What Would Make for Credible Evidence of Voter Fraud?

I remain unconvinced by claims of widespread voter fraud changing recent American elections and anyone who makes such claims without evidence loses credibility in my eyes.

Most partisans prefer to blame outside systems rather than their own group’s incompetence. It’s not impressive.

My body loves the tribal approach to life. My body thrills when my tribe says bad things about our enemies. But with some effort, I can discipline myself to prefer truth to self-serving BS. The tribal side of me, however, always lurks underneath my best mental efforts, and under a little stress, it takes control of me.

I’m the victim here!

I want to be a truth-optimizer, but it is a lonely life.

I ask Gemini: “What would credible voter fraud claims look like? And what would be needed to establish them? In particular, with regard to voting in the LA mayor’s race.”

Gemini replies: Credible claims of voter fraud require specific, systemic evidence that bypasses or corrupts established institutional safeguards. In a major contest like the Los Angeles mayor’s race, proving widespread fraud demands more than pointing to statistical anomalies, data reporting delays, or minor human errors. It requires proving intentional, coordinated manipulation capable of altering the outcome.

To be taken seriously by federal prosecutors or a court of law, a claim must present verifiable patterns rather than isolated incidents. Credible claims generally fall into two categories:

Systemic Procurement and Submission Failure: This includes evidence of large-scale ballot harvesting operations where third parties intercept, alter, or forge signatures on mail-in ballots without the voter’s consent, or instances of non-citizens registering and voting in numbers large enough to affect the margin.

Insider Manipulation or Technological Compromise: This involves evidence that election officials or software vendors intentionally altered tabulation code, bypassed physical security logs to inject fraudulent ballots, or overrode signature verification systems systematically.

Conversely, common complaints often lack credibility because they mistake standard operating procedures for malfeasance. For example, during vote counting, an online data tracker might show a brief lag where one candidate temporarily receives zero votes in a single batch update before catching up a minute later. While visually jarring on social media, this is a known artifact of how automated data feeds pull from county servers, not evidence of a rigged count. Similarly, a slow vote count is a structural feature of California election law, which permits mail-in ballots postmarked by Election Day to arrive up to seven days later, requiring a meticulous, multi-week verification process.

Establishing voter fraud in Los Angeles requires satisfying strict legal and evidentiary standards. Because the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk runs a highly auditable system, an investigator must produce a clear paper and digital trail to prove a violation:

Chain-of-Custody Documentation: Every ballot box, transport bag, and tabulation machine has a physical log and a tamper-evident seal. To prove inside tampering, one must show documented breaks in these logs, missing security seals, or unauthorized access to the secure tabulation facilities in the City of Industry.

Forensic Audit of Signature Discrepancies: Los Angeles County uses automated software to compare the signature on every mail-in envelope against the voter’s record (such as their DMV file), followed by a multi-person human review for any flagged anomalies. Establishing fraud requires a statistical audit demonstrating that thousands of blatantly non-matching signatures were systematically accepted, or that the “ballot curing” process—where voters are contacted to verify their identity—was bypassed entirely.

Witness Testimony and Whistleblowers: Coordinated fraud requires coordination. Solid cases rely on first-hand testimony from election workers, software technicians, or participants in a harvesting scheme, backed by text messages, emails, or financial logs showing instruction or compensation for illegal voting activities.

Proof of Material Impact: Under the California Elections Code, contesting an election successfully requires proving not just that misconduct occurred, but that the number of illegal votes cast or legal votes rejected was large enough to change the final winner of the mayoral seat.

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What Sickness Tells Me

When the fever comes the man I perform falls away. I cancel the day. I lie down. The plans I made lose their grip, and I see that most of them don’t matter as much as I thought.

I used to read sickness as an interruption, a tax on the real work. I read it now as information. The flu and its cousins do not arrive to teach me anything. Evolution has no lesson plan. But the body, cornered by a virus, runs an old program, and that program clears a space I rarely make on my own.

Begin with the biology, because it sets the terms. A virus runs through thousands of generations while I run through none. It mutates and finds the gaps in my defenses faster than my kind can close them. So I stay open to it. There is no version of me built for perfect health. I am a pile of compromises that kept my ancestors alive long enough to breed, and that is all selection ever asked of them.

Most of what I feel when I am sick is not the virus harming me. It is my own body fighting. The fever burns because heat slows the invader and sharpens my immune cells. The ache and the heavy limbs pin me down so the calories go to the fight and not to my errands. The loss of appetite, the wish to be left alone, the gray flatness over everything I usually want. These are not the failure of the system. They are the system. Selection built them because, across a long line of dead ancestors, the men who lay down and burned and went quiet survived the bug more often than the men who pushed on.

So the misery has a job. I am paying for a defense good enough to keep me alive in a world thick with microbes. The bill comes due in days of fever and fog. Most of the time the trade is sound.

When I was winning at life, I would fight through illness and strive to be as productive as possible. When I was losing at life, I welcomed the break from responsibility. In the year before February 1988, I felt like I was winning at life, and so when a severe fever hit, I kept working and studying the best I could. Then the illness never went away, was eventually diagnosed as Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, and over the next six years of bedridden vulnerability, I stopped fighting for my ambitions. I gave up on achieving anything tangible, and instead I reached for God and for pleasure and for wisdom and for anyone who would care for me and for anything that got me through the day with minimal self-hatred.

These days, I do what I can when I am sick, and then surrender more readily than my younger stronger self.

I don’t want to tell my friends that I am sick because they tell me that I get a sick a lot, and I feel judged and found wanting. There are a lot of things I don’t want to tell my friends because I don’t want their unsolicited advice. Advice is usually BS.

I tell myself there is a return on the suffering past mere survival. The body keeps a record of what it fought. The next time the thing comes near, I answer faster, and sometimes I never feel it at all. That record is the one durable gift in the whole affair. Everything else I take from sickness I have to make myself.

Here is what I make of it.

Sickness cuts me low, and low is where I see straight. Yes, I admit that means when I am healthy, I do not see straight. I walk down the street muttering to myself, “There’s a new sheriff in town.” I twirl my fingers, and imagine that my blog posts change western civilization.

When I am strong I carry a dozen projects and a grandiose story about each one. I can keep several versions of myself running at once, the man I am, the man I am becoming, the man I tell other people I am. Strength pays for all that performance. Fever does not. When my energy drops to a tenth of normal, the stories stop running. I cannot afford them. What is left when the stories stop sits closer to the truth of me than anything I say when I am well.

That is the no BS part, and I trust it. With almost no power to act, I still want one or two things. Those one or two things are what I want under the noise, my drives with the performance burned off. A man with twenty priorities has no priorities. Sickness does the cruel arithmetic for me and leaves the short list. I have learned to read that list while I am too weak to argue with it.

It humbles me, and I need the humbling. When I feel strong I forget I am an animal that breathes and bleeds and ends. Instead, I live in this delusion that I am a great man who is remaking the world. The fever reminds me in a few hours that I am not a mind steering a project. I am a body, and the body has the final vote in this world. I am put in my place. The flu costs me my pride and returns me my proportion.

It opens me to other people. When I cannot do for myself, I find out who does for me. Care given and care taken builds a bond that strength never tests. I learn who is in my life and who was only near it.

The strange thing is that none of this belongs to illness alone. I get the same descent from a hard loss. When a connection I valued breaks, or I fail in front of men whose opinion I value, the drive goes out of me the way it goes out under fever. I hibernate. I withdraw. I run the whole thing back and look for where I went wrong, and then I plot a new way forward. The body does not know the difference between a virus and a humiliation. Both drop the floor out. Both force the halt. Both hurt. Both bring me low. Both make me fill up with regret for how I’ve misused my resources. Both make me want to beg for mercy from those I’ve hurt.

There is a name for part of this. Low mood after a setback is the mind doing for a hard problem what fever does for a bug, shutting down the usual traffic so all the attention falls on the one thing that has to be solved. The gloom hurts, and it has a use. It pins me to the failure until I have parsed it. When I come up I hold a plan I could not have reached at full speed, surrounded by distractions.

Is this normal, or am I an outlier? I think the pattern runs common and the awareness runs rare. Most men get sick, feel awful, and want only to get back to the race. They medicate the fog and skip the reading. The descent is the same for them. They do not mine it. What may set my experience apart is that I treat the down time as a retreat I did not choose but can use. I let it strip the bad investments and point me somewhere better.

I love to interpret everything in my life in ways that make me the hero! I’m an unreliable narrator.

I will not pretend illness is a good teacher. It is a harsh and unreliable one. It can clarify, and it can sink a man into fear or a loop that turns without resolving. The same honesty I prize can curdle. A man can reach most of these truths by gentler roads, through prayer, through family and friends, through rest he chooses, through the work of looking hard at his life on an ordinary morning. The fever is not required. It only makes the looking unavoidable.

When it comes, I try to listen. The virus wants my cells. My body wants to live. Somewhere in the cross fire, with my energy down to almost nothing and my performance impossible, I get a few honest hours with myself. I hate them. I would not buy them at this price. Once I have paid, I take what they show me, and I get up changed.

At least, this is what I tell myself on June 12, 2026. I’m good at coming up with stories.

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The Empty Inventory: Elon Musk Through Stephen P. Turner on Tacit Knowledge

When I hear Elon Musk, I hear a charlatan. When I look at Elon Musk without emotion, I see a complicated trillionaire who knows how to work the system (I read the Walter Isaacson biography and it struck me as valuable). I wouldn’t want to work for him.

In my social circle, Musk is often dismissed as a grifter.

My fellow underearners love to dismiss successful people as grifters. We love to say, “My own life is a failure, but at least I see through the bullshit.”

My social circle loves to dismiss AI. It’s fraudulent. It’s going bankrupt. It’s all hype.

Most people I know have a negative frame on life. We’re heading for catastrophe. Everything is bullshit. We’re sinking. We’re drowning.

When I think about it, I should rearrange my social circle. This is not good.

I’m the most optimistic person in my group. I think America is great and AI is great and America and Elon Musk does some great things (though it would not shock me if his story ended in failure and disgrace).

I think we are all wired to dismiss people. We’re wired to say no to everything unless we have a compelling reason to say yes so we can concentrate on those rare persons who add value to our lives.

Elon Musk gives a bad interview. He repeats slogans. He laughs at his own memes. Asked about history or politics, he produces the takes of a man who read three Reddit threads on the subject. Critics conclude from this that he is a fraud who lucked into his companies or stole credit from his engineers. The conclusion follows from a false premise almost no one examines: that what a man knows shows up in what he says.

Stephen P. Turner (b. 1951) spent a career attacking that premise from the other side. In The Social Theory of Practices and Understanding the Tacit, he argues that the knowledge that makes skilled performance possible never exists as propositions in the first place. It exists as trained capacities built up in an individual nervous system through feedback, one correction at a time. There is no shared mental object called “the practice” that gets copied from head to head. There are only individuals, each of whom assembles his own version of a skill through his own history of trial, error, and adjustment. Two engineers in the same building running the same procedures hold different tacit inventories, because each one learned through a different sequence of mistakes.

Apply that to Musk and the puzzle dissolves.

Start with where his knowledge came from. Musk did not learn rockets from books, though he read them. He learned by sitting in design reviews several days a week for over twenty years, asking questions, getting answers, watching which answers preceded failures and which preceded launches. Each review was a feedback cycle. An engineer tells him a valve needs six months of qualification testing. Musk pushes. Sometimes the pushed schedule holds and sometimes the rocket blows up, and either way his discriminations get a correction. Run that loop ten thousand times and you produce a man who can smell a padded estimate the way a horse trainer reads a fetlock. The trainer cannot tell you what he sees. He sees it.

Turner gives us the right description of this. The knowledge is real, causal, and individual. It sits in Musk’s trained responses, not in any statement he could make. When he walks a Tesla production line and stops at one station out of two hundred, the stopping is the knowledge. Ask him why he stopped and he produces a sentence after the fact. The sentence is a label pasted on a discrimination that ran without words.

