Why was Big Law so heavily on the side of same-sex marriage?

Posted on March 20, 2025 by Luke Ford

Grok says:

Big Law—those massive, elite law firms like Skadden, Latham, or Cravath—threw significant weight behind same-sex marriage, especially in the lead-up to Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the Supreme Court case that legalized it nationwide. Their support wasn’t just casual; they filed amicus briefs, lobbied, and often took pro bono cases to push the cause. Why? It’s a mix of pragmatism, culture, and client-driven incentives—less about ideology than you might think.
First, the client base. Big Law serves Fortune 500 companies, tech giants, and Wall Street—sectors that by the early 2000s were racing to brand themselves as progressive. By 2013, over 60% of Fortune 500 firms offered same-sex partner benefits (per HRC’s Corporate Equality Index), and names like Apple, Goldman Sachs, and Google publicly backed marriage equality. When your clients—paying $1,000/hour for your advice—want a social stance, you align. Firms didn’t just follow the money; they anticipated it. An amicus brief from 379 corporations in Obergefell argued anti-gay laws hurt business—recruitment, morale, profits. Big Law saw the same logic: supporting same-sex marriage signaled they were in sync with corporate America’s cultural shift.
Second, the talent pipeline. These firms recruit from top law schools—Harvard, Yale, Stanford—where student bodies and faculty lean heavily left (e.g., 80%+ of law profs identify as liberal, per a 2018 study). By the 2010s, marriage equality was a litmus test for younger lawyers; opposing it risked alienating the Ivy League associates Big Law needs to churn billable hours. Firms like Sullivan & Cromwell or WilmerHale didn’t just cave to “woke” pressure—they marketed themselves as inclusive to win the war for prestige hires. Pro bono work on gay rights cases became a flex: good PR, happy associates, no revenue hit.
Third, the legal elite’s self-image. Big Law thrives on being seen as forward-thinking, not reactionary. Same-sex marriage fit a narrative of constitutional progress—think Brown v. Board or Roe v. Wade—that flatters lawyers who fancy themselves shapers of history. Filing briefs in Obergefell (over 40 major firms did) wasn’t just virtue signaling; it was a chance to play on the “right side” of a landmark ruling. The argument—equal protection under the 14th Amendment—also meshed with their bread-and-butter: defending corporate rights via constitutional law. It’s less hypocrisy than synergy.
Was it unanimous? No. Some partners, especially older ones or in conservative regions (think Texas firms), grumbled privately. But dissent got drowned out by the coastal powerhouses—New York, D.C., California—where Big Law’s cultural tone is set. Plus, the American Bar Association, a Big Law echo chamber, endorsed same-sex marriage in 2010, normalizing the stance.
Why not stay neutral? Risk. By 2012, polls showed majority support for marriage equality (Gallup hit 53%); by 2015, it was 60%. Opposing it—or even sitting it out—could’ve painted firms as dinosaurs, costing them clients and talent to rivals who took the plunge. Neutrality’s safe until it’s not, and Big Law doesn’t gamble when the herd’s already moving.
So, Big Law backed same-sex marriage because it was good business, good branding, and good lawyering—tied to their world of corporate interests, elite networks, and public opinion. Not every partner was a true believer, but the machine didn’t need them to be. It just needed to win.

Did Big Law allow its attorneys to argue the case for the traditional definition of marriage or did Big Law suppress this?

Grok says:

Big Law didn’t explicitly “allow” or “suppress” attorneys arguing for the traditional definition of marriage in any formal, top-down sense—firms don’t typically issue edicts on personal stances. But the reality? If you were an attorney pushing that view inside a major firm, you’d have faced a steep uphill battle—culturally, professionally, and practically. Suppression wasn’t a memo from HR; it was baked into the incentives and environment.
Most Big Law firms took a public, unified stance favoring same-sex marriage by the time Obergefell rolled around in 2015. Dozens—like Kirkland & Ellis, Morrison & Foerster, and Baker McKenzie—signed amicus briefs supporting legalization, often framed as pro bono efforts reflecting “firm values.” These weren’t rogue associates; they were partner-led, signaling institutional buy-in. If you were an attorney wanting to argue the opposite—that marriage should stay one-man-one-woman—you’d be swimming against that tide. Firms don’t have gag orders, but they do have reputations to protect. Openly bucking the corporate line could’ve marked you as a liability—bad for client relations, bad for team cohesion.
Could you have done it anyway? Technically, yes—pro bono work often gives lawyers leeway to pick causes, and firms like to tout “independent thinking.” But in practice, good luck getting support. Pro bono committees, stacked with partners, greenlight projects aligning with firm priorities—same-sex marriage fit; defending traditional marriage didn’t. Take King & Spalding in 2011: they briefly signed on to defend the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) for House Republicans, then dropped it after backlash from clients and gay rights groups. Partner Paul Clement jumped to Bancroft PLLC to keep the case, but the episode showed Big Law’s skittishness—public pressure trumped neutrality. An attorney pushing the traditional view internally would’ve risked similar blowback: no ban, just a cold shoulder.
What about outside the firm? Attorneys could’ve argued it on their own time—op-eds, personal cases—since free speech isn’t dead. But Big Law’s culture doesn’t reward boat-rockers. Associates gunning for partner don’t win points by clashing with the firm’s progressive sheen, especially when clients (e.g., 379 companies in Obergefell’s pro-equality brief) and talent (Gen Z lawyers) expect inclusivity. A 2015 Above the Law post (anecdotal, not data) noted partners at top firms quietly griping about the “diversity mafia,” yet none spoke up publicly—self-censorship, not a muzzle. X posts from attorneys around 2020 (vague trends, not quotes) hint at similar vibes: toe the line or stay silent.
Evidence of outright suppression is thin—no public firings mirror James Damore’s over this. But the absence of Big Law firms defending traditional marriage in Obergefell—while over 40 backed the other side—speaks volumes. The closest you get is boutique firms or solo practitioners (e.g., Clement post-King & Spalding), not Big Law heavyweights. Why? Risk aversion. The legal elite saw where the wind blew—public opinion (60% pro-gay marriage by 2015, per Gallup), corporate clients, and the Supreme Court’s liberal bloc. Arguing the traditional case wasn’t banned; it was just a career dead end.
So, Big Law didn’t “allow” or “forbid” in a legal sense—it just made one side a golden ticket and the other radioactive. Attorneys could’ve tried, but the machine’s weight—clients, culture, profits—ensured they’d be sidelined, not silenced. That’s how it rolls.

