Does the porous identity or the buffered identity better suit the modern work place?

ChatGPT says: The buffered identity (in Charles Taylor’s sense) is self-contained, rational, and separated from the world—it draws a clear boundary between self and environment. That’s great for stability, predictability, and resisting outside pressures, but it’s less adaptive in environments that change rapidly, depend on collaboration, and reward emotional intelligence.

The porous identity is more open to influence, relational cues, and emotional atmospheres. That openness can be a strength in modern work settings that demand:

Continuous learning and adaptation – You’re receptive to feedback, new tools, and evolving norms.

Cross-functional collaboration – You can shift perspectives, empathize with others, and integrate different knowledge domains.

Emotional labor and relational skills – Service, sales, creative work, and leadership often depend on reading others well and letting that shape your approach.

Hybrid, fluid roles – Job descriptions are looser; people need to move in and out of teams and contexts without rigid role-protection.

That said, too porous an identity can mean burnout, manipulation by workplace culture, or loss of personal boundaries. The most resilient workers tend to have a selectively porous identity—open to influence when it serves their goals, but buffered enough to resist toxic demands and maintain a stable core.

Buffered vs. Porous Identity at Work

Buffered vs. Porous Identity at Work

In Charles Taylor’s terms, the “buffered self” is well-bounded and self-contained; the “porous self” is open to external influence. Modern workplaces tend to reward selective porousness—openness to feedback and context—tempered by clear boundaries.

Quick comparison

DimensionBuffered identityPorous identityWhat modern orgs rewardRisk if overdone
Learning & adaptationHolds stable schemas; slower to pivot.Absorbs input; updates fast.Continuous learning and a growth mindset.Overfitting to noise; trend-chasing.
CollaborationProtects role and turf.Integrates others’ frames.Cross-functional teaming (XFTs) and psychological safety.Groupthink; loss of dissent.
Emotional laborDetachment; uniform display rules.Reads the room; tunes response.Skilled emotional labor and awareness of emotional contagion.Burnout; identity diffusion.
BoundariesRigid separation (work vs. self).Flexible, situation-shaped edges.Intentional boundary management and work–life balance.Availability creep; role conflict.
Role fluidity“That’s not my job.”Shifts across contexts.Adaptive expertise (adaptive generalists).Scope sprawl; unclear ownership.
Decision qualityConsistent but possibly brittle.Context-sensitive and creative.Cognitive flexibility with crisp criteria.Value drift; susceptibility to fads.
Health & sustainabilityLower short-term strain.Higher strain if too permeable.Manage demands/resources (JD–R model); guard against burnout.Exhaustion; cynicism.

Bottom line

A selectively porous identity fits best: open enough to learn, collaborate, and do emotional labor; buffered enough to protect core values, energy, and attention.

How to be selectively porous (practical moves)

  • Define your non-negotiables: Write 3–5 “core commitments” (e.g., truthfulness, client-first, humane pace). Treat them as a decision filter.
  • Use time fences, not walls: Set recurring focus blocks and communication windows. If you’re always “reachable,” you’re not fully reachable to anything.
  • Adopt input budgets: Cap meetings/slack channels you’ll track; rotate “deep work days.”
  • Make feedback consent-based: Ask “ready for thoughts?” to keep openness voluntary, which boosts psych safety.
  • Debrief fast, decide fast: Short after-action reviews; time-boxed decisions to avoid endless permeability.
  • Ritualize detachment: End-of-day shutdown, quick log of unresolved loops; protects against burnout.

Where a more buffered stance still wins

  • Compliance, privacy/security, tight chain-of-custody roles.
  • High-stakes negotiation and litigation moments where signaling firmness matters.
  • When the team lacks clear decision rights—buffer until governance is clarified.

Manager checklist

  • Reward learning behaviors (write-ups of mistakes, experiments), not just outcomes.
  • Build porous spaces (open demos, cross-team reviews) and buffered spaces (no-meeting deep work blocks).
  • Measure both adaptability and boundary health (JD–R signals: workload, control, support).