This explains the strange status of Musk’s famous five-step algorithm: question every requirement, delete the part, simplify, accelerate, automate last. Engineers inside SpaceX treat it as scripture. Outsiders who read it find banalities. Both reactions make sense in Turner’s terms. Explication transforms tacit knowledge into a new object, a verbal token, and the token does not carry the capacity. A SpaceX engineer who hears “delete the part” after three years of watching Musk delete parts attaches the slogan to a trained sense of which parts can go. An outsider who reads the same words attaches them to nothing. The words are a mnemonic for people who already hold the skill. They transmit nothing to people who lack it. This is why every founder who recites Musk’s principles fails to become Musk. They copied the explication and missed the inventory, because the inventory cannot be copied. It can only be rebuilt, one feedback cycle at a time, in a new nervous system.

The same logic explains his hiring and firing. Musk interviews engineers by asking them to walk through problems they solved, then drills into details. He is not testing their propositional knowledge. He is sampling their tacit inventories, checking whether the discriminations are there, because a man who solved the problem can answer the third follow-up question and a man who watched someone else solve it cannot. The brutal firings serve the same function from the other side. An organization built on tacit competence has no paper credential that certifies the skill, so the only test is performance, and the only enforcement is removal. Turner’s picture of knowledge as individual and local predicts an organization that looks like SpaceX: thin on process documents, thick on apprenticeship, ruthless about demonstrated capacity.

Turner also explains the part of the puzzle that embarrasses Musk’s defenders: why he sounds like a teenager when he leaves his domain. Tacit knowledge does not travel. The trained discriminations that work on rocket engines work on rocket engines. They confer nothing about Roman history, epidemiology, or the politics of Britain. A man whose entire cognitive strength consists of domain-built tacit inventories has no general verbal facility to fall back on, because he never built one. He never needed one. So when a podcast host asks Musk about civilizational decline, he reaches for whatever propositions float nearest, and the nearest propositions on his timeline are memes. The shallowness of his talk and the depth of his work come from the same source. He invested his learning hours in feedback loops with hardware, and the return on those hours sits where he spent them and nowhere else.

This also tells you why interviews with Musk fail. The interviewer comes to extract the knowledge in portable form. Tell us your principles. Tell us how you think. Musk obliges with first principles talk, and the interviewer leaves with a bag of tokens, and viewers who study the tokens learn nothing operational. The knowledge stayed in the building. Walter Isaacson got closer than the interviewers because he watched Musk work for two years, and watching is the channel through which tacit knowledge moves, when it moves at all. Even then, Isaacson acquired the spectator’s version, the way a man who watches surgery for two years learns what surgery looks like and still cannot cut.

The frame makes a prediction about succession, and the prediction looks right so far. If SpaceX ran on explicit knowledge, Musk could write the manual and retire. It runs on his inventory plus the inventories of the people trained in proximity to him, which means the company’s continuity problem is an apprenticeship problem. Gwynne Shotwell (b. 1963) functions as she does after more than two decades of shared feedback cycles, and Tom Mueller built the engine knowledge in parallel through his own decades of test stands. The people who can extend the capability are the people who built their inventories inside the loop. The company can hire a thousand credentialed engineers, and it does, and each one starts with an empty inventory and fills it the slow way. There is no shortcut, because there is no object to transfer. Turner’s denial of collective tacit objects sounds like academic hairsplitting until you watch a company try to scale a founder’s judgment and discover that the judgment does not scale. It replicates only through contact.

One more payoff. The frame sorts Musk’s evaluators into two errors. The critics score his talk, find it weak, and conclude the man is weak. They assume the verbal inventory samples the whole. The fans make the mirror mistake. They score his talk, find it oracular, and conclude that the memes carry the genius, so they study his tweets the way Confucians studied the Analects. Both camps treat his words as the site of his knowledge. Turner says the site is elsewhere. It is in the 2 a.m. factory walk, the deleted part, the impossible deadline that turns out to miss by only thirty percent because twenty years of feedback taught him how much pad lives in every engineering estimate. The words are exhaust. The engine runs somewhere the microphone cannot reach.

The general lesson cuts against the people most likely to write about Musk. Writers know one kind of knowledge, the kind that lives in sentences, and they grade everyone by it because it is the kind they can see. Turner’s work stands as a long warning that the graders are sampling the wrong inventory. Musk is the largest case in public life of a man whose talk and whose competence have almost nothing to do with each other. Judge the talk and you miss the man. Watch the hands.

Decoding the Gurus

In late December 2022, the podcast Decoding the Gurus did an episode titled Elon Musk: The Techno Shaman. Hosts Christopher Kavanagh and Matthew Browne frame Musk not just as a businessman, but as a secular guru. Gemini says:

They focus on a November 2022 interview Musk did with billionaire investor Ron Baron. The hosts evaluate Musk through several key observations:

The Rhetorical Style: They contrast Musk’s soft-spoken, stuttering, and seemingly self-effacing delivery with the extreme grandiosity of his actual claims. They note that this halting style can give listeners a false impression of humility, masking what is essentially aggressive self-mythologizing and hype.

The Techno-Shaman Persona: The title reflects how Musk positions himself as a savior for humanity. He presents his projects, like making humanity an interplanetary species or solving traffic, as existential moral imperatives. The hosts argue that he uses this framing to bypass standard institutional accountability, suggesting that ordinary rules and committees only hinder his grand vision.

The Sycophantic Interview Environment: The episode highlights the lack of critical pushback from the interviewer. They critique how the tech and investor ecosystems create an echo chamber that feeds Musk’s narcissism and protects him from rigorous scrutiny.

The Fine Line Between Optimism and Falsehood: The analysis looks at how Musk blends genuine technical ambition with overpromising. The hosts discuss his habit of making bold predictions that constantly shift into the future, and how his followers interpret these missed deadlines as visionary optimism rather than misleading statements.

The Grader’s Portfolio: Elon Musk Through Bourdieu’s Scholastic Fallacy

Watch any long interview with Elon Musk and you watch a genre fail. The interviewer arrives with the standard equipment of his trade: the request for a worldview, the invitation to reflect, the question that begins with “how do you think about.” Musk shifts in his chair, produces a slogan, makes a joke about memes, and the interviewer leaves with footage of a man who seems smaller than his companies. The footage then circulates as evidence. Here is the mind behind SpaceX, and look how little it contains.

Pierre Bourdieu spent his last decade explaining why this scene was rigged before anyone sat down. In Pascalian Meditations, he names the error he considers the deepest in the human sciences: the scholastic fallacy, the scholar’s habit of stuffing his own relation to the world into the heads of the people he studies. The scholar lives in skholè, the leisure that universities institutionalize, a standing exemption from practical urgency. Nothing in his day forces a decision before the data arrive. His job consists of turning the world into discourse about the world, so when he looks at a man acting, he assumes the action executes a theory, then asks the man for the theory, then grades him on it. Bourdieu calls this placing a scholar inside the machine, and he means it as an accusation. The reconstruction is the scholar’s artifact. The actor never held it.

Bourdieu’s alternative runs through The Logic of Practice. Skilled agents operate on practical sense, the feel for the game that a habitus acquires through long immersion in a field. The tennis player does not compute trajectories. He moves to where the ball will be, and the moving is the intelligence. Ask him to state his theory of return position and he produces banalities, because the question translates his competence into a register where it never lived. The translation loses everything and the questioner then attributes the loss to the player.

Now run Musk through this. His habitus formed across twenty-five years inside two fields, manufacturing and aerospace, fields whose stakes are physical and whose feedback is brutal. The rocket flies or it explodes. The line produces or it stalls. A man shaped by that feedback develops a feel for the game of hardware: which estimate carries pad, which part can go, which engineer believes his own schedule. The feel operates the way the tennis player’s does, in real time, below articulation, as a trained orientation toward the next move. Then a journalist sits him down and asks for his philosophy, and the question performs the exact operation Bourdieu warned against. It demands that practice present itself as theory. Musk has no theory to present, because his competence was never stored in that format, so he reaches for whatever discourse lies nearest, and what lies nearest is the meme pool of his own timeline. The interviewer mistakes the reach for the mind.

So far this overlaps with what a theory of tacit knowledge might say. Bourdieu adds the part no theory of knowledge contains: the class interest behind the grading.

Verbal facility, in Bourdieu’s scheme, is capital. Linguistic capital, a subspecies of cultural capital, convertible into degrees, bylines, tenure, panel seats, and deference. The people who evaluate public figures for a living, journalists, professors, critics, essayists, hold their entire fortunes in this one asset. Their position depends on a favorable exchange rate, on the social agreement that fluent talk indexes intelligence and that intelligence legitimates standing. Every instrument they use to measure other people, the interview, the profile, the review, the seminar question, was built by their class and measures their asset. This is not a conspiracy. It is what Bourdieu means by a field: a market whose incumbents defend the value of the capital they hold, mostly without knowing they are doing it, because the defense feels like standards.

Musk threatens the exchange rate. Here stands a man with the largest fortune on earth, command of the most advanced hardware programs in private hands, and the verbal presence of a bright fourteen-year-old. If he counts as intelligent, then verbal facility and intelligence come apart, and the asset every intellectual holds loses its backing. The cheapest defense is to mark him down. Call him a fraud, a lucky inheritor, a front man for his engineers. Each of these verdicts protects the grader’s portfolio, and each one arrives dressed as judgment, which is how symbolic power works. Bourdieu’s point cuts past hypocrisy. The intellectual who scores Musk low is sincere. His sincerity is the product of a habitus that cannot perceive competence without a verbal face, because every competence he has ever been rewarded for had one.

The frame then explains something the standard accounts of Musk’s media war miss. Musk did not merely complain about coverage. He bought the instrument. The Twitter purchase, read through Bourdieu, is a move in a struggle between fields over conversion rates. Journalism’s power rested on its monopoly position in consecration, the capacity to decide who counts as serious, and that capacity ran through a platform journalists had colonized. Musk converted economic capital into ownership of the consecration machine, then changed its rules, demoted the verified class, and elevated his own register, the meme, to the house style. Intellectuals experienced this as vandalism. In field terms it was a devaluation. He used money to attack the currency his graders are paid in, and their fury since has the unmistakable pitch of a holding class watching its asset slide.

Bourdieu would not let Musk off, though, and the frame earns its keep by cutting him too. The scholastic fallacy has a mirror. The practical actor who projects his own relation to the world onto every domain commits the same error from the other side, and Musk does this on schedule. He treats government as a badly run factory, social trust as a software problem, journalism as content with bad engagement metrics. His DOGE period read every institution through the deletion heuristic that works on rocket parts, and the results showed what happens when one field’s practical sense gets exported to a field with different stakes. Bourdieu’s framework predicts this failure as firmly as it predicts the intellectuals’ failure to read Musk. Each habitus universalizes itself. The engineer inside the machine of state is as misplaced as the scholar inside the machine of practice.

Musk craves the very capital his existence devalues. He performs erudition, drops Latin, cites history badly, polls his followers on civilizational questions, and visibly wants standing as a thinker, not only as a builder. Bourdieu would find this familiar. Dominant agents in one field routinely seek consecration in the field that ranks above it in symbolic prestige, the way nineteenth-century industrialists bought paintings. The hunger confirms the hierarchy. Musk’s memes are bids for intellectual standing made by a man without the capital to bid properly, on an exchange he had to buy because the existing one refused his currency. The intellectuals laugh at the bids, and the laughter is the one judgment of theirs the frame ratifies, though for a reason they might not enjoy: in this single market, the one they own, their pricing is sound.

The misjudgment of Musk cannot correct itself through better interviews or fairer profiles, because the error sits in the instruments, and the instruments sit in the interest of the class that runs them. Perceiving practical competence as intelligence would cost the intellectual class the premium on its own asset, and no class prices its asset down voluntarily. Musk will keep sounding empty to the people whose job is listening, and the rockets will keep landing, and each side will keep reading the other’s scoreboard as broken. Bourdieu’s bleak gift is to show that both scoreboards work. They just price different capitals, held by classes with no reason to honor each other’s currency.

The Wrong Test: Elon Musk Through the Psychometric Tilt Research

In 1971, Julian Stanley (1918-2005) began hunting for mathematically gifted children at Johns Hopkins. His method was blunt: give twelve-year-olds the SAT, a test built for seventeen-year-olds, and see who scores like a college freshman. The Study of Mathematically Precocious Youth grew into five cohorts and more than five thousand participants, tracked across their whole adult lives. David Lubinski and Camilla Benbow now run it at Vanderbilt, and it stands as the longest, deepest record we have of what becomes of exceptional minds. Fifty years of follow-up. Careers, patents, publications, income, tenure.

