Decoding Trump’s First 100 Days (4-24-25)

01:00 Trump’s first 100 days, https://www.wsj.com/opinion/trumps-100-day-opportunity-policy-economy-narrative-658b8a43?mod=hp_opin_pos_2#cxrecs_s
16:20 The Self-Inflicted White House Wounds, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A6gOQrvi17Y
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2025/02/11/democrats-tricked-strong-economy-00203464
20:00 NYT: They Caught the Flu, and Never Came Home: The virus leads to an estimated 36,000 deaths in the United States each season, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/24/well/flu-deaths-hospitalizations.html
38:00 The Case For Economic Nationalism, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=160817
47:30 Mark Halperin on Trump’s tariffs, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0qvWNisF4k
50:00 Mark Halperin on Trump (E1336), https://www.smerconish.com/podcasts/the-smerconish-podcast/
1:04:00 Eugenics and the Manosphere Anti-Semites, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GrIVfAQA7EU
1:05:00 Eli Lake says he only reads the best historians like Will Durant
1:09:20 ANN COULTER: “The most wonderful 100 days in U.S. history. I can’t believe how great Trump is.”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yXA9iIYlegM
1:14:20 What’s Wrong with The NY Times Article on ADHD – #2 (of 4), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2PAV8TrclWY
1:34:00 Trump vs Harvard, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DUHVwtGZdVY
1:38:20 Harvard’s Strangely Worded Warning to Trump, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gn1LphHmGU8

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The Case For Economic Nationalism

Historian Adam Rowe writes:

“Commerce” within a community is almost always salutary, an extension of the associations and collaborations that are essential to all human flourishing. But “trade” between separate communities, particularly communities with drastically different economic, legal, and cultural institutions, is usually predatory and exploitative. Carey pointed to the slave trade and the Opium Wars as emblematic examples of external trade’s predatory nature.

The 19th century is rife with glaring illustrations of how different trade between societies at different levels of economic diversification and specialization looks from commerce within those same societies. Carey’s basic insight is that economic principles are not as timeless or immutable as the laws of physics. They are historical, which is to say they develop organically with the society in which they operate. The phrase “Indian giver” is itself a relic of the fact that Native Americans and Europeans did not understand trade exchanges in the same way. The inevitable result was misunderstanding and violence.

The key concept in Carey’s analysis was “association.” By association he meant the fruitful combination that results from the division of labor and the union of men. “The tendency of man is to combine his exertions with those of his fellow men,” Carey wrote. But these exertions are not exclusively commercial or material. They are cultural, political, intellectual, and moral—a collective striving from scarcity, savagery, and ignorance toward plenty, decency, and enlightenment.

The crucial point for Carey is that commercial networks are not separate from the other social bonds that create a community. People who belong to the same culture, obey the same laws, and rely on one another for their common defense should also be able to provide one another with all the material necessities of life. These bonds are mutually reinforcing. Interdependence is the glue of community. A heavy reliance on external trade corrodes the internal social harmony on which progress depends.

The more a society engages in external trade, the more specialized its own internal economy will become. But economic specialization, divorced from the broader associations that bind a community together, is neither safe nor fruitful. In a Hobbesian war of all against all, no individual can afford to specialize and rely on trade for the other basic necessities of life. And the same is true of individual nations in a Hobbesian world of predatory states.

The more important point, for Carey, is that national specialization diminishes the internal diversification that drives economic progress in the first place. Everyone in society is improved by close collaboration and interaction with near neighbors engaged in different pursuits and cultivating different individual capacities. The material benefits, in terms of economic efficiency, are only a part of the moral, political, and cultural advantages that flow from increasingly complex forms of interdependence and association. These advantages are mostly lost in trade exchanges with people on the other side of the world who have nothing else in common. A nation advances in every sense as its internal economy diversifies, as the reciprocal pursuits of its citizens multiply. External trade, by separating economic interdependence from all other forms of association, reverses this process. The nation’s internal economy becomes less diverse; citizens become isolated in a stultifying uniformity. The more concentrated a nation’s economy is, the more internally stunted and externally vulnerable it becomes.

