Since President Trump returned to the White House, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority has shown a willingness to short-circuit lower-court proceedings with a slew of emergency rulings in federal cases. But this was a rare instance in which the justices leapfrogged the state courts, too — a sign, legal experts said, that despite intense scrutiny of how the Supreme Court has been using its emergency docket, the conservative justices appear to be expanding its use rather than constraining it.
Unlike the court’s traditional “merits” cases, which arrive after months or years of lower-court consideration, emergency requests are fast-tracked with limited briefing and almost always without oral argument. The emergency docket has exploded in recent years, particularly in the second Trump administration, with the filings accounting for a significant part of the justices’ workload. While the quick-turn orders are technically place holders, they can effectively settle significant issues while litigation plays out in the lower courts.
Stephen I. Vladeck, a Georgetown University law professor and the author of a book called “The Shadow Docket,” said the emergency orders this week made the court “look like what so many regularly accuse it of being: a font of partisan political power.” The justices, he added, had gotten into a “bad habit” of granting relief before litigants had gone through the process in the lower courts.
Then, last August, in an unrelated case on government grants, Justice Neil Gorsuch, joined by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, took another swipe at Judge Murphy, saying he and other judges had engaged in judicial defiance that had required the Supreme Court “to intercede in a case ‘squarely controlled’ by one of its precedents.”
That is an awfully categorical statement to make about an order that contained no reasoning.
What you are seeing in those pieces is less a legal argument than a status narrative about who gets to define legitimacy.
The Supreme Court is described as “partisan” when it produces outcomes that clash with the professional class that dominates elite journalism and much of the legal academy. That language does a few things at once.
First, it reframes disagreement over constitutional interpretation as institutional misconduct. Instead of saying “the Court adopted a conservative reading of executive power or election law,” the framing becomes “the Court is acting politically.” The effect is to move the dispute from law into legitimacy.
Second, it elevates district judges like Brian Murphy into heroic figures resisting partisan power. Notice the narrative structure in the article. Murphy is portrayed as courageous and principled. The administration is portrayed as aggressive. The Supreme Court is portrayed as cryptic and power-grabbing. That framing recruits the reader into a particular coalition.
Third, the criticism of the “shadow docket” performs the same move. Emergency orders have always existed because courts often need to act quickly. What is new is the political valence. When the Court uses emergency orders in ways that block policies favored by the professional class, the procedure becomes suspicious and illegitimate. When the same mechanism blocks policies they oppose, it rarely produces the same alarm.
The deeper issue is that many legal elites still operate with the myth of neutral judging. In that myth the Court sits above politics and simply applies law. When the Court behaves like a normal political institution that interprets ambiguous texts through ideological lenses, the myth breaks.
Historically the Court has always been tied to political coalitions.
Dred Scott v. Sandford aligned with the slaveholding coalition.
Lochner v. New York aligned with a laissez-faire constitutional vision.
Brown v. Board of Education aligned with the emerging civil rights coalition.
Roe v. Wade aligned with the liberalizing social coalition of the 1970s.
Every era describes the Court as principled when it agrees with its coalition and partisan when it does not.
The Murphy episode also reveals another structural tension. District judges increasingly behave like national political actors. They issue sweeping injunctions that halt presidential policies across the entire country. That effectively turns a single trial judge into a temporary veto player over national policy. When the Supreme Court intervenes quickly to stop that, critics describe it as aggressive or partisan.
So you get a strange inversion. A district judge who blocks national immigration policy becomes a defender of the Constitution. The Supreme Court stopping that judge becomes the institution abusing power.
The word “partisan” in this context is doing coalition work. It signals that the Court’s current majority sits outside the cultural and professional networks that dominate elite law schools, legal journalism, and much of the federal bureaucracy. Calling it partisan is a way of challenging its authority without openly arguing that the Constitution should mean something different.
When elites say the Supreme Court is “partisan,” they are not making a neutral institutional observation. They are doing coalition politics.
The professional class that dominates elite media, universities, and many legal institutions treats neutrality as the central virtue of judging. In their status system, a judge’s prestige comes from appearing above faction. The ideal image is the technocratic arbiter applying neutral principles. So calling a justice “partisan” is a way of stripping that status. It places the justice outside the guild’s moral hierarchy.
But there is an asymmetry in how the term is used.
First, elites tend to describe decisions they dislike as “partisan” and decisions they like as “principled.” When the Court produces an outcome aligned with their policy preferences, the language shifts to “defending the rule of law,” “protecting institutions,” or “upholding precedent.” When the outcome cuts the other way, suddenly the justices are acting like political operatives.
Second, the charge of partisanship is often a way of delegitimizing outcomes without directly arguing the law. If the public accepts that the Court is just another political actor, then the authority of its rulings weakens. That creates space for proposals like court expansion, jurisdiction stripping, or ignoring decisions. The rhetoric prepares the ground for institutional conflict.
Third, the critique ignores a basic reality about constitutional law. Many of the hardest cases involve value conflicts that cannot be resolved by pure logic. Questions about abortion, administrative power, religion, gun rights, or federalism inevitably reflect competing political philosophies. Judges bring those philosophies with them. Pretending otherwise is part of the legal guild’s self-image.
From an alliance perspective, the word “partisan” is a moral weapon. It signals to allies that the rival coalition is violating the shared rules of the game. It also reassures one’s own side that their position represents the neutral center rather than a faction.
The irony is that the same elite ecosystem often treats partisanship as normal everywhere else. Congress is partisan. Presidents are partisan. Voters are partisan. Only judges are supposed to float above the conflict. That expectation reflects the professional identity of the legal class more than the structure of democratic politics.
In practice, the Supreme Court has always been entangled with politics.
So when elites say the worst thing a judge can be is partisan, what they really mean is this. Judges should not openly align with the coalition they oppose. Judges who align with their own coalition are described as principled guardians of the Constitution.
Posted inLaw|Comments Off on NYT: An Assertive Supreme Court Turns to Curbing State Courts
In the real world, when a deliberate harm is inflicted, the victim rarely responds proportionately. They tend to up the ante.
The appeal to “proportionate response” comes from two places. One is international law, especially the doctrine of proportionality in the law of armed conflict. The other is the technocratic mindset common in policy and media circles. Both assume that violence can be calibrated like a policy instrument. Two, that assumption fits what Charles Taylor called the buffered self. In that outlook the individual stands outside collective passions and can apply rational calculation to events. Violence becomes something like a policy knob. Turn it up a little. Turn it down a little. Maintain equilibrium.
Violence doesn’t work like that. If I were to punch a bloke without provocation, he would rarely settle for giving me one equal punch back.
If you cheat your boss, your boss is not likely to cheat you back. Instead, he fires you.
If you cheat on your spouse, your spouse will likely fire you.
In real conflicts the logic is usually deterrence and dominance, not symmetry. A state responds to violence in a way that makes future attacks less attractive. That means responding far beyond the initial injury. The goal is not numerical balance. The goal is to change the adversary’s incentives.
Think about ordinary policing. If someone punches a police officer the officer does not respond with a single punch to restore symmetry. The officer uses enough force to control the situation and prevent future resistance. The response escalates until compliance is achieved. The governing logic is authority and deterrence, not proportional exchange.
The same principle operates in war. Israel’s strategy against Hamas or Hezbollah has never been “kill the same number they killed.” The aim is to destroy capabilities and impose costs high enough that the opponent hesitates next time. Historically most wars follow that pattern. The side that absorbs a blow usually escalates in order to restore credibility.
Why does the proportionality language persist?
Part of it is moral signaling. Saying a response must be proportionate allows elites to frame themselves as guardians of restraint and universal norms. It is a way to mark distance from what they see as tribal vengeance.
Part of it is professional culture. Journalists, diplomats, and academics work in institutions that prize rule-based systems. They are trained to think conflicts can be managed through norms and calibrated incentives. The proportionality frame fits that training.
And part of it is psychological comfort. If violence can be measured and balanced, then war becomes predictable and containable. The buffered self prefers that model because it preserves the sense that rational management is possible.
But the actors actually fighting wars usually operate in a different mental universe. They worry about credibility, fear, morale, and future deterrence. Those are emotional and strategic variables that do not fit neatly into proportional formulas.
That is why the rhetoric of proportion collides with reality. The people writing columns imagine violence as a carefully calibrated instrument. The people conducting wars see it as survival of the fittest.
Posted inExpertise|Comments Off on Experts Love Proportionate Response
People evolved to be tribal, and nationalism is just an extension of that basic instinct. Hating that hard-wiring is like hating parents who prefer their own kids to children they’ve never met on the other side of the world.
When pundits and experts do give nationalism legitimacy, they immediately separate good nationalism (Jeffersonian democracy) from bad nationalism (Putin), which seems so hilarious when coming from those posing as objective.
What they mean is nationalism that stabilizes the current international order and status order is coded as good. Nationalism that threatens it is coded as bad.
The experts discussing what comes next for Iran are overwhelmingly anti-nationalist. They are like virgins speculating on what makes for great sex.
Academics and pundits often view nationalism as a relic of a pre-rational era that threatens the universal values they prize. This skepticism stems from a commitment to the Enlightenment ideal of cosmopolitanism. In this worldview, the “buffered self”—to use a concept from A Secular Age by Charles Taylor—seeks to transcend tribal boundaries in favor of objective, global standards. For many intellectuals, nationalism represents a “porous” state where the individual is dangerously susceptible to collective myths and irrational passions.
On the other hand, the institutions that claim to transcend nationalism are overwhelmingly national projects.
American universities train American elites.
American think tanks advise the American state.
European institutions defend European interests.
What they oppose is not nationalism itself but uncontrolled nationalism outside their institutional framework.
Nationalism becomes stronger during war regardless of elite ideology. Wars activate several deep psychological forces such as coalition formation, sacrifice norms, shared identity, and enemy identification. This is why even highly cosmopolitan societies become nationalist when they face external threats. You can see it in the Ukraine war. European elites who spent decades talking about post-national Europe suddenly embraced national mobilization language once Russia invaded. War forces the friend–enemy distinction back into the open.
Nationalism drives political mobilization. A state needs citizens to do difficult things such as pay taxes, accept legal authority, fight wars, and sacrifice for future generations. Abstract universalism is too weak to sustain those commitments. People are far more willing to sacrifice for a bounded community they see as “their own.” That is why every large-scale democracy ultimately relies on some form of national identity.
Without a “we,” redistribution, law enforcement, and military service become much harder to sustain.
The distinction between “good” and “bad” nationalism usually relies on the labels of civic versus ethnic nationalism. Pundits argue that civic nationalism is based on shared political values and legal documents, while ethnic nationalism is based on blood, soil, and exclusion. They view the former as a tool for social cohesion in a democracy and the latter as a precursor to conflict. These categories are moral justifications to signal loyalty to one’s own globalist or elite coalition while pathologizing the alliances of rivals.
Every successful nationalism mixes civic, ethnic, cultural, and religious nationalism. The United States is supposed to be the textbook example of civic nationalism but American identity is full of ethnic, cultural, and historical markers as well as language, founding myths, revolutionary war memory, and Christianity. France claims civic nationalism as well, but French nationalism is tied to language, culture, and historical identity. Ethnic nationalism is rarely purely ethnic either. Even strongly ethnic nationalisms almost always rely on civic ideas like law, sovereignty, and citizenship. So the distinction works mainly as a moral sorting mechanism that allows commentators to praise allied national movements while condemning rival ones.
Academics treat nationalism as a “social construct” or an “imagined community,” a term popularized by Benedict Anderson. By framing it as something “invented” rather than “natural,” they feel empowered to deconstruct it. This creates a symmetry where the academic maintains status by being the “objective” observer who sees through the illusions that bind the common man. When they condemn Vladimir Putin’s nationalism as “bad,” they are often performing what Jeffrey Alexander describes as a purification ritual. They cast the rival’s nationalism into the “profane” category to protect the “sacred” status of their own preferred international order.
These thinkers ignore the necessity of a bounded community for any functioning democracy. Without a sense of “we,” the sacrifices required for a welfare state or a legal system lose their logic. The attempt to separate “good” from “bad” nationalism is usually just an attempt to distinguish between nationalism that supports the current elite power structure and nationalism that threatens it.
