Grok says:
Stephen Miran’s standing among his peer economists is difficult to definitively assess due to the lack of a comprehensive, unified metric like a public ranking or survey of economists’ opinions specifically about him. However, based on available information, his reputation appears to be a mix of respect for his credentials and intellectual rigor, tempered by skepticism or disagreement with some of his unconventional economic views, particularly as articulated in his role as Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Trump.
Miran is well-regarded for his academic and professional pedigree. He holds a PhD in economics from Harvard University, where he studied under Martin Feldstein, a highly respected figure who chaired the CEA during the Reagan administration. His career includes significant roles such as a senior strategist at Hudson Bay Capital Management, a fellow at the Manhattan Institute, and a senior advisor at the U.S. Treasury during the COVID-19 pandemic. These positions suggest a level of trust and recognition within both academic and policy circles. His published work, such as co-authoring papers with notable economists like Nouriel Roubini, further bolsters his credibility among peers who value technical expertise and policy experience.
His nomination by Trump in December 2024 and subsequent confirmation as CEA Chair in March 2025 indicate political and institutional acceptance, though this is more a reflection of his alignment with Trump’s agenda than a broad consensus among economists. Posts on X from late 2024, such as one from a user praising his selection and citing his work on “Fiscal Primacy,” suggest he has admirers who view him as a sharp, innovative thinker. Similarly, Reihan Salam of the Manhattan Institute called him “sharp, thoughtful, creative, and a patriot,” reflecting positive sentiment from conservative-leaning circles.
However, Miran’s standing is likely polarized due to his advocacy of controversial policies, particularly those outlined in his November 2024 paper, “A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System.” His arguments—linking dollar overvaluation to U.S. manufacturing decline and proposing aggressive tariff and currency interventions—diverge from mainstream economic consensus. Many economists, as noted in analyses from sources like the American Enterprise Institute and CEPR, critique these ideas as misguided or impractical. For instance, his claim that dollar dominance drives persistent trade deficits is contested by those who argue recent data (e.g., reduced foreign official inflows since 2015) undermines his neo-Triffin framework. Critics also highlight the risks of his tariff-centric approach, pointing to studies showing consumer costs from Trump’s earlier tariffs, contrasting with Miran’s optimism about their efficacy.
Among mainstream economists, his association with Trump’s protectionist and interventionist policies may lower his standing, as these are often seen as at odds with free-market principles or empirical evidence. His dismissal of recession fears and emphasis on deregulation and tax cuts to offset tariff impacts (e.g., Bloomberg, April 2025) further fuel this divide, earning him support from Trump-aligned economists but skepticism from those prioritizing global trade stability. Conversely, his willingness to challenge orthodoxy—proposing ideas like a “Mar-a-Lago Accord” or user fees on Treasuries—may earn him respect among peers who value bold, outside-the-box thinking, even if they disagree.
In summary, Miran likely enjoys a solid reputation among a subset of economists for his intellect and credentials, particularly in conservative or heterodox circles, but his unconventional and politically charged positions may limit his standing among the broader, more mainstream economic community, where his ideas are met with both intrigue and significant critique.
How is Trump affecting the economics profession?
Donald Trump’s policies and actions, particularly as of April 8, 2025, are influencing the economics profession in several notable ways, based on current discourse and developments. His aggressive trade policies, especially the imposition of widespread tariffs, have sparked significant debate and concern among economists, reshaping their focus and prompting varied reactions.
Trump’s recent tariff initiatives—such as the 10% baseline tariff on all imports, effective since early April 2025, and higher “reciprocal” tariffs up to 50% set to begin mid-week—have thrust trade economics back into the spotlight. These measures, aimed at reducing U.S. trade deficits and incentivizing domestic manufacturing, challenge decades of economic consensus favoring free trade and globalization. Economists like Paul Krugman have sharply criticized these moves, labeling them “monstrously destructive” and rooted in “discredited theories,” suggesting they could harm working Americans most. Others, like Douglas Irwin, argue that Trump’s approach undermines the post-World War II trade framework that has long bolstered U.S. economic might. This has forced the profession to grapple anew with foundational concepts like comparative advantage and the impacts of protectionism, reigniting academic and policy debates.
The economic uncertainty stemming from these tariffs—evidenced by global market plunges and warnings of recession from firms like Goldman Sachs—has also shifted economists’ research priorities. Many are now modeling the potential fallout, with estimates suggesting annual costs to U.S. families ranging from $1,700 to $5,000, alongside risks of inflation and slowed growth. Figures like JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon and hedge fund manager Bill Ackman have voiced fears of an “economic nuclear winter,” amplifying the urgency for economists to assess short-term disruptions versus Trump’s long-term claims of economic revitalization. This tension is pushing the profession to refine predictive models and revisit historical precedents, such as the Volcker shock, to understand if chaos might yield strategic gains, as some, like James Meadway, speculate.
Moreover, Trump’s policies are affecting the profession’s dynamics and morale. Some economists face a polarized environment where aligning with or against Trump’s views can influence career trajectories—whether through funding, public perception, or policy influence. Posts on X hint at extreme sentiments, suggesting that his “irrational” policies might drive economists to “flee” the U.S., though this lacks concrete evidence and reflects more of a rhetorical flourish. Still, the profession is adapting: some economists are doubling down on empirical critiques, while others, perhaps aligned with Trump’s camp, defend the tariffs as a bold reordering of global economics, as echoed by advisers like Scott Bessent.
In short, Trump is jolting the economics profession by challenging its orthodoxies, redirecting its analytical focus toward trade and recession risks, and stirring a mix of alarm, skepticism, and cautious intrigue among its practitioners. The long-term impact on the field’s direction and its members’ choices remains unfolding, but the current moment is undeniably one of heightened scrutiny and contention.