“In all communities in which the power of association is growing, because of increasing diversification of employments, and increased development of individuality, we witness a constant increase of strength and power,” Carey wrote. “Steadiness diminishes with the increased necessity for trade; and therefore is it that in all communities in which employments have become less diversified; there has been a constant decline of both strength and power.”

Productivity, economic diversity and social cohesion all increase together in a virtuous cycle, and the wealth of the community expands with the variety of talents, intelligences and virtues of the individuals who compose it. As labor becomes more and more productive, Carey wrote, man “will learn more and more to unite with his fellow man, and will acquire daily increasing power over the land and over himself: and he will become richer and happier, more virtuous, more intelligent and more free.”

Christopher Caldwell wrote in 2017:

This estrangement is why electoral results around the world last year—from Brexit to the election of Donald Trump—proved so difficult to anticipate. Those outside the city gates in la France périphérique are invisible, their wishes incomprehensible. It’s as if they don’t exist. But they do.

People used to think of the economy as congruent with society—it was the earning-and-spending aspect of the nation just living its life. All citizens inhabited the same economic system (which isn’t to say that all took an equal share from it). As Guilluy describes it, the new economy is more like a private utility: it provides money and goods the way, say, the power company provides electricity. If you’ve always had electricity in your house, what’s the worry? But it’s quite possible to get cut off.

For those cut off from France’s new-economy citadels, the misfortunes are serious. They’re stuck economically. Three years after finishing their studies, three-quarters of French university graduates are living on their own; by contrast, three-quarters of their contemporaries without university degrees still live with their parents. And they’re dying early. In January 2016, the national statistical institute Insée announced that life expectancy had fallen for both sexes in France for the first time since World War II, and it’s the native French working class that is likely driving the decline. In fact, the French outsiders are looking a lot like the poor Americans Charles Murray described in Coming Apart, failing not just in income and longevity but also in family formation, mental health, and education. Their political alienation is striking. Fewer than 2 percent of legislators in France’s National Assembly today come from the working class, as opposed to 20 percent just after World War II.

Unlike their parents in Cold War France, the excluded have lost faith in efforts to distribute society’s goods more equitably. Political plans still abound to fight the “system,” ranging from the 2017 Socialist presidential candidate Benoît Hamon’s proposals for a guaranteed minimum income to those of his rival, former economics minister Emmanuel Macron, to make labor markets more flexible. But these programs are seen by their intended beneficiaries as further proof of a rigged system. The welfare state is now distrusted by those whom it is meant to help. France’s expenditure on the heavily immigrant banlieues is already vast, on this view; to provide yet more public housing would be to widen the invitation to unwanted immigrants. To build any large public-works project is to do the same. To invest in education, in turn, is to offer more advantages to the rich, who’re best positioned to benefit from it. In a society divided as Guilluy describes, traditional politics can find no purchase.

The two traditional French parties—the Republicans, who once followed a conservative program elaborated by Charles de Gaulle; and the Socialists, who once followed socialism—still compete for votes, but along an ever-narrowing spectrum of issues. The real divide is no longer between the “Right” and the “Left” but between the metropoles and the peripheries. The traditional parties thrive in the former. The National Front (FN) is the party of the outside.

Indeed, with its opposition to free trade, open immigration, and the European Union, the FN has established itself as the main voice of the anti-globalizers. At regional elections in 2015, it took 55 percent of workers’ votes. The Socialists, Republicans, Greens, and the hard Left took 18 percent among them. In an effort to ward off the FN, the traditional parties now collude as often as they compete. In the second round of those regional elections, the Socialists withdrew in favor of their Republican rivals, seeking to create a barrage républicain against the FN. The banding together of establishment parties to defend the system against anti-system parties is happening all over the world. Germany has a “grand coalition” of its two largest parties, and Spain may have one soon. In the U.S., the Trump and the Sanders candidacies both gained much of their support from voters worried that the two major parties were offering essentially the same package.