Carl Schmitt argues that the essence of politics is the distinction between friend and enemy. For Schmitt, this is not a metaphorical or emotional struggle but a concrete reality that defines the state. Acadics and pundits often attempt to bypass this logic by framing their preferences as universal moral truths. When they label certain forms of nationalism as bad, they are not engaging in objective analysis. They are identifying a political enemy.
In the Schmittian sense, the pundit class functions as a group that attempts to de-politicize the world through law and morality. They claim that their preferred liberal internationalism is a neutral framework for all humanity. However, Schmitt argues that anyone who speaks in the name of humanity is a cheat. By claiming to represent humanity, they deny the humanity of their enemies and cast them as “outlaws” or “monsters” rather than legitimate political rivals. This explains why the condemnation of Vladimir Putin often feels like a moral crusade rather than a strategic disagreement. The pundit marks him as the absolute enemy to justify a “state of exception” where normal rules of diplomacy or sovereignty no longer apply.
This process mirrors the purification rituals described by Jeffrey Alexander. The elite coalition maintains its internal cohesion by identifying a profane “other.” If they admit that all nationalism functions on the same basic logic of “us” versus “them,” they lose their claim to moral superiority. They must separate the “good” nationalism of their allies from the “bad” nationalism of their enemies to maintain the illusion of a rules-based order. This separation is a strategic necessity for their alliance.
These moral labels are signals. When an academic decries “ethnic nationalism,” they signal their loyalty to a globalist coalition of experts and managers. This coalition gains status by being “above” the tribalism of the masses. The hilarious subjectivity is the result of these thinkers trying to hide their own tribalism behind a veneer of expertise. They are not observing the game from the sidelines; they are players using the language of objectivity to gain an advantage.
Stephen Turner argues that expertise is not a neutral transmission of truth but a social product maintained by “cliques.” These groups of academics and pundits operate within a closed circuit where they validate each other’s status. Because expertise often relies on “tacit knowledge”—things that are understood but never explicitly written down—it is difficult for outsiders to challenge their consensus on nationalism. They share a common “habitus” that makes certain views, like the disdain for borders, seem like common sense rather than a political choice.
This consensus functions as a barrier to entry. If a young academic gives nationalism legitimacy, they risk being cast out of the clique. They are seen as “failing” to understand the objective reality that the experts have constructed. This is why you see such consistency across different universities; the “interplay” of these professional networks requires a shared language of “good” versus “bad” nationalism to maintain the group’s authority. To deviate is to lose one’s standing as a “rational” observer.
This consistency is a highly effective “coordination signal.” By all using the same subjective definitions of what constitutes “dangerous” nationalism, these elites signal their reliability to the larger liberal alliance. They are not actually seeking an objective truth about human nature or social organization. They are reinforcing the boundaries of their own professional tribe. When they label someone like Putin as a “bad” nationalist, they are essentially providing the intellectual ammunition for their alliance to mobilize against a rival.
That “subjectivity” you see is a feature, not a bug. It allows the clique to move the goalposts whenever a new political threat emerges. They can categorize any movement that threatens their “logic” of global governance as “ethnic” or “irrational,” while maintaining that their own preferences are grounded in “universal” civic values. This maintains the symmetry of their power by framing their political enemies as moral deviants.
When pundits analyze Iran, they often ignore nationalism because it does not fit the logic of their internationalist cliques. Most experts prefer to view the unrest through the lens of universal human rights or economic grievances. That focus allows them to stay within the “buffered” safety of a globalist discourse that treats all people as interchangeable units in a liberal order. By ignoring the specific, historical power of Iranian nationalism, they fail to see the very force that often drives the protesters they claim to support. The current situation in Iran highlights this disconnect.
Following the joint U.S. and Israeli strikes in February 2026, many experts expressed concern that these actions would not trigger a “popular uprising” because the public is fragmented. However, they often dismiss nationalist sentiments—such as the growing “monarchist nostalgia” or the “Make Iran Great Again” (MIGA) movement—as atavistic or “ultranationalist.” As noted by observers at Perry World House, there is a profound disconnect between the claims of pundits abroad and the sentiments of protesters on the ground who are reaching for any alternative to the current regime, including nationalist ones.
These experts act as gatekeepers. They marginalize nationalist perspectives because such views threaten the “tacit knowledge” shared by their academic circles. If they admit that a nationalist, monarchist, or even a different kind of strong-man government might be what Iranians actually want, they lose their status as the moral arbiters of what a “good” democracy should look like. They would rather analyze a “failed state” or a “civil strife” scenario than admit that a nationalist restoration might have more legitimacy among the population than a liberal-democratic one.
This is a classic friend-enemy distinction in the Schmittian sense. The experts have labeled nationalism as the “enemy” of progress. Therefore, they cannot give it legitimacy in their commentary. They frame the choice as one between the current theocracy and a vague, universalist future, even though many Iranians in the streets are chanting for a return to a specific national identity. By pathologizing these nationalist desires as “irrational,” the pundits ensure their commentary remains useful only to their own elite alliances, rather than providing an accurate map of the political reality in Tehran.
Jeffrey Alexander describes social performance as a way for actors to project a specific image of themselves to an audience to gain moral authority. In the context of Iran, experts use a “cultural pragmatics” approach to re-code Iranian identity. They attempt to strip away the “profane” elements of nationalism—such as the desire for a strong, independent state or monarchist sentiments—and replace them with the “sacred” symbols of global liberalism. This performance makes the Iranian opposition palatable to Western governments and international organizations.
When analysts discuss the future of the region, they often frame the struggle as one between a religious theocracy and a secular, democratic “civil society.” This is a selective script. By coding the Iranian people as aspiring members of a global democratic alliance, experts perform a purification ritual. They cast the regime as the absolute enemy of progress while ignoring any nationalist aspirations that do not align with Western interests. This is why their commentary feels useless; they are more interested in the “social performance” of being a moral expert than in the messy reality of Iranian national identity.
The pundits are not looking for the truth about what motivates Iranians; they are looking for a way to make the Iranian situation fit into their pre-existing moral and political framework.
Western analysts often frame Iranian politics as a simple struggle between the regime and liberal civil society. But Iranian identity has multiple nationalist currents including Persian imperial nostalgia, Islamic revolutionary nationalism, monarchist nationalism and anti-Arab or anti-Turk regional nationalism.
The protesters drawing on monarchist or nationalist imagery are expressing one of those currents. Experts struggle with this because nationalist restoration does not fit the liberal script of democratic transition. So they either downplay it or treat it as fringe.
Many regime collapses produce nationalist restorations, not liberal democracies. The fall of communism in Eastern Europe produced several examples.
Nationalism is not an archaic psychological defect. It is one of the primary organizing forces of modern states. Elites criticize it rhetorically while relying on it structurally. That contradiction is why the discourse around “good and bad nationalism” often sounds so artificial.
The foreign policy establishment—the blob—views nationalism as a raw, volatile instinct that requires expert containment. In this worldview, nationalism is a pre-rational force that threatens the logic of the rules-based international order. They see their role as providing the “intellectual ballast” to keep the ship of state from being capsized by the “incontinent emotionalism” of the masses.
This belief system is the “official mind” of the blob. It is a shared habitus that treats the liberal international order as a permanent, sacred fixture of reality. To these experts, nationalism is the “profane” other—a social construct that is “invented” to organize humans but often boils over into “extremism” and “violence.” By framing nationalism as something that needs to be “managed” or “downgraded,” they justify their own status as the only people qualified to handle such a dangerous tool.
This containment logic creates a distinct symmetry in their commentary:
When a leader like Putin or a movement in Iran uses nationalist rhetoric, the blob codes it as “ethnic” or “aggressive” nationalism. The expert casts the nationalist actor as a moral deviant to protect the sanctity of global cooperation.
The blob attempts to de-politicize its own power by claiming to speak for “humanity” or “universal values.” By doing so, they turn their political enemies into “outlaws” who lack legitimate standing. Their disdain for Iranian nationalism, for example, is a strategic choice to deny that an independent, nationalist Iran could ever be a legitimate “friend” in the international system.
The blob’s consistent anti-nationalist stance is a coordination signal. It tells other members of the elite clique that they are reliable partners who will prioritize the “logic” of interdependence over tribal loyalties.
The experts must constantly move the goalposts to separate “good” civic patriotism (which supports their alliance) from “bad” nationalism (which threatens it). Their commentary is less about understanding the world and more about performing the role of the “objective” container of irrational instincts.
The blob now faces a crisis of symmetry. Since the 2024 election, the containment logic has shifted from managing foreign threats to suppressing what experts term illiberal internationalism within the American right. This new movement uses the language of nationalism to form a counter-alliance that bypasses traditional bureaucratic gatekeepers. To the establishment, this is the ultimate profane intrusion because it threatens the very cliques that Stephen Turner describes as the source of modern authority.
In this struggle, the expert class uses a strategy of moral disqualification. They no longer treat the nationalist right as a legitimate political rival but as a threat to the state of exception they have managed for decades. By applying Carl Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction, they cast these domestic nationalists as enemies of the constitutional order itself. This allows them to frame their own partisan interests as the defense of democracy. They use purification rituals to separate themselves from the “deplorable” elements of the population, claiming that their own preference for global interdependence is the only rational path.
The blob is currently engaged in a massive coordination effort to maintain its status. The experts signal their loyalty to the globalist coalition by doubling down on the dangers of populism. They treat the desire for national sovereignty as a psychological pathology rather than a political program. This creates a closed loop where the only people allowed to speak on nationalism are those who have already agreed that it is a dangerous instinct requiring expert management.
The experts must maintain the fiction that they are objective observers, even as they act as a defensive phalanx for their own class. They view the rise of an American “MIGA” style nationalism as a contagion that might break the logic of the rules-based order. Their commentary is not designed to inform but to reinforce the boundaries of the “buffered” elite identity against the “porous” and supposedly irrational masses.
Grok says: The piece’s claim that experts marginalize Iranian nationalist currents (Persian imperial nostalgia, monarchist revival, “Make Iran Great Again”/MIGA) because they threaten liberal scripts is vividly confirmed in real time.MIGA and monarchist symbolism exploded after Khamenei’s confirmed death (March 1 reports). Diaspora celebrations in NYC, LA, Portland, London, Berlin, and Paris featured pre-1979 Lion-and-Sun flags, chants of “Javid Shah” (Long live the Shah), and explicit “Make Iran Great Again” signage/hats—directly echoing the essay’s “monarchist nostalgia” or “MIGA” framing. Crowds danced, set off fireworks, and waved portraits of Reza Pahlavi, branding the strikes a “humanitarian intervention” enabling regime change. Inside Iran, scattered reports show similar jubilation (dancing in streets, anti-regime fireworks), though repression limits visibility.
Reza Pahlavi’s positioning aligns perfectly: He called the strikes a pathway to freedom, urged Iranians to “take over your government,” and positioned himself as transitional figure for referendum/democracy. Critics (e.g., diaspora fractures, accusations of far-right Persian supremacism) highlight the essay’s point—nationalist restoration doesn’t fit Western liberal-transition narratives, so it’s downplayed as “nostalgic,” “fringe,” or “chauvinistic.”
Expert disconnect persists: Analyses from Perry World House (rapid-response events March 3), Carnegie, Atlantic Council, and others emphasize fragmentation, risks of chaos/civil war, ethnic fissures (Kurds, Baluchis, Azeris staying away), and no clear successor. They frame outcomes as “regime collapse” or “state failure” rather than nationalist revival. Pahlavi/monarchist momentum is noted but often qualified as “nostalgic,” “strategically adrift,” or hijacked—rarely as legitimate popular expression. This fits the “buffered” elite habitus: nationalism is profane unless civic-liberal; Persian/imperial/monarchist currents threaten the universalist script.
Purification Rituals in Action
Post-strikes commentary performs Alexander-style rituals:Profane coding of regime nationalism (theocratic, aggressive) vs. sacred liberal opposition.
Selective framing of protests as “civil society” vs. theocracy, sidelining nationalist/monarchist slogans that dominated earlier waves (e.g., January 2026: “Pahlavi will return,” “Reza Shah, bless your soul”).
Goalpost-moving: If chaos ensues, blame “irrational” nationalism or foreign intervention; if nationalist restoration emerges, pathologize as “authoritarian” or “far-right.”