The finding that bears on Musk concerns the shape of ability, not its height. Take a child in the top one percent and look at the gap between his math score and his verbal score at age thirteen. That gap, the tilt, predicts the domain of his adult work decades later. A 2007 paper by Gregory Park, Lubinski, and Benbow followed participants for twenty-five years and found the split clean at the extremes. The math-tilted earned the patents, the STEM doctorates, the engineering careers, the startups. The verbal-tilted wrote the books, won the humanities posts, produced the essays and the criticism. Both groups were brilliant by any normal standard. They were brilliant in different directions, and the direction set at thirteen held for life.

Later work added a third axis the SAT never measured. Jonathan Wai, Lubinski, and Benbow showed that spatial ability, the capacity to rotate and assemble structures in the head, predicts engineering and invention beyond what math and verbal scores explain. They call it the neglected dimension, because schools do not test it, admissions offices do not see it, and the culture has no prestige category for it. A child can sit at the 99.9th percentile in spatial reasoning and pass through the entire education system unmarked, since every instrument the system uses is a verbal instrument. The spatially gifted become machinists, surgeons, architects, and chief engineers, and they remain invisible to the class that writes about talent, because the class that writes about talent cannot measure what they have.

Now place Musk against this grid. We have no SAT score for him at thirteen, so the placement is behavioral, and the caution stands. But the signature is hard to miss. He taught himself to code at twelve and sold a game. He took degrees in physics and economics, then built his career on design review, the work of holding a machine in the head and finding the part that should not exist. Engineers who sit in those reviews describe a man who reasons through structures, loads, and costs in real time, at a level that keeps specialists honest. Then watch him in a seminar setting and the same man fumbles a question about history that any graduate student might handle. The profile reads as an extreme math-spatial tilt: a mind near the ceiling on two axes and ordinary on the third, the axis that happens to be the only one an interview can see.

That is the frame’s first payoff. An interview is a verbal test. So is a profile, a panel, a podcast, an essay. The entire apparatus through which public intelligence gets assessed consists of instruments built along one axis, administered by people selected on that axis. Run a spatially tilted mind through a verbal instrument and the instrument returns a low score, and the score is accurate about the axis and worthless about the mind. The SMPY data say these axes come apart at the extremes, and come apart hard. The further out you go, the rarer the balanced profile becomes. Expecting the man who designs the rocket to also charm the seminar misreads the distribution. At that altitude, the population mostly splits.

The second payoff concerns the graders. Who evaluates public figures? Journalists, critics, professors, essayists, the verbally eminent. The SMPY frame describes them as the other tail of the same distribution, the verbal-tilted who converted their axis into careers, exactly as the data predicted they might. Each tail then does what every human does: it tests strangers with its strong suit. The writer probes a subject with questions and reads the answers as the mind. The engineer probes a subject with problems and reads the solutions as the mind. Each test is fair on its own axis and blind on the other, so each population sits in a lifetime of evidence that the other population is overrated. The writer meets engineers who cannot write a paragraph and concludes they are narrow. The engineer meets writers who cannot read a balance sheet and concludes they are decorative. Both inferences feel empirical. Both sample one axis and bill it as the whole.

This makes the misjudgment of Musk a structural product, not a failure of fairness. The people assigned by our division of labor to assess him are drawn from the population least equipped to register his strengths and most equipped to register his weaknesses. Their verdict that he is unimpressive is true along the axis they measure. The error sits in the unstated premise that their axis is the measure, and the premise is invisible to them because their own success confirms it daily.

The frame then turns on Musk. His running contempt for the humanities, the cracks about college as four years of fun, the suggestion that journalists produce nothing, the engineer’s smirk at any field without equations: this is the identical error with the sign flipped. The SMPY verbal-tilt sample includes people of his own rarity who built their eminence in language, and his instruments cannot see them any better than theirs can see him. When he wades into history or political theory and performs at meme level, he demonstrates on himself the exact point his critics miss about him, that competence is axis-bound. He just draws the wrong conclusion, that the other axis does not exist.

SMPY found that tilt predicts not just careers but values and tastes. The math-tilted score high on theoretical values and prefer working with things; the verbal-tilted score high on aesthetic values and prefer working with people and symbols. The tilt sorts whole lives, friendships, politics, reading habits. By adulthood the two tails inhabit separate worlds with separate scoreboards, and each world’s scoreboard hangs where its members can see it. Musk and his graders are not having a disagreement. They are reporting from different instruments, calibrated in childhood, stable for fifty years in the data, with almost no one positioned to read both.

The frames has limits. Tilt findings come from within the top one percent, where everyone has high absolute ability on every axis, and Musk’s actual scores are unknown. The frame cannot prove anything about one man. What it offers is a base rate and a prediction. The base rate says minds at the extreme usually point one way. The prediction says a verbal class will keep scoring a spatial man as empty, and a spatial man will keep scoring a verbal class as fake, and both will keep mistaking their instrument for the world. On fifty years of evidence, that is how the tails behave. Musk and his critics are running the experiment again, with cameras.

The Set

The Musk set has no address. It runs through Austin, Starbase on the South Texas coast, Palo Alto and Hawthorne residue, Mar-a-Lago when politics requires, and above all through group chats and the timeline of X, where membership gets performed in public. It is a court, not a scene. Courts organize around one man’s attention, and everything in this world, its values, its heroes, its games, its moral language, takes shape from the problem of standing near Elon Musk without getting burned.

Start with the rings. The inner ring holds the lieutenants and the fixers: Gwynne Shotwell, who has run SpaceX operations for over two decades and serves as the proof that a stable adult can survive at the center; Mark Juncosa on the engineering side; Jared Birchall, the ex-Morgan Stanley banker who runs the family office and handles everything from security to lawsuits to school logistics for the children; Steve Davis, the Boring Company and DOGE enforcer who executes the cuts Musk orders; Antonio Gracias, the private equity investor who has sat on his boards and vouched for him to capital for twenty years. These people share a trait: they convert Musk’s demands into reality and absorb his volatility without leaking. The second ring holds the money and the lineage, the PayPal alumni who form the set’s founding myth: Peter Thiel (b. 1967), distant and cooler toward Musk than the mythology suggests, but the other pole of the network; David Sacks (b. 1972), now the bridge to Washington; Ken Howery, rewarded with an ambassadorship; Luke Nosek and Max Levchin further out. Around them the aligned capital: Marc Andreessen (b. 1971) and Ben Horowitz, Joe Lonsdale (b. 1982), Shaun Maguire at Sequoia, Steve Jurvetson, the early Tesla and SpaceX checks who hold founding-era status no late money can buy.

The third ring is the court media. Jason Calacanis (b. 1970) and the All-In podcast, with Sacks, Chamath Palihapitiya (b. 1976), and David Friedberg, function as the set’s house organ, translating its moods into commentary. Joe Rogan (b. 1967) and Lex Fridman provide the long-form stages where Musk appears among friends. Walter Isaacson (b. 1952) and before him Ashlee Vance hold the chronicler’s chair. Below them churns the X reply ecosystem, the Mario Nawfals and DogeDesigners and anonymous engineering accounts who amplify, flatter, and occasionally get elevated by a reply from the principal, which functions in this world like a knighthood. The fourth ring is ideological: the effective accelerationists, the pronatalists like Malcolm and Simone Collins, the heterodox physicists and rationalist defectors who supply the set with vocabulary. And threaded through everything, the family sprawl: brother Kimbal Musk (b. 1972) on the Tesla board, mother Maye Musk (b. 1948) as brand ambassador, the mothers of his children, Justine Wilson, Grimes (b. 1988), and Shivon Zilis of Neuralink, each holding a different and unstable status, and the children themselves, one of whom, X, spent years as a prop on his father’s shoulder in settings from the Oval Office onward.

What do they value? Output first. The set measures a man by what he ships: rockets landed, cars built, features pushed, headcount cut. Talk that does not terminate in a deliverable counts as vapor, and “builder” is the highest noun in the language. Velocity comes second and shades into morality; slowness reads as a character flaw, and the set tells its sacred stories in units of time, the Twitter code review on day one, the Raptor engine redesign over a weekend, the data center xAI stood up in nineteen days. Pain tolerance comes third. Sleeping on the factory floor, the 120-hour week, missed holidays, these function as ascetic credentials, monastic suffering in service of the mission, and they coexist without embarrassment beside the jets and the compounds because the suffering, not the comfort, is what gets narrated. Loyalty ranks above expertise. The set watched experts fail Musk’s deadlines for twenty years and watched loyalists hit them often enough, and it drew the lesson that belief is an input to physics. Disagreeableness gets honored as honesty, but only horizontally and downward; upward disagreement has a short shelf life, and everyone has watched the firings.

While most elites cloak their immortality projects, this one states it: civilization is fragile, consciousness may be alone in the universe, and the mission is to make life multiplanetary, align artificial intelligence, restore the birthrate, and carry the light of consciousness forward. Mars is the cathedral. Within this story, Musk holds the founder-prophet role, and everyone else’s heroism is derivative but real: the engineer who deletes a part has advanced the species, the investor who wired money in 2008 when Tesla had weeks of cash kept the light from going out, the staffer who endures the 2 a.m. phone call serves the mission, not the man, which is how the set metabolizes the abuse. The system supplies what ordinary tech careers cannot, a way to die mattering. A man who spent six years on Starship tooling believes his life counts in a ledger longer than his lifespan, and he is not wrong by the set’s accounting. The martyr motif runs strong: Musk as the persecuted savior, hounded by the SEC, the press, short sellers, ex-wives, and assassins real and imagined, and proximity to him lets members borrow the persecution along with the glory. Being hated by the right people is part of the compensation package.

The status games follow from the court structure. The first game is proximity, and it has a public scoreboard: who flies on the jet, who appears in the late-night gaming sessions, who sits in the Boca Chica conference room, who gets the reply or the repost. The second game is crisis service. Status in this set gets minted in emergencies, the engineers who slept at Twitter headquarters during the takeover, the DOGE staffers who moved into federal buildings, the Tesla hands from the 2018 production hell, and veterans wear these campaigns like service ribbons. The third game is having been early: an early check, an early hire, an early public defense when defending Musk was costly. Earliness cannot be acquired retroactively, which gives the set an aristocracy of timestamp. The fourth game is meme fluency, the capacity to speak the timeline’s dialect, and it operates as a shibboleth separating insiders from the polished outsiders, the comms professionals and MBAs whom the set holds in contempt. The negative games match the positive ones: status drains from anyone who talks to legacy press, hires a PR firm, sells stock at the wrong moment, or shows ambivalence about the mission in public. The fastest route to expulsion is the appearance of using Musk rather than serving him; “grifter” is the set’s word for it, and the accusation, once it lands, does not lift.

The normative claims, the oughts of the set, run roughly so. Builders should rule, or at minimum should not be ruled by people who have built nothing. Speed is owed to the future; every month of regulatory delay has a body count measured in unrealized progress. Speech should be free, with the asymmetries unacknowledged. Merit should decide everything, and any process that dilutes it, credentialism, DEI, seniority, committee governance, is corruption. Men of ability owe the world children; reproduction has been promoted from private choice to civilizational duty, and Musk’s own dozen-plus children function as compliance. Institutions that failed, universities, newspapers, agencies, NASA in its bureaucratic form, have forfeited their authority and may be ignored, mocked, defunded, or bought. Loyalty runs upward and protection runs downward, and the second half of that bargain gets honored irregularly.

Beneath the oughts sit the essentialist claims, the set’s beliefs about what people and things are. Talent is innate, scarce, and unevenly distributed; the set speaks of “10x engineers” and of the few thousand people on earth who can do the real work, and it treats this scarcity as a fact of nature rather than a description of its own hiring funnel. The great man is real; history moves through rare individuals, and the set lives inside the strongest available proof of its own premise. Types are real: there are “hardcore” people and soft people, builders and parasites, high-agency men and NPCs, and the NPC label does heavy work, converting critics from opponents into a different kind of being whose objections need no answer. Journalists are a type, constitutionally dishonest. Civilization is an organism with a life force that can dwindle, and birthrates are its blood count. The West is an essence under threat. Even the companies get essentialized; SpaceX is not described as a firm with a culture but as a filter that finds the people who were always of the type.

