the targets were synagogues, schools, community centers, donor institutions, or commercial properties associated with Jewish organizations. The complaint language, from what has been reported, suggests reconnaissance and target selection rather than an operational attack cell already in place in LA.

Still, Los Angeles makes strategic sense from the perspective of an Iran-aligned militia network for several reasons.

First, Los Angeles contains one of the largest Jewish populations outside Israel. The city has dense concentrations of Orthodox and Persian Jewish life in neighborhoods like Pico-Robertson, Beverlywood, Hancock Park, Encino, and parts of the Valley. There are also major institutions with symbolic visibility: synagogues, schools, federations, museums, Israeli-linked commercial networks, and cultural organizations. A foreign proxy group looking for symbolic retaliation against Israel or American Jews would naturally view Los Angeles as a high-value target environment.

Second, the city already sits inside a long history of Iranian intelligence and proxy attention. Southern California has one of the largest Iranian diasporas in the world, including anti-regime dissidents, monarchists, business figures, Israeli-linked networks, and Jewish Iranian communities. Iranian intelligence services have historically monitored dissident and exile communities abroad. That does not mean the broader Iranian-American community is implicated. It means LA has long been viewed by Tehran as strategically important terrain.

Third, the post-October 7 security environment changed Jewish institutional life in Los Angeles dramatically. Many synagogues and schools increased armed security, hired off-duty police, hardened entrances, restricted public access, and coordinated more closely with the FBI and LAPD counterterror units. In Pico-Robertson especially, people became more conscious of surveillance risks, lone actors, and foreign-inspired violence. This alleged plot will reinforce those fears because it appears connected not merely to online radicalism but to an actual Iranian proxy commander tied to Qassem Soleimani and Kataib Hezbollah.

There is also an important operational distinction here. Iranian-linked operations in the West historically often rely less on centrally directed commando-style attacks and more on networks, sympathizers, criminal intermediaries, surveillance assets, or outsourced actors. The complaint reportedly alleges that Al-Saadi used intermediaries and attempted to recruit or direct others. That pattern resembles prior Iranian external operations, including plots disrupted in Europe, Latin America, and the United States over the last two decades.

The Los Angeles angle also fits a broader strategic shift since the U.S.-Iran war escalation described in the complaint. The allegation is not merely anti-Israel militancy overseas. Prosecutors are framing this as retaliatory transnational terrorism aimed at American soil itself. That matters because it moves the threat model from “regional proxy conflict” into “global retaliation architecture.”

Another thing worth noticing is the symbolic geography. New York and Los Angeles are not random American cities. In the imagination of anti-American militant organizations, they function as symbolic capitals: finance, media, entertainment, Jewish influence, global visibility. An attack in either city produces disproportionate international psychological impact.

At this stage, though, there is still a lot unknown publicly:

whether there were actual operatives in Los Angeles
whether surveillance occurred physically on the ground
whether local institutions were warned privately before the arrest
whether the FBI believes additional people are involved
whether this was aspirational planning or an imminent operational conspiracy

The public reporting so far suggests the government intervened relatively early, before an attack infrastructure fully matured in the United States.

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From Sullivan & Son to Beartaria: The Career of Owen Benjamin

Owen Benjamin (b. 1980) emerged from the late 2000s American comedy scene as a figure who joined traditional stand-up performance with an increasingly personalized form of internet broadcasting. His career traces a wider transformation in American media during the shift from institutional entertainment toward decentralized digital personalities sustained through direct audience patronage and livestreaming. Benjamin’s path also illustrates the collapse of distinctions that once separated comedian, broadcaster, political commentator, lifestyle influencer, and sectarian community leader. He became less a conventional comic than a self-contained media institution whose audience organized around identification, loyalty, and antagonism toward perceived elite gatekeeping.
Born Owen Benjamin Smith on May 24, 1980, in Oswego, New York, he grew up in an academic home. His father, John Kares Smith, taught communication studies at the State University of New York at Oswego and sang opera. His mother, Jean Troy-Smith, taught English at the same institution and held a doctorate in mythology. He is of Irish and Czech-Jewish descent through his father. He earned a history degree at SUNY Plattsburgh, where he worked at the student-run television station and began to develop the performance habits that later defined his comedy.
Musical training stayed central to his comedic persona. Unlike many stand-up comics whose performance rested on observational humor or storytelling, Benjamin built routines around improvisational piano, musical parody, and performative crowd engagement. His stage presence depended on verbal spontaneity and improvisational confidence. Even critics granted his unusual capacity for extemporaneous performance. Standing six feet eight inches, he turned his height into a recurring joke and a physical signature.
Benjamin entered the entertainment industry during the final years when the traditional Los Angeles comedy pipeline still held substantial gatekeeping power. He moved through the interconnected ecosystem of clubs, television auditions, podcasts, and minor acting roles that defined upward mobility in American comedy before the dominance of creator-driven platforms. He had a small part in I Now Pronounce You Chuck and Larry, a supporting role in The House Bunny (2008), and the male lead opposite Christina Ricci (b. 1980) in All’s Faire in Love (2009), to whom he was briefly engaged. From 2012 to 2014 he played Owen Walsh on the TBS sitcom Sullivan & Son. He hosted the Art Directors Guild Excellence in Production Design Awards from 2014 to 2016 and the Esquire Network’s The Next Great Burger in 2015. During this phase his persona remained legible inside mainstream entertainment norms. He cultivated the image of an intelligent but irreverent comic able to navigate both collegiate and populist audiences.
His early public identity reflected the wider sensibility of the 2000s alternative comedy environment. That milieu rewarded irony, contrarianism, and transgressive humor while still operating inside the institutional framework of Hollywood agencies, network television, and comedy-club patronage. Benjamin’s performances often showed hostility toward political correctness, but the posture initially resembled the broader comic culture of the era rather than a fully developed ideological project. Many comedians of the period cultivated anti-establishment personas while remaining dependent on mainstream entertainment infrastructure.
The decisive transformation in Benjamin’s career came during the mid-to-late 2010s, when conflicts with mainstream platforms, joined to the rise of livestreaming and audience-supported broadcasting, altered both his public identity and his economic model. The shift cannot be read as mere individual radicalization. It reflected structural change in media distribution. The older entertainment system depended on centralized institutions that controlled visibility, advertising, booking access, and professional legitimacy. The emerging creator economy let performers bypass these structures and build direct relations with audiences. Benjamin became one among many internet-era personalities who read institutional criticism or exclusion not as professional setback but as proof of systemic corruption.
The hinge years were 2017 and 2018. In October 2017 he tweeted opposition to providing hormone therapy to children identifying as transgender and repeatedly attacked an NPR host in language that drew widespread condemnation. In February 2018 he used a racial slur onstage in Saranac Lake, New York, and several venues canceled appearances. In March 2018 the New Hazlett Theater in Pittsburgh canceled a scheduled show after staff reviewed his social media. Twitter banned him in 2018 over posts directed at Parkland survivor David Hogg. Patreon suspended his account in October 2019. YouTube banned his channel in December 2019. Facebook and Instagram followed within weeks. PayPal banned him. He moved to DLive, where in October 2020 he and Nick Fuentes (b. 1998) ranked as the two highest earners on the platform until DLive itself purged several accounts the following month. In January 2020 Benjamin and roughly one hundred of his supporters announced intent to sue Patreon for breach of contract. Patreon countersued seventy-two of those supporters. The litigation extended for years and consumed substantial attention inside the community.
As his conflicts with mainstream comedy culture intensified, his broadcasts fused comedy with political grievance, cultural criticism, religious speculation, conspiracy narratives, and personalized audience interaction. He cultivated a loyal fan community known as the Bears, whose identity functioned as fandom, subculture, and symbolic dissociation from mainstream society. The audience formation echoed patterns visible across decentralized digital movements of the late 2010s and early 2020s. The creator no longer functioned as an entertainer producing content for passive consumption. The creator became the nucleus of a semi-participatory interpretive community joined through shared language, recurring symbols, insider references, and collective hostility toward external institutions.
Benjamin’s broadcasting style depended on long-form livestreaming rather than polished scripted production. The format rewards spontaneity, emotional escalation, and the simulation of intimacy. His streams mix humor with improvisational monologue, audience interaction, theological speculation, and extended commentary on social decline. Stand-up relies on compression and timing. Livestream culture rewards duration, continuity, and emotional immediacy. Benjamin adapted because his strengths lay less in tightly engineered joke-writing than in rhetorical momentum and improvisational charisma. The piano remained central. In his long-form streams the music works as a pacing device and an emotional anchor. It breaks the tension of his monologues and lets him deliver content closer in rhythm to a sermon or fireside chat than to a stand-up set. The instrument also gives him a veneer of high-culture technical skill that he can deploy against what he portrays as the talentless or fake nature of modern Hollywood. The piano grounds his persona in a traditional art form while he delivers content that is socially and technologically extreme.
A major theme of his later career is masculinity, family formation, rural self-sufficiency, and hostility toward urban professional culture. He presents himself not merely as a comic but as a critic of modern social organization. The transition aligned him with broader currents in digital populism that frame contemporary institutions as spiritually corrupt, psychologically manipulative, and economically parasitic. Benjamin’s rhetoric contrasts an allegedly healthy organic life rooted in family, land, manual labor, and religious orientation against what he portrays as decadent urban credential culture. He married Amy Reinke in 2015. They have four children.
Around 2018 he moved his family to a ten-acre farm near Sandpoint, Idaho, and modeled what he describes as self-sufficient living: animal husbandry, gardening, and skill-building toward economic independence. The migration mirrored post-2016 symbolic movements within parts of the American dissident right and adjacent online cultures. The internet lets personalities turn lifestyle performance into ideological theater. Benjamin’s discussions of farming, homesteading, homeschooling, and independent community formation became part of his wider critique of centralized authority. Supporters read these gestures as authenticity and resistance. Critics read them as performative withdrawal joined to conspiratorial radicalization.
The Beartaria project marked the move from digital community to physical territory. Benjamin used his platform to crowdfund the purchase of a separate ten-acre parcel near Bonners Ferry, Idaho, which he presented to followers as a refuge. References under shifting names such as Ursa Rio, the Beartaria Sanctuary, and the Great Bear Trail never fully resolved into a single coherent plan. Local residents in Boundary County voiced concern, comparing the project to the Ruby Ridge standoff. By 2024 a group of former participants announced intent to file a class action alleging land fraud, claiming misrepresentations had led to financial loss without delivery of promised benefits. Benjamin’s later statements distanced him from earlier promotional claims, including the framing of the property as a communal site. The episode pushed him past the realm of media and into questions of land use, local zoning, and community governance. For decentralized digital personalities the end goal often takes shape as a closed loop. The creator provides information. The community provides funding. The physical world provides proof of the narrative.
His religious life evolved alongside the political one. Not reducible to a systematic theology, his later broadcasts increasingly drew on biblical language, providential interpretation, and moral denunciation. The religious speech reflected a broader tendency among internet dissidents to move toward spiritual frameworks after losing faith in liberal institutional narratives. Yet his religiosity stayed personalized and improvisational rather than ecclesiastically disciplined. He used theological language inside a wider civilizational critique aimed at modern secular culture, pornography, corporate media, and elite institutions.
His relationship with the figures sometimes grouped under the heading “intellectual dark web” also warrants notice. Benjamin moved initially in circles that included Joe Rogan (b. 1967) and Jordan Peterson (b. 1962). His later and often vitriolic break from these men illustrates a purity spiral common in online subcultures. He came to frame former peers as controlled opposition or as part of the gatekeeping structures he claimed to oppose. The pattern shows that in the creator economy, holding a unique and radical brand often requires the constant casting off of anyone who keeps ties to mainstream institutions.
Benjamin’s evolution reflects the fragmentation of authority in the digital public sphere. Earlier entertainment systems imposed substantial editorial mediation. Internet broadcasting lowered those barriers. Figures like Benjamin can keep influence despite institutional exclusion because audience aggregation no longer runs entirely through centralized gatekeepers. Patronage platforms, alternative video hosting, livestream donations, and subscription tools let niche creators sustain economically viable communities while remaining marginal to mainstream culture.
Benjamin also illustrates the transformation of comedy under conditions of political polarization. Earlier stand-up often relied on temporary norm violation followed by reintegration into shared social assumptions. Contemporary internet comedy increasingly operates as coalition signaling. Humor becomes a way to distinguish insiders from outsiders and to reinforce group cohesion against hostile publics. Benjamin’s later work often functions less as conventional joke construction than as boundary maintenance inside a dissident interpretive community.
His career has drawn extensive controversy because critics associate his broadcasts with antisemitic rhetoric, conspiracy theories, and inflammatory political speech. Supporters read him as a critic of institutional hypocrisy and media manipulation. The polarized reactions reveal a wider change in the structure of public legitimacy. In the twentieth century, legitimacy flowed downward from institutions toward audiences. In the decentralized digital era, many creators draw legitimacy horizontally from tightly bonded audience communities that distrust institutional adjudication.
Benjamin holds an ambiguous place in American entertainment history because he belongs to two eras at once. He emerged from the older Hollywood-comedy infrastructure but reached his greatest cultural significance as an internet-native broadcaster operating outside institutional legitimacy. His career offers a case study in the decline of centralized cultural mediation and the rise of personality-centered digital micro-publics. His audience does not merely consume entertainment. They participate in a symbolic community organized around distrust of mainstream institutions and admiration for perceived authenticity. In this sense Benjamin belongs to a wider class of media figures who flourish during periods of institutional delegitimation. Such personalities do not simply produce content. They construct counter-publics.
The long-term significance of his career might therefore lie less in his particular political or cultural claims than in what his rise reveals about the structural transformation of American public life. He represents a media environment where comedians become broadcasters, broadcasters become ideological entrepreneurs, and audiences become quasi-tribal interpretive communities. The boundary between entertainment and political identity dissolves. The performer no longer stands apart from the audience as a distant celebrity. Performer and audience share an oppositional narrative about society itself.