Schmittian Symmetry and Blob Containment
The blob’s crisis of symmetry is acute: Domestic “illiberal internationalism” (American nationalist right) mirrors foreign threats. In Iran, experts signal loyalty by doubling down on “managed” transitions—avoiding endorsement of bounded, sovereign nationalism that might produce an independent, non-aligned Iran. Schmitt’s “humanity” cheat is evident: Strikes framed as defending universal values, but outcomes risk nationalist backlash that rejects interdependence.
Good/bad distinction as coalition glue: Experts praise “forward-looking nostalgia” (pre-1979 prosperity) only if channeled liberal-democratically; when tied to Pahlavi/MIGA, it’s “chauvinistic” or “intervention-aligned.”
Turner/Pinsof reinforcement: IR expertise here is clique-maintained tacit knowledge—anti-nationalist consensus as entry barrier. Deviating risks exclusion; consistency signals reliability to patrons (State, think tanks, media).
The essay nails the artificiality: Nationalism isn’t archaic defect but structural necessity elites rhetorically condemn while structurally relying on. Iran’s live experiment—decapitation + nationalist upsurge—exposes the disconnect: Experts analyze “chaos” or “civil strife” while streets/diaspora chant for bounded, sovereign revival. That’s the ultimate symmetry breaker—the blob’s containment logic falters when the “profane” instinct proves more mobilizing than universal scripts.
A dictatorship component lurks inside all functioning democracies as no constitutional order can afford to entirely rely upon procedure during extraordinary times.
The core argument of the paper is that modern democracies repeatedly move into temporary systems of emergency executive power during crises. The constitution still exists, but the real decision-making power concentrates in the executive. The paper shows that this is not an accident. It is a recurring pattern in modern states, especially after the creation of the national security state in the 20th century.
Wars are the classic trigger.
In the Iran war scenario, that means that Congress becomes marginal, bureaucratic processes compress, and decisions move into the White House and a small national security circle.
The real government becomes a war cabinet, even if the constitutional structure formally remains intact. The president becomes the central decision maker
The paper points out that in crisis situations the American system effectively assumes that the president must decide alone on existential questions. The Cuban Missile Crisis is given as an example. Everyone in the room assumed that ultimately only the president could decide whether the U.S. would go to nuclear war.
Translate that into the Iran war. Questions like these become presidential decisions:
whether to escalate strikes
whether to target regime leadership
whether to widen the war
whether to accept ceasefire terms
Public debate continues, but the real authority collapses into the executive.
That is exactly what the paper means by constitutional dictatorship.
The paper opens with a famous George W. Bush line: “I’m the commander… I don’t need to explain.”
That quote captures something I have been noticing about power (the more power you have, the less you explain). During normal politics leaders must justify themselves constantly. During emergency politics legitimacy comes from decisive action, not procedural explanation. That is why Trump can operate with minimal rhetorical explanation in a war. The institutional logic of crisis governance supports that behavior.
The expert class hates this phase. Experts love words. Experts are structurally aligned with a normal politics of process, rules, deliberation, and institutional mediation. Emergency government disrupts that prestige market. A war compresses decision-making into a small group of actors and rewards speed, secrecy, and decisiveness. So the expert class becomes obsessed with procedural violations, lack of congressional authorization, and unclear strategy statements.
From their perspective the system looks “unhealthy.”
From the perspective of crisis governance it is behaving exactly as designed.
The authors’ real concern is not emergency power itself. They argue that democracies cannot survive crises without concentrated authority. The danger is that emergency powers gradually become permanent.
In other words:
temporary crisis authority
→ normalized executive dominance
→ permanent national security state
The paper argues that this process has been happening for decades through intelligence agencies, military powers, and emergency authorities.
During the exception phase of war:
hawks gain prestige
decisive leaders gain prestige
bureaucratic expertise loses prestige
If the war drags on or stabilizes:
managerial experts regain prestige
technocrats return to managing the aftermath
legal debates reappear
So the prestige market is cyclical.
The “state of exception” temporarily rearranges the hierarchy.
Modern democracies already contain the machinery of emergency rule. They don’t collapse into dictatorship during wars. They temporarily reorganize around concentrated executive power. That is why the rhetoric about “democracy ending” during wars often misses the deeper reality. The system is not breaking. It is shifting into its crisis operating mode. And historically, wars are the moments when that mode becomes visible.
Carl Schmitt’s core claim is simple: The sovereign is the one who decides the exception.
In normal politics rules dominate. In crisis politics someone must decide whether the rules apply. The person who makes that decision is the real sovereign.
This helps explain several things about the current situation.
First, why the debate about legality is largely symbolic.
Many experts argue that the Iran war is illegal because Congress did not authorize it.
Schmitt would say that legality is not the decisive question in a true emergency. The decisive question is who has the power to act and who can stop them. In other words, the real constitution of a country becomes visible during crises. It is defined by who can make irreversible decisions.
Second, why elites obsess over process violations. Managerial elites derive prestige from the rule-governed system. Their authority depends on procedures, committees, legal reasoning, and institutional mediation. The state of exception bypasses all of that.
So the expert class tries to reassert control through language like:
norms
constitutional crisis
rule of law
illegal war
These phrases are attempts to drag politics back into the procedural world where their expertise matters.
Third, why Trump-style leadership fits the exception model so well. Schmitt argued that crisis politics rewards leaders who can create a clear friend–enemy distinction. Politics becomes existential. The key question becomes who threatens the community.
This is exactly the kind of rhetoric Trump uses:
Iran as enemy
strength versus weakness
punishment and deterrence
Schmitt would say this is not abnormal political language. It is the language that emerges when politics becomes existential.
Fourth, why explanation often disappears during wars. Schmitt argued that decisive political acts cannot be fully justified within existing rules because they happen outside the normal legal order. They create a new reality. That is why leaders in wartime often speak in blunt terms or avoid detailed explanations. The action itself becomes the justification. This is also why you see statements like Bush’s famous line that the president does not need to explain his decisions as commander-in-chief.
Fifth, why wars reorder the prestige hierarchy. In normal politics the most prestigious actors are:
military commanders
strategists
decisive executives
intelligence operators
The war creates a different status economy.
The people who understand kinetic power gain influence while the procedural experts temporarily lose it.
Schmitt helps explain something deeper about the Iran war. The conflict is not just a military operation. It is a moment of political founding. In Schmitt’s terms, extraordinary moments allow a community to redefine itself and its political order. These moments challenge the established institutional framework and reshape political reality.
That is why wars often become turning points in national identity. They force a society to answer basic questions:
Who are our enemies?
What are we willing to fight for?
Who has the authority to decide?
Those decisions do not come from procedures. They come from sovereign acts. That is the deeper reason the expert class often finds these moments unsettling. They reveal that political order ultimately rests not on rules but on decisions backed by power.
The synthesis of Levinson and Balkin’s Constitutional Dictatorship with the current Iran war explains why the “Professional Iran Hand” alliance is currently being sidelined. The paper argues that the American presidency is not just an office but a “distributed” system of emergency powers that remains dormant until the “state of exception” activates it.
1. The Executive as the “Permanent Exception”
Levinson and Balkin argue that the U.S. has moved beyond the “commissarial” dictatorship of the Roman Republic, which was strictly temporary. Instead, we have a “permanent national security state” that keeps the machinery of concentrated power ready at all times. In the Iran war, we see this machinery hum to life. The “silent power” strategy you noted is the logical outcome of this design. Because the presidency is already constructed to be a constitutional dictatorship in times of war, the sovereign does not need to ask for new powers; he simply reaches for the ones already built into the “National Security Act” and the “AUMF” (Authorization for Use of Military Force) frameworks.
2. The Devaluation of Congressional and Bureaucratic “Friction”
In the paper’s logic, “normal politics” is defined by friction—checks, balances, and public justifications. “Extraordinary politics” is defined by the removal of friction to ensure the survival of the state. This explains why the expert class is currently “screaming into the void” about the lack of congressional consultation. From the perspective of the constitutional dictatorship, Congress is a source of friction that endangers the “decisive action” required to strike the IRGC or respond to the Akrotiri drone hit. The prestige of the “managerial diplomat” drops because their entire skill set is based on navigating the friction that the war has temporarily abolished.
3. The “Decide Alone” Doctrine
The authors highlight that during existential crises, the system assumes the President must decide alone. This is the ultimate “buffered identity.” While Nate Swanson or the Atlantic Council might offer a “six-question framework” for striking Iran, the constitutional reality is that the decision happens in a “black box.” This creates a prestige surge for those who have access to that box—the “Operational Security Experts” like Norman Roule—and devalues those who are merely “watching the box from the outside.”
4. The Transition from Crisis to Normalization
The most prophetic part of the 2010 paper for our current moment is the warning about the “normalization” of emergency power. If the Iran war results in a “Post-Iran” regional order, the concentrated executive powers used to win the war will not simply disappear. Levinson and Balkin suggest they will be “distributed” into the new bureaucracy. This is the “Architect of the New” phase that Mark Dubowitz and the Strategic Hawks are aiming for. They aren’t just trying to win a war; they are trying to “design” the permanent security state that will manage the region after the regime collapses.
5. The Sovereign as “Commander”
The quote “I’m the commander… I don’t need to explain” is the ultimate dismissal of the “Institutional Translator.” In a constitutional dictatorship, the President’s role is to act, and the expert’s role is to facilitate that action, not to debate its “logic” or “symmetry.” Trump’s minimal rhetorical style is not a personal quirk; it is the “equilibrium strategy” of a leader who understands that in the “state of exception,” explaining is a sign of weakness that invites the return of friction.
6. The Cyclical Prestige Market
As the paper notes, the system is not breaking; it is shifting modes. This confirms that the prestige market is cyclical.
Phase 1 (Kinetic/Exception): High prestige for the Sovereign and his Hawks who embrace “Constitutional Dictatorship.”
Phase 2 (Stabilization/Normalization): High prestige for the Managers who can turn the “emergency powers” into “permanent institutions.”
The current “clash of alliances” is a fight over when Phase 1 ends and Phase 2 begins. The Hawks want to extend the “exception” until the regime is totally erased, while the Managers are already trying to re-impose “procedure” to regain their lost status.
Posted inDictatorship|Comments Off on War & The Constitutional Dictatorship
Grok says: As of March 5, 2026 (roughly one week into Operation Epic Fury), Western elite attitudes toward the U.S.-Israel campaign against Iran show mixed, evolving, and increasingly cautious shifts. Initial reactions were polarized along familiar lines—hawkish support from pro-Israel/security conservatives vs. restraint calls from multilateralist/diplomatic circles—but emerging realities (casualties, escalation risks, no rapid regime collapse, oil shocks, and Iranian resilience/retaliation) have nudged broader elite discourse toward skepticism about long-term outcomes and war aims.Key shifts observed in think tanks, media, policymakers, and commentary:U.S. elite/Washington Blob (managerial and realist wings): Early enthusiasm for “once-in-a-generation opportunity” and “high-risk, high-reward” framing (per Reuters/White House leaks) has cooled. Brookings Institution experts (March 3 analysis) highlight dangers of prolonged campaign, potential Trump impatience for quick deal vs. Netanyahu’s ambitions, and counterproductive Iranian radicalism (e.g., Gulf/Cyprus strikes). Reuters reports senior U.S. officials skeptical of near-term regime change post-Khamenei death—expecting hardliner/IRGC continuity rather than collapse. White House rhetoric shifted: initial regime-change calls (Trump urging Iranians to “take back their country”) tempered to “removing threats” without endless war (per NPR/WQLN coverage of mixed messages). This reflects wariness of quagmire, audience costs from U.S. casualties (e.g., CENTCOM: 6 killed, 18 wounded), and domestic polling sensitivity amid oil price spikes.
European leaders/multilateral elites: Largely critical from the start, with growing emphasis on escalation fears. EU (von der Leyen) called developments “greatly concerning,” urging restraint and nuclear safety. E3 (France, Germany, UK) joint statement reiterated long-standing calls for Iran to end nuclear/destabilizing actions but avoided endorsing strikes—focusing on de-escalation. Spain’s Sánchez rejected “unilateral” action as contributing to “uncertain/hostile order.” No major shift to support; if anything, hardening against perceived U.S. unilateralism (e.g., Chatham House/ECFR pieces critiquing strikes as illegal “war of choice”). Emergency UNSC meetings (France/Russia/China push) underscore European preference for diplomacy over military momentum.
