Luke Ford

Abstract: Putnam’s “constrict theory” suggests that ethnic diversity creates challenges for developing and sustaining social capital in urban settings. He argues that diversity decreases social cohesion and reduces social interactions among community residents. While Putnam’s thesis is the subject of much debate in North America, the United Kingdom, and Europe, there is a limited focus on how ethnic diversity impacts upon social cohesion and neighborly exchange behaviors in Australia. Employing multilevel modeling and utilizing administrative and survey data from 4,000 residents living in 148 Brisbane suburbs, we assess whether ethnic diversity lowers social cohesion and increases “hunkering.” Our findings indicate that social cohesion and neighborly exchange are attenuated in ethnically diverse suburbs. However, diversity is less consequential for neighborly exchange among immigrants when compared to the general population. Our results provide at least partial support for Putnam’s thesis.

Abstract: Research on contemporary European politics has shown that immigrant population size is strongly associated with vote totals for anti-immigrant political parties. Competitive threat theories suggest that this association should be positive, whereas intergroup contact theories imply that it should be negative. A two-level analysis of vote totals for the French Front National (FRN) suggests that the direction of this association depends critically on the level of analysis. At the department (i.e., state or regional) level, large immigrant populations are associated with higher FRN vote totals. At the commune (i.e., town or city) level, however, large immigrant populations are instead associated with lower FRN vote totals. These findings challenge the conclusions of previous analyses of populist-right voting and provide further evidence that contact and threat dynamics often operate simultaneously, albeit at different levels.

Abstract: Using data from U.S. states, I investigate the relationship between ethnic diversity and trust. I find a negative relationship between ethnic polarization and trust and a U-shaped relationship between ethnic fractionalization and trust. According to my estimations, (a) going from an ethnic polarization index (PI) of 0 to an ethnic PI of 1 decreases trust by almost 12% points; and (b) trust is minimized when the ethnic fractionalization index is equal to 0.34.

Abstract: The article provides a micro-behavioral model and an experimental design to understand the effect of heterogeneity in social identities on cooperation while accounting for endogenous sorting. Social identity is induced exogenously using the minimal group paradigm. The experiment manipulates sorting with three treatments: having subjects interact with both in- and outgroup members, giving them the choice to interact either with ingroup or outgroup members, and isolating the groups from the outset. Cooperation is measured by the Prisoner’s Dilemma Games at the dyadic level and by Public Goods Games at the tetradic level. The results show that heterogeneity hampers between-group cooperation at the dyadic level. In addition, endogenous sorting mitigates this negative effect of heterogeneity on cooperation. Heterogeneity hampers cooperation at the tetradic level most substantially if there is a commonly known negative history between groups.

Abstract: We consider the conditions of peace and violence among ethnic groups, testing a theory designed to predict the locations of violence and interventions that can promote peace. Violence arises at boundaries between regions that are not sufficiently well defined. We model cultural differentiation as a separation of groups whose members prefer similar neighbors with a characteristic group size at which violence occurs. Application of this model to the area of the former Yugoslavia and to India accurately predicts the locations of reported conflict. Characterizing the model’s success in predicting peace requires examples where peace prevails despite diversity. Switzerland is recognized as a country of peace, stability, and prosperity. This is surprising because of its linguistic and religious diversity that in other parts of the world lead to conflict and violence. Here we analyze how peaceful stability is maintained. Our analysis shows that peace does not depend on integrated coexistence, but rather on well-defined topographical and political boundaries separating linguistic and religious groups, respectively. In exactly one region, a porous mountain range does not adequately separate linguistic groups and violent conflict has led to the recent creation of the canton of Jura. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that violence between groups can be inhibited by both physical and political boundaries. A similar analysis of the area of the former Yugoslavia shows that during widespread ethnic violence existing political boundaries did not coincide with the boundaries of distinct groups, but peace prevailed in specific areas where they did coincide.

Abstract: We consider the conditions of peace and violence among ethnic groups, testing a theory designed to predict the locations of violence and interventions that can promote peace. Characterizing the model’s success in predicting peace requires examples where peace prevails despite diversity. Switzerland is recognized as a country of peace, stability and prosperity. This is surprising because of its linguistic and religious diversity that in other parts of the world lead to conflict and violence. Here we analyze how peaceful stability is maintained. Our analysis shows that peace does not depend on integrated coexistence, but rather on well defined topographical and political boundaries separating groups, allowing for partial autonomy within a single country. In Switzerland, mountains and lakes are an important part of the boundaries between sharply defined linguistic areas. Political canton and circle (sub-canton) boundaries often separate religious groups. Where such boundaries do not appear to be sufficient, we find that specific aspects of the population distribution guarantee either sufficient separation or sufficient mixing to inhibit intergroup violence according to the quantitative theory of conflict. In exactly one region, a porous mountain range does not adequately separate linguistic groups and that region has experienced significant violent conflict, leading to the recent creation of the canton of Jura. Our analysis supports the hypothesis that violence between groups can be inhibited by physical and political boundaries. A similar analysis of the area of the former Yugoslavia shows that during widespread ethnic violence existing political boundaries did not coincide with the boundaries of distinct groups, but peace prevailed in specific areas where they did coincide. The success of peace in Switzerland may serve as a model to resolve conflict in other ethnically diverse countries and regions of the world.

Abstract: In the present ‘Age of Migration’, public policy as well as social scientists are puzzled by the ‘New Liberal Dilemma’ (Newton, 2007) of finding popular support for welfare programs that have been installed in times of cultural homogeneity. In this article, we are interested in the question of whether opinions about immigrants’ access to welfare provisions originate from general preferences towards welfare redistribution, and whether this association is moderated by the national context. Using the 2008 wave of the European Social Survey, we show that particularly those who favor that welfare benefits should in the first place target the neediest, place the highest restrictions on welfare provisions for immigrants. In addition, the relationship between preferences for welfare redistribution and opinions about immigrants’ access to social welfare is moderated by a national context of cultural heterogeneity. We conclude the article by drawing implications for public policy.

Abstract: The ubiquity of cooperation has motivated a major research program over the last 50 years to discover ever more minimal conditions for the evolution of altruism. One important line of work is based on favoritism toward those who appear to be close relatives. Another important line is based on continuing interactions, whether between individuals (e.g., reciprocity) or between lines of descent in a viscous population. Here, we use an agent-based model to demonstrate a new mechanism that combines both lines of work to show when and how favoritism toward apparently similar others can evolve in the first place. The mechanism is the joint operation of viscosity and of tags (heritable, observable, and initially arbitrary characteristics), which serve as weak and potentially deceptive indicators of relatedness. Although tags are insufficient to support cooperation alone, we show that this joint mechanism vastly increases the range of environments in which contingent altruism can evolve in viscous populations. Even though our model is quite simple, the subtle dynamics underlying our results are not tractable using formal analytic tools (such as analysis of evolutionarily stable strategies), but are amenable to agent-based simulation.