Alliance Theory

Benjamin’s pre-2016 alliance structure was the mainstream Hollywood comedy coalition: secular urban professionals, Comedy Central audiences, talent agencies, Adam Sandler’s production company, network television, late-night hosts, and the SUNY-educated comedy circuit. His routines tracked that coalition’s allies and rivals. He criticized political correctness in the safe, post-2000s alternative-comedy register that signaled membership in a coalition while never threatening exit from it. He carried the markers of similarity required for the alliance: irreverence, irony, secular-tinged morality, a credentialed background, geographic mobility. His belief system at that time was no more philosophically grounded than what Alliance Theory predicts. It was loyalty-tracking.
The decisive shift was not ideological discovery. It was alliance restructuring. The 2017 NPR tweets, the 2018 Saranac Lake slur, the David Hogg posts, the New Hazlett cancellation: each broke a transitive tie to his original coalition and forced relocation. Alliance Theory predicts what came next. When a person’s rivals shift, the propagandistic biases attached to the new alliance follow within months, often without conscious effort. Benjamin’s beliefs about media, race, religion, sexuality, vaccines, and globalization restructured in a tight cluster between roughly 2018 and 2020, the same window in which his ally pool collapsed and rebuilt around dissident-right creators, Christian traditionalists, gun owners, homesteaders, working-class Whites without a college degree, and the various deplatformed.
The propagandistic biases Alliance Theory identifies show up across his broadcasts in textbook form. Perpetrator biases run through his treatment of his coalition’s transgressions. When his allies use slurs or violent rhetoric, he attributes the speech to mitigating circumstances, frames it as humor, or denies its severity. His own use of racial slurs onstage and online he treats as either misunderstood comedy or a deliberate test of audience honesty. The same Benjamin who denounces Hollywood for cruelty toward children defends men inside his coalition accused of harsh discipline. Alliance Theory predicts this pattern without appealing to any deep moral inconsistency. He applies perpetrator biases to allies and withholds them from rivals.
Victim biases run through his treatment of his coalition’s grievances. Christians, White men, traditional fathers, banned comedians, vaccine refusers, homesteaders harassed by zoning boards, parents of medically injured children: each becomes a victim whose suffering he embellishes and whose perpetrators he names as a coherent rival class. The mirror-image groups (urban progressives, Hollywood executives, public health authorities) are denied victim status even when they suffer parallel harms. He engages in competitive victimhood with the mainstream press at every turn, asserting that the persecution of his coalition exceeds the persecution claimed by progressive coalitions. Alliance Theory predicts this pattern as a symmetrical tactic, not as a unique conservative pathology. Liberal coalitions do the same in reverse.
Attributional biases follow the same logic. His audience’s economic disadvantages come from external causes: globalization, immigration, central banks, Hollywood, Jewish financial influence in his more conspiratorial moments, COVID policy, agricultural consolidation. His audience’s virtues come from internal causes: faith, family loyalty, manual skill, sexual fidelity, the willingness to homeschool. The Hollywood liberals who once paid him are now described in the opposite terms: their wealth is the product of external rigging (nepotism, blackmail, ideological gatekeeping), and their failings are internal (degeneracy, weakness, mental illness). The reversal tracks his alliance shift with no remainder.
The strange-bedfellows pattern Pinsof emphasizes appears throughout Benjamin’s coalition. Libertarian gun owners stand next to Christian traditionalists who want stronger blasphemy norms. Anti-vax populists who distrust corporate science stand next to homesteaders who run organic micro-economies that depend on the same supply chains they denounce. Anti-government conspiracy theorists stand next to men who want the state to enforce traditional marriage. The combination is not philosophically derived. It is, as Alliance Theory says of every political coalition, the contingent residue of shared rivals. Hollywood, the legacy media, the FDA, the SPLC, urban progressive prosecutors, and the platform trust-and-safety teams supply the binding rivalry. Without them the coalition might not cohere.
The Joe Rogan and Jordan Peterson breaks show transitivity at work. In Alliance Theory’s terms, an ally who keeps loyalty to your rivals threatens infighting and betrayal. As Benjamin’s coalition tightened around opposition to mainstream platforms and mainstream science, Rogan and Peterson, who retained ties to mainstream publishing, Spotify, and mass audiences, became transitive liabilities. Their continued legitimacy in venues Benjamin had been ejected from made them unreliable. The break did not require a philosophical disagreement. It required only the standard pressure alliance structures place on members to share rivals consistently. Benjamin’s framing of Rogan and Peterson as controlled opposition is the predicted rationalization.
Stochasticity also fits. A different sequence of platform bans, a different reception in Pittsburgh in 2018, a different reaction from Hollywood after the Saranac Lake set, might have produced a Benjamin who stayed inside the mainstream conservative-comedy lane held by Adam Carolla or Tim Dillon. The path he took was sensitive to small contingencies that compounded. Alliance Theory treats such cascades as ordinary. Small initial perturbations produce locked-in alliance structures that participants later describe as moral inevitabilities.
A central prediction of the framework applies cleanly: Benjamin and his rivals describe their conflict in moral terms while operating as coalitions. He casts Hollywood as hateful, dishonest, and selfish. Hollywood casts him as hateful, dishonest, and selfish. Both portray themselves as truth-tellers persecuted by intolerant adversaries. Both downplay their coalition’s transgressions and embellish the rival’s. Alliance Theory predicts the symmetry without needing to choose a winner. The framework also explains why the most loyal partisans on each side, including Benjamin and his most engaged critics, are the most willing to condone behavior in their allies that they denounce in rivals. Loyalty is the active variable, not principle.
The framework also clarifies the Beartaria episode. Crowdfunding land for an in-person community is interdependence in the literal Alliance Theory sense: allies provide reliable benefits to one another, and the Bears tested whether digital loyalty could convert into shared material resources. The class-action complaint that followed reflects what happens when interdependence claims outrun delivery. The participants did not expect a philosophy. They expected provision. When the provision did not match the promotion, the alliance fractured along ordinary lines.
What Alliance Theory denies is the framing Benjamin offers for himself: that his shift was a moral awakening, a recovery of authentic values against decadent ones, a private discovery of truths long suppressed. The framework predicts that loyal partisans describe their position in these terms regardless of where on the political map they sit. The progressive activist who denounces Benjamin uses the same vocabulary of moral clarity and awakening. The two narratives cannot both be correct. Alliance Theory’s parsimonious answer is that neither is descriptively correct, that both are coalition-mobilizing speech. What changed for Benjamin between 2008 and 2020 is not what he saw but who he stood with. The beliefs followed.