Think tank spectrum:Hawkish flank (e.g., ISW/CTP/AEI updates): Emphasize military success (degraded air defenses/missile capabilities, reduced Iranian launches), framing as necessary deterrence. Little retreat from “peace through strength” narrative.
Centrist/realist (Brookings, Stimson, Lansing Institute): Stress limits of airpower alone for regime change—Iran “battered but not broken,” risks of radicalized successor, oil shocks eroding support. Brookings notes Trump likely to pivot to deal if casualties mount.
Restraint/critical (e.g., ECFR, Chatham House): View as tipping point for UN Charter norms; warn of regional chaos (e.g., Gulf states rethinking Iran policies, potential fragmentation).
Broader elite signaling: No strong “rally ’round the flag” effect—Reuters/polling notes significant American disapproval. Some Iranian diaspora/exiles cheer strikes (Iran International reports), but Western activists/protests chant “No War.” Congressional frustration over lack of notice/shifting rationales (YouTube/Big Take coverage) points to elite unease with sovereign ambiguity.
The initial prestige boost for hawks (clarity, action) persists in security circles, but managerial/diplomatic elites increasingly hedge—focusing on risks, second-order effects (escalation, domestic costs, no clear endgame), and calls for restraint/de-escalation. If strikes yield quick degradation without major U.S. quagmire, hawkish views hold; prolonged pain (casualties, oil/economic fallout) accelerates shift toward caution and “deal-seeking” realism. European attitudes remain predominantly wary, with no visible pivot to alignment. This mirrors post-Iraq patterns: early momentum fades as complexity sets in.
Posted inIran|Comments Off on Enthusiasm For Iran War Cools Among Experts As Complexity Sets In
1. Wars Create “Extraordinary Politics” That Break Normal Rules
The book argues that democratic systems normally operate through routine institutional politics, but occasionally politics shifts into an extraordinary phase where the existing legal and institutional order is disrupted. In those moments:
normal procedures lose authority
decisions become centralized
new actors emerge suddenly
This maps directly onto wartime politics and explains why the prestige hierarchy among experts and institutions is shifting so quickly. During normal politics, prestige sits with bureaucrats, diplomats, and procedural experts.
During extraordinary moments, prestige flows toward decisive leaders, strategists, and actors capable of rapid action.
The book emphasizes that these moments often occur outside the normal constitutional order and force a redefinition of political authority. That is the “State of Exception.”
2. Foundational Moments Redefine Political Orders
A key concept in the book is that rare events sometimes allow a political community to redefine itself and its institutions. The author draws on three thinkers:
Max Weber (charisma)
Carl Schmitt (sovereign decision)
Hannah Arendt (political founding)
Sometimes wars become founding events that create new political realities.
Examples historically:
World War I → collapse of empires
World War II → new global order
Cold War end → new European system
3. The People Exist Both Inside and Outside the System
Political systems always have an “outside” that cannot be fully controlled by institutions. This outside includes protests, insurgencies, irregular militias, and extra-legal political movements. These actors are not just disruptions. They are integral to political transformation.
Groups like Kurdish militias are not merely irregular forces. They represent the political outside of the Iranian state. When the central state weakens, that outside suddenly becomes politically decisive.
4. Charismatic Leadership Appears in Crises
Drawing on Max Weber, the book stresses that extraordinary moments often produce charismatic leadership, where authority flows from decisive action rather than institutional legitimacy. This is important for interpreting contemporary politics. In routine times authority comes from bureaucratic procedures. In crises, authority shifts toward leaders who appear capable of decisive action such as the military and that boosts the prestige of certain actors. It also explains why strong executive power becomes more accepted during war.
5. Revolutions and Crises Often Create Permanent States of Exception
The book also warns about a danger: extraordinary politics can slide into permanent emergency rule. Historically many revolutions began as transformative moments but ended as prolonged emergency systems. This insight matters for the Iran war. If the Iranian regime collapses or fragments, the region may enter a long period where normal political institutions are weak, military actors dominate and legal orders remain unstable.
So the “exception” might not be temporary. It could become the new normal.
6. Why the Book Clarifies the Iran War
The book suggests that the current conflict is not just another Middle East crisis. It may represent an extraordinary political moment with three possible outcomes:
Restoration
Iran survives and re-stabilizes the existing regional order.
Reconfiguration
Iran weakens but survives while regional power balances shift.
Founding moment
The Iranian state collapses or transforms, creating a new regional political structure.
Most analysts focus on military operations. The book suggests the deeper question is whether this war becomes a founding event in regional politics.
Extraordinary politics is not merely emergency power. It is a moment when institutions weaken, new actors emerge, and political orders can be re-founded. That is precisely the situation along Iran’s borders.
Further thoughts:
1. The Breakdown of the “Iron Cage”
Kalyvas draws on Max Weber to explain how normal politics—the “iron cage” of bureaucratic routine and expert-led management—is shattered during extraordinary moments. In the context of the Iran war, Nate Swanson represents the “normal” procedural expert whose prestige currency is devalued when the sovereign (the executive) chooses to act outside the established “scripts”.
Charismatic Shifts: Weber argued that crises produce charismatic leadership where authority flows from decisive action rather than institutional legitimacy. This explains why current praise for “peace through strength” is centered on the personality of the leader rather than the consensus of the “Blob”.
Symbolic Foundations: Charismatic politics aims at the “symbolic foundations of power,” creating new collective identities. The formation of a unified Kurdish command (CPFIK) is a classic example of creating a new political “we” that exists outside the old state-based institutional order.
2. The Sovereign Decision and the “State of Exception”
Kalyvas reconstructs Carl Schmitt’s theory to show that the “sovereign” is not just someone who manages an emergency, but the subject who “decides on the exception” to found a new order.
Constituent Power: Sovereignty is defined as the “constituent power” to create a new constitution or political form. The strikes on Tehran and the resulting decapitation of the regime are not just “punishment”; they are acts that create a “normative nothingness” from which a new regional hierarchy can emerge.
Apocryphal Acts: Schmitt noted that popular sovereignty survives even in “apocryphal” (inauthentic) ways during normal times, but “wakes up” during the extraordinary. The surge in grassroots mobilization along the Iranian borders represents the “slumbering popular sovereign” reclaiming its power to redefine the state.
3. Founding Moments vs. Absolute Breaks
The book uses Hannah Arendt to offer a crucial warning about the difference between “absolute” and “relative” new beginnings.
The Mirage of the Total Break: Arendt criticized the French Revolution for attempting an absolute rupture (a tabula rasa), which she argued leads inevitably to violence and the “vicious circle” of revolutionary terror. If the “Strategic Hawks” push for a total erasure of the Iranian state, Arendt’s theory suggests the result will be a permanent state of exception or a rapid restoration of tyranny.
Relative Foundings: Conversely, Arendt praised the American Revolution for being a “relative” founding that built on existing bodies (like colonial assemblies). The “independent volunteers” of the Kurdish groups or the shifting alliances of the Gulf states could be seen as the “pre-constituted” bodies necessary to stabilize a new order without falling into the “abyss of freedom”.
4. The Survival of Freedom
Arendt’s most significant contribution, according to Kalyvas, is her focus on how freedom can survive its own institutionalization.The Three-Track Model: Kalyvas advances a model where democracy operates on three levels: instituting moments (the founding), instituted politics (the bureaucracy), and spontaneous mobilization on the fringes.
Civil Disobedience as Bridge: During the Iran war, dissent from the “Antiwar Right” or “Managerial Diplomats” acts as a “semi-extraordinary” force that attempts to pull the sovereign back into a framework of legality and self-limitation.
5. Why the “Prestige Pendulum” Swings
Kalyvas’s analysis explains why the “prestige hierarchy” is currently favoring Hawks over Managers.Managers of the Ordinary: Bureaucrats like Swanson gain status by protecting the “instituted reality”. In a war, which is the ultimate “extraordinary” event, their tools (hedging, risk assessment) appear as “sterile passivity”.
Architects of the New: Strategists like Dubowitz gain “prestige velocity” because they offer a “script” for the founding moment. They present themselves as the “architects” of a “new political space,” aligning their status with the creative power of the sovereign act.
The book suggests that the Iran war is a “founding moment” where the “organized multitude” is acting outside the state to “instaure” a new order. The question is no longer how to return to the status quo, but who will have the “constituent power” to authorize the new regional reality.
Posted inCarl Schmitt, Iran|Comments Off on Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt (2008)
Azerbaijan might invade if the Iranian state weakens.
1. The Drone Strike on Nakhchivan
Today, multiple kamikaze drones, identified by some local media as Arash-2 models, struck the Nakhchivan International Airport and a secondary school. President Ilham Aliyev has described this as a “heinous terrorist act” and an “expression of insolence.” The strike injured at least four civilians and damaged the airport terminal. While Iran has officially denied responsibility, suggesting the attack was a “false flag” by Israel to sow discord, Azerbaijan has placed its armed forces on “State of Readiness No. 1.”
2. The Failure of the “Pragmatic Neutrality”
Up until today, Aliyev was performing a very careful dance. He visited the Iranian embassy in Baku on March 4 to offer condolences for the death of Ali Khamenei—a move he pointedly noted no other head of state had made. He even provided a plane to help evacuate Iranian diplomats from Lebanon earlier this week. The drone strike is being framed by Baku as a “vile blow” that betrays this gratitude. By summoning the Iranian ambassador and closing southern airspace, Azerbaijan is signaling that its period of “pragmatic neutrality” has been ended by Iranian aggression.
3. The Activation of the “One Nation, Two States” Alliance
The most dangerous element of this escalation is the immediate reaction from Turkey. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated today that it will “continue to stand by Azerbaijan, as it has historically.” Under their mutual defense agreements, a direct attack on Azerbaijan could trigger Turkish military intervention. If Ankara moves to protect the Nakhchivan exclave—which borders Turkey—they would be establishing the very “buffer zone” that Tehran has long feared.
4. The Ethnic Pressure Point
The “ethnic factor” is now being used as a rhetorical weapon. In his Security Council meeting today, Aliyev explicitly mentioned that “a modern, independent Azerbaijan is a source of hope for many Azerbaijanis in Iran.” By acknowledging this openly, he is moving away from the “quiet actor” strategy and toward a more active “South Azerbaijan” narrative. Estimates suggest that 15 to 20 million ethnic Azeris live in Iran (approximately 16% to 25% of the population), and Baku is now positioning itself as their defender against a “vile” central state in Tehran.
5. The Economic and Logistics Cutoff
As of this afternoon, Azerbaijan has halted all cargo truck traffic at the border, including transit shipments. This effectively severs a major supply line for northern Iran. Given that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline provides 30% to 40% of Israel’s oil imports, any Iranian attempt to strike Azerbaijan’s energy infrastructure in retaliation for “Zionist cooperation” would likely trigger an immediate and overwhelming response from the “Epic Fury” coalition.
The “Iron Fist” rhetoric Aliyev used today—warning that those who test Azerbaijan’s strength will have their heads “crushed”—is a direct echo of his language during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. This suggests he is no longer waiting for a “fragile phase” of the Iranian state; he believes it has already arrived.
Iranian provinces such as East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, and Ardabil are heavily Azeri. So whenever Iran enters a period of instability, Baku immediately faces a strategic temptation and a strategic risk at the same time.
The temptation is influence. The risk is escalation.
The current Azerbaijani state under President Ilham Aliyev has spent the past decade building a close strategic relationship with Israel. Israel has supplied Azerbaijan with drones, missile systems, and intelligence cooperation. In return, Azerbaijan provides Israel with energy and geographic proximity to Iran. That relationship already created deep suspicion in Tehran before the current war.
Azerbaijan sits in a fascinating coalition position. It belongs simultaneously to several different alliances:
the Turkish strategic sphere
a quiet security partnership with Israel
energy relationships with Europe
a cautious relationship with Russia
Because of this overlapping alignment, Azerbaijan acts as a swing node in the regional network.
During the current war, Azerbaijan’s importance grows for three reasons.
