Interaction Ritual Chains

Here are some highlights from this influential 2004 book by sociologist Randall Collins:

* Eminent thinkers are energy stars. They are highly productive, turning out large amounts of published (and often unpublished work), only some small portion of which becomes famous. They work extremely long hours, seemingly obsessed with their work; their thinking is itself energizing for them, as if they are magnetically drawn along by their chains of thought. At the peak of momentum in these spells of thinking (which often takes the form of writing), ideas come into their heads—in some cases, they report, as if they are taking dictation. This pattern, found among those most magnetized by their work, gives some credence to the notion of “inspiration,” as if the creative thinker is a genius, uniquely in touch with a creative flow from some higher region. The metaphor is misplaced, but it translates into a sociological truth: there are particular locations in intellectual networks where a few individuals become highly focused, highly energized, putting together streams of symbols in new ways; and those symbols do indeed come from outside, not from a mysterious realm of creative spirit, but from the dynamics of the intellectual community internalized in that person’s mind and now on their way to being externalized again.
Not all creative individuals have the same flamboyance—and the same publicity focused upon their private behavior—but they all have relatively high degrees of emotional energy concentrated in their work. The eminent teacher is impressive because he or she transmits this attitude, this intense focus upon intellectual symbols as important above all else, and as magnetically enthralling and energizing for those who come into their orbit.

* Intellectuals at the core of networks have an intuitive, immediate sense of who lines up with and against whom on what issues. Their thinking covers ground swiftly; unlike for marginal intellectuals, there is no need to spell things out; they know what arguments follow from what concepts; ranging ahead, they have a sense of what arguments can be further constructed, what directions can be opened up, what applications made. The symbols that make up the content of their thinking are loaded with EE; they represent not just their object of reference, but the activity of thinking and talking that goes on in intellectual groups. Thus for the core intellectual in the vortex of creative thinking, the symbols flow rapidly together into new combinations and oppositions, as if by magnetic attraction and repulsion. The role of the thinker is to concentrate them in one focus of attention in his or her consciousness, and to set their flow in motion.
The law of small numbers shows another reason why network position is crucial in launching a star intellectual career. What one picks up from an eminent teacher, besides his or her EE and stock of symbols, is a demonstration of how to operate in the intellectual field of oppositions.

* Each person’s career trajectory consists in coming to grips with the recognition of what one’s opportunities are in the intellectual field. Each experiences in their own way an impersonal sorting process going on around them. Some decide to become followers of an existing position: retailers of some other theorist’s ideas to a peripheral audience of students or textbook readers, or its representatives out in the intellectual provinces away from the hot center where the ideas were formulated, like followers of Parisian ideas in American literature departments. Another way to make a career as a follower is as a specialist, applying theories and techniques to particular problems, especially on the empirical side. These moves create smaller attention spaces, with their own jockeying for positions of leadership, governed by their own local law of small numbers.
Others stay the course of their youthful ambitions, modeled directly upon their star teachers and predecessors. Among these, careers pass through a tipping point. Cumulative advantage goes to those who find a vacant niche in the attention space, one of the slots available inside the law of small numbers. Their ideas receive attention from the field, giving them still more EE, more motivation and capacity for obsessive work, more speed in developing the possibilities for expanding their ideas at the forefront of current debate. On the other side of the tipping point are those intellectuals in the process of being squeezed out. Their work, although initially promising, meets little recognition, sinking their EE. They experience lessening confidence, less energy for performing sustained hard work; they become more alienated, less oriented toward the scene of current action. They become liable to extraneous problems, susceptable to being knocked off their career trajectory, “calamity Janes” to whom bad things just seem to happen, makers of excuses, embittered carpers. The micro-processes feeding back and forth between intellectual networks and an individual’s thinking are cumulative, both in positive and negative directions. What kind of thinking one does depends on one’s location in the network, both at the beginning of a career and as the career develops. There is a sociology of unsuccessful thinking, as well as of the kind that history extolls as creative.

* The fact that approximately 95 percent of Americans say they believe in God (Greeley 1989, 14) says little about how religious American society is. Comparisons of survey responses with actual attendance show that people strongly exaggerate how often they go to church (Hardaway et al. 1993, 1998); and in-depth probings of religious beliefs in informal conversation shows quite disparate and, from a theological viewpoint, largely heretical beliefs lumped under survey responses that seem to show conformity.

* Like their white counterparts, black working-class men appear to be creating an ideology that reflects not so much the actual patterns of their own behavior but a favorable view of themselves in the light of the perceived faults of the most salient outsiders.