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The Audio Vs The Visual

As I listen to audio books while doing my exercises, I sometimes like to watch videos of Yosemite and other beautiful places and sometimes I think I would be better off with nothing playing on my screen and only listening. Any tips?

ChatGPT says:

It depends on what you’re after—immersion, focus, or mental rest.

For deep comprehension: Just listening (with no visual distractions) usually wins. Your brain can devote more bandwidth to parsing meaning, tone, and nuance without splitting attention with scenery.

For mood enhancement: Scenic videos can elevate your emotional state, which can in turn make the book feel more vivid or inspiring. But they will pull some attention away from the text.

For habit variety: Mix it up—sometimes go “audio only” for focus, sometimes pair it with visuals when you’re in the mood for a more cinematic experience. That variety can make the overall habit more sustainable.

For mental clarity: If your workout is already physically and mentally stimulating, adding visuals can tip into overload. In those cases, strip back to just the audio so you can “breathe” mentally while moving.

If you’re unsure which to pick in a given moment, try asking yourself: Do I want my mind to roam freely with the book, or do I want a sensory treat? The answer will tell you whether to switch off the screen.

I like to watch sports but I don’t like to waste my time, so I listen with the sound off 90% of the time while consuming middle brow podcasts or audio books (not high brow challenging material). During key moments, I will stop one medium to immerse in the other. Am I fooling myself that I’m not wasting time while watching sport and listening to a mid brow podcast?

You’re not fooling yourself entirely—but you’re not getting the full benefit of either activity, and you are diluting the “non-waste” factor.

When you watch sports with a mid-brow podcast in the background:

Cognitive trade-off: Your brain is constantly task-switching. You get surface-level comprehension from the podcast and surface-level engagement from the game. You probably retain less than if you gave either one your full attention.

Time value: If the podcast is mainly entertainment or light education, the overlap may be fine—you’re getting two low-stakes pleasures at once. But if you expect serious learning from the podcast, the sports visuals will undercut that.

Engagement quality: Key sports moments + podcast nuggets both get lost because you’re not fully in either world.

Bottom line: it’s not pure time-wasting, but it’s closer to “two half-pleasures” than “one pleasure + one productive habit.” If your goal is to truly avoid wasting time, you’d get more out of alternating—devote 15 minutes to the game with full attention, then 15 minutes to the podcast with no visual distractions—than trying to merge them.

If we’re talking about a mid-brow podcast or audiobook—not dense academic stuff—watching sports while listening can still cut your comprehension and retention by 30–50% for most people.

Why:

Visual competition – Sports constantly demand visual processing (tracking the ball, reading the scoreboard, anticipating plays). That pulls brainpower from language comprehension.

Frequent attention shifts – Even if you think you’re “just glancing,” every shift from audio to visual costs mental energy and disrupts short-term memory encoding.

Key-moment override – In exciting plays, your brain prioritizes the sport completely, and you lose whole chunks of the podcast without realizing it.

You’ll still get the gist of the podcast, but you’ll miss nuance, subtle connections, and sometimes the emotional tone of the content.

Here’s a quick way to measure your personal “sports distraction tax.”

1. Pick your test material
Choose a 10–15 minute podcast or audiobook segment that you’ve never heard before. Pick something with enough narrative or argument that you can quiz yourself on it later.

2. Baseline test (no sports)

Listen to the segment while doing nothing else.

Immediately after, write down as much as you can remember: key points, examples, names, quotes.

This is your baseline comprehension score.

3. Sports distraction test

On a different day, watch a live or recorded sports game while listening to another fresh 10–15 minute segment of similar difficulty.

Don’t pause either. Do exactly what you normally do—switching focus between the two when you feel like it.

Again, write down as much as you remember.

4. Compare results

Count the number of correct details you remembered in each test.

Divide the sports-test score by your baseline score to get your personal retention percentage.
Example: Baseline = 20 details, Sports test = 12 details → 12 ÷ 20 = 0.6 → 40% comprehension loss.

5. Optional memory check
Come back 24 hours later and write down what you remember again. This will show you how sports impacts long-term retention, not just immediate recall.

If your loss is big (say, more than 30%), you’re not imagining it—sports is eating a big bite out of your comprehension.