The moral grammar, the way the set assigns praise and blame, completes the picture. The cardinal sins: slowness, cowardice, leaking, betrayal, and grift. The cardinal virtues: shipping, risk, loyalty, candor downward, and posting through the storm. Absolution comes through output; a man who behaves badly but delivers the engine on time stays in grace, and the set’s tolerance for cruelty at the top is underwritten by this exchange rate. Excommunication is sudden, total, and often public, a firing by tweet, a removal from the chat, and the set has a gallery of the expelled and the apostate: Reid Hoffman (b. 1967), the PayPal brother turned Democratic financier; Sam Altman (b. 1985), the protégé turned rival whom the set treats as the great betrayer of the OpenAI founding; Vivek Ramaswamy (b. 1985), exiled from DOGE within days; Linda Yaccarino, who served and was discarded. Even Trump’s excommunication of Musk in June 2025 ran on the set’s own grammar, betrayal answered by expulsion, and the reconciliation that followed, the Mar-a-Lago dinner, the state trip to China this month, ran on its other rule, that usefulness reopens any door. Redemption exists but must be purchased with service. The confessional forms are the all-hands and the X post; the trials are deadlines; the scripture is the timeline itself, where every member’s record of loyalty and apostasy sits searchable forever.

The contradictions are not hidden, and the set has learned to live with them rather than resolve them. A free-speech movement that runs on nondisclosure agreements and retaliation. A meritocracy structured as a court, where the final metric is one man’s favor. An anti-elite formation composed of the richest people who have ever lived. An asceticism conducted between jets. A pronatalist patriarch whose family life is litigation. The members manage these the way courtiers always have, by keeping their eyes on the mission, which forgives everything, and on the king, who might not.

The Voice

Start with the sound. Musk speaks in a flattened hybrid accent, Pretoria underneath, thirty-five years of North America on top, audible mostly in certain vowels. The delivery halts. False starts, restarts, long pauses, sentences that trail off and get abandoned mid-clause. He swallows endings. The pitch stays flat, almost affectless, and then breaks without warning into a wheezy giggle, often at his own joke, sometimes at nothing an audience can locate. He thinks while talking, in public, on camera, and the thinking shows. Most public men of his rank learned long ago to fill silence with polished filler. Musk lets the silence sit. Some pauses run so long that interviewers start to answer their own questions.
The diction comes from engineering and never left. Order of magnitude, step change, first principles, non-trivial, at scale, the machine that builds the machine. He quantifies by reflex, attaching numbers and probabilities to claims other people make with adjectives: not “we’ll probably succeed” but “I’d say eighty, maybe ninety percent.” Then he undercuts the precision with schoolboy intensifiers, “insane,” “ridiculous,” “super hard,” “a million percent,” so the register lurches between the lab and the lunchroom. Layered over this, especially since 2020, is the dialect of his own platform spoken aloud: based, cringe, NPC, memes recited as if they were arguments. And under everything runs the sci-fi vocabulary, the simulation, the light of consciousness, Hitchhiker’s Guide jokes, 42, which he deploys without irony markers, so listeners can never quite tell where the bit ends.
His signature rhetorical move is enormity delivered in deadpan. He announces the colonization of another planet in the tone a man uses to describe a kitchen renovation. “I think we land Starship on Mars… probably… within five years.” The flat affect launders the messianism. Spoken with fervor, the same sentences sound like a cult leader; mumbled with a shrug, they sound like a status update, and the understatement does persuasive work no oratory could. He has no other rhetoric to speak of. He does not build arguments. He drops conclusions, aphorisms polished by repetition across hundreds of appearances: prototypes are easy, production is hard; the best part is no part; the factory is the product. These function as portable verdicts, and when challenged he reaches for one rather than constructing a defense.
Challenge handling splits him in two. With friendly hosts he loosens, giggles, riffs, takes the joint on Rogan. With adversarial questioners he goes cold and clipped and short. “I do not respect the SEC,” delivered on 60 Minutes like a man reading a part number. When the BBC’s James Clayton pressed him on hate speech in 2023 and could not name an example, Musk turned interrogator on the spot, “you just lied,” and the clip became a trophy for his fans. That is his one practiced adversarial move: refuse the frame, demand the premise, and let the silence punish the questioner. He cannot do the politician’s pivot. He either answers the literal engineering content of a question, missing its social content, or he attacks its foundation.
Then there is the leakage. Musk cries in interviews. He choked up on 60 Minutes in 2014 when told that Armstrong and Cernan, his childhood heroes, had testified against commercial spaceflight, and managed only “I wish they would come and visit.” He wept to the New York Times in 2018 about the cost of production hell. The same man posts with surgical cruelty at 2 a.m. The spoken Musk and the written Musk are two different performers. The poster is fast, cocky, vicious, and fluent. The speaker is halting, hedged, and raw. Audiences who know one are routinely startled by the other.
As a stage presenter he is the anti-Jobs, and the failure became a style. He fumbles slides, loses his place, says “uh” forty times, and when the Cybertruck’s unbreakable window shattered on camera in 2019 he produced “oh my fucking God” and kept going. Fans read the clumsiness as proof: a salesman rehearses, an engineer fumbles, so the fumbling certifies that the rockets are real. Whether he knows this or merely benefits from it stays an open question, though a man this attentive to his own myth has had years to notice that polish would cost him.
The latest register is the newest and the worst. Rally Musk, jumping at Madison Square Garden, shouting short sentences, wielding the chainsaw at CPAC, performs an enthusiasm his body does not produce well. He shouts without an orator’s breath control, lands punchlines off the beat, and looks like a man imitating footage of charisma. The crowds cheer anyway, because they came to see him exist, not to hear him.
Put it together and the speaking manner makes a kind of sense. The halting delivery, the probability hedges, the literal-mindedness, the missing pivot, the leakage, all belong to a man who never built the verbal armor public life usually requires, because for twenty years his results excused him from needing it. What charm he has on a stage is the charm of the unarmored. What disasters he has on a stage come from the same place.

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The Anthropology of Sean Hannity

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Sean Hannity is the purest specimen Mearsheimer‘s anthropology could ask for, because in Hannity there is no residue of the liberal man at all. No performance of reason, no individualist interior, no gap between the socialized self and the broadcast self. The infusion runs all the way down.

Start with the infusion. Franklin Square, Long Island, Irish Catholic, grandparents off the boat. A father who worked as a family-court probation officer, a mother who worked in a county jail. Altar boy, seminary schooling at Sacred Heart and St. Pius X. The home’s code: God, cops, country, family, loyalty, and respect for the uniform. Mearsheimer says a man’s moral code arrives before his critical faculties do, installed by family and surrounding society, and that reason arrives later as a junior partner. Hannity’s adult worldview is the Franklin Square code without one alteration. He came of age at nineteen as Ronald Reagan won the presidency, took his political identity from that moment, and has not revised a premise since. He did not reason his way to anything. He is what the home made, broadcasting nightly, and his sign-off is the Gospel of John: let not your heart be troubled. The seminary boy still closes with scripture, consoling the congregation.

Now the form of the show, which separates Hannity from every rival. Rush Limbaugh performed argument. Tucker Carlson performed thinking, the furrowed brow, the dissident intellectual. Hannity performs neither. His program is recitation: the same phrases, the same villains, the same loyalties, repeated nightly like a catechism, and his critics have spent thirty years calling him dumb for it. Mearsheimer’s frame says the critics grade him on the wrong scale. Hannity is not in the reason business and has never pretended to be. He said it himself in 2016: I’m not a journalist, I’m a talk show host. That sentence, like John Laws’s version of it, declines the liberal role outright. The liberal anthropology says a broadcaster serves the audience’s reason. Hannity serves the audience’s solidarity, knows it, and says so, which makes him more honest about his function than the colleagues who dressed the same function in the costume of inquiry.

His political career is a chain of attachments to chiefs. Reagan formed him, Newt Gingrich (b. 1943) elevated him, George W. Bush commanded his war years, and Donald Trump completed him. The nightly phone calls, the advice, the rally stage in Missouri in 2018, the texts to the White House. And here the Dominion discovery, which damaged everyone else, distinguishes him. Carlson’s texts revealed a private self that loathed Trump, a gap between the tribal broadcast and the individual underneath. Hannity’s texts revealed concern, management, loyalty, the same man inside and out. He told lawyers he never believed Sidney Powell’s (b. 1955) fraud claims for one second, yet his on-air accommodation of the tribe’s belief was not cynicism layered over a hidden self. It was the member subordinating his own judgment to the group’s need, which Mearsheimer says humans have always done, because the group is how they survive. Hannity holds his private opinions the way a man holds opinions inside a family: they yield to the family.

His foreign policy record shows ideology trailing the tribe, exactly as the anthropology predicts. Under Bush he was the loudest crusader on cable, and his 2004 book title joined terrorism, despotism, and liberalism as the trinity of evil. The war talk wore some universalist clothing, but the engine was tribal: our country, our troops, kill our enemies. When the tribe’s chief changed and Trump turned the movement against the wars, Hannity adjusted without visible strain, kept the hawkishness where the tribe kept it, on Iran, and dropped it where the tribe dropped it. The doctrine moved. The constant was membership. A man whose positions derive from reason shows friction when the positions reverse. A man whose positions derive from the group shows none, because nothing fundamental changed.

His bond with the audience is membership authority rather than intellectual authority. He tells the dishwasher stories, the bartending, the construction jobs, the college he never finished. He is the audience’s self-image made good: the working-class kid who rose without leaving, who kept the faith of the home. Limbaugh’s listeners looked up at a talent on loan from God. Hannity’s viewers look across at one of their own who got the big chair, and they trust him the way the tribe trusts a member, on the credential of sameness.

His durability delivers the frame’s final lesson. Consider the fates of the stars who built individual brands. Bill O’Reilly, the biggest name in cable, fired. Megyn Kelly (b. 1970), who bet on herself as an individual talent and left for NBC, crashed within a year. Carlson, whose personal brand grew larger than the network, cut in a day. Alan Colmes (1950-2017) is remembered as the liberal foil. Hannity, the least brilliant of all of them by the liberal measure, has held his chair across three decades, every purge, every scandal, every regime change at Fox News, because he never once elevated himself above the group. The individualists rose higher and fell. The loyalist endured. Mearsheimer says embedding in the group has always been the human survival strategy, and reason a lesser instrument. Hannity’s whole career is that sentence with a time slot.