Similarly, Lamont’s (1992) interviews with upper-middle-class American men yields a picture in which they state their boundaries in terms of their dislike of those who lack moral standards of honesty and truthfulness, and thereby present themselves as people who value moral standards above all else. Yet these are presumably the same people who are viewed from the outside by Lamont’s white working-class sample (both groups are situated in the New York metropolitan area) in just the opposite way, as lacking in integrity and straightforwardness. The same people are either honest or dishonest, straightforward or devious, depending on whether they are recounting their own ideology from the inside or are depicted by the adjacent class that sees them from below. What Lamont’s data show, then, is that generalized cultural vocabularies circulating in rather large national groups are pressed into service by individuals situated in different relationships to each other. The use of cultural repertoires also results in situationally constructed ideologies, each one a narrative drama in which individuals portray themselves as part of a group of good guys whose characteristics maximally contrast with another group of bad guys.

* Where there is a repeated round of formal, highly focused ritual occasions (weddings, dinners, festivals) involving the same people, status group boundaries are strong. Who is included and excluded from membership is clear to everyone, inside and outside the status group. All the more so to the degree that ritual gatherings are publicly visible: for example, when the “Four Hundred” met to dine and dance in the ballroom of the most luxurious hotel in New York City, and crowds of the non-elite classes lined the sidewalks to watch them enter and exit, the status group boundary and its ranking system was widely public. Here status has a thing-like quality, following the principle, the more ceremonial and public the ritual enactment, the more reified the social membership category . Conversely, the less scripted, advance-scheduled, and widely announced the sociable gathering, the more invisible the social boundaries.

* …formal rituals generate categorical identities; informal rituals generate merely personal reputations.

* a party can be a bore, a friendly amusement, or a memorable carouse. Here we have a second continuum: situations rank in terms of the attention they generate; situations have higher and lower prestige, depending on how they are enacted. At high levels on the formality or focus continuum, the intensity of the ritual does not matter as much; society is structured by formal inclusions and exclusions at such ritual occasions, and the resulting categorical identities are pervasive and inescapable, so that rituals may be rather boring and still convey strong membership. As we descend toward relatively informal and unfocused rituals, more effort needs to be put into making them emotionally intense, if they are to be experienced as having much effect upon feelings of social position. This may explain why contemporary Americans often are “hot dogs,” making noisy attention displays when they are at sports or entertainment events, large parties, and other public occasions.
Thus the second generalization: to convey an effect, the more informal or improvised rituals are, the more that participants need to be ostentatious, to make blatant appeals to emotion and to visible or highly audible action, if they are to make any impression or reputation. Those starved for institutionalized ritual status (e.g., black lower class; teenagers and young people generally) tend to seek out means of intense situational dramatization.

* Youth are thus the only contemporary group that is officially subjected to petty humiliations because of their categorical status, in this respect resembling black people who are unofficially subjected to similar tests; both groups are assumed dishonorable until proven otherwise. This is a reason why youth culture is sympathetic to black culture, and emulates especially its most rebellious elements.

* The pervasive everyday enactment of group barriers supports a youth counterculture. Youth styles of demeanor are shaped directly in opposition to adult styles: wearing hats backward because the normal style is forward; wearing baggy pants, torn clothes because these are counter-stylish (documented by Anderson 1999, 112). The counterculture starts at the border with adult culture and proceeds in the opposite direction; a status hierarchy develops inside the youth community building further and further away from adult respectability. Over the years there has been escalation in the amount, size, and location of body piercing, of tatoos and body branding. Many of these practices resemble those used in a hierarchy of religious status among Indian fakirs , holy outcasts demonstrating their religious charisma by the extremes to which they are willing to demonstrate their distance from ordinary life.

* The celebrity is one of the few focal points in the modern attention space through which collective emotional energy can be revved up to a high level.

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She Said: Breaking the Sexual Harassment Story That Helped Ignite a Movement

From this 2019 book by two New York Times reporters: During Bob [Weinstein]’s divorce from his first wife in the early ’90s, he began to drink himself to sleep every night, he told Megan. Only with the help of Alcoholics Anonymous and Al-Anon had he been able to recover from alcohol addiction, and now he saw almost all human behavior through the insights he had gained while fighting substance abuse. He believed the bedrock 12-step principles: No one can change anyone else. People have to want to change.
Bob convinced himself that his brother’s problem was sex addiction, and that no one could stop Harvey Weinstein other than Harvey Weinstein. It was a convenient, and arguably disastrous, moral choice, by which Bob justified his failure to do more. He stayed in business with his brother but excused himself from intervening in his brother’s actions. He refused to take responsibility or even help employees who came to him upset about his brother’s belittling language or lacerating tactics.
“People would come into my office and say, ‘Your brother’s screaming and yelling at me,’” he said. “I said, ‘Quit. You’re talented.’”
That was what passed for his management credo. “Send a note to HR,” he would sometimes say to his employees, even though the human resources operation at the company was weak and offered little recourse. “Write a letter.”
But in the weeks after the public accusation from Gutierrez, Bob finally felt compelled to act. The deal to sell the television division was now dead, a major business blow. He feared that without intervention, his brother could do something else even more destructive to the company. Thanks to an accident of timing, he thought he had just the right opening: The contracts for the Weinstein brothers and other top executives were expiring at the end of 2015. Bob would seize the chance to ensure his brother underwent in-depth professional treatment for his sexual behavior.

