May 28, 2026 E. Michael Jones, Culture Wars & Iran Luke Ford No sacred cows.

E. Michael Jones, Culture Wars & Iran

Posted on May 28, 2026 by Luke Ford

Author E. Michael Jones sits at the center of a small, dense world run out of South Bend, Indiana. He founded Culture Wars magazine as Fidelity in 1981, then renamed it after he borrowed Bismarck's word Kulturkampf to name the fight he thought he was in. He runs Fidelity Press, his book imprint, and his wife Ruth P. Jones keeps the business side under the corporate name Ultramontane Associates. The home and the operation are one thing. His public face now is EMJ Live, a Friday broadcast on Rumble, Cozy.tv, and Telegram, plus a heavy flow of guest spots on other men's channels. Watchdog groups including the ADL, the SPLC, and CAMERA describe him as an antisemite, and his presence on Iranian state media and white-nationalist sites is part of why. He calls himself anti-Jewish rather than antisemitic, and that distinction does real work in his world, which I will come back to.

The set has a few rings.

The Catholic-traditionalist ring is the one he claims as his real home. Patrick Coffin gave him a platform there. He debates Catholic Answers apologists like Trent Horn (b. 1983) and channels such as Culture Proof. This ring fights over who counts as a faithful Catholic and who has sold the faith to modernity.

The Muslim and Iranian ring runs through Kevin Barrett (b. 1959), a convert to Islam who hosts Truth Jihad Radio and False Flag Weekly News and broadcasts on Press TV. Barrett and Jones met at the 2013 Hollywoodism conference in Tehran, organized by the late filmmaker and Iranian propagandist Nader Talebzadeh (1953-2022), and there Jones first preached a Catholic-Muslim alliance against what he calls the Zionist enemy. Mark Dankof, a Lutheran pastor and Press TV regular, moves in the same circle, along with Salim Mansur (b. 1950), the Albanian academic Olsi Jazexhi, and Eddie Redzovic's The Deen Show, where Jones pitches the alliance to a Muslim audience.

The third ring is the dissident right, which he overlaps with and fights at the same time. Ron Unz publishes him at The Unz Review. Kevin MacDonald (b. 1944) of The Occidental Observer has hosted him. The comedian Owen Benjamin (b. 1980) amplified him early and helped him reach a young online audience. Nick Fuentes (b. 1998) and the Groypers court him and quarrel with him by turns. Smaller hosts feed the same stream: Charles Moscowitz, a Jewish podcaster who debates him, Tim Kelly of Our Interesting Times, the Irish activist Gemma O'Doherty, Joseph Brothers, Chicago Talk Show Host, and others.

What they value is Logos. Jones takes the opening of John's gospel and turns it into a theory of everything. Christ is the rational order of the world, and a culture lives or dies by whether it conforms to that order. From this he reads usury, pornography, sexual liberation, revolution, and liberalism as forms of rebellion against Logos, and he traces each one back to a theological root. The men around him value the same thing in their own keys. They prize the long polemical book, the convert's hard certainty, and the claim that culture flows downward from doctrine. The magazine's motto says it plainly: no social progress outside the moral order. They want the Catholic neighborhood order Jones says a WASP and Jewish elite destroyed, and they want the West turned back toward the faith.

Their hero is the lone Catholic intellectual who says the forbidden thing and pays for it. Cancellation becomes proof. When PayPal drops him, when Amazon pulls his books, when the ADL writes him up, the men in this world read it as confirmation that he struck a nerve. Suffering at the hands of institutions ranks higher than any institutional honor. The prophet who called a future event also earns rank here, which is why Barrett keeps retelling the Tehran story where Jones predicts the resignation of a pope minutes before it breaks on the hotel television. The convert's testimony carries weight too. Jones returned to the faith after reading Thomas Merton's The Seven Storey Mountain. Barrett tells his own conversion to Islam as a sacred turn. And sheer output is heroic. The enormous volumes, The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit and Its Impact on World History, Libido Dominandi: Sexual Liberation & Political Control, Barren Metal: A History of Capitalism as the Conflict between Usury and Labor, The Slaughter of Cities: Urban Renewal As Ethnic Cleansing, and Degenerate Moderns: Modernity as Rationalized Sexual Misbehavior, function as monuments. The man who writes a thousand-page book has done something the talkers cannot.

The status games follow. Rank goes to the man who has read the big books and can run a cultural problem back to its theological source faster than the next man. Barrett crowns Jones America's leading Catholic intellectual, and that title is a chip the whole set trades on. Proximity to larger platforms raises a man's standing, so a Tucker Carlson mention or a Fuentes feud lifts everyone near it. Martyr capital, measured in deplatformings and watchlist entries, converts into authority. The sharpest contest runs along a boundary Jones himself drew, and it splits the set from the racial right. Jones polices that line hard. He mocks men who call themselves White Catholics. He refuses race science. The Groyper race crowd attacks him for it, and Fuentes plays both alliance and rival, since the two men compete for the same young dissident Catholics.

His norms are old and strict. Society must order itself to Logos. Usury is sin. Sexual liberation is a tool of political control, not freedom. The state and the culture should bend to the Church. Revolution, from the French to the sexual, is rebellion against Christ. And he names Israel and what he calls organized Jewry as the present enemy of that order.

His essentialism is where he parts from his neighbors on the right. He denies that Jewishness sits in blood, genes, or DNA. He calls it a spiritual posture, the rejection of Christ, the choice to stand against Logos. By his account a Jew who accepts Christ stops being a Jew in the only sense that counts. This puts him against MacDonald's biological theory of Jewish behavior and against the Groypers' talk of the White race. The essence he believes in is the will's stance toward God, fixed in the soul rather than the body. He treats Catholic identity the same way, as a matter of faith and not ethnicity, which is why the White Catholic label offends him. That single claim defines the social set and divides it. It lets him keep the Jewish-power thesis that binds him to the racial right while refusing the racial premise that would make him one of them.

Before 2013 the magazine was a Catholic culture-war paper. Jones wrote about Notre Dame, the abuse scandal, the Medjugorje apparitions, the sexual revolution, urban renewal as a plot against Catholic neighborhoods. His books ran along the same track: Monsters from the Id on horror, Dionysos Rising on music, The Slaughter of Cities on the bulldozing of the ethnic parish, The Medjugorje Deception. The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit and Its Impact on World History, his thousand-page volume from 2008, marked the turn toward the Jewish question, but he still framed it as a history of the Church and its enemies. The fight was domestic and Catholic. The enemy lived in chancery offices and Hollywood studios.

Tehran changed the scale. At the Hollywoodism conference in 2013 Jones met Barrett and walked into a state apparatus that wanted exactly what he was selling. Nader Talebzadeh ran a series of gatherings, the New Horizon conferences, with men like Gholamreza Montazami and Hamid Qashqavi, and the guest list mixed Holocaust deniers, anti-war activists, and a few anti-Zionist Jews such as Norman Finkelstein (b. 1953) and Miko Peled (b. 1961), who gave the events cover against the charge of antisemitism. The Iranian state offered Jones three things he could not get at home. It gave him an audience that already believed the West was sick. It gave him Press TV, a broadcast platform with global reach. And it handed him proof, as he read it, that his thesis ran wider than the Catholic Church. The rejection of Logos was not a parish problem. It was a world war, and a state with an army agreed.

The theology had to stretch to carry the new weight, and Jones stretched it. For decades he had said culture flows from worship and that Christ is Logos, the rational order of the world. To bring Shia Islam under the same roof he widened the term. Logos Rising, his 2020 book, recast the whole argument as a history of ultimate reality rather than a history of the Church. Logos became reason, natural law, the order any sound civilization tracks. Catholics and Shia could stand on that common ground. Both honor reason and revelation. Both condemn usury. Both reject sexual liberation. Both name a single enemy. Barrett gave the alliance its slogan, the Catholic-Muslim front against what he called the Zionist Antichrist, and Jones supplied the metaphysics underneath it.

The magazine followed the man. The table of contents drifted from Medjugorje and Notre Dame toward Hormuz and sanctions. Jones started writing and broadcasting on Iran, Syria, Russia, the dollar, the price of oil, the structure of American empire. He sat for Press TV segments advising the Revolutionary Guard that Israel, not Donald Trump, was the real enemy. He kept the old Catholic columns running, but a reader who picked up an issue now found geopolitics next to the abortion coverage. The throughline held. Jones told both audiences the same story. Sexual liberation, usury, revolution, and Zionist foreign policy are one phenomenon, the political form of a refusal to bend to Logos. Iran simply gave the story a map and a front line.

At home the enemy had been the liberal bishop and the pornographer. On the world stage it became organized Jewry and the state of Israel, named without the Catholic framing to soften it. The later books track the hardening: Jewish Fables, Jewish Privilege, and The Holocaust Narrative in 2023, which carried him into open Holocaust revisionism. Watchdog readers had long flagged his sources, including Michael Hoffman, and the Tehran alliance pulled him further along that road rather than back from it.

The cost came fast. The United States sanctioned the New Horizon conference in 2019 as an arm of Iranian influence. Payment processors and platforms dropped him over the years. The mainstream Catholic world, never warm, treated the Press TV appearances as confirmation of the worst read on him. Each blow fed the hero system, so the punishment doubled as proof. The gains were real too. He reached Muslim audiences across the world, picked up the global-south following that shows up in his recent broadcasts, and won a standing abroad that no American Catholic outlet would give him.

Now, in the 2025 and 2026 war coverage, the alliance sits at the front of the operation. The recent shows run with Barrett on False Flag Weekly News, the Iran-war streams with titles like Salamanders on Fire, the Deen Show appearances pitching the Catholic-Muslim front to Muslims directly. Talebzadeh’s death in 2022 took the broker who built the bridge, and Jones speaks of him as a loss the project has not replaced.

The alliance also strained the home audience. The same universalized Logos that lets a Shia Muslim be an ally cuts against the White-identity Catholics and the racial right who want a blood-and-soil West. Jones cannot preach a Catholic-Muslim front and a White Christendom at once. He chose the front. That choice wins him Tehran and Cairo and loses him part of the Groyper base, and it explains why his quarrels with the race crowd grew louder in the same years the alliance deepened.

The easy story says Jones widened his Catholic thesis into a universal one and that the alliance followed from the widening. His own books do not bear that out. A crack runs through the work, and Logos Rising is where you can see it.

Start with the early shelf: Dionysos Rising: The Birth of Cultural Revolution Out of the Spirit of Music, Monsters from the Id: The Rise of Horror in Fiction and Film, Degenerate Moderns: Modernity as Rationalized Sexual Misbehavior, Libido Dominandi: Sexual Liberation & Political Control, Barren Metal: A History of Capitalism as the Conflict between Usury and Labor, and The Slaughter of Cities: Urban Renewal As Ethnic Cleansing. These read modern disorder as the rotten fruit of a single act, the abandonment of the Catholic moral order. Sexual liberation, horror fiction, atonal music, urban renewal, usury, each one a symptom of one disease. The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit and Its Impact on World History, in 2008, gave the disease a carrier. Jones argued that Judaism, after it rejected Christ, became the standing party of revolution against the order Christ embodies. The argument was theological and supersessionist to the bone. Christ is Logos. The Church carries Logos through history. Rome fell to a faith that understood reality better than the empire did. Everything turns on the Church as the bearer of reason and the Jew as the figure who says no to it. The fight was Catholic, and it was triumphalist, and it did not pretend otherwise.

Logos Rising: A History of Ultimate Reality, in 2020, looks at first like the turn toward the universal. The subtitle promises a history of ultimate reality, not a history of the Church. Jones reaches past dogma to the bare claim that the universe is intelligible, that reason and order point to a mind behind them, that any man who denies this collapses into nonsense. He runs the whole of intellectual history through Giambattista Vico's (1668-1744) cycles, revolution and heresy met by fresh appeals to natural law. He spends his fire on the New Atheists, Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett and the rest, for failing to grasp that something cannot come from nothing. Cast this way, Logos sounds like common property. Reason. Order. Natural law. The grounds any serious theist might stand on, Catholic or Muslim or Jewish.

Jones keeps Logos identified with Christ, the Word made flesh of John's first chapter, equal to God and God Himself. And he faults Islam by name on the one point the alliance leans on hardest. He charges Ash'arite theology and Sufi mysticism with a failure to hold reason and revelation together, and he treats that failure as the reason Islamic civilization stalled. The book ranks Islam below Catholic Christianity on the Logos question, the precise question the Catholic-Muslim front claims to share. Even a sympathetic non-Catholic reader felt it. Roosh Valizadeh, an Orthodox convert who admired the book, said its heavy Catholic perspective rubbed against his own faith. The book was not built to be shared. It was built to win.

So the alliance rests on a moral program and a common enemy. Catholics and Shia agree that usury is sin, that sexual liberation is a weapon, that liberal modernity corrodes the family, that Zionism drives the wars. They agree on the floor and the foe. They do not agree on the summit, and Jones's own book says they cannot, because the summit is Christ and the Muslim stops short of Him. The metaphysical claim that might fuse the two camps is the thing Logos Rising denies the Muslim. The fusion stays on the ground floor.

Jones did not soften his Catholic exclusivity to make room for Tehran. He kept the supersessionist core whole and bolted a war coalition onto the side of it. He can do this because his enemy sits at the theological level while his ally sits at the political one. The Jew rejects Logos and so becomes the antitype, the engine of revolution, the permanent adversary. The Muslim mishandles Logos, by the book's own account, but fights the same enemy and keeps the same moral law, and so he enters the story as a junior partner in the war for Logos rather than a co-owner of it. The hierarchy never goes away. Catholic Christianity stays at the top. Islam takes a place of honor in the trench, one rank down.

From the bulldozed parish to the Strait of Hormuz, the constant is the same equation. Logos is the Catholic order. Its rejection is the source of revolution. What changed after 2013 is the size of the map and the roster of allies, not the center. The universal language is the reach. The Catholic claim is the thing being reached with. When you hear him call the alliance a meeting of two peoples of Logos, set it next to the pages where he tells the Muslim he has not quite grasped Logos at all. Both statements are his. The second one is the one he wrote at length and in print.

The economic bridge carries more weight than the metaphysical one. On usury the Muslim is not a junior partner. He holds a parallel doctrine, intact, and on the present-day score he arguably keeps it better than the Christian West does. That changes the shape of the alliance on this front, and it explains why the men around Jones lead with finance rather than theology when they talk to the Muslim world.

Set out the argument first. Barren Metal: A History of Capitalism as the Conflict between Usury and Labor, from 2014, carries the subtitle A History of Capitalism as the Conflict between Labor and Usury, and the thesis sits in that line. Wealth comes from labor and from labor alone. Credit turns into wealth only when a man works it. Lending at interest produces nothing and feeds on what others make, so it is theft dressed as finance, and modern capitalism is that theft run by the state. Jones wants to drag economics back to where Aristotle (384-322 BC) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) kept it, a branch of moral philosophy, the place Adam Smith (1723-1790) himself started before the discipline forgot its parentage. His history runs on a single arc. The Church banned usury from the fall of Rome and held the line for a thousand years by treating the economy as answerable to God. Then the Church's authority broke, the Reformation loosened the ban, and Jews moved into the lending vacuum. Usury is the economic face of the same refusal he writes about everywhere else, the refusal of the moral order, of Logos.

Now lay Islam beside it. Islam carries its own ban on interest, riba, straight from the Quran, with no debt to Christianity for it. The prohibition never lapsed the way the Catholic one did. It survives in law and in working institutions, the whole apparatus of sharia-compliant banking. So on this axis the Muslim does not arrive holding a deficient version of the doctrine. He holds a living one. Where Logos Rising had to rank Islam below the Church on reason and revelation, the usury question lets Jones point east and say, there, that is what fidelity to the moral economy looks like, and the modern Christian West no longer manages it. The overlap is real and it runs both ways. Both traditions call interest a sin. Both root economics in divine law. Both name the same foe, the financier, the central bank, the Federal Reserve, the men Barrett's circle call the Epstein class. The shared enemy and the shared positive program line up, which is more than the metaphysics ever gave them.

Read the architecture of the book and the protagonist is still the Church. The thousand-year hero of the story is the Catholic ban, enforced by Catholic authority, theorized by Aristotle and Aquinas and the Schoolmen. Islam barely appears in the medieval narrative. The lineage Jones reasons from is Greek and Catholic and Western. The Islamic prohibition enters as corroboration, a witness he calls to the stand, not a source he builds the case out of. And the cure he prescribes is Catholic too, a restored moral economy of just wages and productive labor under the old Christian rule, not the adoption of Islamic finance. So the bridge holds at the level of conclusion and enemy and program. The genealogy underneath it stays Catholic.

If the present-day Muslim keeps the usury law that the present-day Christian abandoned, then on this one axis the Muslim stands ahead of the Christian, and that inverts the hierarchy Logos Rising worked to keep. Jones handles it by splitting the ideal from the practice. The Catholic Middle Ages remain the standard, the source, the high-water mark. The modern West's surrender is the fall. The contemporary Muslim earns credit for holding a discipline the modern Christian dropped, but the discipline he holds is still, in Jones's telling, the one the Church invented and perfected first. The Muslim keeps the rule well. The rule is Catholic in origin. The top of the ladder does not move.

When Jones and Barrett take the alliance to a Muslim audience, they lead with the dollar, the sanctions, the Fed, the wars for finance, not with the Trinity. They do this because the financial plank bears real load and the theological plank cannot. On usury the two camps meet as something close to equals against a common predator. On Logos they meet as a senior and a junior. The economic bridge is the strongest timber in the whole structure, and the fusion that makes it portable is the one Jones has built his life around, the identification of the usurer with the figure who rejects God's order. Name the Federal Reserve, name Zionist finance, name the lender, and a Catholic and a Shia hear the same sermon. That is why the alliance travels on the money question. It is the place where his Catholic frame and a Muslim's own law point at the same man.

Here is the puzzle in one line. The sexual question is where Jones and a traditional Muslim agree most, and it is the plank the alliance leans on least. The reason tells you what the alliance is for.

Take the thesis first. Libido Dominandi: Sexual Liberation & Political Control, from 2000, borrows its title from Augustine (354-430), whose phrase named the lust to dominate. Jones turns the phrase on the dominators. Sexual liberation, he argues, is not freedom at all. A man ruled by his appetites is a man easy to rule. Augustine taught that mastery of the passions is the only real liberty and slavery to them the only real chains, and Jones says the heirs of the Enlightenment grasped this and inverted it. They learned to free the appetite so they could own the man. He runs the line from the Marquis de Sade and Adam Weishaupt's Illuminati through Freud (1856-1939), Wilhelm Reich, and Alfred Kinsey (1894-1956), then into Margaret Sanger, the Rockefeller money, Edward Bernays and the advertising trade, Planned Parenthood, the therapeutic state. Pornography, sex education, mass media, encounter groups, all of it one project. Loosen the family, atomize the man, and govern what is left. The cure is the old one. Chastity. Marriage. Self-command under God's law.

On the sexual question a traditional Muslim signs nearly the whole sheet. Modesty. The family as the floor of society. Pornography as poison. Hostility to feminism and to the sexual identity politics of the West. Sexual restraint as a duty owed to God. The diagnosis matches, the values match, the remedy matches. And the modern Muslim world holds the line in plain sight, in dress, in law, in the ordering of the sexes, more visibly than the modern Christian West manages. The seam that opened in the Logos case and narrowed in the usury case nearly closes here. The Augustinian frame is Catholic, but the conclusions land on the same ground a conservative Muslim already stands on, and he stands on it now, not only in memory of a medieval high-water mark.

So the moral overlap is deepest on sex. The political use is thinnest. Four things explain the gap.