Guilluy has tried to clarify French politics with an original theory of political correctness. The dominance of metropolitan elites has made it hard even to describe the most important conflicts in France, except in terms that conform to their way of viewing the world. In the last decade of the twentieth century, Western statesmen sang the praises of the free market. In our own time, they defend the “open society”—a wider concept that embraces not just the free market but also the welcoming and promotion of people of different races, religions, and sexualities. The result, in terms of policy, is a number of what Guilluy calls “top-down social movements.” He doesn’t specify them, but they would surely include the Hollande government’s legalization of gay marriage, which in 2013 and 2014 brought millions of protesters opposing the measure onto the streets of Paris—the largest demonstrations in the country since World War II.

Grok says:

Summary of Carey’s Ideas and Their Context

Economic Nationalism and Protectionism: Carey advocated for protective tariffs to foster America’s industrial development, arguing that they were essential for building a self-sufficient and diversified economy. He believed that economic principles were not universal but rooted in a nation’s specific historical and cultural circumstances.

Distinction Between Commerce and Trade: Carey differentiated internal “commerce” (mutually beneficial economic activity within a community) from external “trade” (often predatory and exploitative between nations with differing economic systems). He viewed commerce as strengthening social bonds, while external trade could undermine them.

Association as a Core Principle: Carey emphasized “association,” the productive collaboration enabled by the division of labor within a nation. He argued that internal economic diversification fosters social cohesion, cultural progress, and economic resilience, whereas reliance on external trade leads to specialization, vulnerability, and social fragmentation.

Critique of Free Trade: While Carey admired Adam Smith’s insights on the division of labor, he rejected the free-trade implications of Smith’s work. He argued that free trade could harm nations by exposing them to exploitation, particularly when trading with economically advanced nations like Britain, which he accused of maintaining global industrial dominance through exploitative trade policies.

Historical Context: Carey’s ideas were influential in the U.S. during the 19th century, a period when protective tariffs underpinned America’s industrial growth (especially between the Civil War and World War II). Despite academic dominance of free-trade theories, Carey’s protectionism resonated with politicians and businessmen.

Historical Significance

Carey’s Influence: The text highlights Carey’s prominence, noting endorsements from figures like Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill, though both offered qualified praise. Carey’s ideas shaped U.S. economic policy during a period of rapid industrialization, contributing to America’s rise as an industrial power.

Protectionism in American History: The text challenges the assumption that free trade is an American tradition, pointing out that tariffs were central to U.S. economic policy for much of its history. This aligns with historical evidence: high tariffs (e.g., the Tariff of 1828, Morrill Tariff of 1861) protected nascent industries, particularly in the North, fostering industrial growth.

Contrast with Free Trade Orthodoxy: In the 19th century, free trade was the dominant academic paradigm, especially in Britain, where thinkers like David Ricardo advanced comparative advantage theories. Carey’s rejection of these ideas positioned him as an outlier among intellectuals but a hero among American industrialists and policymakers.

Relevance to Contemporary Debates

The text argues that Carey’s ideas are newly relevant in light of Trump’s protectionist policies and broader economic nationalism in 2025. Key points of relevance include:
Trump’s Tariffs: Trump’s revival of tariffs (e.g., on Chinese goods, steel, and aluminum) echoes Carey’s belief in protecting domestic industries from foreign competition. The text suggests that Carey’s framework provides intellectual grounding for such policies.

Globalization’s Discontents: Carey’s critique of external trade resonates with modern concerns about globalization’s impact on domestic workers. The text cites Nicholas Eberstadt’s data on rising male non-employment in the U.S. (from 2% in 1950 to 12% in 2016), linking it to economic specialization and offshoring, which Carey warned against.

Economic Diversity vs. Specialization: Carey’s emphasis on economic diversity aligns with arguments that over-reliance on global supply chains (e.g., for semiconductors or pharmaceuticals) leaves nations vulnerable. His ideas support policies aimed at re-shoring industries for resilience and social cohesion.

