Torah law makes no provision for non-Jewish citizenship in the Jewish state. Generally speaking, a goy cannot serve as a valid witness in a Jewish law court. Texts written by gentiles are rarely cited in the Torah tradition. It is rare today to hear an Orthodox rabbi quote a gentile from the pulpit. In other words, goyim seem to play the same role in Jewish jurisprudence as Jews would play in Nazi jurisprudence.
This is not surprising. Jews and gentiles are different peoples with different genetics, different norms and different aims in addition to similar genetics, similar norms and similar aims. They sometimes have different interests and sometimes similar interests.
I’ve spent about seven years of my life in daily Talmud classes. It is rare that a goy is quoted as authoritative in a discussion of Jewish law.
Fifty years ago, when Jews were concerned with being seen as Americans first, Jews second, rabbis often quoted gentiles from the pulpit.
German political philosopher Carl Schmitt saw Jews in Europe as primarily constituting a political nation that tended to have different interests from the gentile nations. Schmitt saw the friend/enemy distinction as the organizing point for a nation. Fundamentally, Jews and gentiles were in conflict. What was good for the Jews was often bad for gentiles and vice versa.
If you turn around the Carl Schmitt speech below and imagine an Orthodox Jewish rabbi is talking about the role of gentiles in Jewish jurisprudence, it’s a nice intellectual and moral challenge.
When Schmitt says, “What is needed is to determine, as accurately as possible, who is Jewish and who is not,” that concept is taken for granted by identifying Jews. The Jew-gentile distinction is the foundation of their lives.
When Schmitt says, “it is no longer possible to quote a Jewish writer just as any other writer,” that is also taken for granted in Jewish jurisprudence. You don’t quote a goy the same way you quote a yid.
When Schmitt says, “A Jewish writer is for us no source of authority,” that concept is also taken for granted in Jewish jurisprudence. You don’t quote a goy like you quote a Jew.
Let me take a few sentence from Schmitt and simply switch a few words around: “For us, a gentile writer, even when he is quoted at all, remains a gentile author. The adding of the word and the designation ‘gentile’ is not an external characteristic, but something essential…”
I told a Jewish friend that I just read a biography of Carl Schmitt. He replied: “Biographies about goyim are for goyim. We Yidden have our Torah.”
Life often comes down to the question — whose side are you on? Can Jews expect gentile law to treat them as just folks when Jewish law makes sharp distinctions between Jew and gentile? What happens when there are sharp conflicts of interest. Should not the goyim side with their own kind?
Two quotes come to mind:
* “American Jews want to maintain a distinct identity and on the other hand want to be fully integrated into broader society and don’t want the distinctiveness to come at a price.”
* “Anti-Semitism is as natural to Western civilization as anti-Christianity is to Jewish civilization, Islamic civilization and Japanese civilization.”
Tanya is clear that Jewish and gentile souls are different. This is obviously a question of faith. There is no empirical way to test the quality of someone’s soul. I am not bothered when confident gentiles assert that their people’s soul is of a different quality than other souls.
You will sometimes find in parts of traditional Jewish life that the purpose of gentiles is to serve Jews. I’m not ashamed and appalled by these sentiments. I think they’re normal and not unique to Jews. You find these same thoughts in other traditional cultures. Parts of Chinese and Japanese thinking regards the purpose of the rest of the world is to serve them. The more you identify with your own people, the more likely you are to have negative views of outsiders.
According to Schmitt: “Jewish opinions, with their intellectual content, cannot be put on the same level with the opinions of German or other non-Jewish authors.” Jewish jurisprudence takes the same attitude towards gentile opinions.
According to Schmitt: “It is a sign of the lack of training in the study of race and hence in the National Socialist thought to overlook this and to assume that there is a more substantial problem behind this, such as some Jews speaking and writing in nationalist terms, some in internationalist terms — that they can advocate at a moment’s notice conservative, liberal, subjective, or objective theories.” Jewish jurisprudence never makes this mistake with the goyim. We don’t expect them to seek our welfare. We don’t look to them for wisdom.
Schmitt regards Jews “as a weapon aimed at us.” It is normal in Jewish jurisprudence to regard goyim as a weapon aimed at us.