The sexual question has no enemy with a state and a face. The usury thesis points at the banker, the Fed, the financier. The Zionism thesis points at Israel and at the men Barrett's circle call the Epstein class. A coalition can march against a government and a banking system. It cannot march against pornography in the same way, because the enemy on the sexual front is a culture, a market, a drift, the air people breathe. Jones names culprits, Kinsey and Sanger and the rest, and he folds Jews into that story too, but the adversary stays diffuse. You cannot build a foreign-policy front out of chastity. You can build one out of opposition to Israel and to Western finance.

The sexual question also splits the partners as soon as you press past the broad strokes. Catholic and Muslim sexual law agree on the headline and part on the detail. Contraception, which the Catholic rule forbids and much of Muslim practice permits. Polygamy. Divorce. The theology of marriage and the standing of women. Lead with sex and these differences surface and start an argument inside the coalition. Keep sex in the background and the two camps nod at each other and move on. Better to lead with the foe they can hate without a single reservation.

The alliance lives on Press TV and the Iranian conference circuit and the geopolitical podcasts. The Iranian state did not bring Jones aboard to preach against Playboy. It wants the anti-Zionist, anti-empire, anti-dollar message, and the sponsor selects the material. The usury and Zionism planks are the ones the platform pays to amplify. The sexual plank earns no airtime in Tehran.

And Jones does not need the alliance for the sexual fight. That fight is his home ground. He wins it, or contests it, among American Catholics and the dissident right without help from any Muslim. The alliance exists for the thing he cannot do alone, which is to throw the anti-Zionist and anti-finance case onto a world stage with a state behind it. So he builds the coalition on the planks where he needs partners with reach, and leaves on the shelf the plank where he already has all the agreement he wants.

In Jones's system the sexual revolution and usury are not two enemies. They are two weapons held by one hand. The controllers loosen the appetite and they lend at interest, and behind both moves stands the same party, the one that rejects God's order. So he does not drop the sexual thesis when he goes to Tehran. He subordinates it. He leads with the puppet-master, the financier, the Zionist, and the sexual revolution rides along as one of the man's tools rather than the banner overhead. The deepest agreement becomes the quiet assumption underneath the loud one. The two faiths agree most about sex, and precisely because they agree about it so easily, it does no work at the front. The work goes to the question that names an enemy a Catholic and a Shia can fight together with a state, a budget, and a war.

Step back and the first thing you see is that this is not an alliance between equals. One side needs it far more than the other, and the smaller partner is Jones.

Look at what he brings and what he takes. From South Bend he runs a magazine, an imprint, and a Friday livestream. He has no Catholic institution behind him, no university post since Saint Mary's College let him go, no diocese, no foundation. The American Catholic establishment treats him as an embarrassment and the watchdog groups treat him as a case file. Strip the alliance away and he is a regional pamphleteer with a website and a camera. What Tehran gave him is the one thing he could not make for himself, a world stage with a state behind it. Press TV put him in front of millions. The conferences gave him the standing of an honored guest. The global-south following that shows up in his recent streams came through that door. Even the title he wears, America's leading Catholic intellectual, was pinned on him by Barrett, an ally inside the coalition, not by any Catholic body outside it. His rank is internal to the alliance that grants it.

Now turn it around. What does the Iranian side get from him? A useful face. Jones is a Western, white, Catholic man with a doctorate who says the thing the Iranian information war wants said, that the wars and the sanctions and the media all trace back to Israel and to Jewish power, and he says it in the register of civilizational morality rather than Islamic grievance. That register is the gift. A Muslim cleric making the same case reads, to a Western ear, as partisan. A Catholic with a PhD making it reads as principled. His insistence that he is anti-Jewish on religious grounds and not antisemitic on racial ones supplies a deniability the operation can use. He opens a channel into Western Christian and dissident-right audiences that Iranian state media cannot reach on its own. All of that has value. None of it makes him hard to replace. Barrett does a version of the same job. Mark Dankof does another. The roster of Western voices willing to appear is long, and the state keeps the ones who stay useful. He needs the platform. The platform does not need him in particular.

That asymmetry sets the terms. An alliance the small partner needs and the large partner finds convenient is an alliance the large partner ends when the convenience runs out. Were Iran's posture to shift, a thaw, a deal, a change in the line, the Western voices get fewer bookings and the front goes quiet. The coalition serves the sponsor's strategy. It lives at the sponsor's pleasure. Jones speaks of it as a meeting of two peoples of Logos. From the other side it reads closer to a media asset, valued while the message is wanted.

Then the broker. Nader Talebzadeh built the bridge with his own hands. He ran the conferences, made the introductions, carried the trust, turned a roomful of Western cranks and a Shia state into something that felt to the guests like a genuine encounter. Jones grieves him in print and calls the loss one the project has not filled. A coalition raised on one man's relationships rather than on standing institutions is exposed when that man dies. The scaffolding survives him. Press TV still books Jones. The war streams with Barrett still run. The successors keep the conferences going. So the alliance survives in its working form, because the working form never depended on warmth. What does not survive is the part Talebzadeh supplied, the sense of a civilizational meeting rather than a booking. With him gone the relationship settles toward what it was underneath all along, a transaction. Iran wants Western anti-Zionist voices. Jones wants a stage. The two keep trading. The romance of the prophecy in the Tehran hotel lobby thins into a standing arrangement.

Judge it by Jones's own rule, truth before comfort, and the comfortable account is the one he tells, two faiths joined against a common foe in service of the moral order. The truer account is harder on him. A marginal American writer found a foreign state willing to broadcast a message no one at home would carry, and the state found in him a respectable Western face for its propaganda. Ask who supplies his reach, his audience, his income, his protection from total obscurity, and the answer points east, to the ecosystem the alliance opened. Ask who carries the risk if the plain version of this is said out loud, and it is Jones, because the plain version costs him the self-portrait he prizes most, the independent prophet who answers to no power. He spends his life telling other men to follow the patronage and see who pays. Turned on himself the same question gives an answer he has reason not to dwell on. The alliance is real as a working relationship. It is thin as the world-historical event he describes. And it flatters him a good deal more than it needs him.
Kevin Barrett works as the control because so much is held fixed. Same stage, the Tehran conferences and Press TV. Same broker, Nader Talebzadeh, who introduced them. Same decade. Even the same programs, since they co-host False Flag Weekly News and trade appearances. Hold the platform constant and the only thing left varying is the man and the bargain he struck. Set the two side by side and Jones comes out ahead, and the reason he comes out ahead is the thing the earlier passes kept circling. He kept more of himself out of it.

Start where each man stood before Tehran. Neither gave up a mainstream career for the alliance. Both had already been expelled before they arrived. Barrett held a part-time lectureship at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, a one-semester slot worth around eight thousand dollars, when his claim that the September 11 attacks were an inside job drew sixty-odd state legislators and the governor calling for his removal. The university let him finish the term and never had him back, and the tenure-track Islam post he says he was first in line for closed over his head. By 2006 he was out of the academy for good. Jones had been pushed from his post at Saint Mary's College at the start of the 1980s and founded Fidelity in 1981 on the way out the door. So both men reached the Iranian platform as exiles. Neither paid his largest price to join the alliance. Barrett paid his to 9/11, Jones paid his to his Catholic militancy and the Jewish question. Each arrived already cheap to acquire.

What they carried in the door differed. Jones came with thirty years of independent capital. An imprint. A monthly magazine. A shelf of thousand-page books. A worked-out theory of history with his name on it and a Catholic brand that stands on its own. Barrett came with a narrower kit, the 9/11 cause, a radio show, the founding of a small interfaith truth group, and the standing of a convert who could speak to Muslims as one of them. Jones brought a body of work. Barrett brought a role.

The second split is depth of commitment. Barrett gave the alliance everything. He converted to Islam. He coined the slogan, the Catholic-Muslim front against the Zionist enemy. He took an editor's chair at the foreign-policy outlet, made the radio show his trade, and welded his whole public identity to the niche the platform serves. The platform is his livelihood and close to his self. Jones converted nothing. He stayed Catholic, kept the imprint running, kept the books selling, kept preaching a Catholic supremacy that, as the Logos pass showed, ranks his Muslim partners a rung below him. He uses the stage. He is not its creature.

Put the two splits together and the ledger is plain. Jones brought more, so he is the more valuable guest and the less replaceable one. Jones kept more, so he holds an exit Barrett does not. Were the Iranian platform to vanish tomorrow, Jones walks back into the life of a Catholic culture-war writer with an audience and a backlist intact. Barrett walks back into far less, because the academy is closed to him, the prior life is spent, and the cause he poured himself into has no home outside the ecosystem that now hosts it. The man who kept one foot outside is hard to use up and easy to release. The convert who burned the bridge behind him is all the way in and cannot leave cheaply. On the instrumental count, Jones struck the better deal, and he struck it by believing in the alliance less.

Barrett would reject the whole ledger. He does not read his conversion as a cost. He reads it as the central gift of his life, a true faith found and a mission worth the academy he lost. By his own lights he made no bargain at all. He answered God and took up a cause. The cost-accounting that makes him the captured partner is the accounting Jones recommends for other men, the follow-the-patronage look at who supplies the platform and who cannot walk away. Run on Barrett it returns a hard number. Run on Barrett by Barrett it does not compute, because he never thought he was trading anything.

And the broker's death falls on the two of them unevenly, which closes the loop from the last pass. Talebzadeh's loss costs Jones a warmth and a convening genius, but not his base, because his base sits in South Bend under his own name. The same loss reaches deeper into Barrett, who has less to stand on if the conferences cool and the bookings thin. The partner who needed the alliance more is the partner the broker's death exposes more. Jones built a house before he ever went to Tehran. Barrett moved in.

So Jones got the better bargain, full stop, and the shape of the advantage is the moral of the whole portrait. He reached a world stage he could not have built, took the sponsor's reach, and paid for it in a coin he had already spent, his mainstream respectability, gone long before. He kept the imprint, the faith, the theory, the exit. The alliance flatters him more than it holds him, and it holds Barrett almost entirely. The two men stood on the same stage. One of them owns the ground he stands on elsewhere. The other one rents.

The ledger priced what a man can count. Reach, income, standing, the exit Jones kept and Kevin Barrett lost. The thing this question points at sits off that sheet, because no one keeps a column for it, least of all the man it bills. The cost is to the seriousness of his own mind, and it comes due slowly, in a coin he has stopped counting.
Begin with what Jones started with, since this only reads as a loss if there was something to lose. Whatever you make of his conclusions, the early shelf carried real equipment. The books engaged hard material, Augustine and the Enlightenment, the long history of lending, the birth of the modern novel, the sources of horror in fiction. He read widely and he built arguments a reader could follow, check, and fight. Even hostile reviewers grant the breadth of the reading. There was an apparatus under the polemic, and an apparatus can be tested. A claim that can be tested can be wrong, and a man who can be shown wrong is still thinking.
Look now at the audience he answers to. The Friday livestream, the Press TV segment, the appearance with Barrett, the comment threads at Unz. That room pays in attention for one thing, the naming of the enemy and the closing of the case. It rewards the clip where the culprit is identified and the whole tangled world resolves into a single hand behind every wound. It pays nothing for the qualification. Nothing for the hard case the thesis cannot quite hold. Nothing for the sentence that begins, here the evidence thins, or here my argument works and there it overreaches. A crowd shaped by grievance wants the verdict, and it wants it whole, and it treats the man who hedges as a man going soft.
Watch what that does to a thinker over years. The thesis stops being a tool he picks up for a given problem and becomes the only tool he owns. When one story accounts for the Reformation and the Kennedy killing and the Council and the sexual revolution and the wars and the Federal Reserve and the oil price, it has quit the work of history and turned into a reflex. A serious man holds his big idea loosely and goes looking for the case it fails on, because that case is where the next thought lives. An applauded man stops hunting for it. The room never asks, and it punishes him when he offers. So the muscle that doubts goes slack from disuse, and he loses the one motion that kept the mind honest.
He loses his referees in the same stroke. A scholar is sharpened by the colleague who finds the flaw and the editor who strikes the cheap line and the rival who will not let a weak link pass. Jones traded all of that, the academy that expelled him and the Catholic intellectual world that shut its door, for a media ecosystem with no referees in it, only fans and denouncers. The denouncers, the watchdog files, do not engage the argument. They condemn the man, which he can wave off as persecution, and which his audience reads as proof he struck the nerve. So criticism stops correcting him and starts feeding him. There is no longer a single person whose disagreement he is obliged to take seriously, because the only critics are the enemy and the only interlocutors are the choir.
Then the deepest part. His vast reading does not stop. It changes jobs. It used to test the thesis. Now it serves it. Every new fact arrives already sorted, filed under the verdict reached long ago, marshaled as one more confirmation that the same party stands behind the same crime. That is the death of inquiry while every outward sign of learning stays in place. The footnotes keep coming. The breadth keeps showing. The prose stays confident. The thinking stops moving. A man can sound more learned each year and be discovering less, and from the lectern the two look identical.
Jones built his life on Logos, on the conformity of the mind to what is real, on truth as the thing worth losing a career over. Reality is mixed. It is full of contingency and exception and the case that ruins a clean theory. To stay faithful to it a man has to let it talk back to him, has to sit with the part that does not fit. Jones built a platform where reality cannot talk back, where every broadcast ends with the enemy named and the room satisfied and nothing left open. The structure he stands on rewards the opposite of what Logos asks. He set out to serve fidelity to the real and assembled a machine that pays him to stop checking. The thing he prizes most is the thing his situation quietly takes.
Hand any serious mind a captive, adoring, grievance-shaped audience and it pays this tax. The left runs its versions. The respectable center runs its own, gentler, better camouflaged versions. The platform does the damage whatever the content. And the loss stays hidden because from the inside it feels like the reverse. More certain. More sweeping. More vindicated by each week’s news. The man feels himself growing sharper at the very hours he is growing duller, and the cheering covers the sound of the thing going quiet. You cannot grieve a faculty you no longer notice you had.
Against Barrett, Jones got the better of it, and that holds. This is the line the deal left out. What he traded was not on the table when he signed, and he pays it now in small installments he cannot feel, the slow narrowing of a mind that was once wider than the use he puts it to. The reach was real and the reach was bought cheap. The price was his own seriousness, drawn down a little at a time, and the room that took it claps louder the more of it is gone.

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Memory as Statecraft: The Work of Sheila Miyoshi Jager

Posted on May 28, 2026 by Luke Ford

Sheila Miyoshi Jager (b. 1963) writes history at the intersection of war and memory. She holds the chair in East Asian studies at Oberlin College, and she has spent more than two decades on a single question. How do nations build the stories that send men to die, and how do those stories outlast the wars that produce them? Her books treat Korea as the ground on which modern East Asia took shape. They also treat Korea as a test of method, a case where the tools of the humanities and the tools of strategic studies have to work together or fail together.

She took her bachelor’s degree from Bennington College in 1984 and a master’s from Middlebury College in 1985. She earned her doctorate in anthropology from the University of Chicago in 1994. The Chicago of those years argued constantly over nationalism, modernity, and the making of identity, and the anthropological training left its mark on everything she wrote afterward. Her hardest military narratives keep the anthropologist’s eye for ritual, symbol, and the emotional grammar of legitimacy. She watches how states stage funerals and revise textbooks with the same attention she gives to artillery and alliance treaties.

Jager is of Dutch and Japanese descent. Her Dutch grandparents, Hendrik and Geesje Jager, hid a Jewish girl named Greetje de Haas for three years during the German occupation of the Netherlands, and Yad Vashem recognized them as Righteous Among the Nations in 1996. A family record of that kind shapes how a historian thinks about war, moral testimony, and the costs ordinary people pay when states collide.

The intellectual climate she came from pointed many of her peers toward pure textualism. Benedict Anderson (1936–2015) had taught a generation to see nations as imagined communities, modern constructions assembled through schools, newspapers, and commemorative ritual rather than ancient ethnic inheritances. Marshall Sahlins (1930–2021) and the wider Chicago humanities world pushed in the same interpretive direction. Many scholars who drank from this stream came to read nationalism as a text, something to be taken apart on the page. Jager took the construction thesis and turned it toward harder ground. She agrees that nations are made. She insists they are made through occupation, famine, civil war, and the contest for territory. In her work memory never floats free of the institutions that enforce it. A state raises a monument for the same reason it lays a keel. That refusal to split symbol from force gives her scholarship its shape and its durability.

Her first book, Narratives of Nation-Building in Korea: A Genealogy of Patriotism (2003), examined how Korean nationalism emerged through literature, gender ideology, and patriotic myth. She showed how modern Korean elites built patriotic narratives during the crisis of colonial encroachment and imperial collapse. Sin Chae-ho (1880–1936) and Yi Gwang-su (1892–1950) stand at the center of that analysis because each tried to invent a modern Korean political consciousness that might survive Japanese domination. Jager read the gendered grain of these narratives with care. Masculinity, martyrdom, and feminine allegories of the nation became the means by which Korean intellectuals turned political weakness into moral heroism. She neither romanticized national feeling nor dismissed it as illusion. She treated it as a modern tool of mobilization that could produce real loyalty and real sacrifice.

Her co-edited volume Ruptured Histories: War, Memory and the Post-Cold War in Asia (2007), produced with Rana Mitter (b. 1969), pushed these concerns into the present. The collection examined how East Asian states put historical memory to work in contemporary politics. Japan, China, and Korea each deploy narratives of victimhood, resistance, humiliation, and liberation to shore up domestic legitimacy and to gain leverage abroad. This was not memory studies in the soft sense. Jager and Mitter read historical narratives as operating instruments of statecraft. Textbook fights, museum design, apology diplomacy, and the choreography of war anniversaries become channels through which states compete for moral standing in the region. In East Asia, the interpretation of the past is a front in a live rivalry.

Her best-known book for general readers, Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea (2013), appeared as North Korea‘s nuclear program expanded and the rivalry between China and the United States sharpened. Jager argued that the Korean War never closed. The conflict remained structurally unfinished, and it kept shaping the political architecture of Northeast Asia. The title carries the argument. North and South emerge not as mere clients of distant superpowers but as rival heirs to one national inheritance, each presenting itself as the true Korea.

This reading set her apart from the structural revisionism of Bruce Cumings (b. 1943), whose interpretation governed Korean War historiography for decades. Cumings stressed how far Korea’s division grew out of Cold War structures imposed by Washington and Moscow, and in his account Korean actors often appeared hemmed in by larger imperial systems. Jager departed through what one might call archival realism. After the Soviet collapse, Soviet, Chinese, and Eastern European archives opened, and the evidence base for the war changed. She synthesized these materials to give agency back to Korean leaders. Syngman Rhee (1875–1965) and Kim Il-sung (1912–1994) no longer read as passive instruments of superpower strategy. They emerge as ambitious ideological men chasing reunification, at times pulling their patrons into commitments the great powers themselves approached with caution. In her telling the war was not only imposed on Korea from outside. Korean regimes chose it and pursued it, each sure of its own claim. Andrew J. Nathan (b. 1943), reviewing the book for Foreign Affairs, noted that her account assigns atrocities to both sides rather than to the North alone.

Her later book, The Other Great Game: The Opening of Korea and the Birth of Modern East Asia (2023), expanded the argument into a reinterpretation of nineteenth-century international history. The title plays against the “Great Game” of British and Russian competition in Central Asia and moves the decisive theater to Northeast Asia. Older Western writing cast Korea as a passive Hermit Kingdom pried open by foreign imperialism. Jager presents it instead as the fulcrum on which the modern East Asian order turned. The collapse of the Sino-centric tributary system and the rise of a Westphalian order of nation-states were hammered out through struggles over Korean sovereignty. By concentrating on the 1880s and 1890s, she shows how Qing China, Meiji Japan, Tsarist Russia, and the United States remade their military, legal, and diplomatic systems through the contest over Korea. The peninsula was not a margin of modern East Asian statecraft. It was the crucible in which that statecraft formed. The book opens a trilogy she is completing on war and revolution in twentieth-century East Asia.