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Alliance Theory v Actor Network Theory Regarding Mike Benz

Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and Alliance Theory (AT) disagree most about what counts as an actor and what needs explaining.
ANT distributes agency across humans and non-humans. The algorithm, the memo, the building, the speed bump, the database. Each acts. The social is not a cause but a result, an achievement assembled out of heterogeneous parts. Method: follow the actors, trace the associations, refuse to import grand categories. Reality is what gets stabilized through chains of translation. A successful network black-boxes its work and looks like a single thing. A controversy cracks the box open and shows the assembly.
Alliance Theory says humans are coalitional primates. Moral claims, intellectual stances, even private beliefs function as coalition technology. Status flows from loyalty signaling. Sacred values mark membership. Public reasoning is mostly alliance maintenance dressed up as truth-seeking. Ask: who gets recruited by this claim, who gets repelled, what coalitional position does the speaker hold?
The contrasts run deep.
On agency, ANT treats the database and the human as actants. Alliance Theory treats agency as living in evolved coalitional brains, with material stuff as instrument and signal.
On reduction, ANT refuses reduction and maps what is there. Alliance Theory reduces public reasoning to coalitional positioning and treats most stated reasons as cover.
On the social, ANT says there is no “society” to appeal to; associations are what we have, and they need tracing. Alliance Theory takes the coalition as the bedrock social fact and reads behavior off it.
On stability, ANT asks how networks hold together over time through material and procedural commitments. Alliance Theory asks what coalitional payoff sustains the arrangement.
On critique, ANT stays descriptive and agnostic. Latour spent his later years worrying that ANT’s anti-realist tendency had armed climate denial. Alliance Theory is debunking by design. It assumes the official story is cover.
On scale, ANT flattens scale. A microbe and an institution are both actants worth tracing. Alliance Theory keeps the coalition as the unit and scales up to alliance networks and down to individual signaling.
Where the two frames fight: ANT resists Alliance Theory’s quick move from belief to coalitional function. ANT says, no, follow what the belief does in the network before reducing it. Alliance Theory resists ANT’s flat ontology that gives the classifier equal weight with the human’s coalitional interest. The classifier, Pinsof might say, is a tool that some coalition built and others now contest.
Where they sit well together: ANT maps the human and non-human pieces of the assemblage. Alliance Theory explains why the human pieces care, what they get for showing up, what they risk by switching sides. ANT shows how the censorship complex (or Tablet, or Adventism) stays stable across time. Alliance Theory shows whose stakes hold it stable.
A worked example. Take the censorship complex. ANT traces the classifiers, the hash-sharing pipelines, the NGO contracts, the platform APIs, the academic disinformation labs, the journalists who depend on those labs for sources. The map is dense and material. Alliance Theory then asks which coalitions the apparatus serves, which careers depend on it, what sacred values police entry, who gets recruited and who gets blacklisted. The map alone is mute about motive. Coalition theory alone is thin about hardware.
The deepest disagreement: is human social life fundamentally coalitional, or fundamentally heterogeneous? AT says coalitions go all the way down. Latour says coalitions are achievements that have to be built and rebuilt through material and procedural work, and that giving the coalition explanatory primacy hides the work.
The combination is sharper than either alone, with the caveat that Alliance Theory’s reductive instinct will keep wanting to collapse ANT’s careful tracings into a coalition story, and ANT’s empiricist instinct will keep wanting to bracket the coalition story until the network is mapped.
Let us apply both frames to Mike Benz and assess the relative yield.