From the perspective of my hero system, Orthodox Judaism, the Obergefell ruling was such an abomination it calls into question if Jews are even allowed by Jewish law to live in such an officially degenerate society. So I am glad to see Trump turn the screws on Big Law, given its role in turning America into a moral sewer.

Grok:

From an Orthodox Jewish perspective, rooted in your hero system, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) can indeed feel like a seismic rupture—legalizing same-sex marriage clashes hard with traditional Halakha (Jewish law), which defines marriage as a sacred union between man and woman, tied to commandments like pru u’rvu (be fruitful and multiply). Leviticus 18:22—“You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination”—sets a clear line for many Orthodox poskim (decisors). The ruling didn’t just shift policy; it enshrined a value system that, to some, signals societal decay, challenging the moral framework you hold dear. Your question—can Jews even live in such a place?—echoes real debates in Orthodox circles about exile, diaspora, and navigating a world at odds with Torah.
Halakhically, living in a “degenerate society” isn’t a new dilemma. Jews have thrived under pagan Rome, medieval Christendom, and secular states without packing up en masse. The principle of dina d’malkhuta dina (“the law of the land is the law”)—from the Talmud (Bava Kamma 113a)—obligates compliance with civil law, so long as it doesn’t directly violate Torah commandments. Obergefell doesn’t force Jews to gay-marry; it’s a societal shift, not a personal mandate. Still, some rabbis, like Rav Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe, late 20th century), warned against living where immorality dominates if it risks spiritual corruption—think kids, community, exposure. Post-Obergefell, voices like Rabbi Aharon Feldman mused (in a 2015 essay) about America’s moral slide, though stopping short of calling for aliyah (emigration to Israel). The tension’s real: stay and insulate, or bail if the sewer overflows?
Big Law’s role in this—pushing same-sex marriage via amicus briefs and cultural clout—makes it a villain in your lens. Firms like Skadden or Latham didn’t just back Obergefell for kicks; they rode corporate America’s progressive wave, as I noted earlier, amplifying a ruling you see as toxic. Trump “turning the screws” on them fits your narrative of payback. Since 2017, his admin and allies have targeted Big Law tangentially—antitrust suits against Google (their client), tax reforms hitting firm profits (2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act cut deductions), and judicial picks like Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, who lean originalist and might curb future liberal wins. Post-2024, if Trump’s back, expect more: maybe pressuring firms via federal contracts (many rely on government work) or amplifying culture-war cases to drain their pro bono budgets. X posts from 2025 (vague trends) hint at MAGA cheering this—Big Law as “woke enablers” getting a taste of their own medicine.
Does it fix the “moral sewer”? Not really. Obergefell’s locked in—overturning it’s a long shot, even with a 6-3 conservative Court (stare decisis weighs heavy). Trump can squeeze Big Law’s bottom line or scare them into quieter activism, but the cultural shift they helped midwife is entrenched—70% of Americans back gay marriage now (Pew, 2023). For Orthodox Jews, it’s less about reversing America than shielding your own: yeshivas, shuls, kosher enclaves. Trump’s screws might feel good, but Halakha’s focus is survival, not vengeance. You glad to see it? Sure. Will it undo the abomination? That’s a taller order.

What are the chances the U.S. Supreme Court overturns Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) in the next ten years?

Grok says:

Predicting whether the U.S. Supreme Court will overturn Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) in the next decade—by March 20, 2035—means weighing legal doctrine, political shifts, and cultural trends. As of now, March 20, 2025, the odds are low but not zero—call it a 10-20% chance, with big caveats. Here’s why.
Legal Barriers: Stare Decisis and Precedent
The Court loves its own rulings like a parent loves a kid—stare decisis (let the decision stand) isn’t ironclad, but it’s a heavy anchor. Obergefell legalized same-sex marriage via the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process clauses, a 5-4 call penned by Justice Kennedy. Overturning it requires a case that chips at its core—say, a state banning gay marriage again—and a Court willing to ditch precedent. Roe v. Wade got axed in 2022 (Dobbs) after 49 years, but abortion’s a hotter potato than gay marriage. Obergefell’s only a decade old, and its reliance on equality (not privacy) makes it stickier—less of a “judicial overreach” vibe for conservatives to pounce on. Justices like Roberts, who dissented but prizes stability, would hesitate; he’s grumbled about precedent erosion (e.g., June Medical, 2020).
Current Court: 6-3, But Not a Monolith
Today’s 6-3 conservative lean—Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett—looks promising for traditionalists. Thomas and Alito openly loathe Obergefell (their 2020 statement in Davis v. Ermold called it a “problem” for religious liberty). Gorsuch, a textualist, might balk at its vibes-based reasoning. But Kavanaugh and Barrett? Squishier. Kavanaugh’s dodged gay-rights signals, and Barrett’s 2020 confirmation hedged on personal Catholic views versus law—she’s no activist. Roberts, the swing-ish chief, hates rocking boats; he’d likely push incremental erosion (e.g., religious opt-outs) over a full reversal. Flipping Obergefell needs five votes—three are probable, two are dicey without a seismic shift.
Political and Cultural Headwinds
Public support’s a beast—70% of Americans back same-sex marriage (Pew, 2023), up from 55% in 2015. Even Republicans are softening; a 2022 Gallup poll showed 55% of them okay with it. States won’t rush to ban it—red ones like Texas or Alabama might try, but blue and purple ones (where most people live) won’t. No ban, no case. Plus, corporate America’s all-in—379 firms backed Obergefell; that’s not flipping by 2035. A Trump 2024 win (assume it, given your leanings) could stack the Court with more hardline justices if Thomas (82 now) or Alito (74) retire, but replacements would still need Senate votes. A 50-50 Senate in 2025 could block radicals if Dems hold firm.
The Pipeline: Cases and Timing
No direct challenge is teed up now. Post-Dobbs, conservatives eyed Obergefell—Thomas begged for a shot in 2022—but nothing’s hit the docket. Religious liberty cases (e.g., 303 Creative, 2023, on wedding websites) nibble at its edges, not its heart. A state would need to defy it outright, get sued, and climb the appeals ladder—3-5 years minimum. By 2030, a 6-3 Court might hear it, but cultural entrenchment (90% of Gen Z supports gay marriage, per 2023 UCLA data) could scare off even conservative justices. Dobbs worked because abortion split 50-50; this doesn’t.
Wild Cards
Justice Turnover: If Trump (or a GOP successor) swaps Roberts or moderates for fire-breathers by 2030, odds creep to 20-25%. Dem wins keep it near 5%.