The book aged well because she never accepted the post-Cold War wager that globalization might dissolve old interstate rivalry. Long before much of the academy rediscovered geopolitics, she kept her attention on sovereignty, territory, deterrence, alliance systems, and historical grievance. When the language of great power competition returned to American strategic talk in the 2020s, her work read as prepared rather than late. The Other Great Game won the 2024 Robert L. Jervis and Paul W. Schroeder Best Book Award from the American Political Science Association and the 2024 Duke of Wellington Medal for Military History from the Royal United Services Institute in Britain. Harvard University Press issued a paperback in 2025. The honors mark a book that crosses from academic to policy readers, a crossing few historians of Korea manage.

As Professor of East Asian Studies at Oberlin College, she works inside one of the more progressive and humanities-bound campuses in the country, a place whose intellectual habits lean toward transnational critique and skepticism of military institutions. From that platform she has produced large books on war, strategy, and imperial rivalry. She has also held standing in the national security world. She served as a visiting research professor at the U.S. Army War College from 2006 to 2008 and worked with its Strategic Studies Institute on questions of civic nationalism, Korean political transition, and regional security. A Fulbright Senior Scholar fellowship took her to Seoul in 2014 and 2015, and a Smith Richardson Foundation grant in 2020 supported the research behind The Other Great Game. Her work runs in two directions at once. She teaches strategists to take memory, myth, and legitimacy seriously, and she grounds humanities scholars in logistics, alliances, and deterrence. She advised and appeared in two Korean War documentaries, The Battle of Chosin (2016) and Korea: The Neverending War (2019), and she has written for the New York Times and the Boston Globe.

She is married to Jiyul Kim, a U.S. Army veteran and historian who also teaches at Oberlin College, and they have four children in Ohio. In the mid-1980s, before either had reached their later careers, she had a long relationship with Barack Obama (b. 1961). The relationship reached the public only with David J. Garrow‘s (b. 1953) biography Rising Star: The Making of Barack Obama in 2017. The episode draws press attention to her, though it has little to do with the scholarship that earns her standing.

Her career also marks a turn in the discipline. Through the 1990s many humanities fields embraced transnationalism and post-national critique, and military history and geopolitical realism looked unfashionable in those rooms. Jager helped close that gap. She showed that nationalism, memory, and military competition cannot be pried apart for separate study. Historical narratives are not decoration laid over material politics. They are part of the working apparatus of power.

That claim gives her work its contemporary edge. The fights over Japanese textbooks, Yasukuni Shrine visits, comfort women narratives, Chinese anti-Japanese commemoration, and North Korean anti-imperial myth are not quaint cultural quarrels. They are moves in a strategic contest. The reading of the past shapes alliances, domestic legitimacy, diplomatic leverage, and public morale. Her scholarship sits within a wider revival of geopolitical history, yet it never shrinks politics to force alone. She holds that states need stories able to organize sacrifice and sustain legitimacy across generations. Nations endure through armies and economies and also through the narratives that bind people to them.

That synthesis explains why historians, anthropologists, diplomats, and military officers all read her now. In her work memory operates. Nationalism is built and politically real. Myths produce institutions. Wars create identities that govern societies long after the guns go quiet. Few historians of East Asia have joined the study of narrative to the study of power with her success.

Dying Well for the Nation: Ernest Becker and the Korean Hero System in Sheila Miyoshi Jager

Ernest Becker (1924–1974) built his work on one claim. Man knows he will die, cannot bear the knowing, and spends his life denying it. The denial does not stay private. It builds cultures. A society is a hero system, a shared scheme that hands its members a path to significance the body cannot cancel. Becker called the personal version the immortality project, the attempt to author a self that outlives its own death. In Escape from Evil he traced the dark return of this drive. Two peoples who each claim to carry the only road past death cannot both be right, so each must deny the other to keep its own promise whole. War follows from the collision of immortality ideologies, and the enemy becomes the carrier of death who has to be purged so the project stays pure.

Read Sheila Miyoshi Jager through that claim and Narratives of Nation-Building in Korea: A Genealogy of Patriotism turns into a study of how a people facing erasure built a hero system from the materials at hand.

Jager set her book in the crisis of colonial encroachment and imperial collapse. Korea stood under threat of political death. Japan moved to absorb the peninsula, to dissolve its sovereignty, its language, its standing among nations. The threat was double in Becker's terms. Every Korean man already faced the death of his body. Now he faced the death of the thing he might have died into, the nation that promised to carry his name forward. A hero system works by trading the first death for a stake in defeating the second. Jager's intellectuals went looking for that trade and had to manufacture it, since the modern Korean political consciousness they needed did not yet exist in usable form.

Sin Chae-ho (1880–1936) supplied the genealogy. He wrote a history that reached back through Tangun and Goguryeo to give the nation an ancient and unbroken line. Becker explains why a threatened people reaches for so deep a past. A line long enough behind you promises a line long enough ahead. The ancestry is a down payment on permanence. Sin's historiography is a causa sui project raised to the scale of a people, the nation authoring its own eternal descent so that no foreign power can claim to have created it or to hold the right to end it. The myth of origin answers the terror of extinction. If the nation has always been, the nation cannot be killed, and the man who dies for it dies into something that does not die.

Yi Gwang-su (1892–1950) supplied the hero. His fiction built the new man who sacrifices for the nation and the new woman who loves the nation as a man loves a woman. Jager read the gendered grain of these narratives with care, and her later work on manliness, the military, and the war memorial extends the same reading. The hero earns his significance through deeds and through death. The feminine figure becomes the beloved object for which the man dies, the nation as mother and as bride. Becker's heroism is coded this way throughout. The man purchases cosmic specialness by spending his body on the immortal thing, and the culture supplies the script that tells him his spending counts. Yi gave Korean men that script. He turned the humiliation of the colonized body into a role with a part to play and a death worth dying.

Jager shows Korean intellectuals turning political weakness into moral heroism. Becker would say this is what heroism is for. The function of a hero system is to take the worst facts about a man, his animal fate, his defeat, his smallness before larger powers, and convert them into a drama of transcendence. The colonized subject is the limit case. He has lost his state, his standing, and the use of his own future. The patriotic narrative hands him back a way to matter by dying well. Martyrdom is the purest form of the trade, since it spends the whole body at once and buys the largest possible share of the symbolic life that follows.

Jager calls her subtitle a genealogy of patriotism, and Becker turns it into a genealogy of an immortality ideology. She shows that the narratives were made, consciously, by named men working under pressure. Becker explains why their making had to be forgotten by the people who used them. He called the necessary self-deception the vital lie. A hero system cannot still the terror of death if the people inside it know it was engineered last week by a journalist and a novelist. The patriotic story has to be lived as eternal truth, as the nation's own voice rising from its ancient soil, or it loses the power to console. So the construction Jager recovers is the construction the believers had to bury. Her archival honesty and Becker's account of the vital lie meet on the same page. She digs up what the immortality project depends on hiding.

Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea argues that the war never closed and that North Korea and South Korea stand as rival heirs to one inheritance, each presenting itself as the true Korea. Becker's Escape from Evil reads this as the predictable end of two immortality projects laid over one nation. Both regimes claim to carry the Korean people past death. Both built founding martyr-cults and heroic genealogies. Two such claims over one inheritance cannot both hold, because the promise of each requires that it alone be the authentic line. So each must deny the other to keep its own promise intact. The denial cannot stop at argument. The rival is not a neighboring state with adjustable borders. The rival is the living proof that one's own claim to sole permanence might be false, which makes him the carrier of the nation's possible death and the figure who has to be purged so the project stays pure.

This reading explains the quality Jager found hardest to account for, the refusal of the conflict to end. A border can be split. A trade route can be shared. An immortality claim cannot be halved. To settle with the other regime on equal terms is to concede that the other line is also real, and that concession voids one's own standing as the single road past death. Death-denial does not negotiate. Syngman Rhee (1875–1965) staked the Republic on its descent from the true Korea and on an anticommunist heroism that named the North as the death-bringing other. Kim Il-sung (1912–1994) built the mirror claim and carried it furthest, until the dead founder became the eternal head of a state that institutionalized his own deathlessness. The hero system froze into theology. Becker would read the eternal-leader cult as the immortality project hardened into stone, the wager that one man's significance might outlast not only his body but the bodies of everyone who came after.

Jager restored agency to these men against the structural readings that cast Korean leaders as instruments of larger powers. Becker gives that agency a shape. Rhee and Kim were not only pursuing reunification as a policy. Each was defending a hero system on which his own significance and his people's escape from death depended. That is why each pulled cautious patrons toward escalation. A great power weighs a peninsula against its other interests. A man defending his immortality project weighs nothing against it, because to lose it is to lose the only thing that answers the terror. The asymmetry of resolve that Jager documents reads, through Becker, as the difference between a strategic calculation and a death-denying faith.

The frame has a limit. Becker is universal and psychological. Every nation everywhere is an immortality project, every people manages the terror of death through some hero system. The frame tells you why men die for Korea. It tells you little about why Korea's hero system took this shape rather than another, why Sin reached for Tangun rather than some other line, why the contest of Qing, Meiji Japan, Tsarist Russia, and the United States power fell out as it did and handed the narrative its particular form. Those answers live in the archives Jager spent years reading, in logistics and treaties and the timing of empires. Becker reads the layer beneath the narrative, the terror that makes any nation necessary. He goes quiet on the geopolitical contest that decided which narrative survived and which men got to die well.

Who Controls the Filing: Master Status and the Public Memory of Sheila Miyoshi Jager

Everett Hughes (1897–1983) noticed that people do not sort one another by the sum of a man’s traits. They sort by one trait that overrides the rest. He called it the master status. A man might be a father, a Methodist, a Republican, and a physician, but the room files him under physician, and the other facts arrange themselves around that one. Hughes pressed the point through cases where the filing went against the man’s own achievement. A profession carries auxiliary expectations about who fills it, and when someone breaks the expectation, observers often resolve the strain by letting the auxiliary trait take over the filing. The Black physician gets sorted as Black before he is sorted as physician. The woman engineer gets sorted as a woman. The achieved status loses to a trait assigned from outside, and the loss is decided by the people doing the sorting, not by the person sorted.

Sheila Miyoshi Jager presents as an example of this loss, with a twist Hughes did not treat. The trait that overrides her achievement is neither her race nor her sex by itself. It is a relationship. In the mid-1980s, before either reached a public career, she had a long romance with Barack Obama (b. 1961). The relationship stayed private until David Garrow (b. 1953) reported it in Rising Star: The Making of Barack Obama in 2017. From that point the open record began to file her under a single auxiliary fact. Four books, the Harvard University Press imprint, the Robert L. Jervis and Paul W. Schroeder Best Book Award from the American Political Science Association, the Duke of Wellington Medal for Military History from the Royal United Services Institute, a trilogy in progress on war and revolution in East Asia, all of it gets shelved beneath the line that she is the woman the president almost married. The master status is not historian. The master status is ex-girlfriend.

Under what conditions does an achieved status lose to one assigned by others, and who controls the filing.

The engine that drives the filing is the one Robert Merton (1910–2003) described as the Matthew effect. Credit and attention flow toward those who already hold them. In science Merton found that the eminent name absorbs the recognition that the obscure collaborator earned. The same flow runs through public attention at large. Obama is the largest attention node of his generation. Anything fastened to him inherits reach. Her public salience does not rise from her own work. It is drawn off his, and the open web encodes that draw as a fact about her. The search box, the encyclopedia entry, the magazine feature all route through his name because his name carries the traffic. Her achievement sits in places the general reader never opens. The relationship sits on the front page of the result.

Margaret Rossiter (b. 1944) named the Matilda effect, the transfer of a woman’s credit toward the men around her. Rossiter found it in laboratories, where the woman’s result became the man’s discovery. The same transfer runs through celebrity. A male historian with Jager's record, once the partner of a future president, would rarely be cast as the ex. The press genre that introduces her as the woman before Michelle is a transfer of standing from the woman to the man, achievement displaced by relation. Gender decides which way the credit runs. Her case extends Rossiter's finding from the co-authored paper to the romantic tie, the same erasure working through a different channel.

Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002) read social life as a set of fields, each with its own currency and its own rite of consecration. Jager holds high standing in the scholarly field, consecrated by the rites that field runs, peer review, the university press, the disciplinary prize. That standing is symbolic capital, and within her field it converts into authority, students, and further commissions. Mass recognition lives in another field with another currency, governed by media reach and audience interest. Her scholarly capital does not convert into that currency. The exchange rate is near zero. The Obama tie hands her a different capital, conferred from outside her field by people who never read her, and that capital trades at a high rate in the mass field. So the predicament is a conversion failure between fields. She is rich in a money the larger market will not change at the window.

Daniel Boorstin (1914–2004) supplies the term for what the mass field made of her. In The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-events in America he defined the celebrity as a man known for being known, fame cut loose from achievement and feeding on its own circulation. Her scholarly reputation is earned. Her public fame is conferred for reasons that have nothing to do with the work, and once conferred it sustains itself by repetition. Each new feature about Obama's early life recopies the line, and the recopying is the whole of its content.

The eclipse is not total. It is split by audience. Among historians of Korea and among strategists who track great power competition, she is the author of The Other Great Game: The Opening of Korea and the Birth of Modern East Asia and little else registers. In that field her master status is historian, settled and secure. The Obama filing lives in the mass field, in the tabloid genre and the search result and the general reader’s half-memory. So the predicament is a division between two economies of attention, each running its own master status for the same woman. The trouble is that the mass field carries thousands of times the reach of the scholarly one. The filing that reaches the most people is the filing that demotes the work.

Who controls the filing turns out to depend on which field does the sorting, and the field with the most reach is the one she controls least. The scholarly filing answers to her output, which she governs. The mass filing answers to the attention engine, which she does not. She did not place the auxiliary fact in the record. Garrow did, drawing on the public hunger for the president’s early life. She cannot lift it back out, because the Matthew effect keeps feeding it as long as Obama holds his salience. Hughes saw that status contradictions get resolved by the observers, not by the person caught in them. Her remedy is therefore structural, not personal. The mass filing might shift if Obama's salience decays with time, or if a book of hers grows large enough in the wider culture to flip the master status on its own weight. The engine resists both. Eminence drains toward the eminent, and his eminence dwarfs hers in the only field where the filing hurts.

Built from Artillery Upward: Cultural Trauma, Carrier Groups, and the Unfinished War in Sheila Miyoshi Jager

Yale sociologist Jeffrey Alexander (b. 1947) opens his theory of cultural trauma with a refusal. Events do not wound a people on their own. A war, a famine, a massacre carries no fixed meaning waiting to be felt. Trauma is a socially mediated attribution, assigned to an event by men who speak for a group, and the same horror might brand one nation’s consciousness and leave another’s untouched. Alexander names the opposite belief the naturalistic fallacy, the lay assumption that the wound rises from the event the way pain rises from a burn. He brackets the question of whether the claims are accurate or just. He asks instead how the claims get made, under what conditions, and with what results. His concern is epistemology, not ontology and not morality.
The apparatus he builds to answer that question has named parts. A carrier group, in Max Weber’s (1864–1920) sense, supplies the agents, men with ideal and material interests, placed somewhere in the social structure, holding the talent to make meaning in public. The carrier group broadcasts a claim through what Alexander, after Kenneth Thompson, calls a spiral of signification. To win, the claim has to answer four questions. What was the pain. Who was the victim. What ties the victim to the wider audience that did not suffer. Who bears responsibility. The answers travel through institutional arenas, the religious, the aesthetic, the legal, the scientific, the mass media, and the state bureaucracy, and each arena bends the claim to its own demands. Whether the claim takes hold turns on the configuration of power. Who owns the newspapers. Whether the courts are free. Who controls the government. When the spiral does its work, a people revise their collective identity, re-remember their past, and then calm down. The affect drains, the sacred cools, and the trauma hardens into monuments, museums, and ritual routine.
This is the ground Sheila Miyoshi Jager works. Her later subject is the contest over memory in East Asia, the fights over Japanese textbooks, the Yasukuni Shrine visits, the comfort women narratives, the anti-Japanese commemoration in China, and the rival mythologies of North and South Korea. Alexander reaches for the same cases. His chapter runs through the comfort women, the No Gun Ri killings, and the Rape of Nanking.
The pain is sexual slavery imposed by an imperial army. The victims are women, primarily Korean, in the tens and possibly hundreds of thousands. The tie to the wider audience holds firm inside Korea, where the women are claimed as daughters of the nation, and breaks against a Japanese public that has often refused to make their suffering its own. Responsibility runs up to the Imperial government, the army, and the Emperor. Then watch the claim move through the arenas. The legal and bureaucratic arenas are where it stalls. The Japanese state gave token reparations and a brief apology and refused to convene an official commission that might issue binding judgment. Alexander’s stratification point explains the stall. The party that held the power to investigate had no interest in the verdict. So the carrier groups built their own arena, the unofficial Tokyo tribunal that found Japan’s wartime leaders guilty without the power to compel a yen of reparation. The trauma process ran, but it ran outside the state that could have ratified it, and that is why it produced moral authority and little else.

The Set

Sheila Miyoshi Jager belongs to no single circle. She sits where three guilds overlap, and the overlap is the whole story of her set. The first guild is the Korea and East Asia history field, the people who read the peninsula and its neighbors in the original languages. The second is the Cold War and international history world that rewrote its books once the Soviet archives opened. The third is the strategic studies and great-power-competition establishment, the war colleges, the security journals, the medal committees. Jager moves through all three, and the men and women in each recognize her as one of theirs without quite owning her.

The Korea field supplies her nearest neighbors. Bruce Cumings (b. 1943) stands at its center, the author of the structural reading of the Korean War that governed the field for a generation, and Jager defines herself against him by giving Korean leaders back their agency. Carter Eckert at Harvard University anchors the colonial-modernity wing. Andrew Gordon, the Harvard historian of Japan, blurbed The Other Great Game: The Opening of Korea and the Birth of Modern East Asia, which marks the Japan side of the guild claiming her too. Rana Mitter (b. 1969), the China historian who wrote China's Good War, co-edited Ruptured Histories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in East Asia with her and blurbed the new book, so the China side claims her as well. Charles Armstrong at Columbia University worked the North Korean archives before his career fell to a plagiarism finding, a cautionary figure the set still discusses. Kathryn Weathersby, who mined the Soviet documents on the war for the Cold War International History Project, supplies the archival model Jager's realism depends on. A younger cohort now reviews her in roundtables: Sangpil Jin, the historian of Korean neutrality who wrote Surviving Imperial Intrigues, Seo-Hyun Park, a political scientist of historical East Asian order, Jaehan Park, a student of grand strategy, and Paul Behringer, a historian of late Imperial Russia. The Texas National Security Review convened that group, which itself tells you where her readers sit.

Behind the working guild stands a lineage. Jager trained in anthropology at the University of Chicago, and the air she breathed there carried Benedict Anderson (1936–2015) and his account of nations as imagined communities, Marshall Sahlins (1930–2021) and the symbolic anthropology of the place, and Prasenjit Duara, who taught the field to rescue history from the nation. The Cold War history wing gives her another set of elders, John Lewis Gaddis (b. 1941) and the rewriting of the postwar story from the opened archives, and Odd Arne Westad (b. 1960), who carried that work into the global south and China. The strategic studies world supplies the consecrating ancestors whose names she now wears as honors. The prize she won bears the names of Robert Jervis (1940–2021), the security theorist, and Paul Schroeder (1927–2020), the diplomatic historian, the pairing of theory and archive the set treats as the ideal. Andrew Nathan (b. 1943) at Columbia reviewed Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea for the policy readership and folded her into that conversation. Her husband, Jiyul Kim, a retired Army officer who teaches history at Oberlin College, sits at the exact joint of campus and military that her career runs along.