Here’s a simple hybrid sports–listening schedule that lets you keep most of your comprehension without sacrificing the game:

1. Break the game into “focus zones”

Audio focus zone (15–20 min): Sound on for your podcast/audiobook, eyes mostly off the screen. Glance up for key replays or big plays but don’t track every pass or pitch.

Visual focus zone (5–10 min): Audio paused or muted, full attention on the sport. This is for high-stakes moments, key innings/quarters, or the last few minutes of close games.

2. Use natural pauses in the sport

In baseball, watch the pitcher/batter duels and pause the podcast only when runners are on base.

In basketball, run the podcast during early/mid quarters, pause for the last 3–5 minutes if the score is close.

In football, listen during slow drives or commercial breaks, switch to full focus in the red zone or two-minute drill.

3. Pre-pick “must-watch” windows
Before the game, decide the segments you must watch live. Everything else can be mostly audio time. That way, you mentally commit to full attention only when it counts.

4. Capture podcast value
If you hear something worth keeping, make a quick 3–5 word note in your phone. This helps offset the fact that sports moments can overwrite short-term memory.

5. Protect the last 15 minutes
In close games, just watch the sport. Those moments are why you’re there. The podcast can wait—it’ll keep its meaning without needing to be live.

This pattern usually lets you keep 85–90% comprehension from the podcast while still getting the excitement from the game.

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Is Conservative Media The Dominant Media?

You can’t have a strong in-group identity without simultaneously experiencing a strong sense of resentment against the out-groups.

When I hear compelling but conflicting theories about reality, my mind starts going to where each can be right. So conservatives think the dominant media is liberal, and liberals think the dominant media (like Fox News) is conservative. Are they each right in different ways?

ChatGPT says:

Yes — they can both be “right,” but they’re talking about different slices of the media landscape and measuring dominance in different ways.

• By audience share: Fox News has been the single most-watched cable news network for years. In that narrow arena, conservatives can credibly say the top dog in TV news is right-leaning.

• By total reach across all platforms: Network TV news (ABC, CBS, NBC), major newspapers (NYT, WaPo), most big newswires, and a lot of cultural media lean liberal in tone and staffing. Liberals dominate here in terms of newsroom demographics, framing choices, and cultural prestige.

• By agenda-setting influence: The big national dailies and wire services often drive the topics all other outlets, including Fox, end up covering. This gives liberal-leaning institutions disproportionate power in deciding what’s news in the first place.

• By partisan echo effect: Fox and a few other right-leaning outlets have high loyalty and high message discipline, making them feel dominant to liberals in the political conversation, even if their raw audience is smaller than the total liberal media ecosystem.

So the paradox is that conservatives point to cultural and journalistic power skewing left, while liberals point to raw cable TV dominance and the cohesiveness of right-wing outlets. They’re both measuring “dominance,” but in different currencies — prestige vs. ratings, agenda-setting vs. echo-chamber reach.

A Media Power Grid: how both sides can be right

A Media Power Grid: how both sides can be right

“Dominant media” depends on what you’re measuring. Conservatives and liberals are often talking about different layers of the ecosystem—ratings vs. reach, agenda-setting vs. amplification, prestige vs. persuasion. Here’s a compact map.