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The Anthropology of Fox News

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Mearsheimer’s anthropology exposes Fox News at the level of its slogans. Fair and Balanced. We report, you decide. Both assume the liberal man: a rational individual who weighs evidence and forms his own conclusions, with the network as neutral servant of his reason. Mearsheimer says that man barely exists. Reason is the weakest of the three sources of preference, behind innate sentiment and socialization, and the deciding was done decades before the viewer ever found the channel. The slogans flatter the liberal self while the product feeds the tribal one, and the gap between slogan and product is the business model.
Look at what the programming does rather than what it claims. It names the group: real Americans, the heartland, the folks. It names the enemies: coastal elites, the mainstream media, Hollywood, the universities, the bureaucrats, the border crossers. It patrols the boundary nightly and reports on threats to the group’s standing and survival. Mearsheimer holds that survival is the prime human motive and that survival has always been social, secured through the group. Fox grasped that the deepest available appeal is not policy but group survival, and its strongest content has always run on extinction anxiety: your country is being taken, your culture erased, your kind replaced. Carlson took that logic to its limit with replacement talk, which is group-survival anthropology broadcast straight, stripped of liberal politeness. The ratings rewarded him because he was speaking to the fear Mearsheimer puts at the bottom of the human stack.
The socialization argument cuts deeper. Mearsheimer says our moral codes are infused in childhood, before the critical faculties mature, by family and surrounding society. Fox’s core audience received its infusion in mid-century America: church, flag, two-parent home, the schoolroom pledge. Then the surrounding society changed its values while the audience’s infusion stayed fixed, as infusions do. Fox does not convert anyone. It curates a world where the old infusion remains valid, honored, and right, and it frames the new dispensation as an alien imposition rather than the same process that formed the viewers themselves. The grievance underneath the channel is that the socializing machinery, the schools, the networks, the studios, the platforms, now infuses different values into the grandchildren.
Which explains the content mix better than any media theory. Run down Fox’s recurring panics: critical race theory in schools, gender ideology in classrooms, campus indoctrination, Disney, drag story hour, library books. Every one is a fight over the socialization of children. Mearsheimer’s anthropology predicts that the fiercest political conflicts will erupt over the value-infusion machinery, because whoever holds it writes the moral code of the next generation, and adults cannot be argued out of codes installed before argument was possible. Fox is a nightly war report from the socialization front. Its audience cannot win back the universities or the studios, so it watches the battle the way exiles follow news of the old country.
On nationalism the channel sits exactly where Mearsheimer’s ranking puts the human heart. Liberal universalism says rights belong to everyone and borders are administrative. Fox’s content says the nation is the unit that counts: sovereignty, the border, America First, suspicion of the UN and the globalists, contempt for foreign policy run as missionary work. Its cable rivals spoke the universal language, facts first, citizens of the world, and lost the ratings war for a quarter century to a channel that spoke particularism, because particularism matches the anthropology. The audience’s drift on foreign wars completes the picture. The same viewers who cheered Iraq in 2003 turned against liberal hegemony as its costs came home, and Carlson spent his last Fox years making the realist case against the Ukraine project, NATO expansion as provocation, to the largest audience in cable news. Mearsheimer’s arguments about the war circulated through that audience while the liberal networks treated them as heresy. The professor’s foreign policy found its mass constituency on the channel his anthropology explains.
One contradiction runs through the network, and it is Reagan’s contradiction inherited. Fox preaches economic individualism, bootstraps and markets, while practicing tribal politics, and the two never conflict on air because the individualism functions as a tribal marker rather than a philosophy. Celebrating the self-made man is how this tribe sings about itself. The content is liberal vocabulary, the function is group emblem, and nobody in the audience experiences any tension, because nobody is processing it as philosophy.
The Arizona call reads differently through this frame than through Collins. The decision desk acted on the network’s official anthropology: viewers are rational individuals, we report, they decide. The audience responded with its real anthropology: the group’s chief was under attack and the channel had joined the attackers. Loyalty beat accuracy within weeks, measured in ratings, and the network capitulated to the tribe at a cost of $787 million. The liberal theory of its own audience was the most expensive mistake Fox ever made about human nature, and it never made it again.

Interaction Ritual Chains

Fox News took the Randall Collins ritual that talk radio built for the commute and rebuilt it for the hearth. Same theory, different hour, different chamber, and a few inventions radio could not make.

Begin with the founder, because the design was deliberate. Roger Ailes (1940-2017) came out of daytime television and Nixon’s image shop, and he understood that he was not building a news channel. He was building a place viewers lived. The instruction he gave his producers was emotional: make the audience feel defended, make them feel at home. Collins would translate: maximize shared mood, and the information will take care of itself.

Television restores something radio lacked: the face. Collins puts the face near the center of ritual life, since entrainment runs through expression as much as voice. Fox News built its prime time on faces held in close-up for minutes at a time. Bill O’Reilly’s (b. 1949) glower, Sean Hannity (b. 1961) disgust, and above all Tucker Carlson’s (b. 1969) furrowed bafflement, a face that performed the audience’s own incomprehension back at it and invited synchrony. The monologue is the same entrainment engine the radio men used, with the face as a second channel of rhythm. The viewer’s expression follows the host’s. That is bodily co-presence at one remove, and it is stronger than the dashboard voice.

The second invention is on-screen assembly. A radio host is alone with the audience. Fox stages the group itself. Fox & Friends puts three people on a couch at dawn, bantering like family at a kitchen table, and the viewer at his own kitchen table joins the circle as the silent fourth. The Five stages a simulated friend group at the happy-hour slot, with laughter, teasing, and one designated liberal to absorb the group’s corrections. Collins says solidarity requires members to witness each other’s mood. Fox solved the problem of the invisible audience by hiring a visible one and seating it on a couch. The viewer entrains with people he can see entraining with each other.

Then the schedule, which turns a channel into a chain. A story enters in the morning shows at low charge, passes through the afternoon, and arrives at prime time fully loaded, each host recharging the symbol and handing it on. The chyrons compress the day’s outrage into liturgical phrases the regulars can read in a glance and outsiders find half coded. By the time Carlson opened at eight, the audience had been entrained for twelve hours, and the monologue landed on prepared ground. Collins describes ritual chains running through individual lives. Fox runs one through its own broadcast day, inside the building, then out through the country each evening.

The audience side is the hearth. Fox skews old, and its core viewers run it six, eight, ten hours a day, in the living room, the kitchen, the nursing home lounge, the airport bar. For the isolated elderly viewer, the widower alone at four in the afternoon, the channel is the household’s other presence, a continuous supply of focused attention, familiar faces, and shared indignation. Collins says people starved of interaction rituals will take emotional energy from whatever source offers it. Fox is the ambient ritual, always on, and the loneliness of its audience is the foundation of its ratings. The set glows in the corner like the fire it replaced.

The sacred objects are visual now. The flag in the graphics, the gold and blue of the set, the dress code that functions as vestments, the logo in the corner of the screen marking consecrated ground. The calendar fills with seasonal rites, and the War on Christmas is the purest case: an annual festival of righteous anger, returning each December like a feast day, in which the group rehearses its persecution and its solidarity on schedule. Collins notes that ritual life organizes itself into calendars. Fox built one. Election night sits at the top of it, the high holy day, the longest assembly, the night the whole tribe watches together.

Which is why the Arizona call of November 3, 2020 was a catastrophe of a kind the frame predicts. The decision desk, acting on the liberal premise that a news channel reports outcomes, called the state for Biden in the middle of the high rite. The audience experienced it as profanation at the altar, the priests desecrating the sacred object on the holiest night. Within weeks, viewers defected to Newsmax in the hundreds of thousands, not because Newsmax had better information, but because it offered the unbroken ritual. The Dominion discovery later showed the aftermath from inside: hosts and executives texting their private disbelief in the fraud claims while broadcasting accommodation of them, terrified of the audience. Collins explains what the texts show. The congregation disciplines the priests. A ritual that has run long enough belongs to its members, and the celebrants keep the rite or lose the church. Fox chose the rite, and the choice cost it $787 million, which the network paid as the price of solidarity.

Donald Trump (b. 1946) fits the frame as the rival sacred object. For years Fox charged him nightly, and a symbol charged by that much ritual attention accumulates more energy than the apparatus that charged it. By 2020 the audience’s loyalty ran to the symbol over the church, and when the two split, the members followed the symbol. Networks can build sacred objects. They cannot repossess them.

The hosts, last, are Collins’s energy stars at maximum wattage. An hour of prime time with three million entrained viewers is the richest EE position American media offers, and the men who hold it behave like men who cannot give it up: the contract wars, the post-firing podcasts and streaming ventures, O’Reilly and Carlson reconstructing smaller altars rather than accept silence. Ailes himself kept the monitor wall running at home. Whoever stands at the focus takes the largest charge, and withdrawal is the one outcome none of them chose freely.

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The Anthropology of Talk Radio

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Mearsheimer’s anthropology explains talk radio better than any media theory does, because the format only makes sense once you drop the liberal picture of the listener.
Take the liberal picture first. Talk radio presents itself as the public sphere in miniature. Open lines, every citizen a voice, opinions tested in debate, the individual exercising reason. That is the founding myth of the format, and almost nothing about the practice matches it. Callers are screened. The host dominates every exchange. Nobody changes his mind, ever, and the audience does not tune in to have its mind changed. It tunes in for three hours a day, five days a week, for decades, which is not the behavior of a rational actor sampling arguments. It is the behavior of a member attending his group.
Mearsheimer says reason is the weakest of the three sources of our preferences, behind innate sentiment and socialization, and that socialization works through long, repeated, protected exposure. Talk radio is adult socialization on exactly that model. The daily three-hour block does for grown men what childhood does in Mearsheimer’s account: it infuses values through repetition inside a trusted relationship, while the critical faculties rest. The host does not persuade. He maintains. He tells the tribe each morning who we are, who they are, and what happened overnight in the war between us.
Talk radio’s core audience has always been the socially stranded: the truck driver alone in his cab, the shift worker, the widow in her kitchen, the small businessman who answers to no one and talks to no one. Mearsheimer holds that humans need group membership to survive and will seek it wherever it can be found. Talk radio sells belonging to atomized people. The voice in the dashboard is a companion, the regular callers are familiar faces, the enemies are shared. Liberal society produces the atomization, and talk radio sells the cure. The format is a compensation racket built on the social nature liberalism ignores.
Several hosts ran their shows on something close to Mearsheimer’s anthropology.
Rush Limbaugh (1951-2021). His audience named the proof. Dittoheads. The term concedes everything: agreement precedes argument, loyalty precedes reason, the caller phones in to affirm membership rather than to deliberate. Limbaugh understood this and said so in his own way. He described his job as validating what his audience already knew and giving them confidence to say it. That is morale work for a tribe under pressure, and he fused it with nationalism, the flag, the EIB Network as a country within the country. Restaurants set aside Rush Rooms so members could listen together. No one ever set aside a room for a podcast of arguments.
Alan Jones built the same structure in Sydney with a harder edge of command. His phrase was pick and stick: choose your people and never waver, a loyalty ethic with no liberal content at all. Jones ran his audience as a chief runs a tribe, distributing favors, organizing letter campaigns, punishing politicians who crossed him, and the politicians feared him because they knew the audience moved as a bloc. A bloc is a group acting on attachment. Liberal theory has no name for what Jones commanded. Mearsheimer does.
John Laws (1935-2025). When the cash-for-comment scandal broke in 1999, Laws defended himself by saying he was an entertainer, not a journalist, and owed nobody the disinterest that journalism’s liberal norms require. The regulators and the broadsheets were scandalized. His audience mostly was not, and it stayed. The liberal institutions assumed the bond between host and listener ran on disclosure, accuracy, and the norms of the rational public sphere. It ran on the voice, thirty years of familiarity, and paternal authority. The scandal measured the gap between liberal norms and tribal psychology, and the tribe’s verdict differed from the institutions’ verdict because the two run on different anthropologies.
Paul Harvey (1918-2009). Hello, Americans. The greeting itself addressed a national family, and his whole career was value re-infusion: small towns, work, church, the decent middle of the country told daily that its inherited code was right. Harvey never argued. He confirmed.
The counterexample seals it. Air America launched in 2004 as the liberal answer to right-wing talk and died within six years. Market structure explains part of the failure, but Mearsheimer’s frame explains the rest. Progressive politics in that era spoke the universalist language of rights and humanity, and universalism cannot bind a tribe, because a tribe needs a boundary and universalism dissolves boundaries by design. Right-wing talk spoke nationalism, the strongest group ideology Mearsheimer knows. One side offered arguments to individuals. The other offered membership to social beings. The format rewarded the side whose anthropology was true.