The Currency of the Multilingual Archive

What does this set value. Above all it prizes command of the sources in the languages they were written in. The cardinal virtue is the scholar who reads Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and Russian and braids the archives of every party into one account. Reviewers praise Jager for the multilingual sourcing first, before they praise anything else, because that is the coin the guild mints. Close behind comes narrative craft. The set admires the big, lucid, sweeping book that a general reader can follow and a specialist cannot fault, and it rewards the crossover to a trade house, Harvard University Press's Belknap imprint or W. W. Norton & Company, that carries the work past the seminar. It values restored agency, the move that takes a supposed pawn and shows it choosing. And it values usefulness without capture, work that lands on a policy desk yet keeps the disinterest of the archive, never sliding into the cable-news take the set holds in quiet contempt.

The Ambition of the Scholar-Synthesizer

The hero of this world is the scholar-synthesizer. He masters several archives, spends a decade, and produces the volume that defines the question for twenty years, the six-hundred-page book that speaks at once to the graduate seminar and the war college lectern. He is neither the area-studies specialist who never leaves his sub-field nor the pundit who has no sources, and the set positions its hero in the narrow band between them. To overturn a reigning interpretation on the strength of new documents is the heroic act, which is why correcting Cumings on the archives earns more standing in this world than agreeing with anyone. The Cold War elders model the move. Gaddis and Weathersby showed that the highest deed is to rewrite settled history when the vaults open, and Jager's archival realism is a bid for exactly that laurel. Jervis and Schroeder, dead now and turned into a prize, embody the union the set worships, the theorist who respects the document and the historian who respects the theory.

The Fences of the Prize Economy

The status games follow from the heroes. The first game is the prize economy, and the prized move is the crossing. A historian who wins a political science association's book award, and then a military medal from the Royal United Services Institute in London, has jumped two fences that rarely open to the same person, and the set reads that double crossing as the clearest mark of arrival. The second game is the roundtable. When a journal gathers four scholars to weigh your book across a single feature, the field is telling you it must reckon with the work, and the reviewers gain standing in turn by being the ones chosen to reckon. The third game is the blurb, where who vouches for you signals which guilds claim you, so a Mitter blurb and a Gordon blurb together announce that both the China and the Japan rooms have let her in. A quieter game runs underneath all of these, the game of the prestige gradient. Jager holds her chair at Oberlin, a liberal-arts college rather than one of the research universities that dominate Korea studies, and her standing rests on the books rather than the letterhead. The set notices the seat you occupy, and it grants a particular respect to standing earned against the grain of the institutional map. The straddle is the last and riskiest game. A foothold in the security establishment buys reach and policy relevance, yet it can cost purity among humanities colleagues who distrust the military, yet the humanities credential in turn buys seriousness in the strategy world that the think-tank writers cannot match. Jager plays both sides of that board, and the play is the source of much of her standing and some of her exposure.

The Logic of Power and Memory

The normative claims of the set, the things its members hold that scholarship ought to do, are firm and repeated. History should give the small powers their agency and stop reading the periphery as a passive victim of the strong. The historian should read every side's archive, and the one-archive or one-language book is suspect on its face. Geopolitics is real and permanent, and the academy should drop the post-Cold War conceit that interstate rivalry was dissolving into global flows. Memory and force belong in one frame, since legitimacy and artillery move together and a history that separates them misses how power works. The large synthesis is a public good, and the scholar owes the reading public a book it can actually read. And the work should serve the policymaker without becoming his servant, informing strategy while keeping the freedom to tell him what he does not want to hear.

The Invented and Eternal Actor

The essentialist claims. The deepest is the durable national actor. The set studies how Israel, Korea, Japan, and China were constructed as nations, and Jager's own first book, Narratives of Nation-Building in Korea: A Genealogy of Patriotism, argues that Korean patriotism was made by named men under colonial pressure, yet the later geopolitical histories treat "Korea," "Russia," "China," and "Japan" as continuous actors with standing interests across a century, as though the nation were both invented and eternal. The set lives inside that contradiction and rarely resolves it. A second given is the permanence of great-power rivalry, the realist's faith that power and competition are features of the world rather than a passing phase, a faith that lets the set read the nineteenth century as a rhyme for the present. A third is the fixed strategic essence of the peninsula, the premise that Korea is by its geography a crush zone and a fulcrum, a near-determinist claim about place that even the agency-restoring historians lean on when they need the stakes to feel inevitable. A fourth is the truth-bearing archive, the positivist confidence that documents read in enough languages deliver what happened, which divides this set from the constructivist wing of the humanities that taught many of them and which treats the document as one more text. The last given is the transferable lesson, the belief that the past yields guidance that carries into present strategy, the working premise of every war-college syllabus and security roundtable that takes her book up.

The Seam Between Anthropology and Strategy

The defining tension of the Sheila set is the meeting of lineage and destination. The Chicago anthropology that formed her pulls toward construction, toward the claim that nations and memories are made and might have been made otherwise. The strategic establishment that honors her pulls toward permanence, toward power and geography and the standing interests of states. Most scholars pick a side. Her set is the small population that holds both, and Jager is its clearest specimen, the woman who can write that patriotism was invented and then write six hundred pages in which the invented nations behave like fixed and calculating powers. That is why the China room and the Japan room and the war college can all claim her at once.

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The Delicious Feuds of Rising Star

Posted on May 28, 2026 by Luke Ford

The quarrel that erupted around David Garrow’s (b. 1953) Rising Star: The Making of Barack Obama was never a quarrel about a long book. It became a contest over what presidential biography is for, what elite writers owe the myths they handle, how a scholar may use evidence about a living man, and which truths liberal institutions reward and which they punish. The surface looked petty. David Maraniss (b. 1949) called Garrow a vile competitor. Michiko Kakutani (b. 1955) called the book a slog. Beneath the insults ran a disagreement about the purpose of the form, and beneath that ran a fight over who controls the meaning of Barack Obama (b. 1961).

Garrow arrived at the dispute already a strange figure inside American letters. He won a Pulitzer Prize for Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, his study of Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968), and his reputation rested on a prosecutorial style. He belongs to a tradition of documentary maximalism. The premise of the method is plain. Moral understanding comes from accumulation, not from elegance or sympathy. Interview enough people, sit long enough with letters and schedules and FBI files and university records and the recollections of old lovers, and the heroic pose collapses into something colder and more contingent. The archive breaks the man. That instinct had already produced friction in the King work, where Garrow chased the anti-hagiographic detail and treated sanctification as a kind of corruption. He distrusts hero systems, and he distrusts liberal ones most of all, because those are the ones his own readers least expect him to touch.

Then came Obama, and the timing carried weight. Rising Star: The Making of Barack Obama appeared in 2017, just after Donald Trump’s victory, and by then Obama had stopped being a former president. For many educated liberals he had become a retrospective symbol of procedural sanity, racial reconciliation, and institutional competence, the anti-Trump made flesh. To complicate that symbol in 2017 read, to many, as an attack on a civic anchor people needed. Garrow worked nine years on the book and produced more than fourteen hundred pages. He had no interest in the anchor.

This is where the contrast with David Remnick (b. 1958) and Maraniss becomes the heart of the matter. Both men are serious reporters and serious biographers. Neither is a hack. But each works from an institution and a method that sit far from Garrow’s. Remnick edits The New Yorker and wrote The Bridge: The Life and Rise of Barack Obama, a portrait built for interpretive synthesis, moral atmosphere, and cadence. His task, by trade, is curatorial. He converts political actors into intelligible public symbols and stabilizes their meaning for an educated readership. He attends to contradiction, but to the kind of contradiction that deepens a man rather than dissolves him. Maraniss, out of The Washington Post, holds related but distinct ground. His Barack Obama: The Story is exhaustive in its reporting and disciplined in its shape. He hunts for the formative line running through a life and selects detail in proportion to that line. Carlos Lozada caught the division in a single stroke: Maraniss shows who Obama is, Remnick tells what Obama means, and Garrow tries to show how Obama lived. The phrase sounds literary. It is sociological.

Garrow detonated against both traditions because Rising Star: The Making of Barack Obama refuses proportion as a value. Reviewers called it bloated, indiscriminate, punishing. Kakutani, then the New York Times chief book critic and a defender of Obama, ran a front-of-section pan calling it more exhausting than exhaustive, a book in desperate need of editing. But the excess was a thesis, not a flaw of craft. Garrow believed earlier biographers had swallowed Obama’s self-construction without noticing, and he set out to drown the smoothness of the official story in granular fact until the seams showed. The flood was the argument.

That conviction explains his fixation on Obama’s romantic life, above all Sheila Miyoshi Jager, who lived with Obama for roughly two years and emerged in the book as a central interpretive witness. In conventional political biography, private attachments stay subordinate unless they touch public events. Garrow treats them as the place where the public man is built and concealed. He reads Obama’s compartmentalization, ambition, and constructed identity through these relationships, and he reads Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance as the first product of that construction. He calls the memoir a work of historical fiction, its most important composite character the narrator himself. Jager objected that Remnick had folded her into an unnamed White University of Chicago student, erasing a mixed-race woman to keep the racial arc clean. Garrow used that resentment as evidence and as a rebuke to his predecessor.

The complaint his critics raised was less about accuracy than about tone. Few reviewers caught Garrow in error. Many charged that he lingered too long where biography is not supposed to linger, that he could not separate the trivial from the essential. But what counts as trivial in a life is set by the biographer’s theory of politics, and there the three men split. Garrow holds that private arrangement illuminates public ambition. Remnick and Maraniss subordinate private disorder to the larger civic arc. The dispute over Jager is a dispute over what a leader is made of.

The conflict turned openly hostile because biography is a status-sensitive trade. Biographers compete for sources, for interpretive ownership, for the claim to the definitive account, and for the durable capital that the word “definitive” confers. Obama was prestige territory. Remnick had supplied the canonical literary portrait. Maraniss had supplied the deep excavation of origins. Garrow landed with a fourteen-hundred-page counterclaim and, in a closing epilogue that reviewers found graceless, went out of his way to cite unfavorable notices of the earlier books and to rank his own discovery above them. He told readers, in effect, that the insiders had sanitized their subject.

Maraniss answered in public. He called Garrow a vile, undercutting, ignoble competitor, and later, on C-SPAN, he held the line, separating respect for Garrow’s scholarship from contempt for his conduct as a researcher and writer. The word “undercutting” carries the freight. It assumes that elite biographical culture runs on tacit reciprocity. Rivals compete, but inside limits, and one does not move to wreck another writer’s standing with his sources or his readers. Garrow broke those limits as a matter of principle, since he regards collegial smoothing as a softer name for protecting power. Remnick, by contrast, mounted no comparable public assault. By some accounts he sent Garrow a courteous private note. The asymmetry is the tell. The man whose method is stewardship absorbed the blow quietly. The man whose method is reported narrative, with a reporter’s sense of fair play, went to the record and stayed there.

These differences encode three theories of politics. Remnick assumes a great political figure can carry the historical aspirations of a people, and his prose protects that capacity. Maraniss assumes a life becomes legible through formation and proportionate selection, and his prose hunts the through-line. Garrow assumes ambition runs strategic and self-constructing all the way down, and that the biographer’s first duty is to refuse enchantment. The Obama case sharpened all three positions because Obama is an unusually self-authored man. He arrived through memoir before he arrived through power, and the memoir set the template every later book had to work around. Garrow attacked the template at the root. To call Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance historical fiction is to call the self-narration a strategic artifact, and that charge threatens more than Obama. It threatens the prestige economy that had treated Obama as an unusually reflective politician whose account of himself could be trusted. Many of the people reacting had invested in that trust.

So the real question under the feud was never which book is better. The question was what a political leader is made of. Narrative purpose or strategic self-invention. Moral aspiration or elite adaptation. Authenticity or performance drilled into a second nature over decades. Each writer answered differently, and each answer carried a politics.

Here the hero system enters, and it helps to see that a hero system is a coalition technology, not a private taste. Obama serves different elite groups in different ways. For centrist liberal journalists he stands for institutional competence and procedural legitimacy. For Black professional elites he stands for ascent through mastery of establishment codes. For cosmopolitan meritocrats he stands for synthesis: elite schooling, multicultural fluency, emotional control, technocratic intelligence. A biography that honors the synthesis reinforces the coalitions that depend on it. A biography that picks at the seams weakens them. Garrow finds the very smoothness suspect, and the smoother the public man, the harder he digs for the fracture beneath. That impulse made him useful to liberal institutions for as long as he aimed it at America’s older sins. His King work pleased the same readership because it targeted racism, FBI abuse, and state repression. The trouble began when the demystifying habit turned inward, against liberalism’s own exemplary man, and the coalition that had sheltered him thinned.

The pattern held afterward. Garrow’s later writing on the King FBI files drew heavy fire, with scholars accusing him of credulity toward documents produced by a discrediting campaign. The charge against him was no longer that he complicated a hero. It was that he had begun handing ammunition to the enemies of the tradition that made him. The same instinct that won applause when aimed at the FBI drew alarm when its products could serve the other side. Demystification, it turns out, is welcome only when it runs in the approved direction.

Two structural features sit under the whole episode. The first is a status fight inside prestige nonfiction, where the definitive biography confers lasting authority and where a massive late entrant can claim primacy over shorter, earlier work by credentialed insiders. The second is a coalition map. Liberal journalism, trade publishing, and the academy overlap in the networks that first elevated Obama and then policed his legacy, and Kakutani‘s pan, arriving from the New York Times before most readers had the book in hand, shows how fast that policing moves. Garrow occupied an awkward seat in this map. He came from the left and from the academy, yet he answered to neither a conservative cause nor a court-historian’s loyalty. That independence made his critique harder to dismiss and harder to forgive. A partisan attack can be filed away. An attack from inside the family, by a man with a Pulitzer for the right subjects, cannot.

The feud, then, repays attention beyond its insults. In a polarized media age, the lives of political leaders become contested ground, and biographies serve as instruments for building or dismantling the myths that hold a coalition together. Garrow’s offense was that he insisted symbols are assembled through ambition, suppression, editing, and ruthless self-creation, and that he pressed the claim not against a villain but against the exemplary liberal man at the moment that man had become a wounded establishment’s comfort. The three Davids share a world. They are products of the same postwar meritocracy, educated men trained to interpret power for other educated men. They differ on the one question that decides everything else. Whether the writer’s task is to preserve a usable meaning for their political coalition, or to pursue the truth.

‘Status is Weird‘

Garrow points the floodlight at the one spot the game cannot survive. Documentary maximalism turns the lights on. The fourteen hundred pages, the FBI files, the schedules, the old lovers, the university records, the flood you already read as a thesis reads here as a refusal to let the game run in the dark. Remnick and Maraniss play biography as a sacred calling. Stewardship, moral atmosphere, the through-line. Garrow walks in and announces that the calling is a contest for the word “definitive,” and that the elegance of the calling hides the contest. He does to the guild what he does to Obama. He names the game while the other players still need it unnamed. That, in Pinsof’s terms, is the offense. Not that he complicated a symbol, which your essay covers, but that he broke the condition that keeps a prestige game alive: shared unawareness.
The heat follows from this. Maraniss calls the book “undercutting” and “ignoble,” and Pinsof tells you why the language runs so hot. This is the angry defense of a fragile game. “How dare you mock dueling. It is a noble tradition of manly honor.” Maraniss does not answer a factual charge. He answers a man who turned the lights on, and the vehemence measures how much the dark was protecting.
Garrow’s brutalism is a status bid dressed as indifference to status. The artfully tussled hair. He refuses proportion, elegance, sympathy, and cadence, and the refusal signals that he cares about something higher than literary grace. He cares about raw fact. But the anti-elegance is a move inside the same prestige economy he claims to expose. He still wants “definitive.” He still ranks his discovery above the insiders in his epilogue. The man who breaks every pose strikes one of his own: the incorruptible archivist, the only honest reader in the room. Pinsof would say the demystifier is playing an anti-status game, and an anti-status game is a status game with the lights kept off in a different corner.
Sacred values do the shielding, and each writer guards a different one. Remnick guards the leader who can carry a people’s historical aspirations. Maraniss guards the reporter’s code, the collegial reciprocity, the limits rivals do not cross. Garrow attacks the sacred value at the root when he calls Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance historical fiction. He questions the taboo, which is that the self-authored man can be trusted about himself. Kakutani’s pan arriving before most readers held the book shows the speed at which a guild defends a sacred narrative under threat. The pan is not literary judgment. It is a fire door.
We attack the games we lose and defend the games we win. Garrow loses the literary game. His prose draws words like punishing and bloated. So he attacks that game and calls proportion a swallowing of Obama’s self-construction and elegance a soft name for complicity. He wins the maximalist game, so he defends it as the one method that does not flinch. Remnick and Maraniss win the literary game, so they defend it as noble and call Garrow’s flood indiscriminate. Each man’s theory of biography tracks the game he can win. Pinsof says every culture war runs on this, and the three Davids are running a small one.
Then the timing. 2017, just after Trump. The Obama symbol was a young status game played hard in the dark by educated liberals who needed him as the figure of procedural sanity. Garrow turned the lights on at the moment the room most needed the dark. Pinsof predicts that defensiveness peaks when a game is both fragile and freshly necessary, and the reaction confirms it. A settled reputation absorbs a hit. A symbol people are still leaning on does not.
One limit. Pinsof flattens. His model treats all the noble talk as cover for status-seeking, which leaves it unable to tell you whether Garrow is right about Obama. Few reviewers caught him in error. If the archive does break the man, “it is all a status game” cannot register that, because the frame dissolves the truth question instead of answering it. The status reading explains the temperature of the feud and the shape of the defenses. It says nothing about whether the colder thing under the pose is there. That part the documents have to settle, not the theory.

Mary Douglas on the Dirt

Douglas gives the complaint its grammar. Dirt is matter out of place. No substance is dirt by nature. Soil on the boot is fine. Soil on the dinner plate is filth. The matter does not change. The location does. So when reviewers said Garrow lingered where biography should not linger, they made a claim about place, and your reading catches the center of it. Obama’s sex life, his calculation, his composite self sit clean enough in the private file. Move them to the heart of the civic story and they read as contamination. The objection arrives as disgust because pollution registers as disgust, not as error. You do not refute dirt. You back away from it. That is why few critics caught Garrow in a mistake and many called the book a slog, exhausting, graceless, unbecoming. The charge was never about accuracy. A purity charge cannot be.
Political biography runs on a classification scheme. It sorts a life into public matter that belongs at the center and private matter that stays subordinate unless it touches public events. The schema is the order, and the order is what cleanliness protects. Garrow adds no false facts. He reorders. Sheila Miyoshi Jager sits in the box marked private. He carries her to the box marked formative and makes her a central witness. The pollution is the crossing, not the woman and not the page count. Maraniss feels a violation he cannot quite ground in fact because the violation is taxonomic. Garrow put the bedroom where the schema keeps the campaign.
The body works as an image of the society, and the body’s margins carry the heaviest danger because they stand for the threatened edges of the whole. Sexual matter sits at that margin. Obama is a man whose body stood for a body politic, the figure of reconciliation and competence made flesh. To handle his sexual history loosely is to handle the nation’s edges loosely. The revulsion at Garrow’s pages on Jager and the others is revulsion at a writer pressing on the margins of a sacred body. The critics could not say this. Douglas can.
The normal operation of the genre is a cleansing rite. Proportion, selection, the search for the through-line wash the private mess of a life into clean public meaning. Remnick performs the rite through cadence and synthesis. Maraniss performs it through formation and the disciplined line. The rite is what turns soil into soil-in-its-place. Garrow refuses to wash. He leaves the dirt where it fell and calls the refusal honesty. The offense the critics felt and could not name is an unperformed purification. Not a bad book. An unclean one.
The anomaly point closes the circuit, and here Douglas only sharpens what you already saw. Matter that fits no category draws the strongest pollution response, because it threatens the scheme rather than any single slot inside it. Garrow comes from the left and the academy and answers to neither a conservative cause nor a court historian’s loyalty. He fits no box, so he reads as contaminating rather than merely wrong. The scheme has no shelf for him, and a thing with no shelf gets handled as filth.
One limit. Douglas explains the shape of the disgust without ruling on where the boundary should sit. Some matter truly is out of place. A biographer can dump real trivia into the civic story and then cry censorship when readers recoil. The frame names the boundary work. It cannot tell you whether Garrow placed the bedroom well or badly, only that the placement, and not the truth of the facts, is what his critics were defending. Whether the clean Obama edits out a real life, or Garrow smuggles in a dirty one, the frame leaves open. That part the archive settles.

Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002)

Bourdieu shows an economy turned upside down. At the autonomous pole the producer earns recognition by renouncing the rewards of the heteronomous one. Sales, readability, the grateful reviewer, the brisk page count, these mark a man as a tradesman. Their absence marks him as serious. So Garrow’s nine years, his fourteen hundred pages, his punishing prose stop looking like failures of craft and start working as the coin of consecration. The more the book repels the market, the more it banks at the other pole. Loser wins. Kakutani means her pan as a withdrawal. She calls the book exhausting and unreadable and unedited, and at the heteronomous pole that ruins a man. Read at the autonomous pole, the same charge reads as a medal. The orthodoxy’s weapon converts into the heretic’s proof of disinterest.
The prize beneath the prize is the power to set the exchange rate. My essay treats “definitive” as durable authority, which is true and where most readers stop. Bourdieu shows the deeper stake. Each man fights to make the field recognize his currency as the legitimate one. Garrow wants archival exhaustiveness consecrated as the standard. Remnick wants interpretive synthesis. Maraniss wants reported formation and proportion. Whoever wins the Obama contest does more than win Obama. He sets which kind of capital converts into authority for the next writer who takes up a president. The feud is a struggle over the dominant principle of value in the field.
Reviewers found the closing graceless, the citing of rivals’ bad notices, the ranking of his own discovery above theirs. In the academic field those gestures are required. A scholar situates his contribution against the literature, names his predecessors, stakes his priority. Garrow did what his training formed him to do. He carried the academic habitus into a journalistic-literary salon that buries its competition under good manners, and the imported gesture read as vile. Maraniss reaches for “undercutting” and “ignoble” because a man trained in his field never states the ranking aloud. The clumsiness is a field-crossing. The scholar’s body moves by one set of rules inside a room that runs on another, and the room recoils. The establishment then closes ranks the way a field always treats the heresiarch, less to refute his facts than to defend the shared belief that the calling is noble and not a market for rank.
One limit. The field map reads the war and names the weapons. It cannot say who is right about Obama.

Hayden White (1928-2018)

White works with four plots: Romance, Tragedy, Comedy, Satire. Remnick takes Romance, the hero who carries a people’s hope. Garrow takes Satire, the ironic plot that punctures. Maraniss, in White’s own vocabulary, sits closer to Comedy than to a plain developmental novel, since his through-line resolves a life into a harmonious whole, formation reconciled with destiny. That leaves Tragedy, and no one wrote it. The tragic Obama is the man undone by the gifts that raised him, the rise that carries its own fall. Remnick’s Romance forbids the fall. Garrow’s Satire forbids the greatness. Maraniss’s comic integration forbids the reversal. The plot that might hold ascent and ruin together never gets told, and its absence shows what each writer could not afford to see.
Some might argue that all three had the facts and chose different stories. White says the choosing comes first. The historian prefigures his field by a trope before he selects a single document. So Garrow’s flood is not the source of his irony. The irony came first, and the fourteen hundred pages arrive already shaped by it. This is why more evidence could never end the feud. Each archive enters under a plot the writer settled on upstream of the record. The dispute lives above the facts, where the form gets chosen, and no quantity of documents reaches up to that level to decide it.
The choice of plot carries a politics, and White locates the politics inside the form rather than laid on top of it. Romance restores and consoles. It is the conservative, redemptive shape, and it consecrates its hero by design. Satire corrodes and withholds consolation, and it serves a skeptical or radical end. When Remnick reaches for Romance he chooses to anoint. When Garrow reaches for Satire he chooses to disenchant. Neither smuggles his politics in as bias. The politics rides in the plot itself, so the formal quarrel and the political one are the same quarrel.
This also explains the tonal complaints about Rising Star. Exhausting, needs editing, no proportion. Read through White, these are objections to withheld closure. Romance and Comedy deliver the shapely ending and the moral. Satire denies both. In The Content of the Form White ties the demand for narrative closure to a demand for authority, for a story that resolves into law. Readers in 2017 wanted Obama to resolve into a usable figure. Garrow handed them the open record and called the refusal honesty. The recoil is a demand for an ending that the ironic mode refuses to supply.
One limit. White’s relativism slides toward the claim that the same facts admit any plot, and so no plot runs truer than another.

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Sydney and Melbourne Talkback: A Comparative History, 1967 to 2026

Posted on May 28, 2026 by Luke Ford

The convict-versus-free-settler story is the explanation Australians reach for first about almost any difference between the two cities, and that is the warning sign. It explains too much. Transportation to New South Wales ended in 1840. Talkback as a legal format arrived in 1967. Between the founding and the first shock jock sit five or six generations and a complete turnover of population through gold, federation, and postwar migration. A theory that has to travel that far without picking up other causes along the way is doing more asserting than explaining.

The cliché also collapses the moment you look past Melbourne’s 3AW. Derryn Hinch (b. 1944) built a Melbourne career on naming offenders, courting contempt charges, and calling himself the Human Headline. Nothing genteel there. And the best-selling newspaper in the country is the Herald Sun, a Melbourne tabloid, brash by design. If free-settler origins bred a city that prizes restraint and rejects bombast, someone forgot to tell its biggest paper and its loudest broadcaster.

John Pascoe Fawkner (1792-1869), one of the two men credited with founding Melbourne, came to Port Phillip as a boy because his father had been transported as a convict. The free-settler city has a convict at its origin. Tasmania, harsher as a penal colony than Sydney ever was, supplied many of Melbourne’s early arrivals. The two founding populations were never as separate as the story wants.

Other causes fit the talkback contrast better. Sydney is the city of property and quick money, and its talkback fused early with state politics and the land trade, which is why a Sydney host could move premiers. That gives you combat and the assumption of a corrupt insider deal far more directly than a memory of leg irons does. Personality and ownership matter too. The shock-jock format in Sydney rode on a few specific men and a commercial strategy built around them. Then there is the awkward fact for any founding-determines-everything account: after the gold rush Melbourne was the larger and richer city, grand and self-satisfied, while Sydney caught up only in the twentieth century. The supposedly refined free-settler town was the boom town flush with money. The neat line from convict ship to 2GB has to skip over that.

The founding stories work less as causes and more as myths each city performs about itself. Sydney tells itself it is the larrikin who distrusts the boss. Melbourne tells itself it is the orderly citizen who runs the committee. Talkback reflects those self-images and sells them back to the audience. On that reading the origin shapes the radio, but through story and identity rather than through any inheritance carried in the blood from the First Fleet.

Talkback radio holds a particular place in Australian media. The form mixes news, opinion, entertainment, and a rough public square. It became legal in April 1967, after engineers gave stations a seven-second delay that let them cut a caller before libel or obscenity reached the air. Until then the law treated the broadcast of a telephone call as an offence. A few stations had defied it. 3AK and 2UW tried talkback in 1963 and dropped it under regulatory pressure. 3AK's Openline ran callers through a clumsy workaround. The presenter listened, summarized the point on air, and played a heavily edited snippet behind a loud, distorting bleep that satisfied the Postmaster-General's inspectors. Wayne Mac, who tells this early history in Don't Touch That Dial, calls it radio in a straitjacket, a technical dance around a law that treated a phone call as an act of national security. The seven-second delay changed both the law and the craft.

The start was national, not local. Just after midnight on 17 April 1967, Ormsby Wilkins (1916-1976) took the first legal talkback calls on Sydney's 2UE. Engineers had spent weeks testing the tape-loop delay, and the studio was tense. Wilkins opened the lines with a flat invitation. "Well, here we are. It's legal. Give me a call." The first caller was a woman who wanted to complain about the price of milk. Wilkins argued with her on the spot and set the tone for Sydney talkback in a single exchange. Mike Walsh (b. 1938) opened the format on 2SM and kept it short, two hours a day, on the theory that listeners might tire of it. Melbourne went the other way. 3DB called itself The Conversation Station and threw the doors open. Its first host was the quiz champion and future Australian Labor Party figure Barry Jones (b. 1932). Pat Jarrett followed him, and her guest, the Victorian Premier Sir Henry Bolte (1908-1990), took calls from listeners, a first for an Australian politician. The Melbourne launch overwhelmed the Postmaster-General's Department, which had underestimated the public appetite. Within half an hour the volume of callers jammed the central Melbourne exchange and blocked business and emergency calls across the city. Technicians had to beg the station to tell listeners to stop dialing. The launch pushed 3DB to the top of the ratings. Norman Banks opened talk on 3AW. John Laws (b. 1935) did the same on 2UE. The two cities began at the same moment, with the same delay, under the same law.

Melbourne host Barry Jones prepared with method. In his memoir A Thinking Reed he recalled reducing talkback to about seventy-five subjects, writing an editorial on each, and keeping the folio open in front of him through the morning. The form looked spontaneous. It rested on preparation. That tension between spectacle and craft runs through the whole history that follows.

From a shared birth the two cities moved apart. Sydney built a confrontational, host-driven style across the 1970s and 1980s. 2UE and later 2GB grew the shock jock, a host who fused entertainment, outrage, and political advocacy, and who sold. John Laws moved between stations and syndicated his morning program across the country. He cultivated an old-world masculinity at odds with the convict-city populism he traded on. He wore heavy gold jewelry, drove fast cars, and broadcast into a gold-plated microphone. He called his audience the world and opened with a boom. "I'm John Laws, the whole world is listening." He once told listeners, "You know my views. I'm not always right, but I'm never wrong." The line stuck because it caught the paradox of talkback authority. Listeners did not tune in for neutrality. They tuned in for certainty. His blend of homespun authority and commercial reach made 2UE the most powerful talkback brand in the nation for years.

The model paid, and it carried risk. A 1999 inquiry by the Australian Broadcasting Authority found that Laws and Alan Jones (b. 1941) held undisclosed agreements to give sponsors favourable comment on air. Counsel assisting, Marcus Einfeld, pressed Laws on the secret payment of more than a million dollars from the Australian Bankers' Association to soften his criticism of the banks. Laws answered with the commercial logic of Sydney radio laid bare. "I am an entertainer. I am not a journalist. I am a commercial vehicle." The finding shocked media elites more than listeners. Ordinary listeners already sensed that the show mixed commerce and personality into one performance. It did little to slow either man.

Laws also carried the old Australian star system to the edge of parody. Kerry Packer (1937-2005) treated radio hosts as strategic assets and grasped before most politicians that talkback could set an emotional weather long before a newspaper fixed the story. He reportedly phoned station executives when he thought Laws was under pressure. Politicians waited outside the studio hoping for a kind mention. The studio worked as a parallel court. One former minister said an appearance with Laws mattered more at the ballot box than a week in Parliament. A famous story, perhaps half apocryphal, has Packer ringing Laws after a hard broadcast with one line. "You're talking to the people they all think they own." True or not, it survived because it caught the alliance listeners felt between populist radio and their own resentment of the establishment.

Alan Jones crossed from 2UE to 2GB in 2002 and took a financial stake in his new home. His breakfast program led Sydney for close to two decades and won more than two hundred ratings surveys. His preparation bordered on the monastic. Producers described him arriving before dawn with folders of marked clippings, polling data, ministerial briefings, and handwritten notes. The broadcast sounded improvised. It rested on industrial preparation. He pressed hard lines on immigration, industrial relations, and climate policy, and he spoke for what he called the battlers. He also understood radio as intimacy rather than commentary. After the 1999 Sydney hailstorm and the 2002 Childers fire, listeners rang him for reassurance as much as for news. One Liberal Party operative said Jones could "make middle Australia feel as if the nation itself was speaking through the kitchen radio." A Sydney commentator called his style "an audio blowtorch applied to the bellies of the powerful." He spoke with the rapid cadence of a tobacco auctioneer and the authority of a headmaster. Premiers and prime ministers took his calls. One New South Wales premier reportedly kept an unlisted line to Jones's desk. A policy attacked at quarter past six might draw a call from the premier by half past, promising a review.

The intensity could combust. In 2012 Jones told a Sydney University Young Liberals dinner that Prime Minister Julia Gillard's father had died of shame. Activist campaigns drove advertisers from his program in large numbers. The affair also showed the tribal shape of his audience. Many listeners read the backlash not as accountability but as an assault by metropolitan elites on their man. Sydney rewarded this radio. The city sat at the centre of national finance and media, its market the richest and most crowded, and that market paid for high-stakes, personality-led talk. The style matched the city's sense of itself, ambitious, loud, built on display.

Melbourne grew a steadier tradition, and it centred on 3AW. The station dates from 1932. It moved into talk early and prized the interview over the tirade. Norman Banks set the early tone and held to it with a formality that now sounds archaic. He wore a suit and tie to the studio into the 1970s, believing visual dignity carried into the voice. He refused callers their slang and cut off a man who said "yeah" instead of "yes." Neil Mitchell (b. 1951) carried the tradition furthest. He held the 3AW morning chair from 1990 until his retirement at the end of 2023, more than three decades. His method came from police rounds and court reporting rather than theatrical populism. Victorian premiers feared him less as an ideologue than as a patient accumulator of local grievance. He could pursue a single planning dispute or policing failure for days until the bureaucracy yielded. During the 2020 and 2021 lockdowns his show became the shadow parliament of Victoria. He did not shout the premier down. He read out emails from desperate small business owners and held the silence until the answers came. He put the method plainly. "You don't need to scream at people to make them sweat. You just need to have the facts, and you need to hold the silence until they answer." His program shaped Victorian debate without the national controversy that trailed Jones. Attempts to plant Sydney-style shock jocks in Melbourne mostly failed. The city preferred a cooler register, in keeping with its self-image as the country's cultural and institutional capital. Community radio reinforced the point. 3CR began in 1976 and gave progressive, participatory voices a home outside the commercial mainstream.

The medium stayed technologically primitive even at its peak. Producers screened callers by hand. Hosts worked from paper notes, vocal rhythm, and instinct. Against television, radio kept a startling closeness. Derryn Hinch (b. 1944) once called it "the only medium where the audience feels you are sitting at the kitchen table with them." That closeness produced moments of civic revelation. During the 1983 Ash Wednesday fires, Melbourne talkback stations became improvised emergency systems. Callers reported road closures, missing relatives, livestock deaths, and wind changes in real time. The medium stopped being entertainment and became public infrastructure. The pattern returned on Black Saturday in 2009, when Mitchell stayed on air for hours as frightened callers described conditions town by town. Melbourne talkback often worked this way, less a national ideological platform than a municipal nervous system.

The contrast ran deeper than radio. Sydney shows its wealth in harbour light and water frontage. Melbourne keeps its power behind brick, behind clubs and law and family names spoken at low volume. Sydney sells sunlight. Melbourne sells a code. Talkback caught the difference. Sydney radio performed. Melbourne radio convened. The car shaped both. Sydney's sprawl and traffic made captive audiences, and the host rode with listeners across the Sydney Harbour Bridge and down the Parramatta Road bottlenecks. The city's anger and impatience turned into confrontational radio. Melbourne's shorter commutes and denser neighbourhoods fed a more communal style. The city listened together, not in rivalry.

Melbourne also folded into its talk the one passion the city treats as civic religion. Australian Rules football runs through 3AW the way harbour glamour runs through Sydney. Football broadcasters in Melbourne reached a near-clerical authority. Lou Richards (1923-2017), Rex Hunt (b. 1949), Bruce McAvaney (b. 1953), and the later voices tied to 3AW and SEN became interpreters of the city's mood. A Melbourne listener might distrust Parliament and trust football radio without reserve. The bond shows in small absurdities. One caller phoned the 3AW breakfast from a hospital delivery room, ignoring his newborn, to argue with Ross Stevenson about a holding-the-ball decision from the Saturday night match at the MCG. It shows in graver moments too. In 1993 Nicky Winmar (b. 1965) lifted his jumper at Victoria Park and pointed to his skin after racial abuse from the crowd. The talkback lines exploded. Radio became the arena where Melbourne argued about race, class, tribal loyalty, and the moral meaning of the game. Football coverage on 3AW is not a sideline. It is part of the civic fabric, a meeting ground for the city's tribes, and it ties the station to its audience in a way no single host could match.

The callers formed their own hidden institution. Veteran producers noticed the same voices returning day after day under different names and accents. Some hosts cultivated the regulars because they could light up a quiet line. Others despised them as cranks and hobbyists. Either way they gave the medium its participatory texture. One Sydney producer said "every suburb had its prophet." Retirees, taxi drivers, insomniacs, amateur constitutional theorists, lonely widows, failed businessmen, union obsessives, and local cranks all joined the same queue. Talkback pressed the class order into one acoustic space.

By the 2000s and 2010s these styles hardened into distinct roles. Sydney talkback worked as a power broker. It amplified conservative causes, mobilised audiences, and on occasion moved a state election. Melbourne talkback stayed engaged but local, embedded in civic argument and less aligned to one side of politics. The ratings followed the cultures. 2GB led Sydney breakfast and drive through these years. 3AW held the top of the Melbourne market across most of the day, on listener loyalty more than on any personality cult.

The contemporary period brought the same pressures to both cities. The AM talkback audience aged and shrank. Podcasts, streaming, and social platforms split attention and advertising. The hosts who built the modern era left the stage. Alan Jones retired from the 2GB breakfast chair in May 2020. Ben Fordham (b. 1976) moved up from drive and took it. Ray Hadley (b. 1954), who held 2GB mornings for decades, stepped down, and Mark Levy took the slot. Melbourne saw a parallel turnover. Mitchell retired at the end of 2023. Tom Elliott moved from drive to mornings, Jacqui Felgate took the drive chair, and Tony Moclair shifted into afternoons. Ross Stevenson and Russel Howcroft, billed as Ross and Russ, held the 3AW breakfast that has anchored the Melbourne market for years.

The survival of the format surprised the analysts who thought podcasts would bury it. Podcasts reproduced much of talkback's psychology, the long-form voice, the parasocial company, the ritual habit. They differ in structure. Podcasts split audiences into niches. Talkback still creates simultaneity. Thousands hear the same voice react to the same event at the same moment, and that shared time is hard to copy. One former Nine Entertainment executive called talkback "the last campfire medium." The phrase explains the survival despite the demographic decline. Radio still offers the sense that a city is listening together.

Ownership changed at the top. In January 2026 Nine Entertainment agreed to sell its entire radio business to the Laundy family for about fifty-six million dollars, a steep discount on earlier hopes. The deal covers 2GB, 3AW, 4BC, 6PR, and a set of smaller and regional stations. The network rebranded as Tapt Media on 1 May 2026, with the call signs kept in place, and the sale is set to complete by the end of June 2026 once the competition regulator clears it. Arthur Laundy, the hotel magnate behind the bid, comes from the pub trade, and his family has signalled a focus on talk, live streaming, podcasting, and data-led advertising under the incoming chief executive Tom Malone. Analysts puzzled over a hotelier buying an aging AM asset. Laundy's own account cut to why the format survives. "A good talk station is exactly like a good pub. People go there because they want to know what the neighborhood is thinking, they want an argument, and they don't want to feel lonely. If you can run a front bar, you can run 2GB and 3AW." A listed media company walked away from broadcast radio. A private family with deep roots in hospitality bought it as a long-term, cost-conscious bet on the talk format and its loyal core.