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Imagine No Religion, Ukraine War Discussion (3-5-22)

00:00 Religion in Secular Society, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=141986
02:00 The dark world of mega-churches? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hTfKpAWkgJY
1:12:30 Peter Zeihan on the Ukraine war
1:18:30 The War in Ukraine Could Change Everything | Yuval Noah Harari, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQqthbvYE8M
1:22:00 Cinema vs religion
1:26:00 Can liberalism can survive the state of emergency?, https://youtu.be/D7L03hQ95KM?t=412
1:29:50 The Two Blunders That Caused the Ukraine War, https://www.wsj.com/articles/cause-ukraine-war-robert-service-moscow-putin-lenin-stalin-history-communism-invasion-kgb-fsb-11646413200

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What Are The Implications Of the Ukraine War For Taiwan? (3-4-22)

00:00 My new Norelco electric shaver (scratchy audio first six minutes)
02:00 Amazon’s nut chocolate harvest
04:00 The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=142846
What Is The Role Of The State? https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=142828
23:00 Hans Freyer’s journey from church to Nazism, https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=136532
30:00 Nobody is permanently woke
32:30 What Are The Implications Of the Ukraine War For Taiwan?, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylaC0MUleZs&t=2391s
36:00 Will Russia cut undersea cables and end the world as we know it?
45:30 John Mearsheimer says the Ukraine War is the West fault, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ppD_bhWODDc
48:00 Why John Mearsheimer blames the West, https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine
56:30 Elliott Blatt joins the show
1:05:00 Portable Power Bank with Solar Charging, Hand Crank & Battery Operated, https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B07FKYHTWP/
1:07:00 Disaster looms for West Coast, https://www.usatoday.com/web-stories/earthquake-disaster-looms-on-west-coast/
1:09:20 Elliott’s communist phase
1:17:00 I didn’t sleep with a girl who ordered a bacon salad
1:22:00 Russia put its nukes on high alert
1:23:50 Why Russia will win
1:26:50 Russia Could Threaten Internet Cables in Underwater Attacks, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-threaten-internet-cables-underwater-attacks-navy-admiral-tony-radakin-1667210
1:28:00 Cord-cutting, Russian style: Could the Kremlin sever global internet cables?, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/cord-cutting-russian-style-could-the-kremlin-sever-global-internet-cables/
1:57:00 El Jefe: The Stalking of Chapo Guzmán, https://www.amazon.com/El-Jefe-Alan-Feuer/dp/1250254507
2:03:50 So sorry. I was wrong… (Ukraine Russia War), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9nm97xuII0
2:08:20 Yale Historian Samuel Moyn on “How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vlH30iPckHg
2:21:00 Europe is showing that it could lead its own defense, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/europe-defense-nato-ukraine-war/
2:33:00 The keys to good Youtube videos
2:39:00 Samuel Moyn, Professor of History, Harvard University: Where do human rights come from?, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eFGu6T1Qe48
2:44:00 By Jerry Z. Muller – Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David Hume to the Present, https://www.amazon.com/Jerry-Muller-Conservatism-Anthology-Political/dp/B008VR2FZC
2:49:00 Eye exercises, https://twitter.com/mythoughtfood/status/1499535875402780674
2:54:30 New Cold War: Russia Has “Permanently” Broken Relations With EU & US, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b8vmGg_zFXQ
3:03:00 Elliott Blatt’s mountain of drudgery
3:11:00 Screenwriting for a living
3:17:00 Elliott’s 9-11

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Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen

Academic Christopher Capozzola writes in 2010:

* One thing we know is that the word obligation was very much on their minds. During World War I, when Americans discussed their relationship to the state, they used terms such as duty, sacrifice, and obligation. The language was everywhere: in congressional debates about entry into war, on the posters of military recruiters during the conflict, and even in the parades that marked the war’s end. Political obligations energized, mobilized, and divided Americans during World War I.