There is nothing more malicious in this Schmitt talk about Jews than is to be found about gentiles in part of the Talmud.
I’m not arguing that either Jews or gentiles are the good guys or the bad guys. They are just different people with different norms and different aims and different interests. As a convert to Orthodox Judaism, I believe that the Jews are God’s Chosen People. That is my faith statement.
“While resisting the Jew,” said Adolf Hitler, “I fight for the work of the Lord.”
Resisting the gentile in some times and places makes the Jew feel that he is fighting for the work of the Lord.
Short of a miraculous Messianic age, Jews and gentiles will often be in conflict.
Carl Schmitt gave this closing speech at a conference held in Berlin, Germany, on October 3 and 4, 1936 (translated by Tom Sunic):
As all presentations have demonstrated, Jewish law appears to be redemption from chaos. The polarity of Jewish chaos and Jewish legalism, of anarchic nihilism and positivistic normativism, of coarse sensualist materialism and abstract moralism, appears so clearly and so vividly before our eye, that we can use this fact — similar to the studies of racial psychology — as a scientific finding in our meetings for our future work. Therefore, in the capacity of German guardians of law and professors of law, for the first time we have made a contribution to the significant research already carried out in the realm of race studies. In this teamwork of ours, over the last two days, we have arrived at the initial conclusion which preserves the honor of our science in conjunction with other accomplishments, and which, as was rightly pointed out by Dr. Falk Ruttke, are accomplishments that can serve us as models.
1. The necessary task regarding the bibliography is very difficult. What is needed is to determine, as accurately as possible, who is Jewish and who is not. The smallest errors in this respect may be blown out of proportion, lead to confusion, and help the enemies of National Socialism score cheap triumphs. Also, these errors could have a damaging effect in view of the fact that young students can be distracted from the main ideas by small inaccuracies, whereas on the basis of the false sense of justice — so common to our German way — they may readily be inclined to ponder over an isolated case of inaccuracy, instead of focusing on the big and just issue for which we are fighting.
2. Only when we have an accurate register can we continue working in the direction of library cataloguing and, by cleaning up the libraries, protect our students from the confusions that lie in these facts; on the one hand we keep pointing to the necessary fight against the Jewish spirit, yet on the other hand, at the end of 1936, a seminar library in legal studies looks as if the greater part of the legal literature is being produced by Jews. Only by cleansing the libraries will this monstrous suggestion disappear, a suggestion grounded in the fact that the works by Jews are still featured in legal seminars, virtually inviting students to carry on with the absorption of Jewish thought. All legal writings by Jewish authors belong, as Reich Minister Dr. Frank aptly remarked, without distinction to the library catalogue of the department “Judaica.”
3. Also crucial is the issue of the quotations. As a follow-up to this meeting it is no longer possible to quote a Jewish writer just as any other writer. It would be downright irresponsible to quote a Jewish author as an expert witness, or even as some sort of authority in the field. A Jewish writer is for us no source of authority — not even as a “purely scientific” authority. This finding is a starting point when considering the issue of the quotations. For us, a Jewish writer, even when he is quoted at all, remains a Jewish author. The adding of the word and the designation ‘Jewish’ is not an external characteristic, but something essential, given that we cannot prevent a Jewish author from using the German language. Failing this, the purification of our legal literature will not be possible. Whoever writes today, ‘Stahl Jolson’ will achieve much more in a clear scientific manner than by writing long exegeses against the Jews, which, in general, move around in abstract expressions and which in concreto do not affect a single Jew. [The person referred to by Schmitt as Stahl-Jolson is usually known as Friedrich Julius Stahl; by using ‘Stahl-Jolson’ Schmitt emphasizes Stahl’s Jewish background. Stahl-Jolson was a conservative Jewish German legal scholar and philosopher (1802–1861) who had converted to Christianity]
Thus, only when we solve the issue of the quotations, we will be able to remove the Jewish-infected literature [von Juden infiziertes], and attain, instead, German legal literature. The problem of the quotations is not only of a practical nature; it is a fundamental problem. One can recognize an individual writer by the way he uses quotations. I’d like to point to the brazen matter-of-factness of the Vienna School of the Jew [Hans] Kelsen, where everybody quotes each other, with other opinions being neglected — to us Germans an incomprehensible cruelty and insolence. The issue of the citations is not a trivial matter. There are today, as far as the Jewish question is concerned, no more trivial matters. Everything is very closely connected and intimate as soon as the real battle of worldviews starts.
