Luke Ford

Abstract: Relatively little is known about what determines whether a heterogenous population ends up in a cooperative or divisive situation. This paper proposes a theoretical model to understand what social structures arise in heterogeneous populations. Individuals face a trade-off between cultural and economic incentives: an individual prefers to maintain his cultural practices, but doing so can inhibit interaction and economic
exchange with those who adopt different practices. We find that a small minority group will adopt majority cultural practices and integrate. In contrast, minority groups above a certain critical mass, may retain diverse practices and may also segregate from the majority. The size of this critical mass depends on the cultural
distance between groups, the importance of culture in day to day life, and the costs of forming a social tie. We test these predictions using data on migrants to the United States in the era of mass migration, and find support for the existence of a critical mass of migrants above which social structure in heterogeneous
populations changes discretely towards cultural distinction and segregation.

INTRODUCTION:

Ethnic, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity are associated with a variety of politico-economic problems, including low growth, low provision of public goods, and conflict. Yet the effects of diversity are not uniform: some heterogenous populations manage to avoid societal conflict and are economically successful. In some cases, diversity can even have positive effects on growth, productivity, and innovation.1 Seeking to explain this puzzle, recent work finds that social cohesion plays an important role in how well a population ‘deals’ with its heterogeneity. For example, more segregated populations are found to have lower quality of governance, lower trust between citizens, and worse education and employment outcomes, compared to similarly heterogenous populations that are better integrated.2

Despite its clear importance, relatively little is known about what determines whether a heterogenous population ends up in a cooperative or divisive situation. In this paper we propose
a model that allows us to study this question. We ask, first, what social structures can arise when society is composed of heterogeneous groups, and second, what features influence which
social structure arises in a particular environment. Understanding this is crucial in an increasingly mobile world in which immigration and social cohesion are frequently at the forefront of
political agendas.3

In our model, individuals from two distinct groups – natives and immigrants – living sideby-side, make choices over activities to engage in, and who in the community to interact with. Some activities, such as language choice, are ‘cultural actions’, in the sense that each group will start with an ex ante preferred language, and there is a cost to switching to any other choice.
Other activities are ‘non-cultural’: there is no group-specific reason why one activity is more costly to engage in than another.4 For example, there may be no group-specific reason why one
sport should be more costly to engage in than another.5
Interaction provides opportunities for economic exchange, and so individuals can benefit from forming social ties with others in the
population. Since interaction requires some degree of commonality of actions, we assume that the benefit of a link is increasing in the number of shared activities, with a fixed (per-link) cost
of formation. The fundamental trade-off is that an individual prefers to maintain his cultural practices but doing so can hinder opportunities for interaction and exchange with those who
adopt different practices.6

Abstract: In order to determine the contribution of social pluralism (ethnic, religious, and racial differences) to violence, diverse multivariate cross-national analyses were done. These involved 109 variables on conflict and violence; pluralism; and social political, economic, demographic, and cultural differences for all states, 1932 to 1982. The results show that pluralism is a multidimensional empirical concept; that regardless of which dimension is focused upon, it has a lesser relationship to violence than do other national characteristics, such as political freedom. And what relationship is found between pluralism and violence, holding other variables constant, is largely accounted for by the number of ethnic and religious groups in a state. Drawing on this and other studies, the conclusion is that where political power is centralized around a trans-plural group, such as a military junta or monarch, or trans-plural ideology, such as communism or fascism, then violence is highly likely, regardless of what plural units may or may not exist. And where power is centralized, nondemocratic, and highly dependent upon one’s social group membership, such as ethnicity or religion, then collective violence is also highly likely.

Abstract: The current paper focuses on White British students in lower secondary education and investigates the effect of school ethnic diversity on their levels of trust and inclusive attitudes towards immigrants. Use is made of panel data of the Citizenship Education Longitudinal Study (CELS) to explore these relationships. Ethnic diversity is measured with the proportion of students in a grade identifying with a minority. In agreement with contact theory, the paper initially finds a positive relation between diversity and inclusive attitudes on immigrants. However, this link disappears once controls for social background, gender and prior levels of the outcome are included in the model. This indicates that students with particular pre-enrolment characteristics have self-selected in diverse schools and that inclusive attitudes have stabilized before secondary education. Diversity further appears to have a negative impact on trust, irrespective of the number of controls added to the model.

Abstract: Putnam’s “constrict theory” suggests that ethnic diversity creates challenges for developing and sustaining social capital in urban settings. He argues that diversity decreases social cohesion and reduces social interactions among community residents. While Putnam’s thesis is the subject of much debate in North America, the United Kingdom, and Europe, there is a limited focus on how ethnic diversity impacts upon social cohesion and neighborly exchange behaviors in Australia. Employing multilevel modeling and utilizing administrative and survey data from 4,000 residents living in 148 Brisbane suburbs, we assess whether ethnic diversity lowers social cohesion and increases “hunkering.” Our findings indicate that social cohesion and neighborly exchange are attenuated in ethnically diverse suburbs. However, diversity is less consequential for neighborly exchange among immigrants when compared to the general population. Our results provide at least partial support for Putnam’s thesis.

Abstract: Research on contemporary European politics has shown that immigrant population size is strongly associated with vote totals for anti-immigrant political parties. Competitive threat theories suggest that this association should be positive, whereas intergroup contact theories imply that it should be negative. A two-level analysis of vote totals for the French Front National (FRN) suggests that the direction of this association depends critically on the level of analysis. At the department (i.e., state or regional) level, large immigrant populations are associated with higher FRN vote totals. At the commune (i.e., town or city) level, however, large immigrant populations are instead associated with lower FRN vote totals. These findings challenge the conclusions of previous analyses of populist-right voting and provide further evidence that contact and threat dynamics often operate simultaneously, albeit at different levels.