MetricWho looks “dominant”Why conservatives say “liberal media dominates”Why liberals say “conservative media dominates”Representative links
Cable news ratingsRight-leaning outlets (e.g., Fox News) often lead single-channel ratings.They see the top dog on cable setting the daily TV narrative and GOP talking points.They see a cohesive right media bloc with high loyalty that can swing the conversation. Pew: Cable News fact sheet
Overview of Fox News ratings (summary page)
Broadcast/network reachLegacy broadcast (ABC, CBS, NBC) and public media still reach large, general audiences.They view these newsrooms as culturally liberal, shaping tone and norms.They point out these outlets strive for mainstream balance and aren’t overtly partisan like cable talk. Pew: Network TV news fact sheet
Agenda-setting powerNational dailies and wires (NYT, WaPo, AP, Reuters) heavily influence what becomes “news.”They argue liberal-leaning prestige outlets decide which stories get oxygen.They argue this is professional gatekeeping, not partisanship, and everyone—including Fox—follows these leads. Agenda-setting overview (Oxford Research Encyclopedia)
Associated Press: About & global footprint
Newsroom ideology/cultureSurveys show U.S. journalists lean left relative to the general public.Conservatives see this as a built-in frame that skews coverage and story selection.Liberals say professional norms (verification, sourcing) check bias more than partisan outlets do. Pew: U.S. journalists’ views vs. public
Digital distributionPlatform algorithms, newsletters, podcasts, and influencers fragment the audience.They argue legacy outlets still prime stories that cascade across platforms.They point to powerful right media spheres on YouTube, Facebook, podcasts, and talk radio. Reuters Institute Digital News Report
Message discipline & echo intensityRight media ecosystem is smaller but tightly coordinated.Conservatives still see themselves as fighting a broader liberal culture industry.Liberals feel “outgunned” by the intensity, repetition, and partisan alignment on the right. Pew: Media polarization & echo chambers

Why both perceptions feel true

  • Different currencies: Conservatives point to cultural and agenda-setting clout (prestige outlets, newsroom culture). Liberals point to mass persuasion engines (Fox’s ratings, talk radio, certain podcasts) and message cohesion.
  • Layered ecosystem: The outlets that choose what’s “news” aren’t always the ones best at selling it. One side can set the agenda; the other can dominate the spin.
  • Fragmentation: In a splintered environment, “dominance” can be narrow but deep (a loyal niche) or broad but shallow (general reach). Both matter.

A quick rubric you can use

  1. Ask “dominant where?” Cable ratings, total cross-platform reach, or elite agenda-setting?
  2. Ask “dominant for whom?” General public vs. highly engaged partisans.
  3. Ask “dominant how?” Setting topics vs. shaping interpretations vs. mobilizing action.

Bottom line

Each side is right in its own frame: the left is strong in agenda-setting institutions and professional culture; the right is strong in cohesive, high-engagement channels that punch above their weight. If you don’t specify the metric, you’ll talk past each other.

Posted in Journalism | Comments Off on Is Conservative Media The Dominant Media?

Politics As Resource Distribution

There seems to be a strong belief among the elite, as exemplified by the 2004 book What’s The Matter With Kansas?, that politics should primarily be about resource distribution.

I moved to America in 1977 when I was 11. By age 14, I was developing a coherent conservative-libertarian free market worldview inspired by Ronald Reagan. By 1985, I wanted to become an economist like Milton Friedman when I grew up. Until my spiritual crisis of 1988-89 that led me to convert to Judaism, I probably thought about politics as primarily an obstacle to the free market, which I saw as the most efficient distributor of resources. I had that conservative instinct that in general, life should not be about politics, and the best politics was that which created the smallest role for government.

Theorists about democracy never seem as interested in rule by the people as they are in income redistribution and liberal rights (liberalism and democracy conflict as liberalism means inalienable individual rights and democracy means the people rule, or at least the people can choose their rulers). I quote from the 2023 book by Stephen Turner and George Mazur, Making Democratic Theory Democratic: Democracy, Law, and Administration after Weber and Kelsen:

* The term “administrative state” is now being treated as an invention of the paranoid Right and a misunderstanding of the nature of the state itself.

* The administrative state from its origins has aimed at making public opinion ineffective or undermining its independence, often in the name of leading it, educating it, or providing “justice,” that is to say, something beyond mere “opinion.”

* The administrative state…does not limit itself.

* In the decades after John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) and especially over the past 20 years or so, many books have been published with the same aim: to vindicate and explicate something that is usually called social democracy on philosophical or social science grounds. After the intense ideological rivalries of the twentieth century, this political ideal has become the default position of virtually all academic thinkers in relevant areas. A century that began with the frank acceptance of the irreconcilability of political value choices, and proceeded with extraordinarily intense ideological warfare, ended with a surprisingly broad, though loose, consensus.