Political Polarization: The text notes a growing divide between globalization’s beneficiaries (elites) and its victims (workers in deindustrialized regions), reflected in political conflicts. Carey’s focus on internal economic cohesion offers a lens to understand these tensions.

Strengths of the Argument

Historical Nuance: The text effectively counters the myth of free trade as America’s historical norm, grounding Carey’s ideas in the context of U.S. industrial success under protectionist policies.

Intellectual Depth: By exploring Carey’s distinction between commerce and trade, the text presents a sophisticated critique of free-trade orthodoxy, highlighting the social and cultural dimensions of economic policy.

Contemporary Relevance: The connection to Trump’s policies and globalization’s challenges makes Carey’s ideas feel timely, especially in addressing issues like deindustrialization and economic inequality.

Interdisciplinary Approach: The text integrates economics with sociology, history, and political philosophy, reflecting Carey’s holistic view of “association” and its role in national progress.

Weaknesses and Critiques

Selective Historical Framing: While the text emphasizes America’s protectionist past, it downplays periods of free-trade influence (e.g., post-World War II trade liberalization under GATT and WTO). This selective focus may overstate Carey’s historical dominance.

Limited Engagement with Free-Trade Arguments: The text critiques free trade as predatory but does not robustly address counterarguments, such as the efficiency gains from comparative advantage or consumer benefits from lower prices. Carey’s rejection of these principles is presented without fully grappling with their empirical support.

Romanticization of Protectionism: The text risks idealizing Carey’s vision of economic diversity and self-sufficiency. Protectionism can lead to inefficiencies, higher consumer prices, and trade wars—downsides that are acknowledged only briefly (e.g., protected industries becoming entrenched constituencies).

Ambiguity on Modern Application: While Carey’s ideas are linked to Trump’s policies, the text does not specify how they might be implemented today. For example, how would tariffs address complex global supply chains or digital economies? The argument feels more rhetorical than prescriptive.

Overemphasis on Economic Nationalism: The text’s celebration of economic nationalism may overlook the benefits of international cooperation. Carey’s view of external trade as inherently predatory seems overly pessimistic in a world of interdependent economies.

Broader Implications

Economic Policy: Carey’s ideas challenge the neoliberal consensus on free trade, supporting policies like industrial subsidies, tariffs, or “Buy American” initiatives. However, implementing protectionism in a globalized economy requires careful calibration to avoid retaliatory trade wars or supply chain disruptions.

Social Cohesion: Carey’s focus on economic diversity and association highlights the social costs of deindustrialization, such as community breakdown and political alienation. Policymakers might consider how to balance global trade with local economic resilience.

Global Dynamics: The text’s critique of trade between nations with disparate legal systems (e.g., democracies vs. dictatorships) raises questions about fair trade practices. Carey’s ideas could inform debates on labor standards, environmental regulations, or trade agreements like the USMCA.

Conclusion

The text makes a compelling case for revisiting Henry Charles Carey’s economic nationalism, presenting it as a historically grounded and intellectually rich framework for understanding contemporary trade debates. Carey’s distinction between commerce and trade, emphasis on economic diversity, and critique of external dependency offer valuable insights into the social and political consequences of globalization. However, the argument would be strengthened by addressing free-trade counterarguments more thoroughly and clarifying how Carey’s ideas apply to modern economic challenges. As economic nationalism gains traction in 2025, Carey’s legacy underscores the enduring tension between global integration and national self-sufficiency—a tension that remains unresolved.

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WP: Trump and law firms: Who’s bamboozling whom?

David Kendall writes:

The deals do not appear to have been formalized in bilateral documents, signed by the parties and specifying respective duties, obligations and penalties for noncompliance. Though some of the firms have issued internal documents (which have quickly made their way to the media), none of these appear to have been approved by the Trump administration.