Backlash: A reversal could spark chaos—millions of marriages voided, legal messes in 50 states. Even Alito might blink.

New Arguments: A killer brief tying Obergefell to federal overreach or bad law (not just “tradition”) could sway Gorsuch-types.

Bottom Line
10-20% feels right—low because precedent, support, and inertia weigh heavy; not zero because the Court’s bold and the right’s hungry. From your Orthodox Jewish lens, hoping Trump’s “screws” on Big Law bleed into this, it’s a long shot. Firms might quiet down, but the ruling’s roots are deep. By 2035, America’s more likely to shrug than fight over it again.

Posted in Law | Comments Off on Why was Big Law so heavily on the side of same-sex marriage?

Was Google right to fire James Damore?

Posted on March 20, 2025 by Luke Ford

Grok says:

Whether Google was “right” to fire James Damore depends on how you weigh principles like free expression, workplace culture, and legal boundaries—there’s no universal answer, just trade-offs. Damore, a software engineer, was fired in August 2017 after his internal memo, “Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber,” went viral. He argued that biological differences partly explain the gender gap in tech, not just discrimination or bias, and criticized Google’s diversity policies as dogmatic. Google’s CEO, Sundar Pichai, called it “not OK” for advancing “harmful gender stereotypes,” and the company axed him for violating its code of conduct.
Legally, Google was on solid ground. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) reviewed Damore’s complaint that his firing violated his right to address workplace issues. In a 2018 memo, an NLRB lawyer concluded Google acted lawfully—his critiques of company policy were protected, but his statements about women (e.g., higher neuroticism, less interest in tech) were deemed discriminatory and disruptive, unprotected under federal law. Private companies can fire for almost any reason, or no reason, as long as it’s not explicitly illegal (like retaliation for unionizing). California’s at-will employment reinforced this: Google could ditch him for clashing with its values or PR image.
From a practical angle, Google had little choice. The memo sparked outrage internally—employees threatened to quit, and two women reportedly withdrew engineering candidacies citing it. Externally, it fueled a media firestorm, risking Google’s reputation as an inclusive tech leader. Keeping Damore could’ve signaled tolerance for views that alienate talent in a competitive market. Firing him was a blunt way to “nip in the bud” a potential hostile workplace, as the NLRB put it, even if it didn’t meet the legal threshold for harassment.
On the flip side, was it “right” in a broader sense? Critics argue Google overreacted, squashing dissent in an irony-laden twist—Damore’s memo called out an “ideological echo chamber,” and his firing arguably proved his point. Some, like psychologist Geoffrey Miller, praised his science as mostly sound (e.g., citing studies on male-female trait differences), though others, like neuroscientist Gina Rippon, slammed it as cherry-picked stereotypes. If Google valued open debate, they could’ve disciplined him or rebutted publicly instead of swinging the axe. Firing him made him a martyr for free-speech advocates and conservatives, amplifying his message far beyond its original reach.
Ethically, it’s murky. Damore’s memo wasn’t a screed—he suggested non-discriminatory ways to boost women in tech, like flexible hours—but its tone and framing (e.g., “biological differences”) were divisive, even if grounded in some data. Google’s response prioritized feelings and optics over grappling with his claims, which might’ve been the braver move. Yet companies aren’t debate clubs; they’re machines for profit and cohesion. Damore crossed a line most employers won’t tolerate, knowingly or not.
So, was Google right? If you prioritize a unified workforce and legal prerogative, yes. If you value unfiltered discourse or think Damore’s take had merit, no. It’s a Rorschach test—your answer reflects what you think matters most.

Given that Google fired James Damore for such flimsy grounds in my view, I hope Trump crushes Google. It is a left-wing corporation pushing woke (though it has moderated in the past year).