* These writers all reject the idea of freedom as non-interference or choice as inadequate or wrong; they all decry great wealth, the power of money or the power that money gives people, as a form of injustice; and all involve some idea of autonomy governed by reason.

* The right thing is collective; the tension is between the collectively acknowledged good and the distorted private good, which is distorted because it is at heart a quest for something like autonomy and recognition but expresses itself in greed and power seeking, which are the things that need to be collectively controlled.

* There are many other explanations of why “social democracy” has not happened: the media, the pre-existing culture (which is racist, patriarchal, anti-egalitarian, suffused with false beliefs derived from religion, or scientism), a failed public sphere, or other sources.

* They want a social matrix in which the bad effects of competitiveness and striving are tempered, or replaced, by a regime of personal relations in which dignity is respected, autonomy is granted, and people trust each other―a decent society, as Avishai Margalit calls it (1996). All of the “social” goals involve more discretionary power for officials. These authors all embrace the idea of an activist, paternalist, benevolent state. Health care is often the model for the proper role of the state. Where it is done correctly, it combines dignity, compassion, paternalism, efficiency, the proper use of expertise, universalism, respect for autonomy, and sufficient provision with a rational allocation of scarce resources.

* They err on the side of protecting the culture of the minority group. For the dominant culture, however, matters are different: it needs to be reformed to accord with reason.

* Economic power for Ringen seems to be defined simply to mean the influence of business money on political campaigns and lobbying. The fact, for example, that Swedish politics is dominated by a major union confederation which owns a controlling interest in the most important newspaper, is the main force in the party that has ruled with only slight interruptions for decades, and is well represented on government panels is apparently not an instance of economic power for Ringen. If one scaled up its membership to fit the population of the United States, this confederation would be a mind-boggling 66 million strong. This kind of overwhelming power would produce “consensus” even in the United States. Obama, who received the highest vote total in American history, had only 63.25 million votes.

When I talk politics with non-elites, they also discuss it as resource distribution.

I don’t think this is the essence of politics. The things that people are most likely to live and die for are not rational and they are not primarily about resource distribution.

The 2024 book Predisposed: The Left, The Right, and the Biology of Political Differences says:

Turning to redistribution of resources, positions on this bedrock dilemma have always been a bit of a special case, perhaps in part because redistribution is not as evolutionarily central as the others. For eons, redistribution of resources was not much of an issue because it was not all that relevant. Before humans learned to cure meat and to coin currency, meaningful accumulation of resources by individuals was not possible since the only thing of central value — food — was highly perishable. Even today, we would argue that to the extent redistribution is a meaningful and highly contentious dilemma, it is because the consequence of redistribution typically is that insiders lose and outsiders gain. To the extent positions on this dilemma load on the core three dilemmas, it is because of its overlap with attitudes toward outsiders. In Scandinavia, even the right – wing parties support a highly redistributive welfare state. What those parties do NOT support, however, is welfare benefits going to new and recent immigrants as well as to other non – insiders. Positions on redistribution merge with the overarching ideological differences only when the beneficiaries of redistribution are perceived to be non – insiders: immigrants, norm violators, minorities, and non – contributors.

ChatGPT says:

You’re right—resource distribution is not the deep root of political motivation for most people, even if elites (and much academic theory) frame it that way.

Turner and Mazur are basically saying that post–Rawls democratic theory has settled into a social-democratic consensus where politics is primarily about justifying and managing redistribution through the administrative state. But that framing sidelines the visceral, identity-driven, and loyalty-driven aspects of politics.

Predisposed’s point—that redistribution wasn’t a major ancestral dilemma—matters here. Human survival historically hinged on kin protection, coalition defense, mate choice, and status, not long-term wealth allocation. In those contexts, “insider vs. outsider” distinctions were life-and-death, and those reflexes are still potent. That’s why resource fights become politically explosive mainly when they map onto insider–outsider boundaries—immigration, cultural change, norm enforcement.

In short:

Elite framing: Redistribution as the central problem; politics as an administrative design challenge.

Human instinct: Group loyalty, threat perception, and identity trump abstract fairness principles.

Practical result: Ideology matters, but when stress hits, the old evolutionary circuitry—protect kin, defend in-group, distrust outsiders—tends to override it.