The first ratings of 2026 show the old order holding for now. 2GB sits as the number one talk station in Sydney, and Ben Fordham leads the city's breakfast market, his share up on the prior survey. Mark Levy leads talk in mornings. 3AW stands as the outright number one station in Melbourne, ahead in both breakfast and mornings, with Ross and Russ at the front. Both stations lead their markets in live streaming and rank high in podcast downloads, the survival routes for a legacy form. 2GB marks its hundredth year in 2026, and the Continuous Call Team its fortieth. The strength is real, and it is also narrow. The audience skews older, more regional, more conservative, and the FM competitors press hard. The Sydney contest sharpened the point. When the KIIS FM breakfast pair Kyle Sandilands (b. 1971) and Jackie O ran ahead of 2GB in the 2024 breakfast count, Sandilands mocked the station as "the home of the walking dead." Fordham's climb back to the front in 2026 was celebrated inside Tapt Media as a win for hard-nosed Sydney news over the Hollywood gossip machine. 3AW holds a wider lead, less exposed to a single rival.

So the history shows unity and divergence at once. A shared national timeline, from the 1920s foundations of Australian radio to the 1967 talkback opening, gave way to two city traditions shaped by local markets, local tastes, and two different ideas of what a city should be. Sydney built its talk on populist spectacle and political muscle. Melbourne built its talk on journalistic steadiness and civic trust. The digital tide and the shift to private ownership now press on both, and the two stations answer with podcasts, streams, and a tighter grip on their core listeners. Talkback in Australia still works as a barometer of public life, and its two strongest voices still carry the accents of the cities that made them. The form looks worn. It has not gone quiet.

Posted in Melbourne, Radio, Sydney | Comments Off

The Code: Power, Privacy, and the Closed Rooms of Melbourne

Posted on May 28, 2026 by Luke Ford

Melbourne runs on a colder grammar than Sydney. Sydney shows its wealth in harbour light, skin, and water frontage. Melbourne hides power behind brick and rain, behind clubs and law and football boxes and family names spoken at lower volume. The city does not reward obvious glamour. It rewards the man who knows the room before he enters it: which lunch counts, which board counts, which school tie still opens a door, which gallery dinner is real and which Grand Final box is only ceremonial. Sydney sells sunlight. Los Angeles sells access to myth. New York sells proximity to power. Melbourne sells initiation into a code, and its highest-status gatherings work as examinations in belonging. The people who pass them make hierarchy look like manners.

The city’s self-image is seriousness. It thinks itself more cultivated than Sydney, less vulgar than the Gold Coast, more institutional than Brisbane, more historically weighted than Perth. The claim flatters Melbourne, and it governs behaviour all the same. Status comes from appearing embedded rather than merely rich. Money matters enormously, but it must pass through culture, sport, law, philanthropy, property, food, or family continuity before it turns legitimate. What follows maps the leading cliques, the quarrels between and inside them, and where the pressure seems to lead.

The old establishment and its clubs

The inherited prestige skeleton still stands. The Melbourne Club, the Athenaeum Club, the Australian Club, the Lyceum Club, and the Savage Club hold the residue of pastoral wealth, law, medicine, banking, and university power. These rooms are memory machines. They like oak, portraits, discretion, long wine lists, and the fiction that nothing important happens because everyone present already knows what does. The world runs through Toorak, South Yarra, Armadale, East Melbourne, Hawthorn, Kew, Brighton, and the better stretches of the Mornington Peninsula.

The highest-status man here is rarely the richest. He is the man whose father, grandfather, school, club, board seats, holiday house, football allegiance, and philanthropy all point the same way. Old Melbourne admires continuity because continuity proves restraint. New money buys the house, the car, and the table. It cannot buy the inherited ease with which a man crosses a room where everyone knows the scandal attached to every fortune. Anthony Pratt (b. 1960) sits near the centre as patriarch of Visy‘s industrial and recycling capital. Solomon Lew (b. 1945) runs Premier Investments and its boards with calculated leverage. John Gandel (b. 1935) holds the shopping-centre fortune. Lindsay Fox (b. 1937) built the logistics empire from a single truck and turned it into civic weight. The heirs of Marc Besen (1923-2023) carry retail and arts money into the next generation through his daughters Naomi Milgrom (b. 1952) and Carol Schwartz (b. 1955). The Smorgon family spread across manufacturing, recycling, property, and investment. The Valmorbida food-and-wine dynasty runs through the same circuits.

The schools as deeper infrastructure

Under the clubs sits the school system, the engine that reproduces the class more efficiently than any nightclub could. Melbourne Grammar School, Scotch College, Geelong Grammar School, Xavier College, St Kevin’s College, Wesley College, Trinity Grammar School, Carey Baptist Grammar School, Lauriston Girls’ School, Methodist Ladies’ College, Korowa Anglican Girls’ School, Ruyton Girls’ School, St Catherine’s School, Loreto Mandeville Hall, and Presbyterian Ladies’ College perform the work that Harvard-Westlake School does for Los Angeles, with a more severe social code. They teach belonging before achievement. They train voice, gesture, friendship, sport, and the ability to move through old rooms without looking impressed. The Associated Public Schools of Victoria and the grammar-school networks sort the city through rowing crews, trustee influence, and corporate placement. The stated claim is meritocratic cultivation. The unstated one is that access clusters inside a handful of postcodes and stays.

The legal and judicial caste

The law carries unusual prestige in Melbourne, more than in Sydney‘s business culture. The Victorian Bar, the Supreme Court of Victoria, the old commercial firms, and the university law faculties give the city a formal status system. Senior counsel, judges, regulatory figures, commercial litigators, and silk-heavy chambers form a caste whose standing rests on speech, memory, and reputation. A barrister at a private lunch might outrank a louder entrepreneur worth ten times as much. Melbourne respects forensic intelligence. It respects the man who can ruin another man slowly through a single sentence.

Finance, funds, and the allocator

The modern economic core runs through funds management, superannuation, infrastructure, property syndicates, and family offices. Melbourne no longer trades on pastoral or manufacturing capital alone. The industry-super world gives it a different kind of power from Sydney‘s investment-bank culture. Sydney likes deal velocity. Melbourne likes control of pools of capital. The admired figure is not the flamboyant rainmaker but the allocator, the man who sits over retirement money, hospitals, airports, energy, logistics, and private credit. The money circulates through Collins Street, Southbank, Cremorne, South Yarra, and the better restaurants. The real rooms stay quiet. The same men sit with the same men at the same tables because predictability itself reads as a credential.

Property, construction, and migrant capital

The property and construction network ranks among the strongest and most contested systems in the city. Melbourne‘s expansion built immense fortunes in apartments, suburban land, logistics, retail, and student housing. The old establishment looks down on developers while leaning on their donations, buildings, and political reach. The developers return the verdict, reading the establishment as hypocrites happy to moralise about taste while sitting on inherited land values created by the same scarcity politics they condemn.

This world overlaps heavily with migrant capital, Greek, Italian, Jewish, Chinese, Indian, and Middle Eastern Australian. Melbourne‘s elite story cannot run as Anglo continuity alone. The postwar migrant builders changed the city’s restaurants, retail strips, property markets, and football culture. The Chemist Warehouse fortune of Jack Gance, Sam Gance, and Mario Verrocchi shows the newest version of the same arc. The older elite absorbed some of these families and resisted others. The test was never money. The test was whether money could turn institutionally useful through a university gift, a hospital wing, a gallery donation, a school trusteeship, a racing sponsorship, or a football presidency.

The Jewish Melbourne network

The Jewish community forms a compact and powerful system, with its centre through Caulfield, Toorak, Armadale, St Kilda East, Elsternwick, Malvern, and Brighton. It carries disproportionate weight in law, medicine, property, philanthropy, retail, funds management, education, and the arts. Schools such as Mount Scopus Memorial College, Leibler Yavneh College, Bialik College, The King David School, and Beth Rivkah Ladies College shape communal reproduction. The leading families fuse immigrant memory, Holocaust memory, professional ambition, Zionist commitment, philanthropy, and tight social vetting. In Melbourne this world holds more old-world gravity than its Sydney counterpart. It faces inland rather than the beach, runs more intellectual and more institutional, and stays more cautious about exposure.

The Smorgon family stands as the emblematic dynasty of Jewish Melbourne capital. The Besen family carries similar weight through retail wealth and patronage, and Naomi Milgrom extends it into fashion and architecture through her foundation. Mark Leibler (b. 1944) represents another type: tax lawyer, communal figure, and political broker who has held the ear of prime ministers from both parties. The hero system admires the builder, the donor, the advocate, the senior doctor, the silk, the patriarch, and the brilliant child. Status runs through education, marriages, philanthropy, Israel commitments, communal reliability, and discreet wealth. Loud celebrity rarely ranks as the highest good.

The salon and hospitality court

The newest layer is a discretionary salon built on hospitality. Andrew Demetriou (b. 1961), the former AFL chief, anchors the private club Sanctum, the Melbourne answer to the studio system, the place everyone eventually wants inside. Andrew McConnell runs the cultural half through Cutler & Co., Gimlet, Supernormal, and Embla, rooms in which the city recognises itself. Chris Lucas built the other pole with Society, Grill Americano, and a scaled luxury operation. The Grossi family holds the old-world Italian seat at Florentino. Rinaldo Di Stasio represents a particular Melbourne ideal of art, severity, and intellectual hospitality through Di Stasio, and France-Soir holds the late-night wine-and-argument tradition. Flower Drum keeps its own quiet authority. A Sydney restaurant sells view and ease. A Melbourne restaurant sells discernment. The room says you know how to eat, how to talk, how to order, how to endure winter, how to treat difficulty as sophistication.

Art, the NGV, and cultural legitimacy

The art network is the city’s legitimacy machine. The National Gallery of Victoria, the Australian Centre for Contemporary Art, Heide Museum of Modern Art, the Melbourne Art Foundation, and the commercial galleries of Collingwood, Fitzroy, and South Yarra convert raw money into taste. Tony Ellwood (b. 1967) runs the NGV and its winter blockbusters. Naomi Milgrom, Janet Whiting, and the senior collectors sit among the patrons who turn capital into consecration. NGV openings draw old money, new money, designers, artists, academics, fashion editors, ministers, and corporate sponsors into one room. The elite distrusts pure commerce and depends on it. Collectors want consecration. Artists want patronage without servility. Old families want proof they remain civilisational rather than merely rich. Everyone performs disinterest while knowing who paid for the room.

Fashion, tech, and the knowledge class

Melbourne fashion runs on a smaller ecosystem than Sydney‘s and a harder editorial code. It likes black, tailoring, European reference, architectural silhouettes, and a suspicion of beach glamour. The set circulates through Spring Racing, Melbourne Fashion Week, NGV events, and luxury launches, and it favours taste that looks slightly forbidding. A younger influencer circuit has grown around Chapel Street, Cremorne, Prahran, Fitzroy, and Collingwood, around boutique gyms and cosmetic clinics and Pilates studios. Melbourne uses these people for attention and withholds deep legitimacy. The old city’s verdict stays brutal: visibility is not standing.

The tech and start-up world clusters in Cremorne, Richmond, Collingwood, and Southbank, with a design-heavy, product-oriented, education-linked feel. Square Peg Capital and the legacy of Seek and Carsales anchor the venture culture. Sam Hupert (b. 1957) built Pro Medicus into a medical-imaging giant, and the data-centre operator Robin Khuda turned infrastructure into one of the country’s largest new fortunes. These founders often want the city’s restaurant, gallery, and property worlds to accept them, which produces a gentler status anxiety. The founder holds the capital and still needs Melbourne to certify his taste. The universities reinforce the technocratic self-image. The University of Melbourne, Monash University, RMIT University, Swinburne University of Technology, Deakin University, and the medical research institutes give doctors, professors, and policy figures real standing, particularly when paired with philanthropy and board seats.

Sport as the great theatre

No city in Australia turns sport into status as thoroughly. The AFL is not entertainment. It is a civic religion, a political meeting ground, a business exchange, a tribal inheritance, and a masculine credentialing system. Grand Final week is Melbourne‘s secular high holy week. The best corporate boxes at the MCG work as governance chambers where premiers, chairmen, media executives, sponsors, barristers, and former captains circulate under the cover of football. Collingwood, Carlton, Essendon, Richmond, Hawthorn, Melbourne, Geelong, St Kilda, and the Western Bulldogs each carry a social mythology. Melbourne Football Club holds the old establishment association. Carlton keeps an aura of commercial aggression and migrant ambition. Collingwood carries working-class mythology even as its elite supporters now include boardroom power. Geelong holds regional aristocracy and pastoral confidence. Football collapses the city’s hierarchies for a few hours and reproduces them at the same time. The seating still tells the truth. Melbourne is egalitarian in speech and hierarchical in space.

Racing supplies the most visible high-status party system. The Melbourne Cup Carnival at Flemington, across Derby Day, Cup Day, Oaks Day, and Stakes Day, remains the great public theatre of the city’s society, and the Birdcage is the one place where Melbourne permits itself to look like a global luxury capital. Fashion houses, banks, liquor brands, footballers, racing families, and old establishment figures gather in a temporary village of marquees. Derby Day holds the highest social voltage because its black-and-white dress code flatters the city’s idea of itself: elegant, rule-bound, faintly severe. The Birdcage is a hierarchy inside a hierarchy. Some marquees sell brand visibility. Others sell access. Melbourne society knows the difference between being pictured and being placed. The racing elite of trainers, breeders, owners, bloodstock agents, and VRC figures holds a peculiar prestige because the sport joins money, animal judgment, risk, rural land, and ceremonial glamour. The admired figure knows horses without sounding theatrical.

Crown Melbourne keeps a strategic place in the prestige economy even with its aura damaged by regulatory scandal. Its scale, hotel infrastructure, private dining, and capacity to host visiting capital and celebrities keep everyone passing through. Melbourne knows Crown is compromised, and knows everyone still goes. The Formula One Australian Grand Prix at Albert Park supplies the sharpest modern glamour, importing drivers, watch brands, European sponsors, and private-aviation money. The Cup is old Melbourne dressed up for the nation. The Grand Prix is global luxury visiting for a weekend, and the city behaves like a place trying to prove it belongs on the circuit. That insecurity sharpens the status games. Who holds paddock access? Who reaches the team suite, the driver dinner, the afterparty where no one posts until the next day?

The feuds and faultlines

Old Melbourne against new money is the master conflict. Old Melbourne sees itself as restrained, educated, civic-minded, and tasteful. New money reads it as snobbish, closed, under-entrepreneurial, and hypocritically dependent on inherited property inflation. The old families call developers and hospitality figures vulgar. The developers reply by building the rooms, apartments, and donations that keep the city running.

Sydney against Melbourne sits behind much of the system as the emotional rivalry. Sydney thinks Melbourne cold, self-serious, provincial, and overinvested in restaurants and football. Melbourne thinks Sydney showy, shallow, real-estate obsessed, and culturally insecure. Both read each other half right. The rivalry holds because each city owns what the other lacks. Sydney has light, harbour, and money without apology. Melbourne has depth, institutions, and the trick of making difficulty feel like sophistication.

The gender question around the male-only clubs keeps its charge. Defenders speak of tradition, fellowship, and member preference. Critics see exclusion and an old boys’ network passing as harmless dining. The argument exposes that the prestige system still rests on controlled access to rooms where informal trust turns into professional advantage. Football carries its own wars over club tribalism, gambling, concussion litigation, and the collision of old masculine codes with contemporary institutional language. Racing faces animal-welfare critiques, gambling fatigue, and a generational shift in taste that has split the meaning of the Cup. For the elite, that division might even raise the prestige of attendance, since to take the right marquee affirms belonging to a world that no longer asks the young for permission.

The parties and where this leads

Melbourne is a calendar city, and its highest-status parties arrive in seasons rather than in one continuous nightlife. Status concentrates around the Grand Prix, the Melbourne International Comedy Festival, Fashion Week, NGV winter exhibitions, Grand Final week, the Spring Racing Carnival, the major charity balls, the private-school fundraisers, and the December exodus to Portsea, Sorrento, Flinders, Merricks, Red Hill, and Point Leo on the Mornington Peninsula. The apex gatherings run the same way they do in Sydney: invitation only, phones in pouches, guest lists kept small, the best nights leaving no trace online. The visible event starts the evening. Then the migration begins, the cars move toward Toorak and South Yarra, the publicists fall away, and the inner circle reconvenes in a walled house or a private club room.

Private-school balls and fundraisers form the under-discussed engine. They are not glamorous in any global sense, and they reproduce the ruling class with brutal efficiency. Parents perform generosity, taste, marriage stability, and network command across auction tables and foundation boards. The party is nominally for the school. The real purpose is dynastic positioning. The Mornington Peninsula weekend system runs as Melbourne‘s wintry answer to Palm Beach, where the city’s elite looks most relaxed because the sorting has already happened. Nobody needs to prove entry once inside the compound.

Where this leads looks clear. The elite system keeps turning more private, more seasonal, more insulated, and more international while it preserves its old vocabulary of seriousness. The public city complains about housing, transport, cost of living, and state debt. The private city keeps moving through school networks, clubs, race marquees, Grand Final boxes, Peninsula houses, gallery dinners, and quietly managed pools of capital. Tech and venture money keeps buying the historic estates of the old manufacturing and pastoral families, and the traditional commercial establishment might end as domestic managers inside larger global funds, which might shift real power away from local boards toward international capital. The school and dynasty system stays the engine under all of it, since it reproduces the network whichever fund wins and whichever platform survives. The deepest Melbourne status never announces itself. It accumulates. It sits on the right boards, gives to the right institutions, appears at Flemington, holds a view on the Demons or the Blues or the Cats, sends its children to the correct schools, speaks with controlled irony, and never seems surprised to be included.

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Invisible Sydney: The Cliques and Closed Rooms of a Harbour Aristocracy

Posted on May 28, 2026 by Luke Ford

Sydney runs on water and on memory. The city sorts its elite less by spectacle than by anchorage, and the highest standing belongs to the man who looks permanently moored: the right school behind him, the right board beneath him, the right jetty at the bottom of the garden, and almost no public footprint at all. Los Angeles sells reinvention. New York sells velocity. Sydney sells continuity, managed quietly, by families who have held the same harbour frontage for two and three generations and intend to hold it for two and three more. What follows maps the leading cliques, the quarrels running between and inside them, and the rooms where the city assembles when it does not want to be seen.

The eastern suburbs dynastic establishment

The closest thing Sydney has to a governing aristocracy clusters along a thin ribbon of sandstone: Point Piper, Bellevue Hill, Darling Point, Vaucluse, Woollahra, Double Bay, and across the water in Mosman. Wolseley Road in Point Piper now ranks as the most expensive street on the continent, with turnover so low that the houses pass by inheritance rather than sale. The schools feed the system and reproduce it: Sydney Grammar School, Cranbrook School, The Scots College, Saint Ignatius’ College Riverview, Ascham School, Kambala School, SCEGGS Darlinghurst, and Sydney Church of England Grammar School. University of Oxford, University of Cambridge, and the University of Sydney Law School extend the network outward, and increasingly the selective American graduate programs do too.