Alliance Theory

Mike Benz’s public career has moved through positions fast enough that the coalition logic is easier to see than it is with subjects whose trajectories are slower. He appears first as Frame Game Radio, an anonymous YouTube account producing alt-right-adjacent content in the late 2010s that attracted a specific audience through videos on Jewish influence in media, academia, and finance. He appears next as a Trump State Department official, serving briefly in 2020 as Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Communications and Information Policy before the administration ended. He appears then as the founder of the Foundation for Freedom Online, which positions itself as a researcher of censorship by the American national security apparatus against American citizens. He has become, in the last three years, a prominent figure in the intersecting networks of Tucker Carlson’s audience, the broader Trump-aligned right, the Elon Musk-adjacent tech-libertarian formation, and the specific anti-censorship coalition that treats the Censorship Industrial Complex as the primary threat to American self-government.
Benz has acknowledged the Frame Game identity, has characterized the earlier work as youthful mistake or provocative exploration, and has distanced himself from its content while not fully disavowing the persona. His current allies have either ignored the earlier work, treated it as irrelevant to his current contributions, or incorporated it into a redemption narrative in which the earlier period represents honest engagement with questions others are afraid to address. His current critics point to the Frame Game work as evidence that his current positions should be read through the continuity of his earlier commitments. The Alliance Theory reading holds both responses as instances of coalition function. The allies minimize because the earlier work is a coalition liability. The critics emphasize because the earlier work is a coalition weapon. Neither side is engaging with the specific question of what the continuity actually is, because engaging with the specific question would require the analytical distance neither coalition wants to grant.
What does the earlier Frame Game material and the current Foundation for Freedom Online material have in common at the level of coalition function? Both identify a specific hidden apparatus manipulating public discourse. Both locate the apparatus in specific institutional formations with specific personnel. Both promise to expose what the apparatus does not want exposed. Both produce content that functions as revelation for an audience that experiences the revelation as liberation from prior deception. The subjects differ: Frame Game located the hidden apparatus in Jewish coalition influence, Foundation for Freedom Online locates it in national security state coordination with tech platforms. The form is similar. The form is what sells. The subject is interchangeable within limits set by what the current coalition can absorb. Frame Game’s subject was toxic in the coalition Benz now inhabits. FFO’s subject is congenial. The shift tracks the coalition migration, not a change in the underlying mode of analysis.
Pinsof’s four criteria for ally choice describe Benz’s current coalition.
Similarity. Opposition to what the coalition calls the regime, meaning the interlocking set of federal agencies, prestige media, academic institutions, and NGO networks that coordinated around specific positions during the Trump years and the pandemic. Sympathy for Trump as the political figure most damaged by regime coordination. Suspicion of all major American institutions except the ones the coalition has built for itself. Fluency in the specific vocabulary the coalition uses: regime, censorship industrial complex, legacy media, captured institutions, weaponized bureaucracy. Comfort with rapid pivot on specific claims when coalition consensus shifts. A presentation style that emphasizes information warfare framings: your enemies have been doing psychological operations on you, the truth has been hidden, the revelation is ongoing. Benz exhibits all of these markers cleanly. His YouTube appearances, his Joe Rogan appearance, his Tucker Carlson appearances, his X presence, and his Foundation for Freedom Online output all deploy the same signals.
Transitivity. Tucker Carlson platforms him. Elon Musk amplifies him. Matt Taibbi and Michael Shellenberger operate adjacent to him on the censorship beat. Joe Rogan has hosted him. Lee Fang covers overlapping territory. The Schellenberger-Taibbi-Benz cluster around the Twitter Files and subsequent censorship investigations is tight. All of these figures share rivals: NPR, the Atlantic, the Washington Post, the Stanford Internet Observatory, the Global Engagement Center, the Aspen Digital program, academics like Renée DiResta, and the broader network of researchers studying disinformation and online manipulation from within the university-adjacent foundation-funded ecosystem. The rivalry pattern is consistent across the cluster.
Interdependence is visible in how benefits flow. Benz provides the coalition with a former State Department credential, a specific research product in the form of FFO reports, and a steady flow of content optimized for the coalition’s platforms. He receives in return podcast bookings, amplification from major accounts, audience for his Substack and YouTube channel, credibility transfers from Carlson and Musk, and the specific form of income that comes from becoming a recognized figure inside a coalition with audience reach. The interdependence is direct. His income and visibility depend on the coalition’s continued elevation of him. The coalition’s credibility on censorship issues depends on having a former State Department official who can speak to how the apparatus works from inside. The mutual benefit holds both parties in place.
Stochasticity. The specific coalition that now platforms him did not have to exist in its current form. Had Twitter not been purchased by Musk, the Twitter Files would not have happened, the censorship beat would not have developed into a mass audience topic, and Benz might still be a niche figure inside the post-Frame Game, post-State Department professional transition. Had Carlson remained at Fox rather than moving to X, his platforming capacity would have been different. Had the specific sequence of pandemic content moderation, Hunter Biden laptop suppression, and 2020 election aftermath not produced the specific narrative structure the coalition now deploys, the material Benz works on would not have the audience it has. The coalition that supports him is a product of a specific sequence of institutional ruptures that could have gone differently. The feeling of inevitability the coalition projects is retrospective. The path-dependence is visible.
The three propagandistic biases run through Benz’s work.
Perpetrator biases protect allies. When figures in the coalition produce claims that turn out to be overstated, the overstatement gets framed as reasonable inference from limited evidence, as necessary correction against regime propaganda, or as minor imprecision in the context of larger truth-telling. When figures outside the coalition produce comparable overstatements, the overstatements get framed as deliberate deception, evidence of institutional capture, or proof of the regime’s indifference to accuracy. The asymmetry is consistent. Specific examples include the treatment of various censorship claims that have been contested by researchers on specific factual grounds. Some of the claims have held up. Some have been overstated. The coalition treats the overstatements as acceptable imperfection in service of a larger truth. The same coalition treats comparable overstatements by disinformation researchers as evidence of the disinformation researchers’ own propagandistic function. The standard is not applied symmetrically because symmetric application would damage coalition credibility.
The bias also protects Benz from self-audit on his own trajectory. The relationship between Frame Game and FFO, the specific rhetorical habits that carried forward from one to the other, the question of whether his current analytical framework inherits structural features from the earlier one, have not received serious public attention from Benz himself. The coalition does not require this audit of him and in fact discourages it, because the audit would produce a narrative the coalition cannot absorb. T
Victim biases saturate the FFO work and the broader coalition. Americans have been censored by their own government. Dissidents have been deplatformed, demonetized, shadowbanned, and otherwise silenced by an apparatus acting in secret. The apparatus continues to operate. The extent of the harm is much greater than the public knows. The coalition bearing this message has itself been targeted by the same apparatus that targeted the broader public. Speaking out carries personal risk. The narrative is not empty. Some instances have occurred. Some of them match what the coalition describes. The function, however, is support mobilization, and the intensity of deployment exceeds what specific instances support. Benz’s role in the coalition is partly to supply the documentary weight that turns general suspicion into specific institutional case. The documents exist. The interpretation of the documents is shaped by coalition needs. Documents that complicate the narrative receive less attention than documents that confirm it.
Competitive victimhood operates across coalitions in the expected way. The disinformation research coalition narrates its own harassment, doxxing, and professional marginalization by the anti-censorship coalition. The anti-censorship coalition narrates its own suppression by the apparatus the disinformation research coalition is alleged to serve. Both describe real events. Both amplify.
Attributional biases govern the treatment of specific figures and institutions. Benz’s prose treats the personnel of the Censorship Industrial Complex as acting from internal disposition: ideological commitment, institutional self-interest, career ambition inside a captured system, personal hostility to the Americans they regulate. The same prose treats the coalition’s own personnel as acting from external constraint: they would do more if they could but they face retaliation, they are outgunned by the apparatus, they are doing what they can under difficult circumstances. When a disinformation researcher makes a mistake, the mistake reflects her character. When an anti-censorship researcher makes a mistake, the mistake reflects the difficulty of operating against a well-resourced opponent. Successes of the opposing coalition receive external attribution. Successes of the home coalition receive internal attribution. Failures reverse. The pattern is consistent across Benz’s output once you look for it.
The Mike Benz coalition contains libertarians who oppose government regulation of speech, traditional conservatives who support government regulation of obscenity and pornography, tech-accelerationists who want platforms to have absolute authority over their sites, tech-skeptics who want platforms broken up, Trump-aligned nationalists who want government pressure against platforms that censor Trump-adjacent speech, and principled First Amendment absolutists who oppose government pressure against platforms in all directions. No consistent principle unites these positions. Shared opposition to the specific apparatus the coalition calls the Censorship Industrial Complex holds the coalition together. When the coalition wins specific victories, the internal differences surface, because the victories require choices the coalition cannot make without some members feeling betrayed. The coalition manages this through keeping the focus on the external enemy rather than on the internal disagreements. Benz’s work supports this management. His framing emphasizes the enemy’s unity and downplays the coalition’s own internal divisions.
A figure who held the views Frame Game held in 2017 does not usually hold the views Benz now articulates without a specific coalition migration producing the shift. The shift is narratable in principled terms. Benz can say, and has said, that he discovered the real apparatus of power was not the one his earlier work identified, that his time inside the State Department showed him how the national security state functions, and that his current work reflects updated understanding of where the threats actually come from. This narrative is available to him. It may be sincere. It is also a coalition-serving narrative that permits him to carry audience and skill from one coalition into another while leaving behind the coalition positions that would have foreclosed his current platforming. Pinsof’s framework treats the narrative as the expected output of someone whose coalition has shifted, regardless of what the person sincerely believes about the shift. Sincerity is not inconsistent with coalition-shaped thinking. It is the condition under which coalition-shaped thinking operates most effectively.
What would Benz have to give up if his current coalition shifted? The answer is specific and substantial. His income depends on continued platforming by Carlson, Rogan, Musk, and the broader X ecosystem. His research product depends on an audience that wants to receive it. His credibility depends on the coalition’s continued investment in him as the former State Department official who can explain the apparatus. If the coalition moved, or if he moved against the coalition, the income, audience, and credibility would erode together. He would find himself in the position he was in during the Frame Game to State Department transition, which was a specific kind of professional limbo between coalitions. The cost of audit is return to that limbo. He has not paid it. Writers and researchers inside coalitions do not audit the coalitions that fund them, regardless of their self-image as independent thinkers.
The specific truths Benz cannot say, without damaging his coalition standing, include several that are worth naming for the analytical value. He cannot say that the Censorship Industrial Complex frame, while pointing at real phenomena, also functions as coalition infrastructure that motivates donations and clicks regardless of whether any specific claim under the frame holds up. He cannot say that some of the disinformation researchers he targets are producing work that, on its own methodological terms, is more careful than some of the work in his coalition. He cannot say that the platforming he receives from Carlson and Rogan rewards specific framings over others and shapes what he can produce. He cannot fully address the continuity between Frame Game’s analytical structure and FFO’s analytical structure, because addressing it would invite questions he cannot answer without damaging his current position. He cannot say that the coalition around him has interests that diverge from the interests of the Americans the coalition claims to defend. These are the costly truths. Writers do not tell them. Benz will not tell them. His not telling them is not evidence of dishonesty. It is evidence of operating inside a coalition whose continued support requires specific silences.
Mike Benz prose is fluent, confident, and dense with specific names, agencies, and documents. The specificity functions as credibility signal. The confidence functions as coalition reassurance, because uncertainty would weaken the coalition’s claim to having exposed the apparatus. The density of names allows the audience to feel that the analysis is grounded in research rather than in speculation. The actual relationship between the names and the analytical conclusions is sometimes loose. Specific connections that the prose implies often rest on weaker evidence than the prose suggests. This is characteristic of coalition intellectual work in which the signal of seriousness is more important to the audience than the rigor of the specific connections.
The Foundation for Freedom Online presents itself as a research organization. It operates without the normal structures of research institutions: peer review, external editorial constraint, institutional accountability for errors. Its output bears Benz’s name and reflects his choices. This is common in the post-institutional research landscape that has emerged alongside the coalition Benz inhabits. Substacks, podcasts, YouTube channels, and single-founder foundations now occupy functional space that was previously occupied by think tanks, journals, and academic centers. The new form has advantages. It produces faster, reaches audiences more directly, and escapes the specific coalition constraints of the older institutional forms. It has costs. The absence of editorial constraint produces a specific kind of drift. Claims that would have been challenged at a think tank do not get challenged at a substack. Errors that would have been corrected in a journal do not get corrected on a podcast. The audience, which is selecting for the content the institution produces, cannot easily distinguish between well-supported and weakly-supported claims because the claims arrive in the same format with the same confidence. Benz operates inside this post-institutional form. His work carries its characteristic features. The features are not specific to Benz. They are the features of the form.
Benz’s expertise, such as it is, depends on tacit knowledge acquired through his State Department tenure, his earlier research, and his immersion in the censorship beat. The tacit knowledge is real. Benz knows things about how the apparatus functions that an outside observer would not know. The tacit knowledge also cannot be verified by his audience. His audience takes his representations on trust, grounded in the credential, the confidence, and the coalition’s endorsement of him. This structure is inherently vulnerable to the specific failure mode where the expert’s tacit knowledge is colored by coalition interests without the audience being able to detect the coloring.
Both Benz and the disinformation researchers he targets have institutional positions that depend on coalition support. Both frame their work as public service against powerful opponents. Both produce output shaped by what their specific audiences reward. The symmetry is not total. The specific institutional settings differ. The specific coalitions differ. The audiences differ. But the structural features are closer than either side would acknowledge. The disinformation researchers are not neutral scholars whose work is being misrepresented by Benz. Some of their work displays the same coalition-shaped features that Benz’s displays. Benz is not a neutral observer exposing a captured apparatus. His work displays the same coalition-shaped features that the apparatus he targets displays.
The implication for readers of Benz’s work, and of the disinformation research he targets, is that careful consumption requires a skepticism that neither coalition will supply. The reader has to do the work of asking what each specific claim would need to show to be credible, which claims pass that test, which claims fail it, and which claims are being offered with more confidence than the evidence supports. This is difficult work that most readers do not do, which is why coalition intellectual work operates at all. If readers did the work, the coalition would not be able to sustain the claims at the intensity it currently supports. The readers’ failure to do the work is not a defect of the readers. It is a function of the cognitive economics of modern information consumption.