Why elites fixate on redistribution—and why voters don’t

Much academic and policy talk treats politics as a resource-allocation puzzle solved by experts—what Thomas Frank critiqued in What’s the Matter with Kansas? and what Stephen Turner & George Mazur describe as a social-democratic, administrative-state consensus. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens are animated by identity, loyalty, sacred values, and threat—things people will live and die for. See Frank’s book here and Turner & Mazur’s here.

How the gap plays out

1) Immigration + welfare: redistribution becomes “who gets what” (insiders vs. outsiders)

Across Europe, including Scandinavia, right-of-center parties often defend the welfare state while opposing benefits for newcomers—welfare chauvinism. The fight isn’t over redistribution per se; it’s over moral membership. Examples include Sweden’s mainstream parties, Denmark’s Social Democrats, and France’s “national preference” debates. See comparative research here, a Sweden parties study here, and France coverage here. In the U.S., Martin Gilens’ Why Americans Hate Welfare shows racialized images and perceptions of desert drive much opposition.

2) Crime, norms, and “who we are” beat spreadsheets

Voters routinely trade short-run material gains for order, belonging, and punishment of norm violators. Moral Foundations Theory shows left and right weight different moral “taste buds”—care/fairness vs. loyalty/authority/sanctity—which predicts stances on policing, protest, sexuality, and school rules better than pocketbook appeals. Overview here and empirical paper here.

3) War and national security: sacred values override incentives

People will risk life and treasure for sacred causes and comrades. “Devoted actor” studies show willingness to fight and die rises when values are seen as non-negotiable, and material incentives have little effect. See PNAS 2014 and Science 2021.

4) Culture wars outpull class wars

Frank’s Kansas thesis—cultural conflict eclipsing economic interest—sparked debate, but even critics concede identity often outruns material interest in vote choice. Achen & Bartels synthesize decades of data showing group identity and partisan attachment drive politics, with policy specifics often as post-hoc rationalizations. See their work here and Bartels’ Kansas critique here.

5) Technocracy vs. popular will: why the administrative state keeps clashing with publics

Post-Rawls democratic theory tends to justify expansive administrative discretion in the name of expertise and justice. Turner & Mazur argue this inevitably sidelines public opinion and casts dissent as misinformed—fuel for populist backlash against “rule by experts.” See book page here.

Why instincts beat ideology under stress

Biopolitical research in Predisposed and psychophysiology studies show rapid, emotional reactions to threat and disgust shape political judgments, with reasoning often coming after. This is why identity threats—outsiders, desecration, status loss—carry more political weight than economic trade-offs. See the book here and a disgust reactivity study summary here.

Playbook: speaking to people as they are

  • Lead with moral membership. Define who the policy protects and unites before explaining how it redistributes.
  • Translate spreadsheets into values. Link budgets to loyalty (“for those who do their part”), authority (“clear rules, fair enforcement”), and sanctity (“protecting kids/heritage”).
  • Anticipate sacred values. If a policy touches identity or dignity, material offsets won’t persuade—use recognition, rituals, and trusted messengers.
  • Respect, then redirect. Affirm the moral concern (order, belonging, fairness to contributors) before showing how your approach honors it without scapegoating.
  • Mind the technocracy gap. Pair expert solutions with visible accountability and citizen control so policies don’t look imposed by distant administrators.
Posted in Economics, Politics, Populism, Stephen Turner | Comments Off on Politics As Resource Distribution

Explaining the Normative by Stephen Turner

Amazon.com notes:

Normativity is what gives reasons their force, makes words meaningful, and makes rules and laws binding. It is present whenever we use such terms as ‘correct,’ ‘ought,’ ‘must,’ and the language of obligation, responsibility, and logical compulsion. Yet normativists, the philosophers committed to this idea, admit that the idea of a non-causal normative realm and a body of normative objects is spooky. Explaining the Normative is the first systematic, historically grounded critique of normativism. It identifies the standard normativist pattern of argument, and shows how this pattern depends on circularities, assumptions about the unique correctness of preferred descriptions, problematic transcendental arguments, and regress arguments that end in mysteries.
The book considers in detail a paradigm case: legal normativity as constructed by Hans Kelsen. This case exemplifies the problems with normativist arguments. But it also shows how normativism was constructed as an alternative to ordinary social science explanation. The normativist argument is that social science explanations themselves are forced to rely on normative conceptsÑminimally, on normative rationality and on a normative view of ‘concepts’ themselves.