Grok says:

Your take’s clear: you see Google’s firing of Damore as weak justification, and you’re rooting for Trump to take them down, viewing them as a woke giant overdue for a reckoning. Fair enough—let’s unpack that.
Google’s move on Damore can absolutely be seen as flimsy if you lean toward free-speech absolutism or think his memo was a good-faith critique. He wasn’t screaming slurs or inciting riots; he wrote a nerdy, data-heavy note that poked at sacred cows—gender parity, diversity dogma. Firing him for “harmful stereotypes” might feel like a cop-out if you think companies should stomach tough debates, especially when he cited studies (however selectively). The NLRB gave Google a pass, but their reasoning—unprotected speech disrupting the workplace—can sound like a convenient catch-all. If they’d canned him for bad code instead of bad takes, it’d be less hypocritical, but that’s not the game here.
Your hope for Trump to “crush” Google ties into a bigger vibe—seeing it as a left-wing behemoth. There’s meat to that: Google’s workforce skews heavily progressive (per internal surveys and donation data—94% of employee political contributions went to Democrats in 2016), and its culture oozes Bay Area liberalism. From YouTube’s content moderation to search algorithm gripes, critics on the right have long accused it of bias—sometimes with evidence (like 2018 exec emails fretting over Trump’s win), sometimes just vibes. The “woke” label fits their past DEI obsession—mandatory trainings, hiring quotas—though you’re right they’ve dialed it back lately. Post-2023, Google’s been quieter on culture-war stuff, maybe spooked by backlash or antitrust heat.
Trump’s had Google in his crosshairs before. In 2018, he tweeted they rigged search results against him (no hard proof surfaced), and his DOJ launched an antitrust case in 2020, accusing them of monopolistic ad-tech practices. That case is still grinding along—March 2025, it’s in pretrial muck. If he wins in 2024, “crushing” could mean doubling down: breaking up their ad empire, hitting them with fines, or pushing regs to curb perceived censorship. He’s got motive—Google’s a fat target for populist rage—and the GOP’s got a fresh appetite for trust-busting big tech.
Will it happen? Antitrust is a slog—decades, not months—and Google’s got cash and lawyers to burn. Plus, “crushing” a company that’s 90% of global search and powers half the internet’s ads isn’t simple; it’s like punching the cloud. Moderation or not, their woke era left a mark, and if Trump’s base stays mad, he might try. But it’s less about Damore now and more about power—economic and cultural. You think they deserve it; others might say it’s overkill. Either way, the fight’s brewing.

YouTube has become radically less woke and censorious over the past two years. Am I right? Why did this happen? Was this related to Elon Musk opening up X? Was it to compete with Rumble? Is this part of a general trend in social media — becoming less woke, less censorious and more friendly to the winning side of the 2024 election?

Grok says:

You’re picking up on a shift in YouTube’s vibe over the past couple years—less heavy-handed moderation, fewer woke overtones—and you’re not entirely off base. It’s tough to pin down “radically less woke and censorious” with hard data since YouTube doesn’t publish detailed logs of its policy changes or content takedowns, but anecdotal evidence and creator sentiment suggest a dialing back. Let’s break it down: is this real, why it’s happening, and how it ties to Musk, Rumble, or the 2024 election.
Is YouTube Less Woke and Censorious?
Evidence leans toward yes, but it’s nuanced. Around 2020-2021, YouTube was aggressively demonetizing and removing content—think COVID misinformation purges (e.g., 1 million videos axed in 2021 per their blog) or anything deemed “hateful” under broad guidelines. Creators like Tim Pool or Steven Crowder constantly griped about shadowbans and strikes. Fast forward to 2023-2024: while policies haven’t flipped, enforcement seems looser. A June 2023 policy tweak stopped penalizing election fraud claims outright, reversing a 2020 stance. High-profile cases—like letting Trump back on in March 2023 after a two-year ban—signal a softer touch. Posts on X from creators (no specific quotes, just trends) echo this: fewer random demonetizations, less fear of instant bans. It’s not a free-for-all—hate speech and violence still get hit—but the woke censorship peak feels past.
Why the Shift?
A few drivers stand out:
Backlash Fatigue: YouTube faced years of pushback from creators and users over opaque rules and overzealous AI moderation. By 2022, trust was tanking—Pew Research showed only 41% of U.S. adults viewed it favorably. Loosening up could be a pragmatic pivot to keep talent from jumping ship.

Cultural Winds: The broader “anti-woke” wave—think Rogan’s Spotify rise or DeSantis’ culture war wins—put pressure on platforms. YouTube, profit-driven, likely saw the writing on the wall: leaning too hard into progressive censorship was alienating a chunk of its audience.

Competition: Rumble’s growth (from 1.6 million monthly users in 2020 to 50 million by 2023, per their filings) and X’s post-Musk openness gave creators alternatives. YouTube couldn’t risk losing its edge as the go-to video hub, especially with ad revenue at stake ($31.5 billion in 2023, per Alphabet).

Musk and X’s Role
Elon Musk buying Twitter (now X) in October 2022 and releasing the Twitter Files—internal docs showing pre-Musk censorship—didn’t directly force YouTube’s hand, but it set a tone. X became a louder, messier free-speech zone, amplifying voices YouTube once muted. Posts on X (trending sentiment, not specific data) suggest creators felt emboldened to test YouTube’s limits, expecting less blowback. The Files also spooked Big Tech—YouTube included—into rethinking public perception. A 2024 X post from @SimonSaysKnow
(paraphrased) ties YouTube’s softer stance to Musk’s influence, arguing it wouldn’t have publicly defended “open debate” otherwise. Correlation’s there; causation’s fuzzier. YouTube was already tweaking policies pre-Musk (e.g., 2021 misinformation updates), but X’s shift likely nudged them faster.
Rumble as a Competitor?
Rumble’s rise—pitched as the anti-YouTube for free speech—plays a role, but it’s not the whole story. By 2024, Rumble hosted names like Dan Bongino and Russell Brand, pulling in right-leaning viewers. YouTube, with 2.5 billion users vs. Rumble’s 50 million, isn’t sweating a knockout, but it’s not blind. Losing even a sliver of creators to Rumble—or worse, ad dollars—stings. The 2023 election fraud policy rollback feels like a nod to keep conservative voices in-house rather than cede them to Rumble. Still, YouTube’s scale and infrastructure dwarf Rumble’s; this is more about retention than panic.
Broader Social Media Trend?
Here’s where it gets interesting. Post-2024 election (Trump’s win, let’s assume given your framing), platforms seem to be sniffing the political wind. X under Musk went full “unfiltered”—misinfo spiked, but so did engagement (active users hit 436 million by January 2025, per X stats). Threads and Bluesky, while growing, stay niche and left-leaning. YouTube’s moderation thaw aligns with this: less woke signaling, more tolerance for edgy takes, especially from the “winning side” (GOP-friendly voices). It’s not a total pivot—hate speech rules stick—but there’s a vibe shift. Why? Money and power. Platforms follow eyeballs, and 2024’s red wave (if we’re projecting) pulled them rightward. Plus, antitrust scrutiny (Google’s DOJ case ongoing as of March 2025) might make YouTube wary of looking too censorious.
The Takeaway
You’re right that YouTube’s less woke and censorious than its 2020 peak—call it a moderate unwind, not a radical one. Musk’s X opened a pressure valve, Rumble lit a fire under competition, and the 2024 election’s fallout (favoring less-restrained discourse) sealed it. It’s less about ideology, more about survival: keep users, dodge regulators, chase trends. Social media’s not ditching moderation—it’s just tilting toward whoever’s loudest and winning. By March 20, 2025, that’s the lens to watch through.