In addition, the two sides’ accounts of the agreements often seem asymmetrical. Trump, for example, in an executive order revoking the original executive order regarding Paul Weiss, claimed the firm “will engage in a remarkable change of course” and “specifically … has acknowledged the wrongdoing of its former partner Mark Pomerantz.” (Pomerantz left Paul Weiss in 2021 to work on a criminal investigation of Trump.) The firm made no such acknowledgment in public.

Such informality about legal obligations would ordinarily be anathema to a firm’s corporate practice. It would simply be unthinkable to negotiate a $100 million handshake deal without ensuring that the essential terms were clarified and set out in writing and then signed by both sides. It certainly would be a red flag for a firm’s malpractice insurance carrier.

The New York Times posts:

Robert C. Post, a law professor at Yale, argued in an email that by acting with such speed that his adversaries have been caught by surprise, Trump has been unexpectedly successful in the opening months of his second term:

“The entire society has been taken aback by the suddenness and violence of Trump’s first 100 days. He has worked astonishing innovations in the exercise of executive power. Much of what he has done is obviously lawless.

“Trump has seized the high ground in the belief that possession is nine tenths of the law. He has dared the courts to defy him. And the courts are on this point cautious, because, as has been true for hundreds of years, their authority depends upon the force of their reason.

Many of Trump’s executive orders suggest that he cares little about legal reason. To speak figuratively, Trump cares only how many divisions the courts can mobilize. In such circumstances, the force of judicial reason depends upon public opinion, and Trump is presently still on a honeymoon with the sectors of the public that elected him.”

Trump’s strategy is to divide his adversaries, Post wrote:

“Unbound by law, immune to shame, the Trump administration has unleashed the full force of the executive branch on institutions of civil society like universities and law firms.

“Civil society is splintering under the assault. Harvard resists; Columbia bends the knee. Paul, Weiss bows in obeisance, Perkins Coie sues. Resistance is genuinely difficult, because the main institutions have left themselves exposed to blackmail from the federal government that has determined to trash all previous norms of behavior.”

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In Covid’s Wake: How Our Politics Failed Us by Stephen Macedo and Frances Lee

Grok says:

In Covid’s Wake: How Our Politics Failed Us by Stephen Macedo and Frances Lee, both Princeton political scientists, is a provocative examination of the U.S. response to the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on political and institutional failures. The book argues that the pandemic exposed deep flaws in public deliberation, with policies driven by groupthink, politicized science, and a failure to weigh costs and benefits. Below is a critique of the book’s strengths, weaknesses, and overall contribution, drawing on available reviews and analysis while critically assessing its arguments.

Strengths

Rigorous Political Lens

Macedo and Lee bring a political science perspective to the pandemic, a refreshing departure from public health or epidemiological analyses. They focus on how institutions—government, academia, media, and public health authorities—handled decision-making, highlighting failures in open debate and tolerance for dissent. Their emphasis on liberal democratic values, such as transparency and evidence-based deliberation, is compelling, especially when they critique slogans like “follow the science” for obscuring complex trade-offs.

Evidence of Pre-Pandemic Planning Ignored

The authors effectively document how pre-COVID pandemic plans, such as those from the World Health Organization (2019) and Johns Hopkins (2019), cautioned against blanket lockdowns and emphasized balancing public health with societal costs. They argue convincingly that these plans were sidelined in favor of China-inspired measures, like widespread quarantines, without sufficient scrutiny. This historical context strengthens their case that policy decisions were reactive rather than reasoned.

Critique of Elite Overreach

The book’s critique of the “laptop class” (elites who could work from home) imposing policies that disproportionately harmed essential workers and less privileged groups is a sharp observation. They highlight how extended school closures hit low-income families hardest, a point backed by emerging data on learning loss and social inequity. This focus on distributional impacts adds moral weight to their argument.

Engagement with Dissent

Macedo and Lee, identifying as left-leaning, take a bold step by engaging with conservative critiques of COVID policies, such as those in the Great Barrington Declaration (GBD). They argue that dissenting voices, like those of GBD authors Jay Bhattacharya and Martin Kulldorff, were unfairly marginalized or censored, stifling debate. This willingness to bridge ideological divides is rare and aligns with their call for open-mindedness.