The issue of the quotations will lead to necessary clarification regarding many other individual issues, such as the issue of quoting half-Jews and those closely-related to Jews. I’ll warn right at the beginning against putting in the center of attention fringe issues and interposed issues. This is a standard way of avoiding clear cut decisions. There are hundreds of cases where it is beyond doubt that they are full Jews [Volljuden]. It is a typical Jewish trick to divert the attention from the heart of the matter to the doubt- related issues, to the fringe issues and to the interposed issues. Authors, with who there is no doubt that they are full Jews (Volljuden), will be in the future in our German legal literature, referred to as Jews. When, for an objective reason it becomes necessary to quote Jewish authors, this will be done only with the addition of the word “Jewish.” By the mere mentioning of the word “Jewish” a healing exorcism will start.
4. The last practical goal is related to the issue of scientific research, particularly regarding dissertations. A lot of good material for doctoral dissertations has emerged from the presentations of these two days. I do not think it is necessary that still 70 to 80 percent of hundreds of doctoral dissertations, which see the light today in Germany, continue to be written in the same old style of civil code and penal code dissertations. Again, this is a serious matter, considering how much talent and intellectual potential exists among German youth and what it means when German law professors in charge of the education and the scientific training of these young Germans, steer these young people to distracting topics and away from the daily life of the German people. Here we have a professional task of first-rate importance. If one keeps in mind what has been concluded in this conference on the dissertation themes alone, concerning the legal historical and constitutional historical approaches — as well as the research into the Jewish mind and its influence on German intellectual life in its “intersection” with the German mind, as was very clearly remarked by one of the speakers — it does not seem to be difficult to draw the attention of a young student to the influence of Lasker, Friedberg, and Johann Jacoby [19th-century German-Jewish liberal legal thinkers and politicians] on German legal developments, or better yet encourage a student to study the rise of the civil procedure code and penal procedure code, as well as other laws in relationship to Jewish influence, or have the student focus his attention on the issue of “Jews and the concept of the rule-of-law-state.” There is no lack of dissertation themes and it would be the most stupid negligence if these new themes were not addressed.
III. But most importantly, what turned out in these past days to be the definitive conclusion, is that Jewish opinions, with their intellectual content, cannot be put on the same level with the opinions of German or other non-Jewish authors. We all became aware with the greatest clarity as to this supposed difficulty, such as when there are Jews expressing national and patriotic views, as was the case with the famed Stahl-Jolson. Over and over again in our conference we have come to realize that the Jew is sterile and unproductive for the German type of spirit. He has nothing to say to us, however shrewdly he may keep deducing [kombinieren], or even eagerly wishing to assimilate himself. Of course, he may play around with his enormous mediation and mercantile skills — but as far as the substance is concerned he creates nothing. It is a sign of the lack of training in the study of race and hence in the National Socialist thought to overlook this and to assume that there is a more substantial problem behind this, such as some Jews speaking and writing in nationalist terms, some in internationalist terms — that they can advocate at a moment’s notice conservative, liberal, subjective, or objective theories. Even the much vaunted skills of criticism of the Jew are the product of his mismatch to everything essential and genuine. It is a completely different concept of criticism from the one used by German law professors acting in a genuine teamwork, criticizing each other or promoting each other. Nor is it correct to depict the Jew as a very logical, very conceptual, constructive, or rational person. It is not so much his “care-free logical sharpness” [unbekümmerte logische Schärfe] — what we ourselves mean by logic, but a weapon aimed at us; it stems from the disproportion concerning the topic and the matter.