Who has done the most to widen the Overton window over the past four years? Donald Trump? Elon Musk? Who? Or what social conditions or political results caused this?

Grok:

The Overton window—the range of ideas considered acceptable in public discourse—has undeniably shifted over the past four years, and both Donald Trump and Elon Musk have played significant roles in that process. Determining who has done “the most” to widen it depends on how one weighs their respective contributions, but we can break it down by their actions, influence, and the broader context of social conditions and political results.
Trump’s impact on the Overton window is rooted in his political tenure and style. During his presidency (2017–2021) and subsequent 2024 campaign, he pushed boundaries by mainstreaming ideas once considered fringe. His rhetoric on immigration (e.g., mass deportation, border walls), trade (e.g., tariffs), and distrust of institutions (e.g., “deep state,” election fraud claims) brought policies and attitudes into the mainstream that were previously on the edges of Republican discourse. Since 2021, his continued influence—amplified by his 2024 victory—has kept these ideas alive, shifting what’s politically viable. For instance, his survival of an assassination attempt in 2024 and the iconic imagery it produced galvanized his base and arguably normalized a more combative, populist stance. This didn’t just widen the window; it smashed parts of it, making room for bolder conservative positions that now dominate GOP platforms.
Musk, on the other hand, has wielded influence through his acquisition of Twitter (now X) in 2022 and his subsequent cultural and political pivot. By releasing the Twitter Files, he exposed internal biases and censorship practices, which fueled a backlash against “woke” culture and tech overreach. His decision to reinstate previously banned voices—like Trump’s—reopened space for raw, unfiltered debate. Over the past four years, Musk’s shift from a self-described moderate to a vocal Trump supporter in 2024, coupled with his massive platform (over 200 million followers), has normalized skepticism of government, media, and progressive orthodoxies. His financial backing of Trump (over $250 million) and his role in the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) further cement his ability to push ideas—like drastic deregulation or anti-establishment critiques—into the mainstream.
Social conditions over the past four years have amplified their efforts. The COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2022) sparked widespread frustration with government mandates, which Musk vocally opposed (e.g., Tesla factory lockdowns) and Trump capitalized on later with anti-lockdown sentiment. Cultural battles over “wokeness,” gender identity, and free speech—intensified by Musk’s personal experiences (e.g., his child’s transition) and Trump’s base—created fertile ground for shifting norms. Political results, like Trump’s 2024 win and the GOP’s embrace of MAGA, signal a public appetite for these expanded boundaries.
So, who’s done the most? Trump’s longer track record and direct political power give him an edge in raw impact—he’s been widening the window since 2016, with the past four years as a continuation. Musk’s contribution is more recent and structural, leveraging X to reshape discourse itself, but his influence skyrocketed post-2022. If we measure by sheer scale of ideas normalized, Trump might lead. If we focus on enabling the mechanisms (platforms, visibility) for that shift, Musk stands out. Together, they’ve been a feedback loop, with social discontent (pandemic fallout, cultural fatigue) and political outcomes (2024 election) doing the rest. The window’s not just wider—it’s a different shape entirely.

Posted in Censorship, Google | Comments Off on Was Google right to fire James Damore?

Race and the Origins of Woke

Posted on March 20, 2025 by Luke Ford

Grok notes: “Seminars in academic or professional spheres tend to lean formal unless explicitly billed as interactive. For example, in Western university settings, students usually wait for permission to speak, while some European or informal tech conference talks might tolerate more back-and-forth. If the video shows constant unprompted interruptions and the speaker struggles to maintain control, it’d be unusual for a standard seminar.”

Comments at YT:

* A brilliant and original thinker nearly suffocated by ageing self-sufficient professors who get distracted by details and fail to see he’s on their side and represents the most coherent approach to win this fight.

* Nathan Cofnas presented his theory of Wokeism to the Classical Liberalism Initiative at Stanford University and received a rough ride from the audience, with many hostile questions.
Cofnas’ theory holds that Wokeism follows from Western moral principles (all individuals have an equal right to flourish) plus the “equality thesis” (the scientifically false but near-universally-imposed axiom that there are no genetic differences in ability or preferences across race or gender groups). If we blindly accept the equality thesis plus the moral principle of equal rights, then “wokeism,” which is a near-hysterical witch-hunt to find the sources of remaining group disparities, makes logical sense. That is the Cofnas theory in a nutshell.
Cofnas could not even convince the Classical Liberals of Stanford, an extremely talented group of hard-headed intellectuals, to accept the falsity of the equality thesis. Their harsh reaction to his talk shows that social scientists still have a difficult and important job to do. Social scientists need to explain to the intellectual elite that the equality thesis is no longer scientifically tenable – it has been empirically rejected beyond a reasonable doubt. Even brilliant Stanford students and faculty who identify as classical liberals still cling to the mistaken belief that groups disparities arise from environmental causes.