Comprehensive Documentation

The book is meticulously researched, with roughly 60 pages of references, making it a valuable resource for scholars and policymakers. Reviewers praise its data-driven approach and thorough documentation of policy choices, which lends credibility to its claims.

Weaknesses

Selective Use of Evidence

Critics note that the book sometimes cherry-picks data to support its arguments. For instance, when comparing international outcomes, the authors cite Sweden’s “excess mortality” to downplay its higher COVID mortality compared to Norway or Denmark, which used stricter measures. This shift in metrics feels like moving the goalposts to fit their narrative against stringent controls. Similarly, they underplay the U.S.’s higher mortality rate compared to Canada, which could undermine their critique of lockdowns.

Neglect of Vaccination Failures

A significant omission is the lack of focus on political failures around vaccination uptake, particularly among Republican voters. Critics argue that the refusal of GOP leaders to counter vaccine hesitancy cost hundreds of thousands of lives, a point the book barely addresses. This gap weakens its claim to be a comprehensive political assessment, as it sidesteps a major partisan failure.

Overemphasis on Great Barrington Declaration

The authors’ defense of the GBD is contentious. Critics, like neurologist Jonathan Howard, argue that they downplay the declaration’s flaws, such as its unrealistic premise of achieving herd immunity through mass infection and its ties to right-wing funding. By framing GBD authors as victims of censorship rather than scrutinizing their scientific errors, the book risks appearing biased toward contrarian narratives.

Limited Engagement with Public Health Experts

While Macedo and Lee critique the public health establishment, they rely heavily on public records and research rather than direct interviews with key figures, such as signers of the John Snow Memorandum, which supported stricter measures. This approach limits their ability to stress-test their conclusions against opposing views, potentially weakening their argument’s robustness.

Tone and Empathy Concerns

Some reviews criticize the book for lacking empathy for COVID victims, particularly those affected by delayed or lax responses. For example, one Amazon reviewer calls it “disgusting” for ignoring the ongoing impact of Long COVID and the millions who died due to insufficient measures. The book’s focus on policy failures over human suffering can feel cold to readers expecting a more balanced tone.

Broader Context and Contribution

Macedo and Lee’s book enters a polarized debate about the pandemic, where both sides—pro-lockdown and anti-restriction—often cling to oversimplified narratives. By framing the response as a case study in groupthink and institutional failure, the authors challenge progressive elites to reflect on their role in stifling debate and prioritizing ideology over evidence. Their call for “devil’s advocates” in policy deliberations and greater public input is a constructive suggestion, though critics argue that involving the general public in complex infectious disease decisions is impractical.

The book’s reception has been mixed but less contentious than expected, suggesting some of its critiques resonate beyond conservative circles. Endorsements from figures like Sandro Galea and Sunetra Gupta highlight its appeal to those questioning public health orthodoxy, while pushback from New York Times readers and colleagues wary of fueling anti-science sentiment reflects ongoing sensitivities.

Critical Assessment

While In Covid’s Wake is a valuable contribution to understanding the political dimensions of the pandemic, it is not without flaws. Its strength lies in exposing how fear and moral panic short-circuited deliberation, leading to policies that often failed to deliver promised benefits. However, its selective engagement with evidence and omission of key issues, like vaccine hesitancy, limit its scope. The authors’ outsider status as political scientists, not public health experts, is both a strength (offering fresh perspective) and a weakness (lacking granular insight into scientific debates).
The book’s most enduring insight is its warning about the fragility of liberal democratic institutions under crisis. By showing how science became politicized and dissent was suppressed, it underscores the need for humility and openness in future emergencies. Yet, its occasionally one-sided framing risks alienating readers who see value in the public health measures that, however imperfectly, saved lives.

Recommendation

In Covid’s Wake is a must-read for those interested in the intersection of politics, policy, and crisis management. It is particularly suited for academics, policymakers, and readers open to questioning mainstream narratives. However, it should be paired with works like Lessons from the Covid War by the Covid Crisis Group for a fuller picture of the pandemic’s complexities. Approach it critically, recognizing both its incisive critique and its blind spots.