Actor-Network Theory

Actor-Network Theory, as developed by Bruno Latour (1947-2022), Michel Callon (b. 1945), and John Law (b. 1946), gives an unusual angle on Mike Benz because Benz already does something resembling ANT in his own work. He follows actants. He traces grants from DARPA to Stanford’s Internet Observatory to the Election Integrity Partnership to platform trust and safety teams to White House liaisons. He treats the linkages as constituting an entity he calls the censorship industrial complex. ANT recognizes the move. It is what Latour called following the actors.
Applied to Benz himself, the theory produces a different picture than Benz’s admirers or critics tend to draw.
The figure called Mike Benz emerges from an assembly of human and non-human actants. The State Department line credentials him. The Foundation for Freedom Online gives him an institutional address. Tucker Carlson multiplies him to one audience. Joe Rogan multiplies him to another. Congressional Republicans translate him into oversight ammunition. Twitter compresses his arguments into clips. None of these alone produces Benz. The Benz who circulates publicly is the network’s output.
Non-human actants do heavy work here. The org chart format performs enrollment that prose cannot. When Benz shows a network diagram during a livestream, the diagram itself acts. Viewers feel they have seen connections rather than merely heard claims. PDFs of grants and contracts function as actants because they can be screenshotted and circulated. The screenshot is a small machine for compressing ambiguous documents into apparent proof. The platform algorithm rewards the visual form. The form selects the content.
Translation, in Callon’s sense, fits Benz’s account well. Government agencies cannot legally censor most political speech. They translate their interests through NGOs and academic partners. Those partners translate the interests into trust and safety recommendations. Platforms translate the recommendations into terms-of-service enforcement. Each step transforms the original interest while keeping the chain intact. Latour and Callon described this as the chain of translation. Benz calls it laundering. The descriptive content overlaps. The moral coloring differs.
Obligatory passage points also fit. Benz argues that platform content moderation became an obligatory passage point for political speech between roughly 2018 and 2022. To reach an audience, speech had to pass the gate. The gate was shaped by partnerships among government, academic, and NGO actants. Whoever shapes the passage point shapes the field.
Here ANT pushes back on Benz in a useful way. The symmetry principle says do not pre-decide which network is the conspiracy and which is the public interest. Trace associations on both sides. Applied symmetrically, the network Benz opposes and the network now producing Benz look structurally similar. Both link government actors, NGOs, academic centers, media figures, and funders. Both translate interests through chains of allied actants. Both produce black-boxed entities that function as single agents in public argument. The censorship industrial complex is one such black box. Russian disinformation is another. ANT treats both with suspicion, not because the underlying associations are imaginary but because the unified agency attributed to them is usually an artifact of polemic.
The serious question is not whether the network Benz describes exists. It exists. ANT expects such networks around any contested policy domain. The question is whether the network has the unified will Benz often imputes to it, or whether it is a looser assemblage of partial alignments, careerist incentives, ideological convergences, and bureaucratic momentum. ANT tends toward the second answer for almost every network it examines. Coordination is real. Coordination is rarely as tight as opponents claim.
Stability is an achievement in ANT, not a default. Networks dissolve when their translations stop working. The censorship network Benz describes peaked around 2020-2022 and has lost ground since. Musk’s purchase of Twitter broke a passage point. The Murthy v. Missouri litigation pressured another. The 2024 election broke several more. Stanford Internet Observatory wound down. The Election Integrity Partnership ended. ANT predicts this fragility. Networks that look monolithic at peak often fragment quickly when key actants defect or platforms change hands.
Benz’s own rise tracks the fragmentation of the network he opposes. He became visible because the network that excluded him lost its passage points. New passage points opened. Carlson became one. X became another. Rogan became another. Benz now occupies a node in a network that benefits from his framing, funds his work, amplifies his clips, and constrains what he can say. The constraint is not censorious. It is associational. Audiences enroll the speaker as much as the speaker enrolls them. The Benz who survives in this network is the one the network can use.
If you wanted to write Benz from inside ANT, you would write him as an effect rather than a cause. The State Department alumnus, the foundation, the diagrams, the platforms, the hosts, the audiences, the litigation, the political cycle, the documents – these collaborate to produce a figure who can credibly say what he says. Remove any one of them and the figure dissolves or shifts shape. He is the network speaking.

Alliance Theory v Actor-Network Theory

Overall, Alliance Theory (AT) yields more for Benz. ANT yields more on some aspects of Benz.
The Benz case turns on a coalition migration. Frame Game to State Department to FFO. AT was built for this question. Same analytical form across the migration, different subject, different audience, different coalition, different income source. AT names the migration and predicts what the new coalition rewards and forbids. ANT can describe the assembly producing the current Benz but lacks native vocabulary for why an actant transits between assemblies and carries skill while shedding positions. ANT brackets motivation. AT addresses it.
AT also names the asymmetric standards across Benz’s output: perpetrator, victim, and attributional biases applied differently to allies and enemies. The asymmetry is a distinctive feature of his prose. ANT’s symmetry principle refuses to take sides on which network tells the truth, which protects the method against polemic but blunts it on this point.
AT generates a list of costly truths Benz cannot say. Either he says them or he does not. The current record is that he does not. ANT does not generate that list.
ANT captures the non-human actants the AT essay underweights. The diagram performing enrollment work that prose cannot. The screenshot as a small machine for compressing ambiguous documents into apparent proof. The algorithm as a selector of forms. These features account for a lot of Benz’s traction and AT acknowledges them only in passing.
ANT also predicts network fragility better. The censorship network Benz opposes peaked around 2020-2022 and has weakened sharply since Musk, Murthy, and 2024. ANT expects this kind of collapse. Stable-looking networks dissolve when key actants defect or platforms change hands. AT has a strong theory of coalition formation and a weaker theory of coalition collapse.
The third ANT advantage is methodological discipline against an AT failure mode. AT can slide into pure motive attribution in which every silence becomes evidence of coalition pressure. Paul Bloom raised this exact concern with Pinsof. The unfalsifiability risk is real. ANT’s neutrality is a check. If you write Benz using only AT, the prose tends to assume the analyst knows what Benz cannot say and why he cannot say it. ANT keeps you closer to the associations and makes you trust the description.
The frames complement each other in a particular way. AT explains why Benz produces what he produces and what he cannot say. ANT explains what gives the output traction once produced: the platforms, the visual forms, the chains of amplification. AT is the logic of coalition. ANT is the materialization of that logic in a network with its own grip on him.