Buffered vs Porous Selves

Charles Taylor (b. 1931) draws the line between two ways of having a self. The porous self of the enchanted world is open: spirits, voices, blessings, and curses cross its boundary, and meaning lives in things outside the mind, which can enter and take hold. The buffered self of modernity is sealed: meanings live inside, the world outside is neutral, and the self engages it at a distance, by choice. Taylor says we moderns are buffered. Talk radio is the evidence that the buffering is thinner than the theory.
Start with the medium. Radio has no screen and no page, nothing to hold at arm’s length. The voice arrives inside the skull, in the earbud, in the sealed cab of the truck, in the kitchen at dawn. Print addresses a reader who sits apart from the text and works on it. Radio enters. The listener does not decode the host; he hosts him. Every other medium asks for attention. Radio asks for admission, and the listener grants it, hours a day, for decades. That act of letting a voice in past the boundary is porosity, performed daily in the most disenchanted suburbs on earth.
Watch what duration does. After enough years, the host’s voice colonizes the listener’s inner speech. Listeners quote the host’s phrases as their own, hear his cadence when they read the news, anticipate what he will say about an event before he says it. The buffered self maintains a wall between my thoughts and the thoughts of others. Long listening dissolves the wall. The host’s mind and the listener’s mind interpenetrate, and the listener cannot say anymore where one stops. Possession is too strong a word by a degree, but only by a degree, and the older language would not have hesitated.
Now the content. Taylor says disenchantment drained the world of personal agency: things happen through impersonal systems, markets, statistics, viruses, rates. The buffered self lives in that flat causal weather and finds it cold. Talk radio re-enchants the cosmos in secular dress. On talk radio, nothing happens through impersonal process. Everything happens because someone did it. They wrecked the economy. They opened the border. They are coming for your way of life. The host narrates a world of agents, intentions, malice, and protection, which is the structure of the enchanted cosmos with demons swapped for elites. The listener under threat from personal forces is a porous self again, vulnerable to powers outside him, and the format keeps him in that state because the state is the product.
The host stands in the old role of the one who manages the boundary. Priests and cunning men once mediated between the porous self and the forces that pressed on it, naming the threat, prescribing the response, offering protection. The talk host does the same office. He names the danger each morning, tells the listener what it means and what to feel, marks the births and deaths of the audience, reads out the names of the sick. Alan Jones ran his program as a parish. John Laws, the Golden Tonsils, was called the voice of God for fifty years, and the joke was only half a joke; the voice carried an authority that no argument in it could account for. The authority was in the presence, which is where enchanted authority always lived.
The caller’s experience confirms it. Long-time listener, first-time caller, and the voice shakes. Why does it shake? On the buffered account, a citizen is phoning a media program to contribute an opinion, and there is nothing to tremble at. The trembling makes sense only if the caller is approaching a presence, entering a charged space where a power can bless him with airtime and agreement or banish him with the cut of a line. People do not tremble before content. They tremble before powers.
Liveness completes the structure. A podcast is buffered media: chosen, paused, skipped, consumed on the self’s own terms, the listener sovereign. Live radio is a flow the listener submits to in real time. It happens to him. He cannot stop the voice, only leave it, and he does not leave it. Submission to a continuous presence beyond your control is the porous posture, and the dial position never changes.
The purest case is night radio. Art Bell (1945-2018) broadcast Coast to Coast AM from a trailer in the Nevada desert to millions of people alone in the dark, and the content was the old enchanted world without disguise: ghosts, possession, visitations, voices from elsewhere. The biggest overnight audience in American radio belonged to a program that treated the porous cosmos as fact. The buffered self was supposed to have outgrown all that. At 2 a.m., alone, with a voice coming out of the dark, the listener discovered he had not.
Taylor gives the reason the whole format works. Buffering bought the modern self invulnerability and paid for it with flatness, the malaise of a world where nothing outside you can touch you and nothing outside you means anything. Talk radio sells the cure for flatness. It offers a daily cosmos where things mean, enemies threaten, a familiar power speaks to you by name, and you are open to all of it. The listener drives to work enchanted. He would never put it that way. He just says he likes the company.

Interaction Ritual Chains

Randall Collins (b. 1941) says rituals need four ingredients: bodies assembled in one place, a barrier against outsiders, a shared focus of attention, and a common mood. Run those through each other and you get the outputs: group solidarity, emotional energy in the individual, sacred symbols, and righteous anger against whoever profanes them. People then chain from ritual to ritual, seeking the energy charge, and a life is the chain. Collins doubts that media can do this at full strength, because the bodies are missing. Talk radio is the great test of that doubt, because it engineered around the missing ingredient and built the strongest ritual chain in broadcasting.
Start with shared focus, the ingredient radio does best. At 9 a.m. the host begins, and hundreds of thousands of people attend to one voice at one moment. Liveness does the work here. A podcast is consumed alone, on the listener’s schedule, and no one knows who else is listening or when. Live radio synchronizes attention across a city or a country, and the host labors to make the audience visible to itself: the folks, you out there, the calls read out, the texts read out, the town named with each caller. Frank from Penrith. Every named caller proves to every silent listener that the assembly exists and he is in it. The bodies are absent. The mutual awareness is not.
Then mood. Collins says rituals run on rhythmic entrainment: voices and gestures falling into a shared beat until the feeling becomes collective. The monologue is an entrainment engine. The host opens with the day’s outrage, builds it through repetition and escalation, and the audience’s pulse follows. Limbaugh’s pacing was a precision instrument. Jones escalated like a man climbing stairs. And the audience invented its own entrainment device: ditto. The word compressed the affirmation so the rhythm never broke. A caller who restated the argument in his own words would have slowed the beat. Ditto kept time. The dittohead was a man announcing that he was synchronized.
The barrier against outsiders is the insider code. Feminazis, the drive-by media, Struggle Street, the running jokes, the villain lexicon, the nicknames that take years to learn. Tune in cold and the show is half unintelligible, which is the point. Mastery of the code marks membership, and the daily broadcast extends the code faster than outsiders can learn it.
Now the outputs. The first sacred object is the host. Collins says the focus of a successful ritual becomes charged, a symbol of the group to itself, and the charge needs periodic renewal. Three hours a day is the renewal schedule. Around the host, lesser sacred objects accumulate: the golden microphone, which Laws possessed in literal gold, the EIB Network, the catchphrases that members exchange like tokens. And sacrilege produces what Collins predicts. When sponsors boycotted Limbaugh or regulators came for Jones, the audience experienced it as profanation and responded with righteous fury, flooding stations and advertisers. Punishing the profaner is itself a solidarity ritual, and a host under attack often emerged with a tighter tribe than before.
Emotional energy explains the listening itself. Collins says individuals leave good rituals charged with confidence and enthusiasm, and they organize their lives to get back to the source. The talk listener drives away from the show pumped, certain, ready to argue at the lunch table, and the charge drains by evening, and tomorrow at nine the source resumes. The schedule is an EE subscription, timed to the commute, with the car as the ritual chamber. The listener then recirculates the charged symbols, quoting the host at work, and each quotation is a micro-ritual that links him to other members and back to the chain.
The call-in segment is the ritual at maximum intensity. The first-time caller’s trembling voice, which Taylor’s frame read one way, reads in Collins as the physiology of high-stakes ritual entry: the member steps from the congregation to the altar. A successful call synchronizes with the host’s rhythm, receives his blessing, and delivers an energy payoff the caller will remember for years. A dissenting caller serves another function. The host crushes him, the group’s anger fires in unison, solidarity spikes, and the line goes dead. The format needs occasional heretics the way the ritual needs occasional sacrifices, and screeners admit a few for exactly that use.
Collins also explains the hosts. Emotional energy stratifies: whoever stands at the focus of a successful ritual harvests the largest charge, and becomes an energy star who needs the ritual more than anyone. This is why the great hosts never stop. Laws broadcast past eighty, retired, and returned, because retirement was withdrawal from the richest EE source he knew. Jones fought to stay at the microphone long after the money meant nothing. Three hours of focused attention from a million people, daily, for decades, produces men who are radiant on air and reportedly diminished off it. The chain holds the host hardest of all.
Two confirmations from the edges. First, the secondary rituals: Rush Rooms, listener cruises, station family days. The audience kept converting the mediated ritual back into bodily assembly, recharging at full Collins strength what the airwaves could only sustain at partial strength. The members themselves sensed what the medium lacked and supplied it. Second, the failures: balanced panel formats, point-counterpoint shows, the respectable forums that program directors love and listeners abandon. Balance prevents a shared mood by design, and without shared mood there is no entrainment, no solidarity, no charge, no chain. The audience was never seeking information. It was seeking the ritual, and it can tell within minutes which stations hold one.

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The Anthropology of Margaret Thatcher

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Margaret Thatcher (1925-2013) gives Mearsheimer an even sharper test case than Reagan, because she said the anti-Mearsheimer thesis out loud. “There is no such thing as society,” she told Woman’s Own in 1987. “There are individual men and women and there are families.” That is liberal atomism stated as flatly as anyone has ever stated it. If Mearsheimer is right, her own career should refute her sentence. It does.
Begin with what made her. The grocer’s shop in Grantham, the Methodist discipline of her father Alfred Roberts (1892-1970), the thrift, the sermons, the civic duty of a provincial alderman’s home. Thatcher did not reason her way to her convictions any more than Reagan did. She received a value infusion in childhood and spent fifty years applying it. The woman who preached that individuals make themselves was herself the most thoroughly socialized politician of her generation, a walking product of one shop on one street in one Lincolnshire town.
Then look at what won her elections. Free-market doctrine never had mass appeal in Britain. The Falklands did. In April 1982 her government was the most unpopular on record, and the war transformed her into the embodiment of the nation. Crowds did not cheer monetarism. They cheered Britain humiliating an enemy and recovering its standing after Suez and the IMF crisis of 1976. Her project sold itself as national restoration: putting the Great back in Great Britain. The individualist economics rode on tribal feeling, which is Mearsheimer’s ranking of nationalism over liberalism in one package.
Her foreign policy splits the same way Reagan’s does. The rhetoric was liberal and Atlanticist, freedom against communism. The practice was balance-of-power realism. She spotted Gorbachev before Washington did and announced in December 1984 that she could do business with him. She opposed German reunification in 1989 and 1990 on naked power grounds, fearing a state that might dominate the continent, and she said so to anyone who listened. No liberal principle supports blocking forty million Germans from self-determination. Realism does.
Europe is the cleanest evidence. The European project is liberalism applied to nations: pool sovereignty, dissolve borders, let rules and markets replace tribal loyalties. Thatcher signed the Single European Act in 1986 for market reasons, then recoiled when she saw where the logic went. The Bruges speech of September 20, 1988 drew the line at the nation-state. When her liberalism and her nationalism collided, nationalism won, exactly as Mearsheimer predicts it must.
The domestic record carries a darker Mearsheimerian lesson. Her economics treated people as the atomistic actors of liberal theory, and where the theory met dense social groups it broke them. The miners’ strike of 1984-85 destroyed not just an industry but the villages built around it, and Mearsheimer’s frame predicts what followed: people stripped of one group attachment seek another. Scotland, hit by deindustrialization and then the poll tax, transferred its loyalty from Britain to Scottish nationalism, and the Tories were nearly extinct there within a decade. The long fuse of resentment her project lit in the deindustrialized north helped detonate Brexit, itself a tribal revolt against liberal integration. Her individualism produced nationalist reactions on every side, because the social nature she denied kept reasserting against her.
Her end completes the argument. The electorate never removed Thatcher. Her tribe did. In November 1990 the Conservative Party, the most ruthless group organism in British politics, judged her a liability over Europe and the poll tax and cut her down through its own internal rituals. The woman who said there were only individuals and families was destroyed by a collective she could not command, and she spent her remaining years wounded by exile from it. She needed the group more than the group needed her.
So Mearsheimer’s frame reads Thatcher as a nationalist who mistook herself for an individualist. The mistake cost her little while the two ran together, in the Falklands and the Cold War. It cost her everything when they diverged, over Europe and within her party. And it cost Britain a measure of social cohesion that her theory said did not exist and her policies proved did.