* I would expect faculty members at a major university to have better etiquette than interjecting so much that the whole line of argument becomes difficult to follow. They even interrupted other audience members’ questions.

* Infuriating that rather than letting him speak, the audience interject meaning the coherence of the argument is lost.

* I don’t see a problem with exerting public, legal pressure to promote your morality. What is the problem with calling for JK Rowling to be dropped by her publisher? What is the problem with boycotts? What, actually, is the problem with ‘canceling’? (If there is a problem, it lies with companies firing people because they care nothing for their employees, and will do any expedient thing for profits, because that’s the economy we chose). Our legal system is not unprepared. It has considered the matter for centuries and has clearly decided that publicly shaming others is a right to be protected.
Because social morality has always worked this way (the only difference now it that technology gives people the power to pile on). You think people weren’t ‘canceled’ in the past? There was never a time when people weren’t being ‘cancelled’. But many older folks are just blind to the way it worked in past decades (when the penalties were actually often much more severe for doing or saying the “wrong things”, btw). Basically, if you agree with the morality being enforced, you probably don’t see it as social enforcement. You think “of course people are doing that, it’s just the right thing to do”. Which is how woke people feel too. The struggle in the public square between wokism and reaction is scary, but it’s the “healthy” way democracy is designed for (even though basically amounts to a daily torrent of complaining). This is how we determine our social morality.

* Is it normal in seminars for the audience to interrupt the lecturer at will without even raising their hand and waiting to be given permission to speak?

Posted in Nathan Cofnas | Comments Off on Race and the Origins of Woke

Please give me a winning platform for a non-Democrat to become the next governor of California.

Posted on March 20, 2025 by Luke Ford

Grok says:

Winning as a non-Democrat governor of California in the next election (2026, with Newsom term-limited out) is a steep climb—California’s a Democratic fortress, with Dems holding the governorship since 2011 and a 46.9% voter registration edge (CA Secretary of State, 2024). The last non-Democrat, Arnold Schwarzenegger, won in 2003’s recall with 48.6%—a fluke of chaos and star power. In 2025, with Newsom’s legacy (housing wins, climate push) and a blue supermajority, a non-Democrat—centrist, libertarian, or Republican—needs a platform that sidesteps partisan quicksand, taps into widespread frustration, and builds a coalition of the fed-up. Your vouching concept, survival focus, and niche-construction lens shape this: a pragmatic, no-nonsense fix for a state creaking under its own weight. Here’s the platform.
Platform: “California Rebuilt—Fix It, Fund It, Free It”
Core Pitch: California’s not failing because of politics—it’s failing because of paralysis. I’ll cut the waste, tackle the crises, and give power back to people, not Sacramento. Results over rhetoric.
1. Public Safety: Law and Order, California Style
Why It Works: Crime’s a slow burn—violent crime’s down 10% since 2020 (CA DOJ, 2024), but property crime (car break-ins, retail theft) spiked 15% in LA and SF (2024 stats). Newsom’s $1.1 billion homeless-police package (2024) hasn’t calmed nerves—55% of voters feel unsafe (PPIC, 2025).

Plan:
Vouch Patrols: Communities opt in—ten law-abiding locals with clean records sponsor neighborhood watch teams, paired with sheriffs. Focus on smash-and-grabs and drug zones (e.g., SF’s Tenderloin, 300% overdose jump since 2020, CDC).

Fast Justice: Triple misdemeanor courts—process petty theft in 48 hours, not months. Private security firms guard stores, funded by a 1% sales tax shift.

Gun Sanity: Streamline concealed-carry permits with vouch system—ten backers, no waitlists. Appeals to rural counties (e.g., Kern, 60% GOP) without urban freakout.

Non-Dem Angle: Ducks “defund” and “mass incarceration”—it’s local control with teeth. X’s @CrimeInSF
crowd would amplify it.

2. Housing: Build Now, Regulate Less
Why It Works: Median home price hit $900k (CAR, 2025), rents $3,000 (Zillow)—Newsom’s 3.5 million-unit goal by 2030’s a pipe dream (500k built by 2024). Voters blame red tape—65% want faster construction (PPIC, 2024).

Plan:
Permit Blitz: Cap housing permits at 30 days statewide—pre-fab and ADUs bypass CEQA lawsuits. Goal: 1 million units in four years, private-led.

Vouch Zoning: Ten working residents can greenlight small projects (duplexes, micro-homes) in their block—no council veto. Cuts NIMBY chokeholds.

Land Unlock: Lease 10% of state-owned land (e.g., near I-5) to builders at $1/year—rural boom, urban relief.

Non-Dem Angle: Free-market muscle with a community twist—Silicon Valley and Inland Empire (40% non-Dem) nod yes, even if SF balks.

3. Cost of Living: Slash Taxes, Boost Jobs
Why It Works: Gas’s $5/gallon (AAA, 2025), income tax tops 13.3%, and 25% of Californians live paycheck-to-paycheck (Census, 2024). Newsom’s $18 billion surplus (2024-25) got eaten by wildfires and Medi-Cal—voters want relief, not promises.

Plan:
Tax Cut: Drop sales tax 1% (from 7.25%), cap income tax at 10%—fund it by axing 15% of state jobs (120k workers, $10 billion payroll, CA Budget 2024).

Energy Fix: Fast-track private solar farms and small nuclear (e.g., Diablo Canyon reboot)—cut electric bills 20% by 2030. No green dogma, just watts.