Wikipedia Page

The page is recent, short and reads as written by editors hostile to him. It leads with USAID dismantlement and Stephen Miller speechwriting, gives FFO a short paragraph, and devotes substantial attention to the Frame Game material, Proud Boys self-description, and the Mein Kampf and Great Replacement quotations. The 2020 election denial line appears in the lead. For someone with Benz’s reach across Rogan, Carlson, Musk amplification, congressional testimony, and federal employment under two Trump terms, the page is thin and the framing is one-sided. The relative emptiness is itself the artifact.
Wikipedia’s notability thresholds for political figures are contested ground. Pages on figures the editorial coalition disfavors tend to get nominated for deletion, get rewritten down to stub status, or get larded with the most damaging available sourcing. Pages on figures the coalition favors expand, soften, and accumulate context. The Benz page reads like the first pattern. Most of his work is absent. The biographical material that exists is the material critics want known. The Frame Game disclosure from NBC and the Times sits prominently because Wikipedia’s reliable-sources policy weights mainstream legacy outlets and those outlets covered the disclosure. The censorship work that drives his audience reach is barely described, because the outlets Wikipedia treats as reliable have not covered that work sympathetically.
A figure can have considerable cultural reach and still have a thin or hostile Wikipedia presence if the legacy press coverage available to Wikipedia editors is uniformly hostile. Wikipedia’s neutrality policy in principle weights all reliable sources. In practice it weights the sources its editorial coalition finds congenial. Benz is one of the figures where the gap between reach and Wikipedia presence is widest.
There is a second-order point here that fits the analytical project. Wikipedia is one of the institutions Benz includes in the network he opposes. The volunteer editor coalition, the Wikimedia Foundation’s funders, the reliable-sources policy, and the legacy outlets that policy elevates form a system that produces the public encyclopedia entry on him. The system produces what the system produces. Critics of Benz get the page they want because the system selects their sources. Benz’s allies, if they wanted to change the page, would have to either change the policy or change which outlets count as reliable. Neither is available in the short run. So the page sits as it sits.
Grokipedia, the Musk-backed alternative, runs a much fuller and more flattering Benz entry. This is also a coalition artifact. Musk built an encyclopedia his coalition controls, and Benz is one of the figures it elevates. The pair of pages, English Wikipedia and Grokipedia, gives you a useful side-by-side of the two networks producing him. The legacy Wikipedia page is the page his opponents write. The Grokipedia page is the page his allies write. Neither is the page a careful outside analyst would produce. Both are coalition outputs.
The interesting analytical move is not to ask which page is accurate. It is to read both pages as evidence of the network. The Wikipedia page is what AT predicts an opposing coalition produces about him. The Grokipedia page is what AT predicts a home coalition produces about him. The absence of a careful page is what the post-institutional research environment looks like at the encyclopedia layer.

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The Conspiracy Theories of Leo Strauss

On the truth scale, Leo Strauss failed. On the attention scale, he won, producing a devoted cult.
Strauss made many claims that have the structure of conspiracy theories, though dressed in scholarly clothing.
The grand cipher of philosophy. The whole esoteric thesis is a meta-conspiracy. For two thousand years, from Plato through the seventeenth century, philosophers wrote on two levels and concealed their real teachings from authorities and from the multitude. Whole generations of scholars missed the code. Only the careful reader, trained to notice contradictions, repetitions, numerical patterns, and strategic silences, breaks the cipher. Strauss claimed this art had been lost only because the modern academy stopped looking.
Modernity as a coordinated plot. Strauss read the modern project not as the gradual emergence of new ideas but as a deliberate philosophical war. Machiavelli began it knowing what he did. Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke continued it. The Enlightenment, on this reading, was a long campaign whose goal was the discrediting of revelation, conducted through ridicule rather than refutation because direct argument could not win. The moderns were a conspiracy of philosophical revolutionaries who reshaped Western life by stealth.
The Enlightenment did not refute religion, it mocked it. In Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (1930), Strauss argued that the Enlightenment claim to have answered orthodoxy was a fraud. The arguments did not work. The Enlightenment won by laughter, satire, and gradual reframing, not by demonstration. The supposed victory over religion was a public-relations triumph passed off as a logical one.
Maimonides was hiding something dangerous. Strauss’s reading of The Guide of the Perplexed scandalized many Jewish scholars. The surface piety, he argued, conceals a teaching far more radical than orthodox Maimonideans admit, possibly approaching a naturalistic critique of revelation. Maimonides did not write for everyone. He wrote for the rare reader capable of receiving what could not be said openly.
Alfarabi preserved a secret line. Strauss claimed Alfarabi (c. 872-950) carried forward a Platonic teaching the Latin West had lost. Behind Farabi’s apparent piety lay philosophical naturalism. Through Farabi, the true Plato reached Maimonides. Through Maimonides, fragments reached Spinoza. A hidden line of transmission ran across centuries and across the Christian-Muslim-Jewish divide.
Xenophon was deeper than he looked. Strauss read Xenophon (c. 430-354 BCE) as a more cunning writer than commonly recognized, hiding his philosophical seriousness behind apparent military memoir and gentlemanly chatter. The whole tradition that dismissed Xenophon as a lightweight had been fooled by the surface. The rehabilitation of Xenophon was the recovery of an esoteric art.
The crisis of the West is hidden from itself. Strauss argued that liberal democratic society cannot name its own predicament. Its confidence rests on classical and biblical inheritances it has repudiated. The intellectual class conceals this from itself through historicism and positivism, both of which forbid asking the question of the good. The West, on this reading, sleepwalks, and the supposed normal scholarship enforces the sleep.
Heidegger’s Nazism was no accident. Strauss saw Martin Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism as the consistent working-out of his philosophy, not a personal failing or a temporary lapse. Radical historicism, taken seriously, leaves no ground for resisting whatever the moment demands. The greatest mind of the age followed his thinking where it led. The professorial habit of treating this as embarrassing biography missed the point.
The Platonic Socrates is a mask. Strauss argued that the Socrates of Plato’s dialogues is a literary creation, not a transcript. Plato writes a Socrates who serves Plato’s pedagogical purposes. The reader who treats the dialogues as records of conversation has been fooled by Plato’s art. The historical Socrates survives only in fragments, and the Platonic Socrates teaches Plato’s lessons, not his own.
The teaching of every great book is what the book takes pains to hide. This is the unifying claim. Strauss inverted the normal reading habit. The surface lessons of philosophical texts are the bait. The real teaching lies in what gets stated once and dropped, what gets contradicted, what gets placed at the structural center of the work, and what gets said only by the most disreputable speaker. The careful reader looks for the awkward, the buried, and the apparent mistake.
The shared logic of all these claims is that truth resists open statement and that any culture serious about philosophy will have learned the art of saying and not saying.
The Strauss appeal sits in a different register than truth. Take the channels in rough order of force.
Initiation. A bright eighteen-year-old enters college without a clear sense of what kind of intellectual to become. The Straussian school offers a complete identity for the taking. A posture of gravity and ironic distance from current politics. A syllabus that runs from Plato through Maimonides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Tocqueville, and Nietzsche. A vocabulary, the theological-political problem, the philosopher and the city, the gentleman, the quarrel of the ancients and moderns. A method, close reading for surface and depth. A community whose members recognize each other instantly. Most academic options offer fragments. This option offers the whole man.
Flattery built into the method. The Straussian art tells the student he is not one of the many. He is among the few capable of reading what the careless miss. For an intelligent young man who has spent his life suspecting he is smarter than his teachers and his peers, the confirmation is intoxicating. The flattery is structural, not personal. The method itself flatters anyone who performs it.
Permission to take ideas seriously. American higher education by the mid-twentieth century treated old texts as historical curiosities. Plato had to be understood in his time and then set aside. The Straussian school said no. Plato might be right. Maimonides might be right. The student gets permission to read the great books as live arguments about how to live. No other school grants this permission so cleanly.
A diagnosis of modernity. Strauss said modern life suffers from a particular illness, the rejection of natural right and the embrace of historicism and value-relativism. The diagnosis fits the intuitive sense many students carry that something has gone wrong. The school offers an account of what went wrong and how to think about it. Most academic schools do not offer a diagnosis at all. The market gap is enormous.
A defense against postmodernism. Where deconstruction sees only power and play of signifiers, the school says the great texts can be read for truth. The school positions itself as the citadel of meaning. Students who refuse the postmodern offer have somewhere to go.
A religion-substitute. The structural elements of religious community appear without the supernatural commitments. Masters and disciples. Texts read with reverence. Rituals in the seminar. Heretics and orthodox. A long lineage of teachers stretching back into the past. A way of life. For a Jew or Catholic or Protestant losing observance, the school offers continuity of form with relief from content.
The Jewish case sits at the center. Strauss was Jewish. Maimonides anchors the canon. The theological-political problem comes from Jewish, Christian, and Muslim sources. Bloom, Mansfield, Berns, Cropsey, Jaffa, Smith. The roster reads heavily Jewish. For Jewish intellectuals who want serious Jewish life without the synagogue, the Straussian engagement with Maimonides, Halevi, and Spinoza supplies a Jewish intellectual home without the demands of observance. Many of the school’s most influential figures fit this profile. The school does the work of Jewish continuity through philosophy rather than through practice (Halacha).
Sophisticated conservatism. Post-war American conservatism in the academy had nowhere to go. Crude reaction was unrespectable. Religious traditionalism was unfashionable. Libertarian economics was dry. The Straussian school provided a form of conservatism that engaged the great tradition. It defended bourgeois democracy without embracing technocratic liberalism. It worried about the cultural Left without joining the religious Right. For a young conservative with intellectual ambition, the school was the only serious option for decades and remains close to that.
Mentorship and career. Strauss took his students seriously. His students became serious teachers in turn. The school has been good at mentorship in an academy where graduate students are often neglected. It offers attention, letters of recommendation, placement, introduction to senior scholars. The infrastructure includes chairs at major universities, the journal Interpretation, foundations like Earhart, think tanks like the Claremont Institute, and government positions especially in Republican administrations. For a smart young man willing to perform the moves, the school offers a career path that competing schools do not match.
Endless work. Every great book contains hidden teachings. Every great philosopher coordinated his rhetoric. The student can spend a lifetime producing readings. Each reading can be defended within the school by appeal to the master’s intuition. The method never runs out of material. This is academic gold.
Conspiracy theories thrive because they supply pattern, community, esoteric knowledge, flattery (the believer sees what others miss), and explanation of a confusing world. The Straussian school supplies the same goods at higher altitude. It is conspiracy thinking for intelligent men with classical educations. Each great book contains hidden teachings. Each great philosopher coordinated his rhetoric. The world makes sense once you have the key. The believer sees what others miss. The community recognizes its own. The comparison should not be heard as insult. The structural goods that conspiracy provides are the same goods the school provides. The school just provides them with better texts, better company, better tailoring, and academic prestige instead of basement chatrooms. A conspiracy theorist on Reddit and a Straussian at Yale run the same psychological program with different production values and different reading lists.
Add the channels together and the appeal is overdetermined. Identity, flattery, permission, diagnosis, defense against nihilism, religion-substitute, Jewish home, conservatism with respectability, mentorship, career, endless work, and a sense of belonging to a long chain of careful readers reaching back to antiquity. Truth-tracking sits nowhere on this list. The school can deliver all these goods while delivering little new knowledge of Plato or Aristotle. The persistence of the school reflects the continuing absence of alternatives that offer a comparable package, not any vindication of its scholarship.
Strauss’s circle developed several features that earn the word “cult.”
The master’s asides and jokes get the same close attention as the books. The reading method only the trained can use properly. A vocabulary signals membership: regime, the philosopher, the city, low but solid ground. An inside-outside line gets policed by the question of whether someone reads correctly. Transmission happens through personal contact rather than published argument. Factions and schisms run deep (East Coast versus West Coast, Claremont versus Toronto versus Chicago versus St. John’s, Jaffa versus Pangle). Sacred texts hold authority internal to the group. Criticism counts as evidence of incomprehension rather than disagreement. The lecture notes circulated only to the trustworthy. The Strauss archive at Chicago stayed tightly held for decades until Heinrich Meier began publishing the German materials.
The closed shop has its own ranking and its own rewards. Those rewards require silence and a habit of indirection. Plain answers belong to outsiders. Vagueness signals that the real teaching cannot be reduced to plain speech.
Did Strauss’s conspiracy thinking get amplified by his students? Yes.
Allan Bloom made the diagnosis of modern crisis a bestseller in The Closing of the American Mind (1987). Harry Jaffa (1918-2015) pressed the recovery of natural right into American constitutional argument, fighting Pangle and Mansfield in long feuds about whether Lincoln continued the Founding or reformed it. Harvey Mansfield (b. 1932) pushed the manliness theme and the suspicion of feminism and modern liberalism. Carnes Lord and Abram Shulsky carried the esoteric method into work on intelligence. Shulsky and Gary Schmitt wrote Leo Strauss and the World of Intelligence (1999), arguing that intelligence analysts should read foreign communications the way Strauss read Maimonides. William Kristol (b. 1952), through The Weekly Standard, applied the rhetoric of regime, virtue, and decline to American foreign policy.
The disinformation frame fits parts of this story.
A practice of treating public speech as a code concealing real intent trains an analyst to assume manipulation everywhere. It also licenses production of public speech that conceals real intent. The two skills are the same skill turned in opposite directions. Reading and writing in code share a grammar.
The Office of Special Plans under Douglas Feith (b. 1953) in the run-up to the Iraq War got directed in part by Shulsky. The OSP existed to produce intelligence assessments contradicting the CIA’s, supporting the case for invasion. The unit existed because the regular intelligence community refused to produce the readings the political leadership wanted. Shulsky brought his Straussian training in finding hidden meanings to the task of finding Iraqi WMD programs and Al Qaeda ties in fragments of evidence that intelligence professionals had already discounted.
The harms attributable to the school, in descending order of confidence:
First, the Iraq War. The Straussian network did not cause the war on its own. Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Bush wanted it. But Paul Wolfowitz (b. 1943), Shulsky, Feith, Kristol, and the writers around them supplied the intellectual case and the institutional energy. The war killed many thousands of Americans and many hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. It cost trillions of dollars. It opened space for ISIS. The school did not act alone, but the school sits on the ledger.
Second, the corrosion of plain speech. If every important text says the opposite of its surface, no public document means what it appears to mean. A managerial elite gets trained to assume manipulation in others and to license it in itself. Public reasoning becomes theater. The school did not invent this attitude, but the school dignified it as wisdom.
Third, the noble-lie license. Strauss himself did not advocate lying to the public. His students, or at least the popularizers of his students, drifted toward the view that elite deception of the masses is principled rather than corrupt. Shadia Drury’s reading exaggerates this drift, but the drift is real.
Fourth, the aristocratic disdain for democratic deliberation. The competent few must guide the incompetent many. The classics teach this, on the Straussian reading. The political consequences include impatience with consultation, with congressional oversight, with public argument.
Fifth, an intellectual culture immunized against empirical correction. The esoteric reading method generates secret meanings from any text. No external evidence can refute the reading, since the reader can always claim to see what the unsubtle reader has missed. The same habit transferred to policy means evidence does not constrain the reading. The case for invasion already existed. The intelligence had to fit.