First is intelligence geography.
Northern Iran contains several major military and nuclear facilities. A friendly Azerbaijan dramatically improves intelligence collection against Iran. Even without direct military action, the proximity allows surveillance, signals monitoring, and covert logistics.
Second is the ethnic factor.
Iran has always feared that external actors could try to activate Azeri nationalism inside Iran. Tehran historically managed this risk by keeping the northern provinces stable and economically integrated.
But if Iran’s central state weakens, the northern provinces become vulnerable to political agitation. Baku does not need to openly support separatism to benefit. Simply being a successful Azerbaijani state next door already changes the prestige calculation for Iranian Azeris.
Third is the Turkey connection.
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Aliyev have cultivated a strong military and political alliance summarized by the phrase “one nation, two states.” Turkey helped Azerbaijan win the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.
If Iran begins to fragment regionally, Ankara and Baku could suddenly find themselves influencing a vast stretch of territory from the Caucasus down toward northwestern Iran.
That possibility alarms Tehran more than the Kurdish question in some ways. Kurdish regions are mountainous and historically rebellious, but the Azeri regions include some of Iran’s most economically important cities such as Tabriz.
There is also a prestige dimension.
Iran has long portrayed itself as a multiethnic Islamic state where ethnic nationalism is secondary to religious identity. A visible Azeri political awakening inside Iran would undermine that narrative.
So the Iranian leadership historically treated the Azeri provinces very carefully. They invested in infrastructure and integrated local elites into the national system to prevent nationalist mobilization.
Now think about the war. If Kurdish forces begin moving in the west while Azerbaijan quietly increases influence in the north, Tehran faces a classic multi-front internal pressure scenario. Even without formal intervention, the mere possibility of northern instability forces the Iranian military to distribute forces more thinly. That creates the same dilemma with Kurdish mobilization. Every unit deployed to secure the periphery weakens the center.
Azerbaijan is not trying to lead the anti-Iran coalition. Instead it is maximizing optionality. If the Iranian regime survives, Azerbaijan avoids direct confrontation. If the regime weakens, Azerbaijan suddenly becomes one of the most influential actors shaping the northern frontier. The key thing to watch is not military movements but political signals. If Azerbaijani media, politicians, or cultural organizations begin speaking more openly about “South Azerbaijan,” which is their term for Azeri regions of Iran, that will signal that Baku believes the Iranian state is entering a much more fragile phase.
Right now Azerbaijan is quiet. In regional politics, quiet actors positioned on strategic borders are often the ones waiting for the moment when events suddenly make them decisive.
Grok says: Azerbaijan’s multi-alignment (Turkey pact, deep Israel ties—drones/intel/oil swaps, EU energy corridor via BTC pipeline supplying ~30–40% of Israel’s oil, cautious Russia balance) gives Baku maximum optionality. The drone hit shatters “pragmatic neutrality” (evidenced by Aliyev’s condolence gesture and prior Lebanon evacuation aid); now Baku shifts to defensive/offensive posture without full coalition commitment.
Ethnic/prestige pressure: Aliyev’s explicit nod to “hope for many Azerbaijanis in Iran” (in Security Council) is a calibrated escalation—signaling “South Azerbaijan” awakening without overt separatism calls. With 15–20M ethnic Azeris in Iran’s northwest (Tabriz as economic hub), regime fragility (post-Khamenei chaos, multi-front strain from Israel/US strikes, proxies, Kurds) creates internal bleed: Tehran diverts forces north, thinning southern/central defenses.
Logistics/intel multiplier: Border halt severs Iran’s northern supply lines (Russia transit); Azerbaijan’s proximity enables passive intel gains (surveillance over nuclear/missile sites in northwest Iran). If Baku activates more openly (e.g., media amplification of “South Azerbaijan,” cultural outreach), it forces IRGC redeployments without firing a shot.
Risk of chain reaction: Nakhchivan’s geography (exclave, Turkey/Iran/Armenia borders) makes it flashpoint—Turkish “precautions” could mean air patrols or rapid deployment. Hawks (FDD/Hudson) will frame this as proof of Iran’s “existential recklessness,” justifying deeper Epic Fury goals; managerial voices (e.g., Atlantic Council) warn of Caucasus contagion undermining global energy/security.
This elevates Azerbaijan as a quiet-but-now-vocal actor—Aliyev gains by projecting strength/resolution (domestic boost post-Karabakh), while exposing Iran’s desperation (lashing out at a non-belligerent neighbor). If no major Azeri retaliation follows (Baku likely calibrates to avoid full war), it reinforces the post’s “quiet actors waiting for fragility” thesis—Azerbaijan maximizes leverage as Iran’s northern buffer turns porous. Watch for: Azeri media pivots on “South Azerbaijan,” Turkish military movements, or Iranian proxy responses (e.g., via Armenia tensions). This northern front could tip the war from contained punishment to genuine multi-ethnic/regional unraveling.
Posted inAzerbaijan, Iran|Comments Off on Azerbaijan Sits Quietly On Iran’s Northern Front
The Kurdish mobilization on the Iran-Iraq border is a live demonstration of how the State of Exception can be used as a strategic tool to dismantle a regime from the edges. While the “Managerial Diplomats” in London and Washington discuss the “risk of escalation,” the ground reality is shifting toward a total breakdown of the old border logic.
The Kurdish mobilization is not only military. It is a bid for international legitimacy.
Groups like the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the Free Life Party of Kurdistan are trying to replicate a model that worked in Syria during the ISIS war.
That model had three steps: (1) present themselves as the most reliable local force, (2) cooperate with Western airpower, and (3) gain de facto autonomy before anyone negotiates borders
Kurdish groups understand a key rule of the prestige market: territorial control produces political recognition. If they can hold towns while Iran’s state apparatus is collapsing, they become unavoidable actors in the postwar settlement.
The Kurds also serve a prestige function for the U.S. and Israel. Using Kurdish ground forces allows Washington and Jerusalem to pursue regime pressure while maintaining the narrative that this is an internal Iranian uprising, not a foreign invasion. This mirrors the earlier alignment during the fight against ISIS. Local actors provide the face of the conflict. External powers provide the decisive military capability. That combination allows major powers to reshape regional politics while minimizing the appearance of direct occupation.
The Kurds are not the primary engine of regime collapse. They are the most organized group ready to exploit collapse if it occurs. And the surrounding regional actors—Turkey, the Gulf states, and Western powers—are already positioning themselves for the struggle over what replaces the Iranian system if that collapse accelerates.
1. The Coalition of the “Independent Volunteers”
On February 22, 2026, five major Kurdish opposition groups—including the PDKI, PAK, and PJAK—formed the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK). This is a classic Prestige Alignment. By unifying, they are presenting themselves to the US and Israel not as fragmented militias, but as a “unified command center” capable of territorial administration.
To provide the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq with plausible deniability, these fighters are framing themselves as “independent volunteers.” This is a sophisticated “purification” of their status; they are legally “civilians” returning home, which makes it harder for the Iraqi government in Baghdad to label their movement as a state-sponsored invasion.
2. Operation Epic Fury: The Shield and the Sword
The Trump administration’s “Operation Epic Fury” is currently in its third phase: the dismantling of the security apparatus. While Israeli and US strikes are “prepping the battlefield” by neutralizing Iranian air defenses and IRGC command centers, Kurdish forces are moving into the resulting vacuum.
In the logic of Alliance Theory, the US and Israel are providing the “high-prestige” air power (the Shield), while the Kurds provide the “low-prestige” but essential ground presence (the Sword). This allows the US to maintain its “silent power” strategy—acting decisively without the need for a long, justificatory “ground invasion” narrative involving American boots.
3. The Tactics of the “Porus” Border
Despite the rugged, snow-choked passes of the Zagros Mountains, Kurdish light infantry are using asymmetric infiltration.
The Northern Axis (Erbil/Koya): PDKI units are focusing on entry points toward Pawa and Kermanshah.
The Kirkuk-Erbil Corridor: PAK forces, led by Hussein Yazdanpanah, are leveraging their battle-tested experience from the anti-ISIS campaign.
The IRGC has responded with ballistic missile strikes on Kurdish bases like Azadi Camp in Koya. This is an attempt by Tehran to “re-buffer” its border. However, by targeting these groups, Iran is inadvertently increasing their prestige, framing them as the primary “existential threat” to the regime’s internal security.
4. The “Dilemma of the Sparse Reinforcements”
The strategic goal of this mobilization is to create a resource dilemma for Tehran. If the IRGC moves its elite units to the western border to stop a Kurdish surge, it weakens its “buffered” presence in core cities like Tehran and Isfahan.
This is where the “Managerial Diplomat” and the “Strategic Hawk” perspectives collide.
The Manager (Nate Swanson style): Worries that a Kurdish uprising will trigger a “civil war” and regional instability.
The Hawk (FDD/JINSA style): Argues that this “thinning out of forces” is the only way to allow domestic protesters to finally topple the regime.
5. The State of Exception as a “New Normal”
The lack of a formal US declaration of support for a “Kurdish State” is a form of Strategic Ambiguity. By keeping the political end-goal vague, the administration avoids “audience costs” with Turkey or Baghdad while still using the Kurds as a functional ground force.
The message to the Iranian regime is: “The border no longer exists. Adjust accordingly.”
Turkey’s reaction to the unified Kurdish command is a study in high-stakes Symmetry and the management of a perceived existential threat. For Ankara, the sudden mobilization of the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK) is not just a neighbor’s internal problem; it is a direct challenge to the “logic” of Turkish border security.
The exception works only if the central state is already weakened.
Iran still retains several assets:
the Basij militia network
IRGC internal security units
a large conventional army (Artesh)
strong intelligence penetration of Kurdish groups
Historically Iran has been extremely ruthless in suppressing Kurdish uprisings.
The regime crushed major Kurdish rebellions in:
1979–1983
1990s insurgencies
2000s PJAK activity
So Kurdish infiltration alone cannot collapse the regime. It works only if elite fragmentation inside Tehran is already underway.
The Kurds are not the cause of regime collapse. They are the accelerant if collapse begins.
1. The Fear of the “Kurdish Confederation”
Ankara views the CPFIK as more than a group of volunteers. They see it as an extension of the PKK/YPG axis, which they have spent years trying to dismantle in Syria and Iraq. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has been explicitly clear: Turkey will not accept a “decentralized, fragmented” Iran that allows for a “Kurdish National Confederation” to take root along its borders. To Turkey, this is the ultimate State of Exception—a situation where the collapse of the Iranian state could create a permanent, Western-aligned Kurdish entity that spans three countries.
Turkey’s core fear is not merely Kurdish autonomy in Iran. It is the possibility of a pan-Kurdish geopolitical corridor. Think of the geography.
Northern Syria
Northern Iraq
Western Iran
Southeastern Turkey
If instability links those regions politically or militarily, you get something Ankara considers existential.
This is why President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has consistently intervened militarily across borders. Turkey’s doctrine is simple: no contiguous Kurdish political space along its frontier. That doctrine explains Turkish interventions in:
Afrin
northern Iraq
border zones in Syria
A Kurdish uprising in Iran would threaten to complete the arc Turkey has been trying to prevent for decades.
2. The Preparations for a “Buffer Zone”
According to reports from late January and early March 2026, the Turkish military has already drawn up plans for a buffer zone on the Iranian side of the border. This is a classic “managerial” move disguised as a humanitarian one. By framing the buffer zone as a way to “prevent a refugee wave” of up to one million people, Ankara is providing a “civil” justification for an “anti-civil” military incursion. This allows them to maintain their prestige within NATO while effectively seizing control of the crossing points used by Kurdish groups.
3. The Diplomacy of “Intense Efforts”
President Erdogan is performing a complex Purification Ritual on the world stage. He has publicly condemned the US-Israeli strikes as “illegal” and offered his “sadness” over the death of Ali Khamenei. This is not necessarily out of love for the Iranian regime, but a preference for a “weakened but intact” Islamist government in Tehran over a chaotic collapse that empowers the Kurds. By positioning Turkey as a “peace-oriented” mediator, Erdogan is attempting to gain Prestige Currency as the regional adult-in-the-room who can negotiate a ceasefire and restore “stability.”