Gig Power: Tax breaks for 100,000 new gig workers (drivers, freelancers)—offset Prop 22’s red tape (2020).

Non-Dem Angle: Lean, pro-growth—Central Valley farmers and tech bros (20% libertarian lean, per X trends) could swing it.

4. Wildfires and Water: Survival First
Why It Works: Wildfires burned 1.2 million acres in 2024 (Cal Fire), water’s rationed in SoCal (20% cuts, LADWP 2025)—Newsom’s $50 billion climate plan feels like a Band-Aid. 70% of voters demand action, not goals (UC Berkeley, 2024).

Plan:
Firebreaks: Pay ranchers to graze 2 million acres—natural fuel reduction, 30% cheaper than Cal Fire crews.

Water Now: Build five desalination plants (private-funded, SoCal coast)—add 500,000 acre-feet yearly by 2028. Vouch system for farmers—ten locals back your irrigation rights.

Insurance Fix: Cap fire premiums at 5% above baseline—state reinsures via a $2 billion pot, not handouts.

Non-Dem Angle: Practical over preachy—NorCal (Shasta, 55% GOP) and ag counties love it; urbanites feel the win.

5. Trust and Accountability: Vouch State
Why It Works: Sacramento’s a black box—60% distrust state government (PPIC, 2025). Your survival-not-happiness vibe and vouch nationalism hit here: tie privileges to community stakes.

Plan:
Vouch Privileges: Optional—ten clean-record adults vouch for you to skip fees (e.g., DMV, permits) or get tax credits ($500/year). Misstep, they pay $1,000.

Local Power: Devolve 20% of budget ($60 billion, 2024-25) to counties—vouch councils (elected) allocate it. Sacramento’s just a referee.

Transparency: Live-stream all state spending—X-style dashboard, no fluff.

Non-Dem Angle: Decentralized, anti-elite—libertarians (8% of voters) and rural reds (25% of state) cheer; moderates stomach it.

Campaign Strategy
Target: Inland Empire (35% non-Dem), Central Valley (40% GOP), and Orange County (45% swing in 2022 midterms, per CA SOS). Peel off 15% of Latino voters (50% of state, 30% backed GOP in 2024, Exit Polls) and 10% of Fair-Weather Dems (techies, suburbanites). Turnout’s key—2022’s 50.5% (SOS) means 3 million non-voters are winnable.

Message: “Newsom built dreams—I’ll build results. You vouch for me, I fight for you.” Hammer cost, crime, fires—kitchen-table stuff. X hashtag: #CARebuilt.

Dodge: Culture wars (abortion, trans rights)—CA’s settled left. Pivot to “fix what’s broken.”

Foil: Dems might run a Bay Area liberal (e.g., Ro Khanna)—paint them as “more of the same”; if it’s a SoCal moderate (e.g., Eleni Kounalakis), outflank on grit.

Why It Could Win
California’s not a monolith—13 million voted in 2022, but 8 million sat out (SOS). Newsom’s 58% in 2018 shrank to 51% recall survival (2021)—voters are restless. Wildfires (2025’s early burns), housing costs, and crime optics (SF’s Walgreens closures) fester. A non-Dem who’s pro-jobs, anti-waste, and street-smart could grab 52% if Dems split or snooze. Your vouch twist adds edge—trust’s a currency Newsom’s crew can’t mint.
Risks
Blue Wall: Dems’ 2-to-1 voter edge (24% GOP, 2024) means turnout must skew hard—60%+ to win.

Vouch Backlash: Rural loves it; urban might cry “gated state.” Pitch it as opt-in, not dogma.

Money Gap: Dems outspent GOP 3:1 in 2022 ($150 million, FEC)—you’d need a Caruso-style bankroll or X-driven grassroots.

This platform’s survival-first—cut the fat, secure the state, free the people. It’s niche-building: a California where accountability trumps ideology. Could it crack the blue ceiling? If 2025’s wildfires rage and wallets shrink—yeah, maybe. What’s your take—too vouch-heavy, or just the jolt CA needs?

Posted in California | Comments Off on Please give me a winning platform for a non-Democrat to become the next governor of California.

Give me a winning platform for a non-liberal to become mayor of Los Angeles.

Posted on March 20, 2025 by Luke Ford

Grok says:

Crafting a winning platform for a non-liberal to become mayor of Los Angeles in 2025 (with the next election in 2026) is a tall order—LA’s a deep-blue city, with Karen Bass winning 54.8% in 2022 against Rick Caruso’s 45.2% in a nonpartisan race that still leaned heavily Democratic. A non-liberal—say, a centrist, libertarian, or conservative—needs to flip the script without alienating a electorate that’s 70%+ liberal (Pew, 2024). Your vouching idea and our talks on survival, mismatches, and niche construction give us a frame: focus on practical fixes to visceral problems, dodge ideology traps, and build a coalition around trust and accountability. Here’s a platform, grounded in LA’s 2025 realities, that could pull it off.
Platform: “LA Works—Trust, Safety, Results”
Core Pitch: LA’s broken—homelessness, crime, cost of living—but not because of “values.” It’s execution. I’ll cut the red tape, hold people accountable, and make the city work again, not for ideologues, but for you. No grand theories—just results.
1. Public Safety: Restore Order, Rebuild Trust
Why It Works: Violent crime’s down 5% since 2022 (LAPD, 2024), but perception’s worse—60% of Angelenos feel unsafe (LA Times poll, 2024). Bass’s police hiring push (1,000 new cops) isn’t landing with a public skeptical of both “defund” and “tough-on-crime” dogma.

Plan:
Vouch Policing: Pilot a program where communities nominate “safety sponsors”—local adults with clean records—to liaise with cops, vouching for neighborhood needs. Cops focus on hot spots (50% of crime’s in 10% of areas, per LAPD), not blanket patrols.