‘The U of C & Me | Yale Professor Steven B. Smith’ (Sep. 12, 2023)

The talk’s center is loss. Yale political science professor Steven B. Smith knows this and tries to head it off. He quotes Tony Soprano at 56:46, “the worst conversation is about the way things used to be,” then proceeds to have that conversation. The Tony Soprano fence works as a permit. He gets to lament because he announced he won’t.
The strongest material covers Allan Bloom. Smith admires him and tells stories that condemn him. Bloom “knew right away whether he thought you were worth cultivating and if you were not, you were out” (28:00). He “ridiculed Sappho as a second rater, made fun of Simone de Beauvoir” (28:25). His former undergraduate Miriam Galston, expecting the customary celebratory senior lunch, got taken to help with Bloom’s grocery shopping (29:00). Smith reports this and adds only, “you couldn’t get away with that today.” The structure of the anecdote does the rest of the work.
Then at the Q&A a host asks about Bloom’s homosexuality and Smith says it “was tolerated because there was something about him” (59:42) and “nobody cared” (1:17:32). Look at what Smith has already told us in the same talk: Bloom kept a court of young men who drove his car and did his laundry, excluded women from teaching, wore silk kimonos to greet guests, borrowed money from students that “was never repaid.” Smith presents these as color. The listener who has stayed an hour has more material than Smith uses.
The Leszek Kolakowski (1927–2009) line at 41:21 might be the best thing in the talk. “A modern philosopher who has never once suspected himself of being a charlatan must be such a shallow mind that his work is probably not worth reading.” Smith says he agrees and that few philosophers stop to consider it. The talk never applies the test to its own author or to its subjects. Seth Benardete (1930–2001) reads an unreadable paper on the Statesman to Yale freshmen and then announces the Aeneid has “the zero at the center of the book” (37:05). Smith leaves the interpretation suspended between depth and elaborate bluff. He tells us he asked Benardete’s former students later and “there was no written record.” The Stanley Rosen anecdote at 33:43 cuts sharper. Rosen asked Benardete what we should love instead of other human beings; Benardete said “Greek vases”; Rosen called it “the most sophisticated argument I have ever heard except that it had one flaw. It was nonsense.” Smith reports the deflation and then writes about Benardete with the awe of the undeflated. He wants both.
On Chicago as the un-Yale, the contrast holds up. Marty Peretz at 12:42 gets warned, “it’s not Yale, it’s not Harvard, it’s not Princeton. You’re going to have to work.” Norman Nie welcomes the incoming class at 13:04 by telling them they will all end up teaching high school. That is a stance. Smith credits it: Chicago “appreciated originality and creativity. The only thing that was not tolerated was the commonplace or the banal” (18:35). The line might be true of the period. The accompanying claim that Chicago didn’t track prestige sits uneasily with the sociology of the Strauss circle. Leo Strauss had lecture notes mimeographed and circulated only to students deemed “trustworthy” (18:09). Joseph Cropsey (1919–2012) answered Smith’s questions about Strauss “with vagueness or platitudes” (18:16). Smith calls this “a conspiracy of silence” (17:48) and presents it as charm. It sounds more like a closed shop with its own ranking, just not the official one.
The most honest moment comes near the end. The host pushes him on the academy now. Smith says, “today I feel very often it’s your political identity and your political position that is the determining factor and whether you’re a scholar or not is something that I’m afraid I fear is becoming less and less important” (58:07). He walks it back inside ten seconds: “I don’t know, it’s just a sense.” The walk-back is the Yale move. The Chicago move might have been to leave the sentence alone.
The Bernard Silberman bit at 47:35 might be the most useful sentence in the talk for any graduate student. Asked whether you can do anything, “lie like a rug.” Can you teach a course you have no background in? Yes. Would you share an office? Love to. Silberman gave up serious scholarship and taught courses with titles like “Losers” and “Springtime for Hitler in Germany” (48:00). Smith reports this without elegy. Silberman traded the ambitions for the freedom to make jokes. Smith chose differently. The talk is partly a defense of that choice.
One omission worth naming. Smith spends real time on the Strauss circle’s secrecy and treats it with affection. He never asks what kind of intellectual culture produces students who refuse to discuss their teacher’s ideas because discussion itself counts as a sign of misunderstanding. He came up inside it. He might not see it.
The Cropsey line about Kolakowski and Adam Jaworski at 44:06 stays with me. Both Polish Marxists. Kolakowski moved right and wrote In Praise of Inconsistency. Jaworski stayed loosely Marxist. Smith asks Cropsey why the divergence. Cropsey shrugs and says, “some people learn from their experience.” Smith offers it without comment and moves on. It might be the harshest line in the talk.