The names recur across boards, galas, racing syndicates, and trust deeds. James Packer (b. 1967) remains the emblematic figure even in semi-retreat, the inherited fortune fused to casino glamour and permanent volatility. His sister Gretel Packer (b. 1965) holds the quieter, steadier half of the dynasty. Lachlan Murdoch (b. 1971) operates as the trans-Pacific heir whose centre of gravity slid toward Los Angeles while his Australian symbolic weight stayed put. Sir Frank Lowy (b. 1930), still active at ninety-six through the family office and the Lowy Institute, set the template for the immigrant builder who converts retail capital into institutional permanence. Around them sit the Fairfax legacy families, the Smorgons, the Besens, the Oatleys, and the Triguboff property interests. Harry Triguboff (b. 1933) built apartment Sydney from below while this class watched from above.

Their claim is stewardship. They cast themselves as custodians of national continuity, and they treat wealth as a precondition for entry rather than a passport to it. A man needs polish, pedigree, behavioural fluency, and usually several generations of embeddedness. Philanthropy supplies the moral coating. Hospitals, galleries, universities, and sporting foundations turn capital into standing that money alone cannot buy. The apex man here wears RM Williams or unbranded Loro Piana, belongs to the Australian Club, sits through long lunches at Catalina, and never appears to want anything.

The Merivale court

No single private actor shapes the circulation of Sydney prestige more than Justin Hemmes (b. 1972) and the Merivale empire he inherited from his father John Hemmes (1931-2015) and rebuilt into a semi-private city-state. Establishment, Ivy, Mimi’s, Fred’s, Totti’s, Hotel CBD, the Newport Arms, and roughly a hundred other venues form a parallel Sydney through which lawyers, private-equity men, models, athletes, racing families, media executives, and visiting celebrities move in a continuous loop. The old nightclub collapsed years ago. The lockout laws scarred the city’s nightlife and pushed glamour behind doors. Hemmes read the shift early. Afflevant Sydney wanted controlled spontaneity, not chaos, and he sold it controlled spontaneity at scale.

Hemmes himself functions as a kind of civic prince. His social visibility outruns that of most elected ministers, and the European DJs, fashion executives, and private-equity heirs orbit his calendar rather than the reverse. The room that matters at a Merivale night is rarely the public dining floor. It sits upstairs, behind a velvet rope, or it moves entirely, to a harbour mansion after the official event ends or to a vessel running between Rose Bay and Pittwater. Status here comes from being known to the host and trusted by him, not from the table itself.

Finance, Macquarie, and the men who count

The deepest power in Sydney still runs through money, and money runs through Macquarie Group, UBS, Barrenjoey, Goldman Sachs Australia, and the senior law firms: Allens, King & Wood Mallesons, Herbert Smith Freehills, Clayton Utz, and MinterEllison. Unlike Los Angeles, where entertainment confers legitimacy, Sydney finance often sits at the top of the order without apology. Macquarie alumni move through it like a discreet fraternity, sliding between infrastructure funds, airport boards, energy projects, mining capital, philanthropy, and politics. The admired figure is not flamboyant. He is hyper-competent, globally mobile, numerate, and reputationally cautious, because in Australian finance culture a single leak can cost a career.

Their evenings stay quiet. The real ones happen in Darling Point homes, in members’ rooms, in the private dining at Rockpool, Margaret, Hubert, or Oncore by Clare Smyth, and at invitation-only charity dinners where a cabinet minister sits two seats from a fund founder and a racing patron. Visibility gets rationed because stability matters more than glamour.

The harbour and the yacht network

Sydney’s prestige system remains maritime in a way no American city quite matches. The harbour sorts people. Boats serve as mobile private clubs, and the windows around the Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race and the New Year period turn into apex circulation seasons when old money, finance, politics, media, and foreign capital converge on the water. The Cruising Yacht Club of Australia, the Royal Sydney Yacht Squadron, the Royal Prince Alfred Yacht Club, and the Royal Motor Yacht Club anchor the world. Bob Oatley (1928-2016), of Hamilton Island and Rosemount wine, set the image of the expansive capitalist-patriarch who fused agriculture, leisure, hospitality, and sail into one identity, and the Oatley family still carries it.

This crowd admires endurance and inherited fluency. A man does not merely buy a boat. He learns tides, crews, weather, wine service, and the etiquette of the deck, and the vessel becomes a floating credential. During race week an invitation onto the correct yacht outranks attendance almost anywhere ashore.

Tech founders and the venture set

Surry Hills, Redfern, Barangaroo, and the converted warehouses of Alexandria hold the founders, the venture money, and the AI entrepreneurs. Mike Cannon-Brookes (b. 1979) and Scott Farquhar (b. 1979) made Sydney a real technology capital through Atlassian, and Cannon-Brookes has since pushed enormous sums into green-transition capital and harbour-front property, planting himself in the dynastic world from a side door. Blackbird Ventures, with Niki Scevak among its principals, and Square Peg Capital push the investment culture forward. The admired man scales an idea into a global enterprise from the far edge of the world and defeats the tyranny of distance. Status runs on metrics: valuations, growth, retention, ownership of the underlying IP. Their claim is that software democratises opportunity and that the old property dynasties move too slowly to deserve their rents. Old Sydney returns the compliment by reading them as clever boys in board shorts who have never sat through a hard year.

The Asia-Pacific capital nexus

Modern Sydney cannot be read without Asia-Pacific money. Chinese-Australian developers, Hong Kong finance, Singaporean wealth, and two decades of education migration reshaped large parts of the property and commercial structure. Chatswood, parts of Bellevue Hill, Mosman, and the lower North Shore became zones where elite Asian capital married into established prestige. Crown Sydney at Barangaroo stood as the symbol of that convergence before its regulatory troubles dimmed the aura, and Barangaroo itself reads as Sydney’s bid to function as an Asia-Pacific luxury capital linking Singapore, Hong Kong, London, and Los Angeles. The network prizes educational intensity, family continuity, property acquisition, and transnational optionality. Its children pass through Knox Grammar School, Ravenswood School for Girls, Shore, and the selective schools before medicine, law, finance, or an American university. The highest operators move between Mandarin-speaking capital and Anglo institutions without friction.

The eastern-suburbs Jewish network

Sydney’s Jewish community carries influence well beyond its size across law, medicine, property, finance, philanthropy, and private schooling. Bellevue Hill, Bondi, Dover Heights, and Rose Bay form the geographic centre, and Moriah College and Emanuel School sit as major social nodes. Figures tied to property, retail, banking, and the law move heavily through it, with the Lowy and Smorgon names among the markers. Philanthropy and institutional governance carry real weight, and the ethos combines educational ambition, communal continuity, and strategic discretion. Sydney differs from Beverly Hills here. The culture stays more restrained and less performative, and the highest-status men often avoid publicity almost completely.

Art, architecture, and cultural legitimacy

Blue-chip galleries and museum boards turn resource money and property gains into cultural standing. Roslyn Oxley9, the commercial galleries of Paddington and Chippendale, the Art Gallery of New South Wales and its new Sydney Modern wing, the Museum of Contemporary Art, the Biennale of Sydney, and Sydney Contemporary form the spine. Simon Mordant (b. 1959) and Gene Sherman (b. 1947) sit among the patron-trustees who convert capital into curatorial authority, and Roslyn Oxley remains a gatekeeper of the dealer world. Because the market stays smaller than New York or London, trustees and collectors hold outsized power.

Architecture carries unusual weight too, since Sydney prestige revolves around houses and setting. The harbour home is the city’s central cultural artifact: sandstone cliff, water access, understated interior, private garden, a sightline toward the Heads. The cultural elite claim refinement against commercial vulgarity and cast themselves as guardians of Australian aesthetic seriousness against American excess on one side and local provincialism on the other. The underlying economy still rests on property wealth and banking liquidity, which keeps a permanent tension between artistic autonomy and oligarchic patronage.

The wellness and coastal aristocracy

Bondi, Bronte, Tamarama, the Northern Beaches, Palm Beach, and the Byron Bay outpost host a bio-optimisation class organised around ocean swims, Pilates, surfing competence, triathlon culture, longevity clinics, and disciplined leisure. Australian activewear brands, cosmetic clinics, supplement empires, and luxury fitness infrastructure built a local version of the Los Angeles wellness world, with harder beach discipline and less self-mythologising. The body is the credential. Athletic thinness, cosmetic maintenance, and surf fluency carry status, and Bondi works as an open-air theatre of elite body management. Aging gets reframed as a management failure. The claim is that dense urban life poisons the body and that a disciplined elite can outrun the common decline through the right routine and the right postcode. Older money still views this world with suspicion, since online fame lacks permanence and rarely buys entry into the deeper strata.

The schools as the quiet engine

Under all of it sits the school and dynasty system. The Athletic Association of the Great Public Schools of New South Wales network and its co-educational counterparts may form the most decisive sorting machine the city has. Sydney Grammar School, The Scots College, Saint Ignatius’ College Riverview, The King’s School, Cranbrook School, Ascham School, Kambala School, SCEGGS Darlinghurst, and Sydney Church of England Grammar School: these feed elite reproduction across finance, law, medicine, and property, and the friendships made on those fields outrank the later university line on a résumé. The stated claim is meritocratic cultivation. The unstated one is that access clusters inside a handful of postcodes and stays there.

The feuds and faultlines

The deepest quarrel pits inherited establishment capital against the financialised, tech-infused power that Cannon-Brookes, Farquhar, and the venture set represent. The older eastern-suburbs families read the new men as casual, unanchored, and culturally thin. The new men read the old guard as repressed, over-Anglo, and stagnant. The harbour versus the city expresses the same divide in geography.

Property and preservation wage a second permanent war, and it runs hot because it touches dynastic continuity and visual dominance. Waterfront neighbours fight quiet campaigns over development applications, view lines, and jetty access. Developers cast themselves as pragmatic city-builders hemmed in by bureaucratic romanticism. Preservationists cast developers as destroyers of civic beauty chasing liquidity. The agency men profit from both: John McGrath (b. 1963), Gavin Rubinstein, Bill Malouf, and the high-end brokers who run the residential intelligence network and convert liquidity into land.

The lockout era left a lasting scar. Much of the hospitality world still regards the political class that imposed those laws as philistine and economically destructive, and the current private-luxury party culture grew partly as a reaction against those years. A generational split sharpens around Australia’s relation to America. Younger finance, tech, and influencer elites model themselves on Los Angeles, Miami, London, Dubai, and Singapore. Older Sydney still values British restraint, institutional continuity, and low visibility. Even wellness has fractured into hostile tribes over surf-culture authenticity and the correct posture toward development on the Northern Beaches.

The hottest parties

Sydney’s highest-status parties manage proximity, hierarchy, liquidity, secrecy, and trust. The city no longer runs prestige through public spectacle. The old myth ran on glamour anyone could see: the Logies carpet, the packed Ivy Pool Bar, the cameras outside the Sydney Opera House. That world survives in thin form for tourists and influencers. The apex system now runs through invitation-only rooms built to strip out unpredictability and exposure, and the best gatherings leave no trace online.

The single most important recurring ritual remains New Year’s Eve on the harbour, where the fireworks come second to the question of where a man watches from and with whom. Invitations to Point Piper compounds, Darling Point terraces, Rose Bay waterfront houses, and superyachts anchored near the Sydney Harbour Bridge form the real hierarchy. Helicopter transfers, private chefs, imported DJs, and reserve champagne all appear, though Australian norms against visible excess keep the ostentation moderated. Hemmes-hosted dinners across the southern summer work as unofficial court assemblies, and visiting actors, Formula One drivers, and fashion executives pass through Ivy penthouses and eastern-suburbs estates almost as a matter of course.

Below New Year sit the afterparties clustered around Vivid Sydney, the ARIA Music Awards, Sydney Contemporary, and Australian Fashion Week. The public installation or the charity gala starts the night. Then the migration begins. Cars move toward the harbour, publicists fall away, security tightens, and the inner circle reconvenes in a Bellevue Hill house or an architectural compound over the water. The Golden Sheaf in Double Bay holds symbolic value as a transitional room where younger eastern-suburbs money performs visibility before graduating into the private world, and the restaurant culture around Matteo, Margaret, Bistro Rex, and the Woollahra and Potts Point pop-ups now matters more than any nightclub.

Palm Beach forms the other crucial node. It works for Sydney roughly the way the Hamptons work for New York, with more sun and less theatre. The houses become dynastic compounds where school networks, finance, sailing, and hospitality wealth merge over long lunches and tender rides. The ideal guest arrives by seaplane and appears permanently relaxed.

Past the branded institutions lies the frontier: nomadic micro-salons and secret dining societies with no permanent venue, no membership, no public identity. Luxury concierges, private chefs, and estate managers arrange them inside empty trophy homes, hidden rooms in boutique hotels, or listings waiting for a buyer. A list might hold twelve or fourteen names. No sponsors. No posts. Sometimes no written list at all. The logic minimises exposure and raises trust density, and these dinners draw the highest guests precisely because they strip away the last institutional visibility of even the private clubs.

What drives the whole system forward is the pursuit of class symmetry. Elite Sydney engineers frictionless rooms where everyone has passed parallel filters: the right schools, social fluency, similar wealth bands, calibrated taste, shared references, reputational vetting. No one explains a reference. No one brings unpredictable conflict. The map of the city reshaped around it. A modern elite Sydneysider moves from a Surry Hills venture salon to a Merivale dinner to a Point Piper afterparty to a Palm Beach recovery weekend without touching public Sydney once. The old dream city ran on aspiration and visibility. Elite Sydney runs on invisibility.

Where this might lead looks clear enough. Tech and venture money keeps annexing property from below and above, buying out the historic estates of the old merchant families. The traditional commercial establishment might end as domestic asset managers inside larger global funds, which might shift real power away from local boards toward international sovereign wealth. The civic faultline stays most volatile: housing scarcity, harbour development, and the eternal contest between public beaches and private waterfront compounds. Every new superyacht berth and every Wolseley Road record sharpens the argument over whether Sydney remains a city for its residents or an archipelago of private prestige zones linked by tenders and chauffeured cars. The names on the marquee change. The families mooring their boats at the Royal Motor Yacht Club change far less. The defining Sydney move in 2026 is not to appear everywhere. It is to appear in the few rooms that matter while seeming barely to notice the hierarchy at all.

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The Emotional Palettes of Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth

Posted on May 28, 2026 by Luke Ford

Brisbane carries the mood of a slow Sunday in the subtropics. Heat and humidity slow a man down and loosen his hurry. The brown river bends through the center and sets the pace. Colors run warm: jacaranda purple, river water turned gold in the late afternoon, fig-tree green after rain, the faded terracotta of old Queenslander roofs. The feeling is prosperous confidence without display. Brisbane spent decades as the younger sibling to Sydney and Melbourne, and that memory still shapes its temper. It stays friendlier than Sydney because it has not forgotten when it needed friends. Status comes through land, construction, medicine, sport, and stable family life. Ambition has to look casual here. Beneath the ease runs a quiet worry that the city depends on forces elsewhere: commodity cycles, southern money, migration, the weather itself. The optimism has a defensive edge. Brisbane looks most like itself when people leave work, not when they arrive.

Sydney paints in hard coastal contrast. Sapphire harbor, white stone, dark glass towers, the green-black of expensive eucalyptus above the sea. The light clarifies and exposes. This is the capital of competitive prestige, and wealth here wants recognition. A harbor view ranks a man almost the way a title once did. Geography becomes social order. The eastern suburbs run like an aristocratic belt where beauty, money, and schooling fuse into one system. The mood is evaluative, not relaxed, despite the beaches. The model Sydneysider wakes early, exercises where others can see, speaks fast, and guards his position. Fitness and property carry moral weight. Even leisure competes. The colors stay brighter and colder than Brisbane’s: more blue, white, steel, reflected glare. At night the harbor lights suggest one grand city, but underneath sit guarded enclaves of finance, law, media, and medicine. Sydney projects confidence to the world because it fears decline, and it knows the financial centers of Asia now dwarf it.

Melbourne paints in intellectual gray. Wet asphalt, dark coffee, old sandstone, tram green, black winter coats, gallery white. The atmosphere feels autumnal even in spring. Status here runs through cultural fluency rather than visible money. Sydney asks how much a man has. Melbourne asks what his taste reveals about his inner life. The city romanticizes difficulty and turns weather, laneways, and coffee into identity. It admires people who seem coherent more than people who seem rich. Writers, architects, academics, musicians, and barristers hold high symbolic rank, though property developers and mining money still pay for much of it underneath. Prestige hides itself: an old school name, plain clothing, a reference few will catch. Yet the refinement sits on anxiety. Melbourne fears provincialism and measures itself against London, Berlin, and New York because the comparison sustains its sense of self. The city looks most like itself at dusk in winter, trams moving through drizzle, bars full of men arguing about politics, literature, football, and house prices as if these belonged to one conversation.

Adelaide paints in restrained elegance. Dusty green, vineyard gold, limestone cream, muted navy, dry summer earth. The mood stays controlled and quietly defensive. The city remembers itself as a colonial administrative town that never grew imperial, and it values steadiness over speed. Striving has to stay socially manageable. Status comes from continuity. Family names last longer here, schools matter, and reputation moves through small networks where everyone knows everyone at one remove. Wine works as both industry and identity. Adelaide admires competence that keeps quiet about itself and reads flamboyance as insecurity. The city feels enclosed, bounded by dry hills and distance from the eastern capitals. Because it is small, a reputational wound lasts a long time. Ambitious young men often leave for Sydney or Melbourne, and the fear of stagnation returns again and again. Adelaide answers by turning quality of life into a civic philosophy and insisting that smaller scale produces deeper living. Often it is right.

Perth paints in mineral light. Bleached white, deep ocean blue, ochre, dry scrub green, copper at sunset. Few wealthy cities sit this far from anywhere, and the isolation shapes everything. Perth projects self-sufficiency. Its money came from extraction: mining, energy, engineering, land. So the city respects men who build, finance, or pull things out of the ground more than men who refine their taste. Sunlight rules the mood. The place spreads outward rather than up, with wide roads, large homes, and beaches that run for miles. Success means space. The isolation breeds two opposite feelings at once. One is independence, a habit of seeing Sydney and Melbourne as overcomplicated and performative. The other is a worry about being forgotten by national institutions, which feeds a fierce local patriotism. Western Australians often talk about the eastern states as foreign powers. Perth turns contemplative at sunset over the Indian Ocean, when the heat drops and the sky widens, and it feels less like a city inside Australia than a coastal civilization attached to the edge of it.

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The Emotional Palettes of Portland, Seattle and Vancouver

Posted on May 28, 2026 by Luke Ford

Portland runs in moss green and rust. Wet cedar, coffee black, the brown of secondhand wool, the gray-blue of rain pooling on the Willamette, the pale amber of a bar lamp seen through a fogged window. Light comes down through a low cloud and flattens the city to one soft register, so even the loud parts sound tired. Men argue in the key of apology. They say sorry before they tell you that you are wrong.
The city distrusts winning. A man earns standing by what he refuses. He refuses the corporate job, refuses the new car, refuses to sound like a man closing a sale. Taste outranks money so long as the money stays out of sight. The software engineer pulling four hundred thousand a year dresses to look poorer than the bartender with the good record collection. The fear here is not failure. The fear is complicity, the worry that a man has sold something he should have kept. Portland watches Seattle the way a small congregation watches a rich neighbor who left the faith.
Underneath the warmth sits a permanent fatigue. The place keeps the nervous system of a college town that woke up one morning as a city and never forgave itself. It rewards feeling and struggles with closure. Meetings run long. Consensus turns into a sacrament. The city greets you well and disappoints you slowly.