* Looking at the history of a liberal society like the United States, it might seem that Americans have never really had to think much about their political obligations, let alone act on them. In the later wars of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, liberal individualism, an economy of consumption, a nationalized culture, legally protected civil liberties, and an expanded federal state all played more prominent roles in public life. But even so, throughout American history, a citizenship of obligation has always coexisted with one of rights…

* Americans’ sense of obligation came from many places: political traditions of republicanism that valued the common good over individual liberty, utopian visions of community, Christian beliefs that made of duty a virtue, paternalist notions that legitimated social hierarchies and demanded obedience to them.

* In the years before the war, voluntary associations—clubs, schools, churches, parties, unions— organized
much of American public life. Such groups provided social services, regulated the economy, policed crime, and managed community norms. Schooled in this world of civic voluntarism, Americans formed their social bonds—and their political obligations—first to each other and then to the state. Indeed, in the absence of formal federal institutions, these voluntary associations sometimes acted as the state. They organized public life and helped Americans feel a sense of collective identity, and they also carried out much of the practical work. Americans of the early twentieth century thus owed allegiance to an overlapping array of authorities, of which Uncle Sam’s federal government was only one, and perhaps not even the most important.

* As the state made ever stronger claims on its citizens, wartime events prompted one of the twentieth century’s broadest, most vigorous, and most searching public discussions about the meanings of American citizenship.

* Movements against mob violence did much to erase the vigilantism and lawless violence that characterized nineteenth-century American political culture, but they also helped wipe away the era’s vibrant political culture of associational life. They effaced the multiple authorities of prewar life—and thus diminished the multiple loyalties that operated there. Increasingly, Americans articulated their political obligations not to many things but to one: the state. When they imagined government rather than people as the source of rights, Americans unwittingly handed over to the state an array of coercive powers over matters previously governed by voluntary associations.

* That progressives—the people who brought America direct election of senators, direct taxation, initiative and referendum, and a philosophy of participatory democracy—should have turned away from “the people” is ironic but not surprising. As angry wartime crowds silenced pacifists, labor radicals, and small-town ministers, the idea of appealing directly to the people and locating democratic legitimacy in their associations lost some of its luster.
The state—even the seemingly tyrannical state of the 1920 Palmer Raids that civil libertarians despised—appeared the better option in a devil’s bargain. Progressives’ faith in “the people” became, for many, a postwar fear of “the mob” and “the crowd.”

* An inauspicious beginning this was, indeed, for a century of civil liberties, as books were burned by librarians, suffragists were beaten by women, and conscientious objectors harassed by men of the cloth. Perhaps it was no surprise, then, that for much of the early twentieth century, rights talk was only that—talk. Civil
liberties would never be sustained by the rich institutional networks of everyday life that undergirded the culture of obligation, and so the lived experience of rights proved far weaker than the culture of obligation that preceded it. Bereft of institutions at the local or national level to create and nourish a meaningful culture of
rights, American political culture limped into the 1920s with a contested and fractured sense of the obligations of citizenship but with no real alternatives in place.

* On the home front, Americans proudly called themselves vigilant citizens and believed that they were doing work much needed—and explicitly requested—by the national government. In that assumption, they were not wrong. Leading public figures, drawing on long-standing traditions equating citizenship with obligation, did call on Americans to stand vigilant during the war. Appealing to habits of voluntary association, they supported the organization of vigilance movements nationwide: committees of safety, women’s vigilance leagues, home guards. The government depended on the voluntary work of such groups for the success of the nation’s war mobilization effort. “This country,” boasted Justice Department official John Lord O’Brian just two weeks after Prager’s killing, “is being policed more thoroughly and successfully than ever before in its history.”

* As long as Americans have claimed the right to rule themselves, they have also insisted on the authority to police each other. In the early republic, they tied vigilance to concepts of popular sovereignty, but vigilance was also a political practice whereby collective policing by private citizens contributed to community defense.

* These days, some Americans wish for obligations, hoping to renew among Americans a sense of commitment toward our fellow citizens. Ninety years, they tell us, have put rights, and not obligations, at the center of our political life. Individualism has corroded our common culture and our civic associations; we even bowl alone.

* From such a perspective, the sense of voluntarism and obligation in the political culture of early twentieth-century America must astound. People sacrificed, fought, and even died because of commitments to a common political life that Americans seem no longer to share. They created those obligations in their everyday institutions, places where they expressed their understandings of citizenship and fairness, of membership and belonging, where they came to consensus about their obligations in face-to-face meetings. It must have been
comforting to see a familiar face at the draft board hearing or on the doorstep selling Liberty Bonds, to be able to negotiate the terms of political obligation in the lodge or club; it must even have been somewhat reassuring to those who registered as enemy aliens that they could do so at the local post office.

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