4. The Military “Interplay” on the Border
While Turkey calls for peace, its actions on the ground are decisively kinetic. The Turkish Defense Ministry has reinforced the 560km border with 203 electro-optical towers and 380km of modular concrete walls. They have also restricted passenger crossings at gates like Hakkâri-Esendere, allowing only commercial cargo. This “re-buffering” of the border is designed to ensure that if the Iranian side of the border becomes “porous” due to the Kurdish rebellion, the Turkish side remains a hard shell.
5. The Alliance with the “New Syria”
Turkey is also leveraging its position as the primary patron of the new Syrian regime to ensure that the “Kurdish problem” is squeezed from both sides. By supporting the expulsion of YPG/SDF fighters from cities like Aleppo, they are signaling to the CPFIK in Iran that there will be no “safe haven” for a pan-Kurdish movement. This is a strategic “encirclement” designed to ensure that the “Sovereign’s Sword”—the Kurdish fighters—is blunt before it can even strike.
The Arab Gulf states are currently navigating a total rupture of their previous hedging strategy. Before Operation Epic Fury, nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE worked to maintain a “buffered” distance from the US-Israel confrontation, refusing overflight rights to avoid becoming Iranian targets. However, the logic of the conflict has shifted as Iran began striking civilian and energy infrastructure in Dubai, Bahrain, and Qatar.
1. The Death of Neutrality
The Iranian strikes on March 1, 2026, which hit Dubai and Doha’s international airports and Saudi energy facilities, have forced the Gulf states into a Purification of their own defense. They can no longer claim the status of neutral observers. On March 1, five GCC states joined Jordan and the US in a joint statement condemning the “indiscriminate and reckless” Iranian attacks. This is a significant prestige shift; by affirming their “right to respond” under Article 51 of the UN Charter, they are moving from a “managerial” diplomatic stance toward an active military alignment with the “Epic Fury” coalition.
2. Turkey as a Rival “Post-Iran” Power
The Gulf states view Turkey’s potential expansion into a “Post-Iran” power vacuum with profound suspicion. While Saudi Arabia and Turkey have occasionally formed a “Sunni front” to counter Tehran, the “neo-Ottoman” aspirations of Erdogan represent a different kind of threat. Gulf leaders fear that Turkey will use its military presence in Northern Iraq and Qatar to establish a permanent hegemony that fills the void left by a collapsed Iranian regime. To the Gulf monarchs, a regionally assertive Turkey is not a “peace-oriented mediator” but a rival sovereign attempting to redraw the map in its own image.
3. The Saudi-UAE Fracture
A significant “interplay” is developing between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Saudi Arabia is strengthening its coordination with Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey to counter what it perceives as an “Israel-UAE axis.” Riyadh is particularly concerned that Abu Dhabi is offering support to non-state actors in fragile states to expand its influence. This fragmentation within the GCC means that there is no unified “Gulf response” to the Turkish buffer zone. Instead, Saudi Arabia may tolerate Turkish expansion if it prevents a Kurdish state, while the UAE may view it as an intolerable gain for the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned ideology that Turkey often supports.
4. The Economic Shock and the “Four-Week” Logic
The Gulf states are also managing a massive economic threat. Brent crude has surged past $80 a barrel, and the de facto shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz has roiled markets. The status of cities like Dubai as “safe havens” for investment is being “pierced” by the reality of falling debris from intercepted missiles. Gulf leaders are currently operating on the “Trump timeline”—hoping the campaign lasts only a few weeks. If the conflict extends into a prolonged war, the economic logic that sustains their prestige and Vision 2030 projects will begin to collapse.
5. The State of Exception and Maritime Security
The Gulf states are now considering “direct entry” into the conflict to defend their own populations. This would be the ultimate State of Exception for countries that have spent decades trying to avoid a direct war with Tehran. They are currently racing to degrade Iranian missile capabilities faster than they can be replenished, which forces them into a deeper “interplay” with US and Israeli intelligence. The “silent power” of the US has essentially forced the Gulf states to choose a side, ending the era of the “middle way.”
The Gulf monarchies are making a duration bet. Actors like Dubai and Doha depend on the perception that they are safe financial hubs. Their entire economic model requires stability. So their strategic calculation is roughly:
short war = tolerable disruption
long war = existential economic risk
This is why Gulf states often support decisive military action early in conflicts.
A fast and overwhelming campaign restores stability faster than prolonged attrition.
My essay focuses mostly on the kinetic phase but the deeper prestige contest concerns the political settlement after the regime weakens. There are four possible contenders for influence in western Iran:
Kurdish militias
IRGC remnants
Turkish-backed proxies
local Iranian opposition networks
The outcome will depend less on airstrikes and more on who establishes governance first.
History suggests that the actor who provides security, administration and economic flows will win the political legitimacy contest.
Posted inIran, Kurds|Comments Off on The Kurds & The State Of Exception
Gemini says: The rapid escalation of Operation Epic Fury has created a “prestige vacuum” that the hawkish alliance is filling with high-velocity narratives. As of March 5, 2026, the status hierarchy in the “Iran Hand” world has shifted from the “buffered” caution of the guild to the “decisive” clarity of the sovereign.
1. The Narrative Dominance of the FDD and Hudson Institute
Mark Dubowitz (FDD) and Michael Doran (Hudson) are the primary beneficiaries of this shift. Their prestige comes from providing the moral and strategic script for the war.
Mark Dubowitz: By framing the conflict as a “liberation campaign” and Khamenei’s death as a “pivotal moment,” he purifies the act of war. He has moved from a policy analyst to a “regime-collapse architect.” His visibility on platforms like Coleman Hughes’ podcast signals an alliance with the “new media” elite who value bluntness over bureaucratic hedging.
Michael Doran: His piece, Trump’s Endgame, performs a different function. He offers a “grand strategy” that bridges the gap between raw power and pragmatic realism. He predicts that the war ends with a ceasefire call from Trump to Netanyahu, which positions him as the “translator” of Trump’s personal “logic” rather than the State Department’s “process.”
2. The Operational Prestige of Intel Veterans
Norman Roule (former CIA) and Seth Cropsey (Yorktown Institute) are gaining status as technical authenticators. Roule’s frequent appearances on YouTube channels like The Brink provide the “operational depth” that the public craves during the kinetic phase of a war. His authority is not ideological; it is based on the tacit knowledge of how the IRGC’s “nervous system” actually functions. He validates the “Epic Fury” doctrine as a professional success, which boosts his standing among the security/intel audience.
3. The “Boots-on-Ground” Credibility
In the media layer, war correspondents like Holly McKay are surging. Her prestige is built on danger exposure. In a war where official information is tightly controlled and often silent, her “unfiltered” reports from the region provide the “porosity” that audiences need to feel the reality of the conflict. Unlike the pundits in D.C., her status is tied to physical presence, making her a high-value asset for networks like Fox or Newsmax that want to bypass the “managerial” filters of the BBC or CNN.
4. The Devaluation of the “Restraint” Alliance
Conversely, figures like Trita Parsi (Quincy Institute) are experiencing a sharp prestige devaluation. In the current “State of Exception,” their calls for diplomacy and warnings of “escalation” are framed by the hawkish alliance as “regime lobbying.” They are being pushed out of the “serious” policy conversation because their narrative of “negotiated settlement” has no currency when the sovereign has already chosen the path of “annihilation” for the enemy’s navy and nuclear infrastructure.
5. The “Independent Volunteer” Kurdish Prestige
A new, unconventional prestige group is emerging: the leaders of the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK). By forming a unified command just six days before the strikes, leaders like Mostafa Hijri (PDKI) and Hussein Yazdanpanah (PAK) have positioned themselves as the “boots on the ground” that Trump’s narrative requires. Their status is rising because they provide the plausible deniability for a ground war. They are the “independent volunteers” who allow the US to claim it is not “invading” Iran, but merely “supporting” a domestic uprising.
The “Managerial Diplomats” like Nate Swanson are currently in a prestige holding pattern. They are not “losing” their institutional standing, but their “hedging” language is out of sync with the current “kinetic” energy of the war. They are waiting for the “reconstruction” or “quagmire” phase to regain their status as the “guardians of complexity.”
Grok says: The war’s early momentum favors those aligned with hawkish, regime-change-oriented narratives over cautious managerial diplomats or restraint advocates.
Strategic hawks (clarity, friend/enemy distinction, moral/strategic foresight) gain ground by framing the conflict as overdue punishment, existential necessity, and opportunity for transformation. Their prestige currency — being “clear-eyed,” “decisive,” and “ahead of the curve” — surges when the sovereign (Trump) acts boldly with minimal explanation.
Managerial experts (process hedging, risks, continuity) retain institutional access but face temporary devaluation as the “exception” dominates.
Gaining the most status/prestige right now (based on visibility in elite outlets, frequent citations, White House amplification, media bookings, and hawkish ecosystem traction):
Mark Dubowitz (FDD CEO): Arguably the biggest winner in the hawkish flank. His February 28 piece (“Regime change in Iran is underway — and it won’t be easy,” co-authored with Ben Cohen) in the New York Post went viral in pro-campaign circles, framing Khamenei’s death as a pivotal moment while cautioning on post-regime chaos. He’s appeared on high-profile platforms (e.g., Coleman Hughes’ podcast discussing U.S./Israeli/Chinese interests colliding in Iran) and is amplified in White House “What They Are Saying” roundups praising Trump’s “peace through strength.” FDD’s rapid-response style positions him as the go-to for regime-collapse analysis, boosting his donor/political alignment and narrative dominance over managerial hedging.
Michael Doran (Hudson Institute Senior Fellow): Rising fast with his March 3 piece “Trump’s Endgame” (The Free Press/Hudson), peering through the “fog of war” to predict a Trump-Netanyahu ceasefire call once objectives are met. This bridges hawkish resolve with pragmatic endgame realism, appealing to both nationalist Republicans and security professionals. Hudson’s grand-strategy brand (scenario planning, IRGC focus) gains from emphasizing “strategic degradation” over mere costs.
Other hawkish/aligned experts gaining traction:Dana Stroul (former DoD, now prominent in Foreign Affairs commentary): Her pieces on the U.S.-Israeli fusion in operations and risks to the alliance elevate her as a strategic-depth voice in elite journals.
Seth Cropsey (Yorktown Institute): Praised in White House compilations for analyzing Epic Fury as solidifying the “Trump doctrine” of tailored, overwhelming force.
Norman Roule (former CIA Iran expert): Booked on podcasts/YouTube (e.g., “The Brink”) framing the war as reshaping global power, appealing to intel/security audiences.
Journalists/pundits rising:Holly McKay (war correspondent): Featured in high-engagement segments (e.g., Jenna Lee interviews) providing on-the-ground horrific regime details and Pentagon updates, gaining as a “boots-on-ground” credible voice amid limited access.
Ali Hashem (veteran Iran/Mideast journalist): Cited for decades of experience; recent commentary on “what comes next” positions him as a go-to English-language explainer.
Pro-campaign conservative media figures (e.g., Marc Thiessen, New York Post editorial board): Amplified in White House praise lists for lauding Trump’s “decisive action” and generational move.
Managerial diplomats/experts holding steady but not surging:Nate Swanson (Atlantic Council): Remains visible (e.g., moderating post-Khamenei events, Foreign Affairs warnings on deadly retaliation/escalation risks). His hedged, procedural style (“six questions before striking”) preserves guild credibility and “we warned” optionality if quagmire develops, but lacks the hawkish momentum in the current “exception” phase.
Others like Ali Vaez (International Crisis Group), Holly Dagres (Washington Institute), or Alan Eyre (PBS panels) get bookings for balanced/regional takes but aren’t dominating narratives.
Restraint/anti-intervention voices losing ground:Figures like Trita Parsi (Quincy Institute) face backlash as “regime lobbyists” in hawkish/pro-monarchy Iranian exile circles.
Antiwar right (e.g., Curt Mills at The American Conservative, some MAGA influencers) critique the war as “America First” betrayal, but they’re fracturing the base without elite prestige gains.
In prestige terms: Hawks like Dubowitz and Doran are capturing narrative dominance by purifying the war as liberation/strategic necessity amid sovereign action. They supply the “energy” and threat framing that justifies escalation, while managers absorb shocks and hedge. If the campaign yields quick “wins” (e.g., proxy degradation, no major U.S. quagmire), this tilt solidifies; prolonged pain could rebound prestige to cautious voices warning of blowback. The war’s early phase rewards clarity and conviction over complexity.