Seattle runs in cold blue and machine silver. Dark water, fir green, brushed aluminum, white cloud, the orange sodium light of a ferry crossing the sound at dusk. The light cuts sharper than Portland’s. Mountains stand at the edge of every view like men waiting to be impressed. People speak with care, work past reason, and give themselves away by inches. Emotion read aloud counts as waste.
Where Portland moralizes taste, Seattle moralizes competence. The high-status man climbs Rainier on Saturday, builds systems at Amazon by Monday, and keeps a home spare enough to pass for a clean codebase. Wealth shows in the rain shell, the Scandinavian chair, the espresso machine, the ultralight pack. The city has no patience for theater. To Seattle, Los Angeles looks like a man crying in public.
The contradiction comes from frontier myth crashing into the spreadsheet. The old picture held the lone engineer and the mountaineer facing the weather alone. The city now turns on enormous firms that count everything. So even the rebellion gets managed. Radical politics start to sound like a project plan. The dread beneath the reserve is redundancy. These men build the machines that make men obsolete, and they suspect their own turn might come in the next reorganization. The coldness outsiders feel is partly that suspicion, a refusal to invest too much in a self that the next quarter might retire.

Vancouver runs in glass and snowlight. Blue rain, evergreen near black, white peaks, smoked charcoal, the green tint of condo towers along the harbor. The city looks placed more than built, set down between water and cliff. Light arrives bent through cloud and reflected off ten thousand windows. Even the rich streets feel hushed. Few cities in North America look this calm, and the calm covers a hard tension.
People speak low and move politely. Anger comes out as withdrawal, not as a raised voice. The city prizes a smooth surface over almost anything. Money moves quietly through real estate and trans-Pacific finance, and status comes from composure, health, and a good view. The hedge fund manager and the yoga teacher trade the same words about wellness and balance. Vancouver turns wealth into weather rather than display. The best blocks do not feel like victory. They feel sealed off.
The fear here is hollowness. The city knows it is beautiful and worries the beauty might be the whole story. Housing turned into both the engine of wealth and the source of despair, and a generation now stands outside the gate of ordinary adult life. Downtown empties early. Many describe a quiet loneliness that comes from living inside a place built for scenery. Vancouver has solved livability and cannot manufacture weight.
Three cities, one rain. Portland answers to conscience and asks whether a life feels honest. Seattle answers to competence and asks whether a life works. Vancouver answers to calm and asks whether a life stays smooth. A man tuned for one breaks down in the others. The Portland maker reads as a child in a Bellevue boardroom. The Seattle engineer reads as armored at a dinner table off Alberta Street. The Vancouver financier glides through both and leaves no mark on either.

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New Yorker: Malcolm Gladwell on the seductive appeal—and shaky science—behind the F.B.I.’s criminal profilers and their “mind reading.”

Posted on May 27, 2026 by Luke Ford

Malcolm Gladwell wrote in 2007:

Douglas and Ressler didn’t interview a representative sample of serial killers to come up with their typology. They talked to whoever happened to be in the neighborhood. Nor did they interview their subjects according to a standardized protocol. They just sat down and chatted, which isn’t a particularly firm foundation for a psychological system. So you might wonder whether serial killers can really be categorized by their level of organization.
Not long ago, a group of psychologists at the University of Liverpool decided to test the F.B.I.’s assumptions. First, they made a list of crime-scene characteristics generally considered to show organization: perhaps the victim was alive during the sex acts, or the body was posed in a certain way, or the murder weapon was missing, or the body was concealed, or torture and restraints were involved. Then they made a list of characteristics showing disorganization: perhaps the victim was beaten, the body was left in an isolated spot, the victim’s belongings were scattered, or the murder weapon was improvised.
If the F.B.I. was right, they reasoned, the crime-scene details on each of those two lists should “co-occur”—that is, if you see one or more organized traits in a crime, there should be a reasonably high probability of seeing other organized traits. When they looked at a sample of a hundred serial crimes, however, they couldn’t find any support for the F.B.I.’s distinction. Crimes don’t fall into one camp or the other. It turns out that they’re almost always a mixture of a few key organized traits and a random array of disorganized traits. Laurence Alison, one of the leaders of the Liverpool group and the author of “The Forensic Psychologist’s Casebook,” told me, “The whole business is a lot more complicated than the F.B.I. imagines.”
Alison and another of his colleagues also looked at homology. If Douglas was right, then a certain kind of crime should correspond to a certain kind of criminal. So the Liverpool group selected a hundred stranger rapes in the United Kingdom, classifying them according to twenty-eight variables, such as whether a disguise was worn, whether compliments were given, whether there was binding, gagging, or blindfolding, whether there was apologizing or the theft of personal property, and so on. They then looked at whether the patterns in the crimes corresponded to attributes of the criminals—like age, type of employment, ethnicity, level of education, marital status, number of prior convictions, type of prior convictions, and drug use. Were rapists who bind, gag, and blindfold more like one another than they were like rapists who, say, compliment and apologize? The answer is no—not even slightly.
“The fact is that different offenders can exhibit the same behaviors for completely different reasons,” Brent Turvey, a forensic scientist who has been highly critical of the F.B.I.’s approach, says. “You’ve got a rapist who attacks a woman in the park and pulls her shirt up over her face. Why? What does that mean? There are ten different things it could mean. It could mean he doesn’t want to see her. It could mean he doesn’t want her to see him. It could mean he wants to see her breasts, he wants to imagine someone else, he wants to incapacitate her arms—all of those are possibilities. You can’t just look at one behavior in isolation.”
A few years ago, Alison went back to the case of the teacher who was murdered on the roof of her building in the Bronx. He wanted to know why, if the F.B.I.’s approach to criminal profiling was based on such simplistic psychology, it continues to have such a sterling reputation. The answer, he suspected, lay in the way the profiles were written, and, sure enough, when he broke down the rooftop-killer analysis, sentence by sentence, he found that it was so full of unverifiable and contradictory and ambiguous language that it could support virtually any interpretation.
Astrologers and psychics have known these tricks for years. The magician Ian Rowland, in his classic “The Full Facts Book of Cold Reading,” itemizes them one by one, in what could easily serve as a manual for the beginner profiler. First is the Rainbow Ruse—the “statement which credits the client with both a personality trait and its opposite.” (“I would say that on the whole you can be rather a quiet, self effacing type, but when the circumstances are right, you can be quite the life and soul of the party if the mood strikes you.”) The Jacques Statement, named for the character in “As You Like It” who gives the Seven Ages of Man speech, tailors the prediction to the age of the subject. To someone in his late thirties or early forties, for example, the psychic says, “If you are honest about it, you often get to wondering what happened to all those dreams you had when you were younger.” There is the Barnum Statement, the assertion so general that anyone would agree, and the Fuzzy Fact, the seemingly factual statement couched in a way that “leaves plenty of scope to be developed into something more specific.” (“I can see a connection with Europe, possibly Britain, or it could be the warmer, Mediterranean part?”) And that’s only the start: there is the Greener Grass technique, the Diverted Question, the Russian Doll, Sugar Lumps, not to mention Forking and the Good Chance Guess—all of which, when put together in skillful combination, can convince even the most skeptical observer that he or she is in the presence of real insight.

Gladwell’s piece holds up well after almost two decades. Empirical work since 2007 has strengthened the case against FBI-style profiling.

The BTK resolution looks worse for the profilers. Dennis Rader (b. 1945) stopped killing in 1991 and stayed silent for thirteen years. In 2004 he started taunting the police again. He asked them whether a floppy disk could be traced. They lied and said no. He sent one. The metadata pointed to Christ Lutheran Church and a user named Dennis. A search of the church board listed Dennis Rader as president. DNA from his daughter’s pap smear at a university clinic sealed the identification. The profile contributed nothing. He turned himself in by reinitiating contact.

The 1984 session Gladwell quotes got nearly every social dimension wrong. John Douglas (b. 1945) and his colleagues predicted a loner, sexually inadequate, lower middle class, probably divorced, hard to remember. Rader was a married father of two, an Air Force veteran, a Cub Scout leader, the president of his church council, a city compliance officer in Park City, Kansas, and a graduate of Wichita State. He had a normal social life and a steady work history. Roy Hazelwood (1938-2016) called him a “now” person who needed instant gratification. Rader’s signature was patience. He stalked some victims for years.

Donald Foster, the Vassar literary scholar Gladwell cites, did the most damning work on James Brussel (1905-1982). Brussel’s memoir cleaned up his predictions. The contemporaneous record shows he told the NYPD to look for a German-born man with a facial scar, a night job, expertise in military ordnance, age forty to fifty, living in White Plains. George Metesky (1903-1994) was Lithuanian-American, had no scar, was largely unemployed after 1931, had no ordnance training, was fifty-three, and lived in Waterbury, Connecticut. The double-breasted suit hit was real. The surrounding package missed almost everywhere. Profilers and journalists kept the hit and forgot the misses.

The Liverpool studies under Laurence Alison have been replicated and extended. The organized/disorganized split keeps failing the empirical tests. So does homology, the assumption that similar crime behavior reflects similar offender characteristics. Brent Turvey’s work in evidence-based behavioral analysis points the same way. So does David Canter (b. 1944) Investigative Psychology program in the UK, which uses actuarial models and geographical profiling rather than clinical intuition. Canter’s work on journey-to-crime and the circle hypothesis has produced testable results. The Douglas-Ressler typology has not.

Genetic genealogy has changed the calculus more than anything else. Joseph James DeAngelo (b. 1945), the Golden State Killer, evaded capture for forty years despite multiple profiles. GEDmatch caught him in 2018 through a third cousin’s DNA. Profilers had described him as a loner with possible military experience. He was a former cop, fired for shoplifting, who lived a suburban life with a wife and three daughters. Genetic genealogy has now closed dozens of cold cases that profiles failed to crack.

The deeper problem with profiling is conceptual. The method assumes a stable personality that expresses consistently across contexts. Modern personality psychology has been working through this issue since Walter Mischel (1930-2018) published Personality and Assessment in 1968. Behavior depends on situation more than the trait theorists assumed. A man who is meticulous at work might be sloppy at home. The crime scene reflects the constraints of the moment as much as any enduring trait.

The FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit still operates, but the work has shifted. Threat assessment for school shooters, workplace violence, and terrorism takes more of the agenda. The romantic image of the profiler naming the killer’s wardrobe has receded inside the bureau. The public face still draws on the Douglas-Ressler legacy. The internal practice leans more on statistical case linkage.

What survives from the profiling tradition is the interview record. Douglas and Robert Ressler (1937-2013) did interview thirty-six convicted murderers in the late 1970s, and those transcripts remain useful primary documents. The classification scheme that emerged from the interviews has fared poorly. The interviews themselves preserved offender narratives that would have been lost otherwise.

Popular culture sustains the profiling mystique. Thomas Harris (b. 1940) wrote Red Dragon in 1981 and The Silence of the Lambs in 1988, both based on the BSU profilers. The film of Silence won the big five Oscars in 1992. Mindhunter came to Netflix in 2017. Criminal Minds ran on CBS for fifteen seasons. The profiler became a stock figure of American crime drama. The institutional incentive to maintain the mystique runs through the bureau, the authors, the networks, and the consulting market. The skeptical empirical literature reaches a much smaller audience.

Gladwell needs little updating. The case he made in 2007 has gotten harder, and the technology that solves cold cases has moved past behavioral speculation.

Posted in Crime, FBI, Malcolm Gladwell | Comments Off

The Peter Baker Social Set

Posted on May 27, 2026 by Luke Ford

Peter Baker (b. 1967) and Susan Glasser (b. 1969) sit at the center of a Washington social and journalistic set with clear contours. He is chief White House correspondent for The New York Times. She is a staff writer at The New Yorker. Together they have written The Divider, Kremlin Rising, and The Man Who Ran Washington. They host dinners. They appear together on panels. They represent the reigning Washington power couple, inheriting that position from Sally Quinn (b. 1941) and Ben Bradlee (1921-2014).

The set around them includes Maggie Haberman (b. 1973), David Sanger (b. 1960), Adam Liptak (b. 1960), Maureen Dowd (b. 1952), Thomas Friedman (b. 1953), David Brooks (b. 1961), Carl Hulse, Glenn Thrush, Adam Nagourney, and Elisabeth Bumiller at the Times. At The Washington Post: Dan Balz (b. 1946), Ruth Marcus (b. 1958), Eugene Robinson (b. 1954), David Ignatius (b. 1950), Bob Woodward (b. 1943), and Carl Bernstein (b. 1944). At the magazines: David Remnick (b. 1958), Jeffrey Goldberg (b. 1965), Anne Applebaum (b. 1964), George Packer (b. 1960), David Frum (b. 1960), Mark Leibovich (b. 1965), and Franklin Foer (b. 1974). Television: Andrea Mitchell (b. 1946) with her husband Alan Greenspan (b. 1926), Jake Tapper (b. 1969), Chuck Todd (b. 1972), Wolf Blitzer (b. 1948), Jonathan Karl (b. 1968), Robert Costa (b. 1965), Norah O’Donnell (b. 1974), and Margaret Brennan (b. 1970). The Politico, Axios, Puck, Semafor tier: Mike Allen (b. 1964), Jim VandeHei (b. 1971), Ben Smith (b. 1976), Jonathan Martin (b. 1976), and Alex Burns. The older presences who still set tone: Sally Quinn, and the memory of Tim Russert (1950-2008), David Broder (1929-2011), R.W. Apple Jr. (1934-2006), Mary McGrory (1918-2004), and Walter Cronkite (1916-2009).

What they value.

Access above all else. Proximity to the source is the basic currency. A reporter who can call a senator at home, who has the chief of staff on speed dial, who gets the return call from the cabinet secretary on a Saturday, ranks higher than a reporter who cannot. They tend their sources. Lunches at Café Milano. Off-record dinners at the Bombay Club. Drinks at the Hay-Adams. Long background conversations that feed the next book.

Norms and decorum. They believe in the unwritten rules of American government and they covered the era when those rules held. They mourn the loss of the working filibuster, the disappearance of cross-aisle friendship, the collapse of debate civility, the rise of social media performance. They want the institutions to work the way they were taught they worked.

Bipartisanship. The figures they have honored over decades sit across the aisle from their own background politics. John McCain (1936-2018). Joe Lieberman (1942-2024). Joe Biden (b. 1942) in his Senate years. Mitt Romney (b. 1947) in his late phase. They reward the maverick. They punish the strict partisan, and the punishment now falls harder on Republicans because the Republican party broke from older norms after 2015.

Expertise. The credentialed authority deserves deference. The Council on Foreign Relations report, the Brookings paper, the Kennedy School scholar, the former cabinet secretary now at a think tank, the retired four-star at the Atlantic Council. These voices carry weight. Skepticism toward expertise reads to them as anti-intellectualism. They came of age when expertise produced the postwar order and they want that order to hold.

Their hero system.

Watergate is the founding scene. Bradlee and Graham (Katharine Graham, 1917-2001) at the Post. Woodward and Bernstein at the desk. The Pentagon Papers and Vietnam coverage. The press as the institution that brought down a corrupt president. This is the origin story they tell themselves and each other.

The press giants who followed: Cronkite, Russert, Broder, Apple, Russell Baker (1925-2019), David Halberstam (1934-2007), Anthony Lewis (1927-2013), Mary McGrory, Tom Wicker (1926-2011). The book is the proof of seriousness. Woodward writes another book. Baker writes another book. Leibovich writes This Town. Haberman writes Confidence Man. The book outranks the daily story because the book becomes the historical record. They do not chase tomorrow’s news. They write tomorrow’s history.

Tim Russert holds a particular place. His memorial at the Kennedy Center in 2008 was the gathering high mass of this set. His Meet the Press chair was the throne. The tough but fair questioner from blue-collar Buffalo who rose through merit to interrogate presidents was the platonic form. The chair never refilled.

Status games.

Bylines on the front page above the fold. The lead byline on a co-written investigation. The exclusive interview with a former president. The book deal at seven figures. The Pulitzer. The Polk. The Peabody. The Loeb. The named lecture at the Shorenstein Center. The teaching post at Columbia Journalism. The professorship at NYU. The cable hit on Morning Joe in the seven o’clock hour. The panel chair at the Aspen Ideas Festival. The keynote at any Newseum-adjacent dinner. The toast at the White House Correspondents Dinner. The book blurb from a senior peer.

Inside the New York Times and the Washington Post a granular hierarchy runs. Whose name leads the joint byline. Who gets sent on the presidential trip. Who anchors election night. Who writes the obituary of a major figure. Who reviews a colleague’s book in the Sunday paper.

Migration patterns reveal position. The reporter who leaves the Times for Semafor or Puck signals one thing. The reporter who leaves Politico for the Times signals another. Substack is acceptable for those already established. Founding a publication confers prestige when it is funded and respectable. Bari Weiss (b. 1984) sits outside the set, regarded with suspicion. The Atlantic under Goldberg holds more status than the Atlantic of earlier editors. The New Yorker under Remnick holds the literary apex.

The ritual calendar binds them. The Gridiron Club dinner. The Alfalfa Club. The Bohemian Grove for some of the older men. Renaissance Weekend. The Bilderberg invitation. The Aspen Strategy Group. Council on Foreign Relations membership. The Pacific Council. Sun Valley for the media titan tier. Davos. The Christmas parties at senior editors’ homes. The book parties at Cleveland Park houses.

Marriages and friendships within the set produce small dynasties. Glasser and Baker. Mitchell and Greenspan. Quinn and Bradlee. Anne Kornblut and Jon Cohen. Ezra Klein (b. 1984) and Annie Lowrey (b. 1984). Carl Bernstein’s son Jacob writes for the Times. Sally Quinn’s son Quinn Bradlee writes. The children of journalists go to Sidwell, St. Albans, or National Cathedral. The set reproduces.

Normative claims.

Democracy requires a free press and they constitute that press. The First Amendment is sacred and they are its keepers.

Civility protects the republic. Decorum is more than manners. Decorum holds the republic in place. The breakdown of civility is the breakdown of the order.

Both-sides framing is fair, with one departure: when one side has broken from shared norms far enough to require asymmetry. The set held to symmetric language through 2015 and then began to shift. Internal debate continues. Baker and Haberman lean toward straight reporting. Others want sharper editorial framing.

Trump represents an existential threat to American democracy. This claim consolidated after January 6, 2021. It now operates as shared premise rather than contested view.

Access produces understanding. The reporter who can sit with the source, read the body language, hear the unspoken qualifier, knows more than the analyst who only reads the documents. This belief justifies the social rituals and the source tending.

The institution has a soul. The New York Times is more than a newspaper. The Washington Post is more than a newspaper. They are institutions with traditions, standards, and obligations to the republic. The journalist who works there inherits something larger than himself.

Essentialist claims.

Trump voters carry certain traits: resentment toward elites, racial anxiety, economic dislocation channeled into cultural grievance, lower educational attainment, geographic concentration in declining places. This portrait was assembled in 2016 and refined since. The basic essentialism holds in coverage.

The serious journalist possesses a calling. Not every man can do the work well. It requires temperament, training, relationships, years of investment. The serious journalist is a kind of man, and the kind reproduces through mentorship and institutional formation.

The serious politician is identifiable. McCain had the traits. Biden has them. Obama has them. Lieberman had them. Romney has them in his late phase. The traits include institutional respect, willingness to compromise, gravitas, restraint, command of policy detail, a certain dignity in bearing. The unserious politician is identifiable by the inverse.

America has an essential character the set understands and protects: liberal democratic, pluralist, internationalist, committed to the rule of law and the postwar order. Deviations are aberrations to be reported, contained, and corrected. The arc of American history bends toward this character even when interrupted. They hold this with religious conviction.

Foreign adversaries have essential characters too: Putin’s Russia, Xi’s China, Khamenei’s Iran, Kim’s North Korea. These characters explain behavior and resist deep change. The set’s foreign policy coverage rests on this essentialism more than its members might admit.

The members of the set know they belong to it. They read each other. They review each other. They quote each other on cable. They invite each other to panels. They attend each other’s parties. They mourn each other’s deaths in collective elegies that appear on the Times opinion page, the Post opinion page, the Atlantic, and the New Yorker within the same week. They take their own seriousness as given. The republic, they believe, is safer because they are at work.

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