The relationship of Jewish thinking to the German spirit is of the following kind: the Jew has a parasitic, tactical and mercantile relationship toward our own intellectual work. Through his mercantile skills he has often a keen sense of the authentic; with great ingenuity and quick flair he knows how to target the authentic. This is the instinct of a parasite and of a genuine tradesman. As little as this skill has been demonstrated by the Jews in the art of painting, Jewish art dealers can, nevertheless, faster tell a genuine Rembrandt than German art historians. Likewise, in the field of jurisprudence, this cannot be a proof that with his skills the Jew can very rapidly recognize good authors and good theories. The Jews quickly spot German substance and it is to this that they are attracted. We must not give them credit for this – only to warn us to switch on our inhibitions. It is simply due to the overall situation of the Jew, in his parasitic, tactical and mercantile relationship toward the German intellectual heritage. Even such a horrible, sinister mask swapping, which underlines the whole life of Stahl-Jolson should no longer distract us. Whenever it is ceaselessly emphasized that this person is “subjectively honest,” — as true as this may be — yet, I must add that we cannot glimpse into the soul of the Jews and that we have no access into the inner character of the Jews. We only know the discrepancy between our kinds. Whoever has grasped this truth — also knows what race is all about.
Furthermore, it is necessary to realize how differently the Jews have behaved at different stages of history. Heinrich Lange [NS German legal scholar, 1900–1977] has explicitly pointed to that in his excellent essays. The most significant turning points in Jewish behavior during the last century were the years 1815, 1830, 1848, 1871, 1890 — Bismarck’s dismissal, the beginning of the Wilhelminian era — 1918, 1933. It is, therefore, unacceptable to put on the same level a case of Jewish appearance on the scene in 1830 with that in 1930. Here again we have the Jew Stahl–Jolson, who still exerts influence on the denominational and ecclesiastical opposition against the National-Socialist state. It is completely false to portray him as an exemplary, conservative Jew in contrast to other belated Jews that could have unfortunately never become that. In this fact lies a dangerous failure to recognize the essential insight, i.e., that with every change in the overall situation, with each new period in history, and so quickly that we can only grasp it with utmost attention, a change occurs in the overall Jewish behavior, a mask swapping of demonic subtlety [von dämonischer Hintergründigkeit] where, by contrast, the issue regarding individually involved Jews, is fully irrelevant. Indeed, the great adaptability of the Jews has been carried to extremes over several thousand years of their history by specific racial characteristics whereby the virtuosity of mimicry has been even more fostered by long practice. We can see it, but we cannot comprehend it. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that there is Jewish virtuosity.
I repeat again and again the urgent plea to read every sentence on the Jewish question in Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, and especially his comments on “Jewish dialectics.” What has been put forward at our meeting by experts in many scientific papers and in outstanding speeches is told in simple language to every national comrade [Volksgenosse] in a fully comprehensive manner. Do refer our law students always to those sentences by the Führer.
But beyond the Jewish problem let us not forget the German side of this question. For example, in a direct application of what Dr. Falk Ruttke said, we could mention the case of Karl Marx and the impact he had, as represented by the case of Friedrich Engels, or Bruno Bauer, or Ludwig Feuerbach, or perhaps even Hegel. Here lies a tragic problem. How was it possible that a German from Wuppertal, such as Engels, fell prey to the Jew Marx so completely? How was it possible that thousands of decent and honest national comrades [Volksgenossen] could over decades succumb in such a way to the Jewish mind? From where comes this non-resistance of many German men and from where comes weakness and the darkening of the German style at such a historical moment? The examination of this issue belongs to our scientific self-awareness as well as to the armor for the new struggle.
We have recognized all this in this workshop with greatest scientific clarity. Compared to the blindness and ignorance of earlier times, these are revolutionary insights. If equipped with it we can enter into the struggle whose new phase has begun. Let us not deceive ourselves about the seriousness of this struggle. The speeches at the Nuremberg Party Congress left no doubt about it. Judaism is, as the Führer notes in Mein Kampf, not only hostile to everything that is hostile to Jews; it is a mortal enemy of any real productivity of any other people. Its world power does not tolerate national productivity because otherwise its own kind of existence would be refuted. Jewish interest in the real productivity of other nations, the speed with which the Jewish artist or the intellectual merchant collide with the German artist, poet or scholar — and by means of giving him a pension or tenure [Rente] harness [einspannen] him for themselves — are not virtues and they are not qualities that should distract us from the essential. We are dealing with the Jews not for their own sake. What we are looking for and what we are fighting for is our own authentic nature and the unspoiled purity of our German people. “While resisting the Jew,” says our Führer, “I fight for the work of the Lord.”