Buffered vs Porous Selves

Thatcher is the buffered self elected to office. Taylor traces the buffered self to the Reformation’s long discipline: the war on magic and sacrament, the relocation of meaning from the world into the conscience, the sealed individual answerable to God and his own will. Methodism carried that discipline into the English provinces, and the grocer’s house in Grantham ran on it. Conscience, thrift, work, self-command, no mystery and no excuse. Thatcher did not merely hold the buffered anthropology. She was its finished product, three centuries of Reform compressed into one woman above a corner shop.
Her creed projected that self onto the whole country. There is no such thing as society means: there are no porous selves. There are sealed units of will and responsibility, each generating its own purposes from within, connected by contract and family and nothing else. Her economics assumed that man. Strip away subsidy and shelter, and the buffered individual stands forth, chooses, strives, and prospers. The Sermon on the Mound in May 1988 gave the theology version: salvation is individual choice, the Good Samaritan needed money before he could do good. The Church of England answered with Faith in the City, a porous Christianity of communities and bonds, and she regarded the bishops as fools. The two anthropologies could not hear each other.
In person she seemed sealed to a degree that astonished people. No doubt, no need for approval, four hours of sleep, no visible malaise. The lady’s not for turning is the buffered self’s motto: my meanings are inside, generated from within, and the weather of other minds does not cross my boundary. Ministers came to her with the mood of the party, the mood of the country, and the mood did not enter. She lacked the porous receptors. She could not feel a room, and toward the end she could not feel the nation turning on the poll tax, because feeling a nation requires a permeability she had trained out of herself or never had.
Yet her power over others was porous power. Cabinet ministers, grown men who had governed empires of paper, described being in her presence in the language of possession and fear. The handbagging, the blue gaze, François Mitterrand’s (1916-1996) line about the eyes of Caligula and the mouth of Marilyn Monroe. Charisma is a presence crossing into other selves and acting there, an enchanted phenomenon with no place in her own theory of persons. She wielded on others a force she did not believe existed.
And her politics, when it mattered most, re-enchanted the world. The Falklands turned the nation back into a charged and sacred thing, a presence that claimed lives and demanded rejoicing, and the country answered as porous selves answer a summons. Her rhetoric peopled the cosmos with agents of menace: the enemy within, the Argentine junta, Brussels reimposing the frontiers of the state. Enemy within is demonology, the old enchanted grammar of possession and threat. She preached a disenchanted economy and ran an enchanted politics, and the second carried the first to three election victories.
The deepest collision came in the coalfields. Her theory saw inefficient industries staffed by individuals who could retrain and move, because buffered selves can move; their meanings travel with them, inside. The villages she broke were the last enchanted communities in industrial Britain: the pit, the chapel, the band, the gala, the union banner carried like a relic. The men were porous to those things. The pit was not their employer. It was in them, constitutive, the way the parish was in a medieval villager. When the pits closed, men grieved as for deaths, and then died early themselves in numbers, and her anthropology had no category for the wound. You cannot register the destruction of meanings you believe do not exist outside the head. Arthur Scargill (b. 1938) led an enchanted tribe against a woman who could not see one.
Her end ran the lesson in reverse, twice. First, the fall: the party’s mood gathered for months, porous men like Geoffrey Howe (1926-2015) absorbing the danger and signaling it, and she, sealed, perceived nothing until the votes were counted. The buffered self’s invulnerability had become deafness. Second, the aftermath: the woman whose theory said the self is complete in itself was hollowed out by exile from power, wandering, by every account, in grief for a presence that had left her. Denis, the red boxes, the purpose, the force that had filled her, gone. She turned out to be porous after all, open to one great power her whole life, and when it withdrew it took most of her with it.
So Taylor’s frame reads Thatcher as a woman who governed porous people with a buffered creed, broke their enchanted worlds in the name of a self they did not have, and was broken in turn by forces her philosophy could not admit through the boundary. The creed was wrong about Britain. Its last refutation was her.

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The Anthropology of Ronald Reagan

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

Mearsheimer’s frame turns Reagan inside out. Ronald Reagan (1911-2004) talked like the purest liberal individualist in American politics, and on Mearsheimer’s account that talk was the surface of something else: nationalism wearing liberal clothes.
Start with the rhetoric. The city on a hill, the evil empire, the Westminster speech of June 8, 1982 consigning Marxism-Leninism to the ash heap of history. That language is universalist. Rights belong to everyone, freedom is the natural condition of man, and the Soviet system offends against human nature. Pure political liberalism by Mearsheimer’s definition.
Now look at the practice. Reagan governed in a bipolar world, and Mearsheimer argues that bipolarity disciplines states into realism whether they like it or not. Liberal hegemony only became possible after 1989, when the United States faced no peer. Reagan never had that luxury. So his foreign policy looks like containment with a megaphone. He armed proxies in Afghanistan and Nicaragua rather than sending armies to build democracies. He embraced Jeane Kirkpatrick’s (1926-2006) distinction between authoritarian friends and totalitarian enemies, which is realist alliance logic dressed as moral philosophy. He pulled out of Lebanon in 1984 after the barracks bombing rather than escalate for credibility’s sake. He negotiated with Gorbachev (1931-2022) the moment the balance of power made negotiation profitable. A liberal crusader does not sign the INF Treaty with the head of the evil empire. A realist does.
Reagan preached individualism, but nobody experienced Reaganism as atomism. People experienced it as belonging. Morning in America, the flag, the restored pride after Vietnam and the Carter years. Reagan offered Americans membership in a group with a story, and that is why they loved him. The cowboy individualist is an American tribal myth, a marker of group identity. When Reagan celebrated the lone entrepreneur, his audience heard a hymn to us, the Americans, against them. His individualism functioned as a shibboleth of the tribe.
Reagan’s own biography illustrates Mearsheimer’s claim about socialization beating reason. He did not reason his way to his creed. He absorbed it: the Disciples of Christ piety of his mother in Dixon, Illinois, the small-town Midwest of the 1920s, the Hollywood anticommunism of the Screen Actors Guild fights, the General Electric years touring plants and giving the same speech hundreds of times. By the time Reagan held power his values were decades-old infusions, and he held them with the fixity of a man who never doubted what his group taught him. Reason came later, as decoration.
Reagan succeeded because he fused the two ideologies in the order Mearsheimer says they must be ranked. Nationalism first, liberalism second, with liberalism serving as the vocabulary of the nation rather than a program for the planet. The universalist talk gave Americans a flattering self-image. The realist practice kept the costs down. His successors inverted the order after the Cold War, took the universalist talk as a literal program, and produced the failures Mearsheimer’s book catalogs.

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The Anthropology of the Democratic Party

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

The Democratic Party comes off worse, because it is the institutional home of the creed Mearsheimer calls a delusion. The GOP contains a faction his theory vindicates. The Democrats are built on the thing he says is false.
Start with the core. Rights universalism is the party’s official religion. Every human being everywhere holds the same inalienable rights, and politics exists to vindicate them. This is the language of the party’s lawyers, its NGOs, its foundations, its foreign policy hands, and its activist base. If Mearsheimer is right, this creed misdescribes the species. People do not experience themselves as bearers of universal rights. They experience themselves as members of particular groups, and the largest group that commands real sacrifice is the nation. A party whose moral vocabulary runs past the nation to humanity asks voters for an allegiance almost no one feels. “Citizen of the world” is, on his premises, a phrase that describes nobody.
Here is the paradox, though. The Democrats preach universalism and practice tribalism. The party’s electoral machine is a coalition of identity groups, each organized around the group attachments Mearsheimer says drive human beings. So the party half-confirms his theory in its daily operations while denying it in its philosophy. The trouble is the level at which the tribalism operates. The Democratic coalition mobilizes tribes below the nation: racial groups, gender categories, sexual identities. The Republican coalition increasingly mobilizes the nation as the tribe. If Mearsheimer is right that nationalism is the most powerful political ideology on the planet, the party that organizes sub-national tribes against a party that claims the national tribe has chosen the weaker position. Ceding the flag is ceding the strongest force in politics.
The coalition structure produces its own pathologies under his premises. A party of many tribes without a tribe above them must pay each member group constantly, in policy, in language, in vetoes over the platform. Each group polices its boundary, because that is what tribes do. Hence the purity spirals, the acronym politics, the inability to tell any constituent group no. A single-tribe party disciplines itself around the leader. A many-tribe party negotiates itself into paralysis.
The professional-class wing fares no better. The educated stratum that now dominates the party believes in reason as the route to political truth: explain the policy, check the facts, correct the misinformation, and voters will update. This is the anthropology Mearsheimer ranks last. If socialization and innate sentiment beat reason as sources of belief, then explainer journalism, fact-checking operations, and the whole technocratic style convert almost no one. The misinformation framing rests on the assumption that wrong beliefs come from bad information, when on his account they come from group attachment, and no correction touches them. Thomas Frank (b. 1965) asked what was the matter with Kansas, why voters there ignored their material interests. Mearsheimer’s answer is that nothing was the matter. Voters vote their tribe. The Democrats keep offering material benefits to working-class voters, the rational-actor appeal, and keep watching those voters, White and increasingly Hispanic and Black, drift toward the party that offers belonging instead. Benefits do not buy loyalty. Membership does.
Immigration is where the creed costs most. The universalist logic runs straight to the activist positions: no human is illegal, asylum is a human right, enforcement is violence. The national tribe’s boundary instinct runs the other way, and on Mearsheimer’s account that instinct sits deeper than any argument. The party’s immigration politics since 2013 reads as a long experiment in testing his theory, with the results he predicts.
Foreign policy implicates the Democrats as much as the neocons. Liberal hegemony was a bipartisan project, and its Democratic version, humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion, the rules-based international order, flows from the same universalism. Libya was a Democratic war. If Mearsheimer is right, the Clinton-Obama-Biden tradition of foreign policy fails for the same reason the Bush tradition failed: you cannot install a creed in a society whose members were socialized into something else. The antiwar left, long the party’s embarrassing uncle, holds the position his theory endorses, which mirrors the GOP’s situation, where the restrainers were the embarrassing uncles until recently.
Now the other side of the ledger, because his premises also reveal the Democrats’ great hidden asset. If socialization beats reason, the side that controls the institutions of childhood and young adulthood wins the long game regardless of elections. Progressives hold the schools, the universities, the entertainment industry, the HR departments. They perform the value infusion on each cohort before its critical faculties mature. Young Americans lean left not because the arguments persuaded them but because the institutions formed them, which is exactly how Mearsheimer says moral codes get made. On his premises this is worth more than any presidency. It also explains why the Republican assault on those institutions, school choice, homeschooling, the university funding fights, is rational rather than paranoid. Both sides now act as if Mearsheimer is right about where beliefs come from.
One more implication, about religion. The Democrats became the secular party as their constituencies stopped going to church, and on Mearsheimer’s account that removed a deep source of solidarity and moral formation. What filled the space looks like a substitute creed: sacred values, blasphemy norms, conversion narratives, excommunications. This confirms his anthropology, humans will have a tribe and a sacred order whether or not they call it religion. But the substitute is the creed of a class, formed in universities and fluent only there. It cannot scale to a nation, and it alienates the voters whose formation happened elsewhere.
The path his theory suggests is the one the party keeps finding and losing. Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) fused liberal policy to national solidarity and won five consecutive presidential cycles for his party. Barack Obama (b. 1961) ran in 2008 on one America, no red states and blue states, the national tribe, and won bigger than any Democrat since. The party wins when it claims the nation and loses when it speaks past it, upward to humanity or downward to the demographic coalition. If Mearsheimer is right, the Democrats’ problem is not their policies, which often poll well. It is that they built a church on the doctrine that congregations do not exist.
Charles Taylor (b. 1931) draws the line in A Secular Age between two ways of having a self. The porous self of the enchanted world stands open to forces outside it. Spirits, curses, blessings, relics, and words can get in and do things to you. Meaning lives in the world, not just in minds. The buffered self of modernity closes that boundary. Meaning retreats inside the head, the world becomes a neutral system of objects, and the self gains invulnerability at the price of what Taylor calls the malaise of immanence, the flatness of a disenchanted world. Run the Democratic Party through this distinction and the party splits open along a line nobody in it can name.
The party’s commanding heights belong to the most buffered population ever assembled. The professional class that staffs the campaigns, the foundations, the agencies, and the newsrooms lives the buffered life in full: secular, credentialed, therapeutic, managerial. Its political style follows from its self-structure. Policy is social engineering. Problems are technical. The world is a system to administer, and the administrator stands outside what he administers, disengaged, running the numbers. Trust the science. Read the explainer. The wonk is the buffered self doing politics, and the party’s chronic production of candidates who read as managers rather than leaders comes from a class that trained itself out of the registers in which leadership is felt rather than evaluated.
But the party’s base was never buffered. The Black church is a porous institution. Grace moves through bodies there, the Spirit descends, the dead are present, and a sermon is an event in the world rather than a transfer of information. Hispanic Catholicism keeps its saints, its candles, its processions. Immigrant communities carry enchanted worlds with them. For most of the twentieth century the Democratic coalition ran on this porousness. The civil rights movement was a porous event. Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968) spoke of souls, redemption, and the beloved community, and the language did work because his hearers had selves that language of that kind could enter. The party’s moral music came from its porous wing. As the leadership class secularized, the party kept the songbook and lost the voice. Obama could still cross the line, singing Amazing Grace in Charleston, preaching eulogy as a participant rather than an observer. Hillary Clinton (b. 1947) could not, and the difference between those two politicians is in large part the difference between a man who could enter the porous register and a woman locked in the buffered one.
Now the strange part. Taylor predicts the buffered self will not rest easy. The closed boundary produces flatness, and the flatness produces a hunger for re-enchantment. Look at the party’s activist wing through this lens and you find the porous self reborn inside the secular world. Words wound there. A slur is not information about the speaker but a force that enters and damages the hearer, which is porous anthropology to the letter, meaning located in the word as a power rather than in the mind as an interpretation. Safe spaces are anti-contagion architecture. Trauma discourse describes a self that external events colonize and inhabit. Whiteness functions as a possessing force that operates through people without their intent, and implicit bias names a spirit you carry unknowing, while “doing the work” is the exorcism. Systemic racism, in its strongest formulations, has the structure of an enchanted force: invisible, omnipresent, acting at a distance, working through hosts. None of this is meant as mockery. It confirms Taylor. Strip a population of God, saints, and sacraments, and the porous structure does not vanish. It returns wearing secular clothes, with sacred victims in place of saints, privilege confessions in place of the confessional, and cancellation in place of excommunication.
So the party holds a contradiction it cannot see. Its official epistemology is buffered: facts, data, expertise, the disenchanted universe of the explainer. Its activist practice is porous: contamination, purity, possession, words as forces. The same young staffer who mocks religious voters for believing words can be blasphemous will file an HR complaint describing speech as violence, and no one in the building notices the two anthropologies at war in one person. Taylor calls this cross-pressure, the buffered self haunted by what it buffered out, and the Democratic Party may be the most cross-pressured institution in American life.
The electoral costs run in two directions. Toward the religious, the buffered leadership cannot hear porous claims as anything but irrational preference. A religious-liberty claim sounds like a policy demand rather than what it is, a report from people for whom the sacred is real and violable. The party’s tone-deafness toward the devout, including the devout inside its own coalition, is a translation failure between self-structures. Toward the unchurched young, the party becomes the accidental supplier of enchantment. Politics turns into the only available source of the sacred, which produces activists who need politics to deliver meaning, belonging, and salvation, loads on the system it was never built to carry. A buffered politics of administration cannot feed them, so they radicalize toward the porous politics of purity and contamination, and the party’s internal wars follow.
Mass politics itself is a porous experience. The rally, the flag, the martyr, the anthem, solidarity felt in a crowd, these work on selves to the degree the boundary opens. A party run by buffered selves distrusts all of it as manipulation, kitsch, or danger, and so it cedes the enchanted register of national life to its opponents while wondering why its superior policy papers do not move anyone. The Democrats’ nostalgia for the civil rights era is nostalgia for the last moment the party spoke as a porous institution and the country felt it. The songbook is still on the shelf. The question Taylor leaves is whether a leadership class formed by disenchantment can ever sing from it again, or whether it can only cite it.