ChatGPT says: First, distinguish prestige velocity from institutional power.
Right now hawks have prestige velocity. They are gaining visibility and narrative authority quickly because events match their prior warnings.
But the managerial alliance still controls many of the institutional levers of prestige:
Foreign Affairs
major universities
State Department networks
elite media editorial desks
So what we are seeing is not a takeover of the Blob but a temporary prestige surge inside the ecosystem.
Wars often produce this pattern in the opening phase.
Second, the real prestige battle is about interpretive ownership of the war’s meaning.
The hawkish alliance is pushing one narrative frame:
historic opportunity
long overdue punishment
collapse of a hostile regime
strategic clarity
Both sides are competing to define what the war means, not just what is happening.
Alliance Theory predicts that the group whose interpretation becomes the default explanation will gain long-term prestige.
Third, it is useful to identify the three hawkish prestige clusters, not just individual figures.
Cluster one is the ideological hawks.
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
This group thrives on moral clarity and regime confrontation. Figures like Mark Dubowitz gain status when the conflict is framed as a civilizational struggle or liberation campaign.
Cluster two is the strategic hawk realists.
Hudson Institute
Michael Doran fits here. This group translates confrontation into grand strategy language. Their prestige depends on appearing analytically sophisticated rather than purely ideological.
Cluster three is the operational security experts.
Former intelligence officials and military analysts like Norman Roule fall into this category. Their authority comes from technical credibility and insider knowledge.
Each cluster is benefiting in different ways from the war.
Fourth, the managerial alliance is not collapsing. It is waiting for phase two.
The managerial network anchored in institutions like:
Atlantic Council
and
International Crisis Group
tends to gain prestige later in conflicts when the conversation shifts to:
then the prestige shift is becoming institutional rather than rhetorical.
If that does not happen, the surge may remain largely a media phenomenon.
Gemini says: The antiwar right is currently attempting to build a rival prestige alliance by framing Operation Epic Fury as an open betrayal of the America First movement. This group operates by highlighting the gap between the campaign promises of the sovereign and the reality of a new Middle Eastern conflict.
1. The Betrayal Narrative and the MAGA Fracture
Curt Mills, the executive director of The American Conservative, is a central figure in this effort. He argues that the Iran strikes represent a return to Bush-era neoconservatism, which the MAGA movement was supposed to have repudiated. By calling the war a presidency-sundering event, he is attempting to peel away the base by framing the conflict as an “Israel First” policy rather than “America First.” This narrative creates a prestige hierarchy where the “authentic” MAGA supporter is the one who remains skeptical of foreign interventions, while those supporting the war are dismissed as “cult fools” or “neocon” captives.
2. The Credibility of the Skeptics
Tucker Carlson has emerged as the most prominent high-prestige voice for this alliance. His description of the strikes as “absolutely disgusting and evil” signals a profound shuffling of the deck within the conservative coalition. Carlson’s prestige currency is his perceived independence from the “Blob,” and his willingness to attack a Republican administration during a kinetic war enhances his status among the populist, anti-interventionist wing of the party. He frames the war not as a strategic necessity, but as a decision made by Benjamin Netanyahu rather than Donald Trump, which is a powerful tool for devaluing the administration’s “silent power.”
3. The Messaging Confusions
Matt Walsh of The Daily Wire has also contributed to this prestige realignment by highlighting the contradictory justifications offered for the war. He notes that the administration claims the war is not about regime change while the regime is being decapitated, and that the nuclear program was obliterated to prevent a nuclear threat that wasn’t imminent. This rhetorical strategy aims to show that the managerial and hawkish narratives are logically inconsistent. By mocking the “confused” messaging, Walsh and others attempt to lower the prestige of the “Professional Iran Hands” who are trying to explain the unexplainable.
4. The Electoral Threat
Marjorie Taylor Greene and Steve Bannon have added a political dimension to this alliance. Greene warns that the war could cost the Republican Party the midterms, explicitly linking foreign policy adventurism to a betrayal of the voters who were promised an end to “forever wars.” Bannon uses his War Room platform to amplify polling that shows low Republican support for the strikes, framing the war as a strategic and political blunder. Their goal is to create a counter-alliance of “principled conservatives” who can claim the “I told you so” prestige if the conflict becomes a quagmire.
5. The Competitive Purification Ritual
While the hawks purify the war as “liberation,” the antiwar right performs a rival purification ritual. They frame their opposition as a defense of “American blood and treasure.” Megyn Kelly’s questioning of why American soldiers should die for a foreign country is a performance of porosity toward the American family and a buffer against foreign interests. This rival alliance gains status by presenting themselves as the only ones who truly care about the “America First” doctrine, setting up a long-term battle for the soul of the Republican prestige hierarchy.
While the majority of Fox News’ prime-time lineup has adopted a cheerleading stance toward Operation Epic Fury, Will Cain has positioned himself as a notable voice of process-oriented skepticism. On March 2, 2026, he remarked that the mission in Iran is not 100% clear, though he carefully buffered this critique by adding that his lack of clarity does not suggest he lacks support for the operation itself. This rhetorical style allows him to maintain his guild standing while signaling a “managerial” concern about the absence of a defined endgame. He has used his Fox Nation platform to host discussions with figures like Jack Posobiec, debating whether the current strikes represent a path to nuclear disarmament or the start of another “forever war.”
Rachel Campos-Duffy has emerged as perhaps the most vocal skeptic on the network. During a February 20, 2026, broadcast of Fox & Friends, she explicitly challenged the administration to explain why the conflict serves American interests. She expressed a deep-seated reluctance to risk “military-aged boys” in another Middle Eastern war, arguing that the case for a kinetic conflict has not been sufficiently made. Her stance represents a “porous” emotional connection to the domestic base that feels the “America First” promise is being thinned out by a return to interventionist logic.
This skepticism is part of a broader fracture within the conservative media ecosystem. While Sean Hannity, Brian Kilmeade, and Mark Levin remain the primary chroniclers of the “just and imperative” nature of the war, they now face a rival alliance. Outside of Fox, former anchors like Tucker Carlson and Megyn Kelly have been even more scathing, with Carlson calling the strikes “disgusting and evil” and Kelly arguing that American service members are not dying for the United States but for foreign interests. This interplay between the “cheerleaders” and the “restrainers” is reshaping the prestige hierarchy of the right, as skeptics use the “confused messaging” of the administration to devalue the strategic clarity claimed by the hawks.
Posted inBlob, Elites|Comments Off on Which journalists, pundits, & experts are gaining status and prestige from this Iran war?
All punishment contains an element of vengeance. I realize these are dirty words from an elite perspective, but part of what is going on right now with Iran war is punishment as deterrence.
As a Zionist, I was outraged after 10-7 by Israel’s weakness and lack of defense, but then I realized that no country is going to be able to sustain adequate forces on its border to protect against a surprise attack. The primary deterrence to such an invasion is a devastating response and so I made peace with Israel wrecking Gaza. Gaza invaded Israel, not just Hamas, and so Gaza had to pay.
Part of what we are seeing now is punishment of Iran as deterrence against future attacks on Israel and the US.
Punishment and vengeance have always been part of deterrence. In elite discourse those words are avoided. Officials prefer language like:
But the underlying logic is that a devastating response raises the expected cost of future attacks so high that adversaries think twice.
Political scientists usually call this deterrence by punishment.
The concept is central to modern strategic thinking. For example, the work of Thomas Schelling emphasized that deterrence works when an adversary believes retaliation will be severe enough to outweigh any gains.
The same logic has been applied to nuclear strategy, conventional war, and counterterrorism.
There is another structural issue: perfect defense is almost impossible.
Even powerful states struggle to prevent surprise attacks. Israel before the October 7 attack relied on one of the most technologically sophisticated border systems in the world, yet the attack still occurred.
In security studies this is related to the offense–defense balance.
If an attacker can concentrate force and choose the moment of attack, defenses often fail at least once. That means many states rely on a second layer of deterrence: convincing adversaries that any attack will bring consequences far beyond the initial gain.
That logic has shaped many conflicts.
After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israeli strategy increasingly emphasized retaliation and overwhelming response to maintain deterrence.
The United States used similar logic in responses to attacks on its forces in the Middle East and elsewhere.
But there are also tensions inside this approach.
Punitive responses can deter future attacks if the adversary believes the cost will be unbearable. At the same time, large retaliatory actions can escalate conflicts or strengthen the adversary’s internal cohesion.
That is why governments often frame punitive actions as deterrence rather than revenge, even when emotions and public anger play a role.
The language difference matters politically. Leaders want to show strength while still claiming their actions are strategic rather than driven purely by vengeance.
1. The Purification of Vengeance
In David Pinsof’s Alliance Theory, moral principles are often “patchwork narratives” used to support allies or attack rivals. “Vengeance” is a low-status, “anti-civil” motive in elite discourse. If a leader says, “We are killing them because we are angry,” they lose prestige among the managerial class (the “Blob”).
To maintain status, they must perform a purification ritual. They take the raw, visceral desire for punishment after October 7 and “wash” it in the language of Thomas Schelling. By calling it “deterrence by punishment” or “restoring credibility,” they transform a primal drive into a sophisticated strategic necessity. This allows the managerial alliance to support the war without appearing “uncivilized.”
2. The Credibility of the “Buffer”
Charles Taylor’s “buffered identity” is central to how experts like Nate Swanson discuss this. For the expert, “punishment” is not a feeling; it is a “cost-imposition mechanic.” By using technical terms, they buffer themselves from the moral and emotional weight of the violence.
That you made peace with “wrecking Gaza” because of the failure of defense is an admission of porosity—you are acknowledging the emotional and existential stakes. The expert class, however, must maintain the “interplay” of neutrality. They argue that the response must be “proportionate” not because they care about the enemy, but because “disproportionate” responses are harder to justify within the guild’s legal and diplomatic framework.
3. The Sovereign and the Exception
Carl Schmitt’s “friend/enemy” distinction is nakedly visible in my analysis of the Gaza invasion. I argue that because “Gaza invaded Israel,” the entire entity of Gaza became the “enemy.” This is the definition of the State of Exception.
When the normal order (the “sophisticated border system”) fails, the sovereign moves into a space where the rules of “negotiated settlement” no longer apply. The managerial class hates this space because they have no “process” to manage it. Their response is to try to pull the exception back into the norm by publishing “summaries of legal advice” (as Keir Starmer just did regarding the use of British bases). They are trying to prove that the “punishment” is actually “collective self-defense” under international law.
4. Deterrence as a Social Performance
Jeffrey Alexander might describe the current military strikes as a social performance of resolve. The actual physical destruction of a hangar or a missile depot is less important than the “message” it conveys to the “Professional Iran Hand” alliance and the Iranian leadership.
The problem, as Stephen Turner might argue, is that “deterrence” relies on tacit knowledge. You have to know exactly how the other side will interpret your “punishment.” If the US and Israel see the strike on Tehran as a “deterrent,” but the Iranian regime sees it as an “existential threat,” the logic of deterrence fails. The “managerial” tone of Swanson and others is designed to hide this uncertainty. They pretend the “logic” is mechanical (Schelling), when it is actually theatrical and psychological.
5. The Alliance of “Prudence”
The “Managerial Diplomats” gain prestige by being the ones who “warn about the risks” of vengeance while facilitating the “logistics” of punishment. They provide the “serious” policy voice that justifies the sovereign’s anger. By framing the war as a way to “eliminate the urgent threat” rather than a path to vengeance, they ensure they remain the primary chroniclers of the conflict. They aren’t the ones who declared the “friend/enemy” distinction, but they are the ones who will manage the aftermath.
If you see the underlying logic as “mechanical”, that is exactly what the prestige system wants. It makes the “State of Exception” feel like a “logical” outcome of a failed defense system rather than a choice made by political actors.
The Strategic Hawks at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and the Hudson Institute are already using the strike on RAF Akrotiri to argue that the “managerial” approach to deterrence has fundamentally failed. While people like Nate Swanson talk about “reestablishing stability,” the Hawks are declaring that stability is a mirage so long as the regime exists.