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The Caring Professor

The more caring the professor, in my experience, the more likely it is that he will try to fuck you.

Those who mentor the under-privileged and disadvantaged, like Jerry Sandusky, are the most likely to try to take advantage of their position.

If you are an attractive young woman undergoing an Orthodox conversion in Los Angeles, the odds are about 50% your Av Beit din will try to fuck you.

They don’t pick on anyone, however. They prey on the vulnerable. For the formidable, they only show their best selves.

If someone with power over you tries to fuck you, that likely reflects not just their moral weakness but your weakness too. I bet that you put out a signal that you are fuckable.

I know too many women who repeatedly get raped by mentors. I know too many women who tell me about being repeatedly raped by men they knew. They’re surprised when they get into bed naked with a guy and he takes advantage. Other women I know would never put themselves in that position.

If your shul’s Orthodox rabbi operates behind a locked office door, beware.

If the rabbi who arranges for scholars in residence for your shul tends to choose the most attractive, beware.

I knew musicologist Robert Murell Stevenson at UCLA in 1988-89. We had a lot of meals together at Rieber Hall along with his friend Jules Zentner (another groomer as well as an expert in Scandinavian Literature).

Professor Stevenson, a bachelor, had just retired from teaching but he was quite the mentor. He took a particular interest in our African-American athletes from under-privileged backgrounds and would pimp them out to the Hollywood Gay Mafia. They could earn thousands of dollars meeting the needs of the most powerful men in Los Angeles.

Professor Stevenson did not have a high estimation of the cognitive abilities of these scholar-athletes but he recognized that different peoples have different gifts.

I suspect the sex work he arranged was similar in style to his musical compositions, “marked by kinetic energy and set in vigorous and often acrid dissonant counterpoint.”

Professor Stevenson was a complicated guy. He didn’t hold by affirmative action but he accepted the world as it was. We’d talk about Martin Luther King’s plagiarized PhD thesis.

The professor did not suffer fools. When I said something stupid, he’d say that was stupid. When UCLA did stupid things, the professor would say they were stupid.

He didn’t have much of a filter.

Professor Stevenson was a descendent of the novelist Robert Louis Stevenson.

Apparently, there wasn’t much of a financial demand for getting these scholar-athletes into heterosexual work.

I’m not sure if the professor ever availed himself of their services.

When my father saw a professor investing in me without obvious benefit, such as Jules Zenter, he read correctly that the prof would try to fuck me. I had to learn that hard lesson.

No other mentor tried to fuck me.

Look for the pattern. Outsized kindness. Then friendship. Then a sexual advance once trust deepens. Textbook escalation. Not exotic. Not rare.

An adult man with status uses mentorship to position himself for sexual access to a younger person who depends on him. The pattern shares structural features with Sandusky: asymmetrical access, helping as camouflage, dependency as leverage.

What sits in the public record across major university programs includes Colorado’s hostess scandal, Nevin Shapiro at Miami providing escorts and access to players, and longstanding patronage arrangements between wealthy Los Angeles figures and athletes before NIL legalized direct compensation. UCLA sat at the crossroads of celebrity, money, and athletic prestige.

Institutions underestimate the risk posed by charismatic helpers. Public reputation for goodness functions as cover. Dependency keeps targets quiet. Colleagues prefer not to look. Mentorship plus dependency plus institutional reluctance to investigate produces predictable predation, and the most nurturing figures often draw the least scrutiny because their public goodness shields them.

How many such men operate at any given university at any given time? I’d estimate one or two per department, often known informally to colleagues, rarely reported, almost never punished.

When I was at Sierra Community College, the most charismatic teachers enjoyed the most sexual access to the most beautiful women. The teachers described it as studying social norms. Several women I knew did not enjoy this attention and the cruelty that resulted from them saying no.

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Overrated Philosophers

This crowd enjoys a cultural standing beyond their merit because they fill coalition needs.
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) is the patron of Jewish liberal humanities intellectuals. Origins of Totalitarianism is powerful as literary-historical writing but soft as causal analysis. Many historians have disputed her conflation of Nazism and Stalinism. The Human Condition reads more like poetry than political theory. The banality of evil thesis turned out to be wrong about Eichmann, as Bettina Stangneth (b. 1966) showed in Eichmann Before Jerusalem. Arendt remains huge because she lets literary intellectuals think about politics in their preferred register, because she is the rare woman in the canon, and because she is the Jewish Heidegger student who broke with him politically though never personally. Strip the coalition function and she becomes an essayist with strong style and dubious arguments.
Judith Butler (b. 1956) depends on the coalition of academic feminism and queer theory. Gender Trouble of 1990 won the Bad Writing Contest of 1998 for a reason. Her prose is obscure. Her central claims about gender performativity are derivative of earlier feminist work and of Erving Goffman (1922-1982). Without the coalition need for a philosophical figurehead, she might be a competent but unremarkable theorist.
Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) earned massive prominence in the humanities, but his arguments rarely survive paraphrase. Analytic philosophers have mostly judged his work either trivial or incomprehensible. The coalition is literary theorists who need a method that lets them claim philosophical depth without engaging the historian’s evidence or the analytic philosopher’s argument. Deconstruction served that need.
Michel Foucault (1926-1984) has a prominence far past the merit. His historical work is often wrong on the facts. Madness and Civilization has been demolished by historians of medicine. His genealogical method is rhetorical rather than rigorous. Without the coalition use by activists and humanities scholars, Foucault is a brilliant essayist whose historical claims are mostly wrong.
Slavoj Žižek (b. 1949) is a performance artist with a Lacanian vocabulary. His prolific output is full of self-contradiction. The coalition is the leftist intelligentsia who want a celebrity in their register. He is quick and funny. He is not, in the technical sense, doing philosophy.
Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929) is German liberalism’s philosophical patron. Theory of Communicative Action is influential beyond its merit. The coalition is European social democrats who need a serious foundation. His prose is grindingly difficult. Many of his core distinctions do not hold up under analysis.
John Rawls (1921-2002) has a standing inflated by his role as the patron of post-1960s egalitarian liberalism. Without the coalition need for a philosophical justification of the welfare-state project, Rawls might be a respected but not towering figure. The original position, the veil of ignorance, and the difference principle have all received serious criticism that the coalition mostly ignores. He is treated as having settled questions he in fact reopened.
Cornel West (b. 1953) is prominent as a Black public intellectual. His philosophical output is thin. He is a preacher and a celebrity. The coalition is Black liberal-left intellectuals plus White liberals who want to platform a Black philosopher.
Peter Singer (b. 1946) writes clearly, but the arguments are often simple. His prominence rests on the utilitarian commitments of much of the secular liberal class. He says clearly what they already believe.
Sam Harris (b. 1967) is not a philosopher despite the doctorate. His arguments on free will, moral realism, and Islam are weak. His prominence rests on the New Atheist coalition that needed a public figure.
On the conservative side:
Leo Strauss (1899-1973). A high-status Alex Jones type. His readings are often forced and his patterns imposed. A coalition of conservative intellectuals needed a serious figure and Strauss filled the role.
Russell Kirk (1918-1994) is inflated by traditionalist conservatives who needed a respectable founder. The Conservative Mind of 1953 is more anthology than argument. Kirk is rhetorically gifted but not a major thinker.
Ayn Rand (1905-1982) is not taken seriously by academic philosophy, but she is treated as a philosopher inside the libertarian coalition. Her prominence outside that coalition is small.
Jordan Peterson (b. 1962) is a clinical psychologist who became a public intellectual. His philosophical claims are confused. The coalition is conservative-curious young men who needed a figure who would speak to them directly about meaning and order.
Among religious and traditionalist coalitions:
Alasdair MacIntyre (b. 1929) has a standing inflated by Catholic and traditionalist circles who need a serious critic of liberalism. After Virtue of 1981 is substantial. The later work is more apologetics than philosophy. Charles Taylor (b. 1931) is inflated by communitarian and Catholic coalitions. A Secular Age of 2007 is more sociology than philosophy and he is treated as having said more than he in fact said.
A note on public intellectuals who present as philosophers but are not. Steven Pinker (b. 1954) is a psychologist who writes about progress. Yuval Noah Harari (b. 1976) is a historian who writes Big Books that fall part upon analysis. Robert Sapolsky (b. 1957) is a biologist who writes about behavior and makes dubious claims. Jonathan Haidt (b. 1963) is a social psychologist who writes about moral intuitions and makes dubious claims. All four are treated as authorities on philosophical questions because they serve the educated rationalist-liberal coalition that needs accessible figures who confirm its self-understanding.
Cultural prominence is a coalition product. The merits are often hard to measure in philosophy, so the coalition function takes over more easily than it does in fields with clearer standards. The same logic that drives Spinoza’s inflated standing drives the standing of these figures. Each one solves a coalition’s problem of needing a serious thinker who validates its position.

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