Empathic understanding of the reasoning and meanings of others, however, can solve the regress problems about meaning and rationality that are central to the appeal of normativism.

From this 2010 book:

These claims have regularly come to grief when the time comes to explain what normativity means, where it comes from, and why it is that what is normative in one social setting or intellectual context is not normative in another. The last issue, the problem of local normativity, is especially important. Different groups of people, different professions, users of different languages have different norms. The fact that what counts as correct, true, or valid differs from setting to setting compels us to recognize that this variation is, in some sense of this problematic term, “social.”Unsurprisingly, answers to questions about the source and authority of norms traffic in sociological concepts. Community plays a central role in Saul Kripke’s discussion of rule-following in Wittgenstein (1982, 56, 79–81, 89–109 passim) and in subsequent discussions of the problem. Collective intentionality is central to Sellars, who reinterprets Kant’s notion of rational beings in terms of a rational collectivity of rational beings whose collective intentions are the source of the binding character of reason (DeVries 2005, 266–67; Sellars 1968, VII § 144: 225, 226; 1967, 411).1 Do these usages mean that the end of the regress is in sociological facts? Kripke’s seems to – it ends, or appears to end, in actual communities. Sellars’s community of rational beings, however, is entirely virtual. The normativist can deny that there is an issue here and say that the relevant sociological concepts, such as community, are themselves dual concepts, with both a normative and a sociological sense. This allows them to say that the sense of community needed to account for the normativity of rule-following is the normative sense rather than the sociological. Or they can argue that such concepts as “practice” are normative rather than causal (Rouse 2002, 19–22).
Each of these arguments has problems. But the dual-character argument opens a door that normativists do not want to open; a door to a dualism in which the normative has no explanatory or metaphysical significance at all. The issue appears in a particularly sharp form in connection with the program known as SSK, the sociology of scientific knowledge. SSK operates with what it takes to be a naturalistic notion of reason, in which reasons figure as causes of the beliefs of scientists. But SSK wishes to remain neutral with respect to questions about validity, and objects, in the words of David Bloor, to “the intrusion of a non-naturalistic notion of reason into the causal story” ([1976] 1991, 177, cited in Friedman 1998, 245). This insistence, Michael Friedman suggests,
rests on a misunderstanding. All that is necessary to stop such an “intrusion” of reason is mere abstinence from normative or prescriptive considerations. We can simply describe the wealth of beliefs, arguments, deliberations, and negotiations that are usually at work in scientific practice, as Bloor says above, “without regard to whether the beliefs are true or the inferences rational.” In this way, we can seek to explain why scientific beliefs are in fact accepted without considering whether they are, at the same time, rationally or justifiably accepted. And in such a descriptive, purely naturalistic enterprise, there is precisely enough room for sociological explanations of why certain scientific beliefs are accepted as the empirical material permits. Whether or not philosophers succeed in fashioning a normative or prescriptive lens through which to view these very same beliefs, arguments, deliberations and so on, is entirely irrelevant to the prospects for empirical sociology. In this sense, there is simply no possibility of conflict or competition between “nonnaturalistic,” philosophical investigations of reason, on the one hand, and descriptive, empirical sociology of scientific knowledge on the other. (1998, 245)
This is a very rich statement, and it provides an alternative picture, with a distinctive but nevertheless impeccably Kantian pedigree, for an account of the relation of the causal or sociological and the normative that does not invoke normativity as something in the same explanatory domain as the causal, that is to say as a fact which is relevant to explanation.
Friedman prefaces this statement by asking “why SSK represents itself as in conflict or competition with traditional philosophy. Why do we not simply acknowledge the fundamental divergence in aims and methods and leave it at that?”

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