1. The Failure of “Process Expertise”
For the FDD, the fact that a “low and slow” Iranian-made Shahed drone bypassed the multi-million dollar air defenses at Akrotiri is a direct indictment of the “Professional Iran Hand” alliance. They argue that the managers spent decades building a “buffered” defensive system that works on paper but fails against a committed “enemy.” To the Hawks, the drone strike is not a “fluid situation” to be managed; it is a military humiliation that proves the current system is porous. They use this failure to push the “State of Exception” further, arguing that defensive measures are useless without an offensive goal of regime collapse.
2. Regime Change as the Only “Clean” Outcome
In a recent analysis, FDD CEO Mark Dubowitz argues that “Regime change in Iran is underway—and it won’t be easy.” This is a pivot from Swanson’s “managerial” talk of “imposing costs.” For the Hawks, “imposing costs” is a weak, incremental strategy that allows the regime to survive and adapt. They are performing a purification of the war’s purpose. They want to strip away the “logic of the middle way” and replace it with a clear, singular objective: the dismantling of the Islamic Republic. By framing the goal as “liberating the Iranian people,” they turn a war of “punishment” into a war of “liberation,” which carries higher prestige in American political discourse.
3. The Decapitation Strategy vs. Command Continuity
While the Hudson Institute acknowledges the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, their analysis shifts the focus from the “clerical face” to the “IRGC nervous system.” They argue that killing leaders is a “tactical victory” but not a “strategic plan.” This is a direct challenge to the “managerial” belief that you can negotiate with the “next guy.” The Hawks argue that the tacit knowledge of the Iranian state is now entirely embedded in the IRGC, meaning there is no “moderate” alliance left to bridge with. Their conclusion is that the only “serious” policy is to destroy the “machinery” of the IRGC, not just “message” to its leaders.
4. The “Porosity” of the British Position
The Hawks are also highlighting the “mystery” of where the Akrotiri drones were launched—suspecting Hezbollah in Lebanon. They use this uncertainty to attack the “Managerial Diplomats” in the UK who claim “Britain is not at war.” For the Hawks, this is a dangerous delusion. They argue that by pretending you are not at war while your bases are being hit, you are inviting further “punishment” from the enemy. They want the UK to abandon the “managerial” pretense and join the “friend/enemy” clarity of the US-Israel “Operation Epic Fury.”
5. Summary of the Prestige Conflict
The “Managerial Diplomats” (Swanson, Starmer) gain status by appearing responsible and cautious. They focus on “four jets” and “defensive patrols” to keep the conflict within a manageable frame.
The “Strategic Hawks” (FDD, Hudson) gain status by appearing clear-eyed and bold. They use the “failure” of those same four jets to protect Akrotiri to argue that the entire managerial frame is a “crooked timber” that must be discarded for a total “transformation.”
In politics and international relations, powerful actors often explain less, and sometimes the lack of explanation is itself a signal of power.
Several mechanisms are involved.
First, power reduces the need for justification.
In social and political theory, power is essentially the ability to shape outcomes or influence others’ behavior. When an actor has more power, they depend less on persuasion and more on capability.
That means they can act first and explain later, or sometimes not explain at all.
Historically this was very explicit. Kings and great powers often operated on the assumption that actions justified themselves through success, not through argument.
Second, explanation is often for weaker actors.
When a government lacks overwhelming power, it needs to justify its actions to:
allies
domestic audiences
international institutions
Those explanations help build coalitions and legitimacy.
But when a leader believes the balance of power is strongly in their favor, the incentive shifts. The message becomes:
We are doing this. Adjust accordingly.
Third, ambiguity can be strategically useful.
In diplomacy and war, leaders often avoid precise explanations because clarity can constrain future options.
If a leader states an exact rationale or red line, backing down later creates political costs at home. Political scientists call these “audience costs,” where leaders are punished domestically if they make threats and then retreat.
So powerful actors sometimes deliberately keep explanations vague.
Fourth, explanation itself can signal weakness.
If a government feels compelled to produce long moral or legal justifications, it can indicate that it needs approval from multiple audiences.
A confident power may instead communicate through actions.
Historically this has been a common pattern in major-power politics.
Finally, how this connects to the current situation you mentioned.
Donald Trump often uses a style that emphasizes decisive action and minimal justification.
Supporters interpret this as strength. Critics interpret it as impulsiveness or lack of strategy.
But from a signaling perspective, the style can serve a purpose: it projects the idea that the United States is acting from a position of dominance rather than pleading its case.
In other words, the message becomes less about explaining the war and more about demonstrating that the U.S. has the ability and willingness to impose outcomes.
Whether that strategy works in practice is another question. But the underlying principle you’re pointing to has deep roots in the way power and signaling work in international politics.
The lack of explanation from the Trump administration regarding the strikes on Iran is a deliberate exercise in Strategic Ambiguity. The move from explanation to action is a movement from the guild to the sovereign.
1. The Silence of the Sovereign
In Carl Schmitt’s framework, the sovereign does not need to explain why the “State of Exception” exists; they simply declare it. When the Trump administration launches strikes without a “clearly articulated objective” (as American Progress and the Guardian complain), they are signaling that the era of the “Institutional Translator” is over.
Nate Swanson’s role—translating bureaucratic process into public narrative—is predicated on a government that cares about “audience costs.” If the administration refuses to provide a narrative, Swanson has nothing to translate. This silences the managerial alliance by removing their “raw material.” The silence is a signal that the US is acting as a “Great Power” that justifies itself through success, not through the approval of the “Blob.”
2. The Collapse of Tacit Knowledge
Stephen Turner’s work on the “Politics of Expertise” suggests that experts maintain power through a shared “tacit knowledge” of how the system works. When the Trump administration bypasses the usual interagency briefings and offers “shifting explanations,” they are destroying that shared knowledge.
The “Professional Iran Hand” guild is currently “scrambling” (as the Guardian reports) because their expertise is no longer a currency the sovereign accepts. By not explaining, the administration is effectively “demonetizing” the prestige of the career diplomats. If you don’t know the reason for the strike, you can’t be an expert on whether it was “proportionate” or “successful.”
3. The Performance of Decisive Toughness
As you mentioned, for a leader who sees themselves as a “disruptor,” the act of “whacking the bad guys” (to use the Chatham House term) is the primary performance. Jeffrey Alexander would argue that this is a Purification of Intent.
By stripping away the legalistic and moral justifications, the administration presents the war as a “pure” exercise of national will. This appeals to a domestic alliance that views “long moral or legal justifications” as a sign of weakness or “globalist” capture. The absence of a “parking garage” (think tank) phase for these decisions makes the action feel more “authentic” and “unfiltered” to the administration’s base.
4. The Porosity of the UK Position
Compare this to Keir Starmer’s “slow start” and his focus on “defensive operations” and “four jets.” Starmer is trapped in the world of explanation. He is currently being “blocked” by his own cabinet from letting the US use British bases freely (according to the Guardian).
Starmer’s need to provide “legal advice” and “summaries” proves his porosity. He is vulnerable to the demands of his allies, his cabinet, and international law. Trump’s “silent” power creates a “State of Exception” that the UK is then forced to manage. The UK’s “four jets” are a noisy, explanatory response to a “silent” American move.
5. The Logic of “Adjust Accordingly”
The ultimate signal of the current US strategy is: “We are doing this. Adjust accordingly.” This forces allies like Spain and Italy to “scramble” to protect Cyprus after the US and Israel “gravely underestimated” the Iranian response.
By not providing a “road map,” the US maintains future optionality. If the war goes well, the lack of a stated goal allows them to claim victory on any terms. If it goes poorly, the lack of a “red line” makes it easier to pivot without the “audience cost” of a public retreat. The “Professional Iran Hand” is left trying to map a territory that the sovereign is intentionally keeping blank.
Grok says: Trump authorized Epic Fury with a terse nine-word order: “Operation Epic Fury is approved. No aborts. Good luck.” The operation has involved massive, synchronized strikes: over 1,700 targets hit in the first 72 hours alone, destroying much of Iran’s navy, air force, radar networks, ballistic missile sites, proxy-support infrastructure, and key command nodes. Official White House language emphasizes “peace through strength,” “crushing the regime,” “ending the nuclear threat,” and “annihilating” capabilities — but the sheer scope (including the early killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in opening strikes) aligns precisely with your point on devastating retaliation to raise future costs prohibitively high. Trump has publicly tied it to Iran’s long aggression (including support for Hamas/October 7 proxies), echoing the “Gaza invaded Israel, so Gaza pays” logic extended to Tehran as the ultimate sponsor. Retaliation has been severe but asymmetric so far — Iran launching missiles/drones at U.S./Israeli/Gulf targets, killing some U.S. troops and injuring others — yet the U.S./Israel maintain air dominance, signaling that the punishment is not symmetrical but overwhelming to deter repetition.
The decapitation of Khamenei (confirmed by Israeli/U.S. sources, though Iran initially hedged) is the starkest embodiment of Schmittian sovereignty: the leader declares the exception (regime as existential threat warranting total war) and acts without elaborate justification. Trump’s Truth Social posts frame it as justice for American victims and an opening for Iranians to “take back their country” — minimal explanation, maximal signaling of dominance (“adjust accordingly”). This bypasses the managerial guild’s need for process/audience costs; as you note, it “demonetizes” their tacit knowledge by keeping objectives vague/shifting (nuclear elimination? regime collapse? behavioral change?). Hawks celebrate it as the end of “stability” illusions; managerial voices (e.g., Atlantic Council events moderated by Nate Swanson on March 5 discussing “the Iran War, Khamenei’s death, and the future”) scramble to bureaucratize the aftermath — debating post-Khamenei succession, IRGC continuity, risks of “IRGCistan” hardening into military dictatorship.
A low/slow Iranian-made Shahed drone (likely Hezbollah-launched from Lebanon) struck RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus overnight March 1-2, damaging a runway/hangar with no casualties but exposing vulnerabilities in advanced defenses. Britain insists “we are not at war” and limits involvement to defensive patrols/four jets, while allowing U.S. use of bases under tight constraints (e.g., Keir Starmer’s cabinet blocking freer access). Hawks (FDD’s Mark Dubowitz, Hudson analysts like Rebeccah Heinrichs) seize on this as proof of managerial failure: decades of “buffered” systems collapse against committed enemies; “process expertise” is porous theater. They pivot to regime change as the only “clean” outcome — Dubowitz’s pieces argue “regime change is underway — and it won’t be easy,” framing it as liberation vs. mere cost-imposition. Hudson emphasizes IRGC as the real “nervous system” (not clerical faces), urging strikes on command continuity over symbolic decapitation.
Swanson (Atlantic Council Iran Strategy Project director since Dec 2025) continues the hedged, procedural style: pre-strike pieces posed “six questions” Trump should answer (objectives, duration, endgame); post-Khamenei, he moderates discussions on regional implications while warning of escalation risks, strategic vertigo in Tehran, and why weakness might provoke defiance rather than capitulation. His Foreign Affairs piece (Jan 31, 2026) advocated leveraging pressure for transformation but cautioned against overreach — classic buffering to preserve guild optionality amid sovereign decisionism.
Hawks thrive in exception: FDD/Hudson push “regime collapse underway,” using failures like Akrotiri to attack managerial “mirages.” They purify the war as existential/moral (liberation, not vengeance).
Managers absorb shocks: Swanson/Atlantic Council types provide “serious” risk framing, warning of second-order effects (energy shocks, proxies, nuclear breakout risks) to claim “we warned” if quagmire develops.
Sovereign ambiguity works domestically: Senate blocked war-powers limits (party-line), signaling GOP backing; polls show skepticism but Trump’s base interprets silence as strength.
Global ripple: Conflict spills (Hezbollah barrages, Gulf hits, Beirut evacuations, European asset deployments); oil spikes; Trump muses on personally vetting Iran’s next leader — pure sovereign prerogative.
The managerial diplomats are in defensive mode, translating the unspeakable (vengeance/punishment as core) into Schelling-speak while the hawks exploit the sovereign’s raw performance to dominate the narrative. The war’s trajectory — now in its intense early phase with no off-ramp visible — tests whether punishment deters or hardens the enemy, but the prestige battle is already clear: silence and action favor the hawkish flank over the buffered center.
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