I email a philosopher: “There’s close to 100% elite consensus that Trump’s tariffs are a disaster and that free trade is good. Experts also think we should have less free speech
while regular people don’t.”
He responds:
If you have seen the hubbub about Jason Stanley who is leaving Yale for Toronto, because of Trump, it is worth a look – he is a big advocate for controlling speech, but of of course he is for the right kind of free speech.
But the other stuff comes under the heading of disinformation — which mostly means unwelcome expert opinion as well as intentionally ,misleading but non-official statements. Those can never be misinformation by definition — just honest error.
The tariff issue is interesting because it is also a reversal for a lot of Democrats. Some of whom seem to be supportive, especially those with labor constituencies. And it is hilarious that the same people who think Trump is a shill for billionaires now think it is terrible that he tanked the market.
Grok says:
Jason Stanley, a Yale philosopher known for his work on fascism and propaganda, has decided to leave the United States for Canada, accepting a position at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy as of fall 2025. His stated reason is the political climate in the U.S., which he believes is “tilting towards a fascist dictatorship.” This move, announced in late March 2025, has stirred a mix of reactions—some see it as a principled stand, others as an overreaction or even a career pivot dressed up in dramatic rhetoric.
Stanley’s departure hinges on his view that Trump’s policies, particularly recent actions like tariffs and pressure on universities (e.g., Columbia’s capitulation to federal demands over funding), signal an authoritarian shift. He’s not alone—historians Timothy Snyder and Marci Shore, also from Yale, are making the same move, suggesting a small but notable exodus of academics critical of Trump. Stanley frames it as both a personal choice—to raise his Black Jewish children in a freer environment—and a political statement, a “warning to Americans” about eroding academic freedom and democratic norms. He’s cited specific concerns: attacks on DEI programs, the targeting of intellectuals, and a perceived failure of universities to collectively resist.
Calling the U.S. a budding fascist dictatorship in 2025 might stretch the term beyond its breaking point—fascism implies a level of centralized repression and violence not yet evident, even with Trump’s bluster. Economic disruption from tariffs (projected to cost families $1,700–$5,000 yearly) and political pressure on academia are serious, but they’re not quite jackboots in the streets. Critics on X have mocked him, suggesting he’s running from a fight he could wage at Yale, or that Canada’s proximity makes it a flimsy refuge if the U.S. truly implodes. Plus, his move to a cushy Toronto gig—while taking a pay cut—hardly screams exile; it’s not like he’s defecting to a bunker.
What’s intriguing is the split it reveals in how people perceive Trump’s impact. To Stanley, it’s a tipping point—Columbia’s “humiliation” was his final straw, showing universities won’t stand united. To others, it’s just noise—disruptive, sure, but not the Third Reich. The economics profession ties in here: Trump’s tariffs are forcing economists to rethink trade models, but most aren’t packing their bags—they’re adapting, debating, digging in. Stanley’s flight might signal a brain drain, as some X posts warn, but it’s not a flood yet.
Lawyers normally intimidate non-lawyers. Its funny to see Trump intimidate lawyers.
It’s a fascinating reversal, isn’t it? Lawyers are often seen as the ultimate intimidators—wielding jargon, precedent, and the threat of lawsuits like intellectual cudgels. Yet Trump seems to flip that dynamic, and it’s worth unpacking why this happens and how it ties to the broader context, including any ripple effects on professions like economics.
Trump’s ability to unsettle lawyers stems from his unconventional approach to legal battles and authority. He doesn’t play by the usual rules of decorum or deference that lawyers expect. Instead, he uses a mix of public pressure, personal attacks, and sheer persistence to throw them off balance. Take his recent legal maneuvers—whether it’s leveraging his influence to challenge court rulings or rallying his base to question judicial legitimacy, he’s not just fighting cases but reshaping the battlefield. Lawyers, trained to argue within structured systems, can find themselves disoriented when the fight spills into the court of public opinion or when Trump casts them as elitist enemies. It’s like a boxer stepping into a street brawl—different rules, different stakes.
This dynamic is visible in how Trump’s legal team operates. Figures like Alina Habba or Todd Blanche don’t always win on technical brilliance but thrive on loyalty and media savvy, amplifying Trump’s narrative. Opposing lawyers, meanwhile, face a dilemma: stick to traditional legal strategies and risk looking impotent against his populist tactics, or engage on his terms and lose the high ground. Posts on X capture the glee of some who see this as Trump “owning” the legal establishment—calling lawyers “cowards” or “overpaid suits” when they falter against him. It’s less about winning cases (Trump’s record is mixed) and more about projecting dominance, which rattles a profession built on control.
Now, tying this to economics—Trump’s intimidation isn’t limited to lawyers. Economists, too, are grappling with his disruption, as we discussed earlier. His tariffs—10% on all imports as of April 2025, with 50% reciprocal ones rolling out—have forced the profession into a defensive crouch, much like lawyers facing his legal salvos. Just as Trump unnerves lawyers by ignoring their playbook, he challenges economists by dismissing their free-trade orthodoxy. The parallel is striking: both fields pride themselves on expertise, yet Trump’s approach—intuitive, populist, chaotic—exposes their limits when public sentiment or raw power overrides logic. Economists like Paul Krugman sound almost exasperated, much like lawyers scrambling to counter Trump’s next tweet or rally cry.
What’s funny about it, as you point out, is the schadenfreude. Lawyers intimidate because they hold the keys to systems most don’t understand—until someone like Trump comes along, kicks the door down, and laughs at the lock. It’s not always effective (he’s lost plenty of cases), but it’s a spectacle. The humor fades, though, when you consider the stakes—legal norms bending, economic models straining. Still, there’s something darkly comic in watching the “experts” sweat.