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What might Evelyn Waugh say about Trump and politics in 2025?

Grok: Setting: A hypothetical 2025 London literary salon, reimagined with Evelyn Waugh miraculously present, sipping a martini and holding court. His sharp tongue and satirical eye, honed in the 20th century, now dissect the political circus of Donald Trump and the global stage, as observed through X posts and contemporary chatter. Below is an imagined monologue, capturing Waugh’s voice—caustic, erudite, and dripping with disdain—addressing Trump and politics in 2025.
My dear friends, if one must endure the cacophony of this modern age, with its incessant “X” bleatings and the vulgarity of digital pamphleteering, let us at least dissect the grotesque pantomime that is politics in 2025. And who better to epitomize this farce than Mr. Donald Trump, a man who seems to have mistaken governance for a music-hall act, complete with bombast and a wig that defies both gravity and taste?
I have perused the latest dispatches on this “X” platform—good Lord, what a sewer of human thought, where every Tom, Dick, and Harry fancies himself a Cicero. Trump, it seems, remains a force, a sort of orange-hued Falstaff, bellowing about tariffs, Big Law, and the perfidies of his enemies. His war on large law firms, for instance, is the stuff of low comedy: a man who once wielded lawyers like cudgels now rails against their fees, as if he’s discovered thrift in his eighth decade. It’s as though Nero, mid-fiddle, decided to tax the fire brigade.
What would I say of Trump? He is no statesman, but a ringmaster, thriving on the chaos of the crowd. His politics are not ideology but performance—a vulgar ballet of tweets (or whatever they’re called now) and rallies, where the mob’s roar substitutes for reason. In 2025, he seems less a president than a perennial candidate, a ghost haunting the American psyche, refusing to fade like a decent villain should. His supporters, bless their simple hearts, see him as a savior, smashing the idols of elites; his detractors, meanwhile, clutch their pearls and cry “democracy’s end.” Both are wrong. Trump is neither savior nor apocalypse, but a mirror—reflecting a civilization that prefers spectacle to substance, a Rome that would rather watch gladiators than read Seneca.
And yet, the man has a certain genius, if one can call it that. Like a character from my own Scoop, he understands the press’s hunger for outrage and feeds it daily, a one-man scandal factory. His pronouncements on X—about taxing lawyers, or China, or some imagined conspiracy involving windmills—are not policies but provocations, designed to keep his name in neon. In my day, we had Beaverbrook and Rothermere; now, every man with a smartphone is a press baron, and Trump is their king.
Politics itself, in this benighted year, is a shambles. The Americans, God help them, oscillate between Trump’s carnival and the sanctimonious drivel of his opponents, who seem to believe that earnestness is a substitute for competence. Across the Atlantic, we British fare little better, governed by a parade of mediocrities who lack even the originality to lack originality. The world stage is a farce: Europe bickers like dowagers at a tea party, China looms like a headmaster with a cane, and the rest scramble for scraps. Trump, at least, has the merit of being candid in his absurdity—a rare honesty in a world of polished lies.
What would I write of this? A novel, perhaps, though it would strain credulity. Picture it: The Triumph of Trump, a satire where a brash tycoon storms a decadent republic, armed with nothing but bravado and a hairpiece. His foes, a coalition of prigs and pedants, fall before his sheer indifference to their rules. The climax? Not a revolution, but a reality show, where the nation votes not for laws but for catchphrases. Too outlandish? Hardly. Reality has outstripped fiction, and I, for one, am exhausted by its audacity.
In the end, Trump is not the disease but a symptom—a garish boil on the body politic, signaling a deeper malaise. We have traded dignity for distraction, principle for popularity. If I were to offer advice, it would be this: turn off your screens, pour a stiff drink, and read something written before 1900. The world may not improve, but at least you’ll have better company than the howling mob on X.

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