Professor Michael Barnett says: “From the 1850s through the 1967 war, American Jewish institutions that were involved in foreign policy making had a strong universal orientation, especially to the extent that they were concerned about being identified with the extremes of Jewish nationalism. Their foreign policy instincts were liberal internationalist – and they believe that liberal internationalism abroad, just like liberalism at home – was the best way to advance the values and interests of the Jewish people. The big change happened in 1967 – at this point the more tribally oriented Jews begin to capture the major Jewish institutions. As I argue, this is partly because of their growing passion, money, and commitment. Because of this development, and other factors, more universally oriented Jews moved elsewhere. The social justice organizations are not necessarily part of the traditional national Jewish organizations, but rather emerge somewhat outside the system and below the radar. What we have seen over the last decade, I think, is the extent to which the more universally oriented constituency is trying to regain their influence – and the point of fissure is over Israel.”
Dear Professor Barnett,
Your new book sets out to explore “Jewish Foreign Policies” in America. This is a very curious term you use, one that could be misconstrued as implying that America’s Jews are some kind of a political entity with its own political institutions and its own foreign policy. I’d like to use this first introductory round to let you explain the term, which ‘Jews’ it refers to, and what’s your rationale behind using it. So what is a “Jewish foreign policy?”
Professor responds:
I see the Jews as a transnational political community. All political communities are worried about their survival and want to advance their values vis-à-vis those outside its boundaries. Any political community that attempts to promote its interest and values “abroad” can be said to have the goal of creating a foreign policy.
Foreign policy is the process by which a political community organizes its relations with “outsiders” for the purpose of protecting its fundamental interests and values. All political communities, to the extent that they want to survive and even advance their values, will have a foreign policy. Although international relations scholars tend to imagine that the only political communities that exist in the world are nation-states, and that these states protect the “national” interest, there are non-state actors, such as nations without states, which also have a foreign policy. One of the interesting features of 19th century Jewish political life was the extent to which the emergence of a transnational Jewish political community began to organize and assemble institutions for the purpose of advancing Jewish interests and values. Bottom line: to say that there is Jewish foreign policy means acknowledging that the Jewish political community wants to protect its identity, interests, and values.
States have an easier time making foreign policy than do transnational communities because they have authority and sovereignty, which means that they are seen by the international community as having the right to make and promote the community’s interests and values…So, my understanding of the Jewish political community expects that different Jewish national communities, e.g. French, British, German, and American, will have distinct institutions that are intended to represent “Jewish” interests. And because the Jews are a transnational people, there will always be some blurring of the boundaries between the transnational and the national; that is, we can expect that the American Jewish community will attempt to find ways to represent both its interests and the broader interests of the Jewish people, though this will always be something of a challenge.
And when you dig deeper into the American Jewish community you will find sharp disagreements over how to protect the identity, interests, and values of the (American) Jews.
A final cautionary note: There is nothing insidious about a people wanting to organize to protect its identity, interests, and values. It is natural. It requires anti-Semitism to turn such natural tendencies into something dangerous and malevolent.
Dear Professor Barnett,
Near the end of your book you describe a deep disparity between US and Israeli Jewry when it comes to the Universalism vs. Tribalism question. According to you, “Israel and the United States offer two ways for Jews to be in the world.” While Israeli Jews are presented as “unapologetic nationalists” who “do not need to make excuses for their concern about the needs of their own (Jewish) citizens and the Jewish people,” US Jews “did not have to choose between their communal identity and their universal aspirations; they could have both.” The condition of American Jews, which are both grounded in their Jewish roots and get to enjoy their hopeful universalism, is presented as “the best of all worlds.”
The professor responds:
The challenge for American Jews has always been how to avoid shedding their Jewish identity. Jewish nationalism, Zionism, and Israel have helped put a brake on assimilation for American Jews. This is, in fact, one reason many American Jewish leaders began to turn to Zionism after World War I; Zionism would help keep American Jews from slipping away. And those arguments can be heard today – American Jews need these expressions of nationalism in order to retain some meaningful notion of Jewish peoplehood and communal commitments. It is because of these expressions of particularism (and at times tribalism) that American Jews have felt safe reaching for the universal. So, Zionism and Israel have allowed American Jews to fly close to the sun, without worrying that they might fly so close that they melt into a universalizing pool. Jewish nationalism has allowed American Jews to have their “cake and eat it too.” And isn’t this the best of all possible worlds? It certainly has been for many American Jews (though not all).
But the ability of Zionism and Israel to play that role depends in part on how American Jews view Zionism and Israel. American Jews are most comfortable with a Zionism and an Israel that approximates their own mixture of particularism and universalism – or at least does not become too tribal. So, American Jews have needed a Jewish nationalism and an Israel that retains clear commitments to the universal values that have become part of their identity.
American Jews have needed a Zionism and an Israel to help them retain a strong foot in the particular. But what happens if Zionism and Israel become seen as too tribal by American Jews – if Israel no longer appears to be acting in ways that are consistent with their values? One possibility is that they will increasingly distance themselves from Israel. And if they distance themselves from Israel, what will be the implication for American Jews? Will this hasten their assimilation?
The Jewish question is the name given to a wide-ranging debate in European society pertaining to the appropriate status and treatment of Jews in society. The debate was similar to other so-called “national questions” and dealt with the civil, legal, national and political status of Jews as a minority within society, particularly in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries.
The debate started within societies, politicians and writers in western and central Europe influenced by the Age of Enlightenment and the ideals of the French Revolution. The issues included the legal and economic Jewish disabilities (e.g. Jewish quotas and segregation), Jewish assimilation, Jewish emancipation and Jewish Enlightenment.
The expression has been used by antisemitic movements from the 1880s onwards, culminating in the Nazi phrase “the Final Solution to the Jewish Question”. Similarly, the expression was used by proponents for and opponents of the establishment of an autonomous Jewish homeland or a sovereign Jewish state.