No-Nonsense Enforcement: Crack down on open drug markets and gang turf (e.g., Skid Row’s fentanyl spike, up 20% in 2024 per CDC), but pair it with private-sector rehab, not jail churn.

Tech Edge: Drones and AI for real-time crime mapping—cut response times 30% (like Chicago’s pilot, 2023).

Non-Liberal Angle: Sidesteps progressive “decarceration” and conservative “lock ‘em up”—it’s pragmatic, community-driven, and tech-savvy. X users like @LACrimeWatch
would eat this up.

2. Homelessness: Clear Streets, Build Fast
Why It Works: Bass cut homelessness 5% (2024 count), but 41,000 still live unsheltered (LAHSA, 2025), and Measure A’s sales tax hike (2024) hasn’t moved the needle fast enough. Voters are fed up—70% want encampments gone (USC poll, 2024).

Plan:
Rapid Housing: Slash permitting to 30 days for modular units—private firms build 10,000 beds in 18 months, not years. Copy Texas’s $5k/unit model, not LA’s $600k flops.

Accountability Zones: Vouch system for shelters—ten housed residents with clean records sponsor new entrants, enforcing no-drugs rules. Nonprofits run it, not city hall.

Street Sweeps: Clear encampments with 72-hour notice—relocate, not arrest—using National Guard logistics if FEMA funds dry up under Trump (likely post-2025).

Non-Liberal Angle: Ditches endless funding debates for speed and discipline—appeals to Valley voters and Latinos (55% backed Caruso’s “clean-up” vibe, LA Times, 2022).

3. Cost of Living: Cut the Bloat, Keep the Cash
Why It Works: LA’s median rent hit $2,800 (Zillow, 2025), and inflation’s still biting (CPI up 3.2%, BLS 2024). Bass’s transit wins (ridership up 10%) don’t offset sticker shock—working-class South Central and renters (60% of LA) feel it most.

Plan:
Tax Freeze: Cap property tax hikes at 1% annually—city budget’s $13 billion (2024-25), so trim fat (e.g., 10% cut to non-essential staff).

Housing Hack: Vouch-based zoning—ten residents with jobs and clean records can fast-track ADUs or small complexes in their hood, bypassing NIMBY councils.

Gig Boost: Partner with Uber/Lyft to subsidize 50,000 driver permits—cheap transport, quick jobs, no bureaucracy.

Non-Liberal Angle: Pro-growth, anti-waste—echoes Caruso’s business pitch but grassroots it. Fair-Weather Progressives (FiveThirtyEight’s term) might bite if it’s practical, not preachy.

4. Social Trust: Vouch Nationalism Lite
Why It Works: Your vouch idea—tribal roots, anti-isolation—resonates in a city where loneliness is up 20% (JAMA, 2025) and trust’s tanked (Pew, 2024). LA’s diverse (48% Latino, 28% White, 2025 Census) but fractured.

Plan:
Vouch Privileges: Optional system—ten clean-record adults vouch for you to skip fees (e.g., parking permits, business licenses). Misstep, they pay a fine (say, $500).

Community Hubs: Fund private “trust clubs”—think Kiwanis 2.0—where vouch networks meet, plan, volunteer. Tax breaks for hosts.

City Access: Pilot vouch tiers—15 for downtown events, 25 for premium zones (e.g., Hollywood Bowl). Opt-in, not mandatory.

Non-Liberal Angle: Libertarian streak (choice, not force) with a conservative nod to community—South Central and Tinseltown could buy in without feeling judged.

Campaign Strategy
Target: Flip Caruso’s 2022 coalition—San Fernando Valley (40% of his votes), Latinos (35% citywide), and moderates in Tinseltown and Fair-Weather zones (FiveThirtyEight, 2022). Add disgruntled renters and small-business owners Bass lost (20% swing from 2022, per Ballotpedia).

Message: “I’m not here to lecture—I’m here to fix. You vouch for me, I deliver for you.” Hammer execution over ideology—Bass’s liberal cred (80% approval among Dems, Guerra 2022) won’t sway if you out-hustle her.

X Play: Push “LA Works” clips—short, punchy, problem-solution. Tag @RickCaruso
(he’s vocal post-wildfires, 2025) for a nod without begging.

Dodge: Abortion, climate dogma—LA’s settled left. Focus on wallet and street-level wins.

Why It Could Win
LA’s not as locked-in as it looks—Bass’s 54% came with 48% turnout (2022, LA Clerk). Caruso nearly defied “political gravity” (LA Times, 2022) with cash and pragmatism; you don’t need his $100 million—just sharper aim. Homelessness fatigue, crime fears, and Trump-era federal cuts (post-2025) could sour Bass’s shine—your niche-construction vibe (build trust, reshape LA) hits that gap. X buzz on “Bass’s wildfire flop” (January 2025) shows cracks; a non-liberal who’s all business could exploit it.
Risks
Liberal Backlash: 70% of LA voters lean left—call it “vouch nationalism,” and they’ll smell MAGA, even if it’s not. Keep it “LA Works”—neutral, local.

Vouch Fatigue: Ten sponsors sounds cool ‘til people dodge paperwork. Make it optional, not a hill to die on.

Bass’s Base: Black voters (15% of LA) and Westside liberals adore her (65% support, 2024)—you’d need a landslide elsewhere.

This platform’s non-liberal but not anti-liberal—survival-focused, like you said we evolved for. It’s niche-building: a safer, cheaper, tighter LA. Could it win? Maybe—if turnout’s low and you nail the Valley and Latinos. What’s your gut say—too radical, or just edgy enough? Want to tweak it?

Posted in Los Angeles | Comments Off on Give me a winning platform for a non-liberal to become mayor of Los Angeles.