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The Anthropology of the Republican Party

In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.

If John J. Mearsheimer (b. 1947) is right about human nature, the Republican Party’s internal fights stop looking like arguments over policy and start looking like a contest between a faction built on a false anthropology and a faction built on a true one.
Start with fusionism. The Reagan-era synthesis of free markets, traditional values, and anticommunism rested on the individualist picture Mearsheimer rejects. Its economic wing treated the voter as a rational actor who responds to incentives, calculates his tax burden, and wants government out of the way so he can flourish alone. Paul Ryan (b. 1970) was the purest expression of this. He offered entitlement reform, dynamic scoring, and opportunity-society rhetoric to an electorate that, on Mearsheimer’s account, never wanted any of it, because people do not experience themselves as atomistic actors maximizing utility. They experience themselves as members of groups under threat or in decline. The base’s indifference to the donor-class agenda, visible since at least 2012 and undeniable after 2016, follows from his premises. Libertarianism within the GOP becomes a doctrine for the small minority of men whose temperament lets them feel like lone wolves, funded by a donor class whose interests it serves, and structurally incapable of winning mass loyalty.
The faction Mearsheimer’s anthropology vindicates is national conservatism. Donald Trump (b. 1946) grasped by instinct what Yoram Hazony (b. 1964), Patrick Deneen (b. 1964), and JD Vance (b. 1984) argue in books: the nation is the largest tribe that works. Mearsheimer says in The Great Delusion that when nationalism and liberalism collide, nationalism almost always wins. If so, the populist turn is a correction toward reality, and the party’s older establishment was the delusion. Immigration becomes the central issue under this reading because it concerns the boundary of the group, and boundary questions arouse the deepest sentiments humans have. The establishment treated immigration as an economic question with a clear answer. The base treated it as a question about who we are. Mearsheimer’s premises say the base had the better grasp of what politics is.
His argument cuts hardest on foreign policy, which is the book’s subject. If rights universalism is a philosophical error, then the democracy-promotion wing, the Bush-Cheney-Bolton lineage, was committed to a project that might never have worked: remaking tribal societies in the image of a creed their members never internalized. Afghanistan and Iraq become predictable failures rather than execution problems. The restraint wing of the party, which barely existed in 2003 and now contests for dominance, holds the position his theory endorses. Sovereignty replaces human rights as the organizing vocabulary. The fight between Vance and the remaining Reaganite internationalists over Ukraine is, on these premises, a fight the restrainers should win and probably will.
The religious right gets an unexpected vindication too, though on secular grounds. If socialization beats reason as the source of moral preferences, then whoever controls the institutions of childhood controls the moral future. The school-board fights, the curriculum wars, the battles over what a seven-year-old hears about sex and country and God stop looking like culture-war theater and start looking like the most consequential politics there is. Mearsheimer’s account implies that conservatives who spent decades fighting over marginal tax rates while progressives captured education made a catastrophic allocation of effort. The value infusion happens before the reasoning faculties mature. The side that performs the infusion wins, a generation later, regardless of who wins the arguments.
For practices, the implications are uncomfortable for anyone who likes deliberative politics. If reason is the weakest of the three sources of preference, persuasion through argument converts almost no one. Mobilization beats persuasion. Loyalty signals beat white papers. The rally, the flag, the enemy, the grievance, these work because they engage the tribal endowment. Trump’s style is, on this reading, a more accurate political technology than the think-tank style it displaced. The party’s drift toward loyalty tests and primary purges follows the same logic: tribes police defection because defection threatens survival, and a party that behaves like a tribe will punish heretics more harshly than incompetents.
Governance is where it gets dangerous, and where Mearsheimer himself might caution the GOP against over-reading him. He is no postliberal at home. His argument for liberalism is that people will never agree on first principles, that such disagreements turn lethal, and that liberal tolerance is a survival arrangement, a modus vivendi rather than a truth. A Republican Party that takes his anthropology as license for full tribal rule misreads him. The same premises that explain why nationalism beats liberalism abroad explain why a continental, multiethnic nation needs liberal institutions at home to keep its internal tribes from each other’s throats. The constructive project his theory implies is a thick civic nationalism: build a shared American identity strong enough to function as the tribe, so the smaller tribes within it do not tear the place apart. The destructive temptation his theory also explains is majority-group identity politics, which treats one tribe within the nation as the nation. The first might hold a diverse country together. The second guarantees the conflict it claims to prevent.
So the picture: the donor wing holds the money and a refuted anthropology. The populist wing holds the voters and the correct one, but flirts with conclusions Mearsheimer rejects. The party’s unresolved condition, populists winning the symbolic fights while donors win the legislative ones, persists because the coalition contains both the truth about human nature and the interests that profit from denying it. If Mearsheimer is right, that arrangement is unstable, and the populists hold the high ground, because they are working with the grain of the species.

Buffered & Porous Selves

The Democrats are a buffered leadership sitting on a porous base it can no longer hear. The Republicans are a porous base that captured the party and drove the buffered leadership out.
Start with where the enchanted world survived in America. It survived on the right. Evangelical and charismatic Christianity never accepted the buffer. In the Pentecostal and charismatic churches that supply the party’s most committed voters, demons are real and active, prayer changes outcomes, prophecy continues, healing flows through hands, and spiritual warfare is a daily fact. The devil is an agent with plans. This is the porous self in full, not a remnant of it, and it constitutes the largest enchanted population in the developed world. The Republican coalition is built on top of it.
For decades the party paired this porous base with a buffered command structure. Fusionism, seen through Taylor, was an alliance of self-structures as much as ideologies: buffered money and porous believers. The Chamber of Commerce wing, the libertarian economists, the Wall Street Journal editorial page, Mitt Romney (b. 1947) and the Ryan budget wonks, these were buffered men running a disenchanted politics of incentives and growth charts, while the enchanted base supplied votes and moral energy. The arrangement held as long as the buffered wing delivered respect along with judicial appointments. It stopped holding when the base noticed the respect was absent. What followed was the porous capture of the party.
Trump is the porous phenomenon par excellence, and Taylor explains him better than most political science does. Begin with his formation. His family church was Norman Vincent Peale’s (1898-1993), and positive thinking is a porous doctrine: words are forces that shape reality, speech acts on the world rather than describing it. Trump talks the way a man talks when he believes saying it makes it so. The fact-checkers spent a decade treating his statements as failed propositions, buffered selves grading an enchanted speaker, and they never touched him because his audience does not receive his words as propositions either. They receive them as acts, blessings and curses, loyalty and war. The rallies are enchanted events, closer to revival than to speech, where presence does the work and the crowd comes to feel a force rather than evaluate an argument. The MAGA hat functions as a talisman. The prophecy movement declared him a Cyrus, an anointed pagan instrument of God, and Paula White (b. 1966) stood in the White House calling on angels from Africa and South America. None of this embarrasses the base, because none of it is foreign to the porous self.
Conspiracy belongs in the same analysis. QAnon is a porous cosmology: hidden powers behind appearances, a cosmic war of good and evil, coming judgment, secret knowledge for the initiated. The Deep State is demonology for the administrative age. Where the buffered self sees institutions, procedures, and incompetence, the porous self sees powers and principalities, and the porous reading generates loyalty and martyrdom in a way no institutional analysis can. The COVID wars ran along the same line. To the buffered self, the vaccine is a technical object entering a body that is a system. To the porous self, the needle is the state crossing the boundary into the flesh, contamination by an alien power, and the resistance was felt at the level of self-structure before any argument arrived.
The buffered conservatives know they lost. George Will (b. 1941), the disenchanted Tory atheist, left the party. The Burke-and-Buckley style, argument, citation, the well-made essay, gave way to prophecy and rally. The remaining buffered men in the coalition, the tax-cut donors and the Federalist Society lawyers, now operate the way the Democratic porous wing operates in its party, as a tolerated minority that supplies something the dominant self-structure needs, in this case money and judicial craft, while the energy comes from elsewhere.
Taylor’s malaise of immanence shows up on the right in its own form, and here the party has an advantage it barely understands. The young men adrift in the disenchanted world, the audience that found Jordan Peterson (b. 1962) and kept going, hunger for exactly what the buffered order cannot supply: weight, meaning, a cosmos with stakes. The right offers re-enchantment without apology. Trad Catholicism, Orthodox conversion, the online vitalists and neo-pagans, the gym-and-God circuit, all of it sells thickness of being to selves starving on immanence. The left supplies re-enchantment too, but disguised, embarrassed, smuggled in as politics. The right sells it under its own name, and in a market of starving selves the open seller wins.
Now the costs, which are severe. Governance is buffered work. Regulations get drafted, budgets scored, agencies run, by disengaged reason operating on systems. A party whose energy is porous and whose governing requires buffered skills produces what we have watched it produce: administrations at war with their own technical staff, prophecy where planning should be, loyalty tests applied to jobs that need competence. The porous self also makes a magnificent market for grifters. An audience that receives words as forces and leaders as anointed will buy the supplements, the gold coins, the miracle cures, and the legal defense funds, and the right’s media economy has become in part a machine for harvesting enchanted trust. And porous politics has no internal brake. The buffered self can be argued out of a position. The possessed cannot, and a party that runs on enchantment cannot easily call its own demons off.
Step back and the two parties form a single picture. The selves are sorting. The buffered are consolidating in one party, the porous in the other, and each party keeps a shrinking minority of the opposite type, Black churchgoers among the Democrats, country-club rationalists among the Republicans. American polarization, read through Taylor, is not two ideologies fighting over policy. It is two self-structures that no longer share a world, one living among objects and the other among powers, each finding the other not wrong but unintelligible. The Republicans hold the deeper reservoir of what mass politics runs on. The Democrats hold the machinery of the disenchanted state. Neither can do what the other does, and the country requires both.

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