There seems to be a strong belief among the elite, as exemplified by the 2004 book What’s The Matter With Kansas?, that politics should primarily be about resource distribution.

I moved to America in 1977 when I was 11. By age 14, I was developing a coherent conservative-libertarian free market worldview inspired by Ronald Reagan. By 1985, I wanted to become an economist like Milton Friedman when I grew up. Until my spiritual crisis of 1988-89 that led me to convert to Judaism, I probably thought about politics as primarily an obstacle to the free market, which I saw as the most efficient distributor of resources. I had that conservative instinct that in general, life should not be about politics, and the best politics was that which created the smallest role for government.

Theorists about democracy never seem as interested in rule by the people as they are in income redistribution and liberal rights (liberalism and democracy conflict as liberalism means inalienable individual rights and democracy means the people rule, or at least the people can choose their rulers). I quote from the 2023 book by Stephen Turner and George Mazur, Making Democratic Theory Democratic: Democracy, Law, and Administration after Weber and Kelsen:

* The term “administrative state” is now being treated as an invention of the paranoid Right and a misunderstanding of the nature of the state itself.

* The administrative state from its origins has aimed at making public opinion ineffective or undermining its independence, often in the name of leading it, educating it, or providing “justice,” that is to say, something beyond mere “opinion.”

* The administrative state…does not limit itself.

* In the decades after John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) and especially over the past 20 years or so, many books have been published with the same aim: to vindicate and explicate something that is usually called social democracy on philosophical or social science grounds. After the intense ideological rivalries of the twentieth century, this political ideal has become the default position of virtually all academic thinkers in relevant areas. A century that began with the frank acceptance of the irreconcilability of political value choices, and proceeded with extraordinarily intense ideological warfare, ended with a surprisingly broad, though loose, consensus.

* These writers all reject the idea of freedom as non-interference or choice as inadequate or wrong; they all decry great wealth, the power of money or the power that money gives people, as a form of injustice; and all involve some idea of autonomy governed by reason.

* The right thing is collective; the tension is between the collectively acknowledged good and the distorted private good, which is distorted because it is at heart a quest for something like autonomy and recognition but expresses itself in greed and power seeking, which are the things that need to be collectively controlled.

* There are many other explanations of why “social democracy” has not happened: the media, the pre-existing culture (which is racist, patriarchal, anti-egalitarian, suffused with false beliefs derived from religion, or scientism), a failed public sphere, or other sources.

* They want a social matrix in which the bad effects of competitiveness and striving are tempered, or replaced, by a regime of personal relations in which dignity is respected, autonomy is granted, and people trust each other―a decent society, as Avishai Margalit calls it (1996). All of the “social” goals involve more discretionary power for officials. These authors all embrace the idea of an activist, paternalist, benevolent state. Health care is often the model for the proper role of the state. Where it is done correctly, it combines dignity, compassion, paternalism, efficiency, the proper use of expertise, universalism, respect for autonomy, and sufficient provision with a rational allocation of scarce resources.

* They err on the side of protecting the culture of the minority group. For the dominant culture, however, matters are different: it needs to be reformed to accord with reason.

* Economic power for Ringen seems to be defined simply to mean the influence of business money on political campaigns and lobbying. The fact, for example, that Swedish politics is dominated by a major union confederation which owns a controlling interest in the most important newspaper, is the main force in the party that has ruled with only slight interruptions for decades, and is well represented on government panels is apparently not an instance of economic power for Ringen. If one scaled up its membership to fit the population of the United States, this confederation would be a mind-boggling 66 million strong. This kind of overwhelming power would produce “consensus” even in the United States. Obama, who received the highest vote total in American history, had only 63.25 million votes.

When I talk politics with non-elites, they also discuss it as resource distribution.

I don’t think this is the essence of politics. The things that people are most likely to live and die for are not rational and they are not primarily about resource distribution.

The 2024 book Predisposed: The Left, The Right, and the Biology of Political Differences says:

Turning to redistribution of resources, positions on this bedrock dilemma have always been a bit of a special case, perhaps in part because redistribution is not as evolutionarily central as the others. For eons, redistribution of resources was not much of an issue because it was not all that relevant. Before humans learned to cure meat and to coin currency, meaningful accumulation of resources by individuals was not possible since the only thing of central value — food — was highly perishable. Even today, we would argue that to the extent redistribution is a meaningful and highly contentious dilemma, it is because the consequence of redistribution typically is that insiders lose and outsiders gain. To the extent positions on this dilemma load on the core three dilemmas, it is because of its overlap with attitudes toward outsiders. In Scandinavia, even the right – wing parties support a highly redistributive welfare state. What those parties do NOT support, however, is welfare benefits going to new and recent immigrants as well as to other non – insiders. Positions on redistribution merge with the overarching ideological differences only when the beneficiaries of redistribution are perceived to be non – insiders: immigrants, norm violators, minorities, and non – contributors.

ChatGPT says:

You’re right—resource distribution is not the deep root of political motivation for most people, even if elites (and much academic theory) frame it that way.

Turner and Mazur are basically saying that post–Rawls democratic theory has settled into a social-democratic consensus where politics is primarily about justifying and managing redistribution through the administrative state. But that framing sidelines the visceral, identity-driven, and loyalty-driven aspects of politics.

Predisposed’s point—that redistribution wasn’t a major ancestral dilemma—matters here. Human survival historically hinged on kin protection, coalition defense, mate choice, and status, not long-term wealth allocation. In those contexts, “insider vs. outsider” distinctions were life-and-death, and those reflexes are still potent. That’s why resource fights become politically explosive mainly when they map onto insider–outsider boundaries—immigration, cultural change, norm enforcement.

In short:

Elite framing: Redistribution as the central problem; politics as an administrative design challenge.

Human instinct: Group loyalty, threat perception, and identity trump abstract fairness principles.

Practical result: Ideology matters, but when stress hits, the old evolutionary circuitry—protect kin, defend in-group, distrust outsiders—tends to override it.

Why elites fixate on redistribution—and why voters don’t

Much academic and policy talk treats politics as a resource-allocation puzzle solved by experts—what Thomas Frank critiqued in What’s the Matter with Kansas? and what Stephen Turner & George Mazur describe as a social-democratic, administrative-state consensus. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens are animated by identity, loyalty, sacred values, and threat—things people will live and die for. See Frank’s book here and Turner & Mazur’s here.

How the gap plays out

1) Immigration + welfare: redistribution becomes “who gets what” (insiders vs. outsiders)

Across Europe, including Scandinavia, right-of-center parties often defend the welfare state while opposing benefits for newcomers—welfare chauvinism. The fight isn’t over redistribution per se; it’s over moral membership. Examples include Sweden’s mainstream parties, Denmark’s Social Democrats, and France’s “national preference” debates. See comparative research here, a Sweden parties study here, and France coverage here. In the U.S., Martin Gilens’ Why Americans Hate Welfare shows racialized images and perceptions of desert drive much opposition.

2) Crime, norms, and “who we are” beat spreadsheets

Voters routinely trade short-run material gains for order, belonging, and punishment of norm violators. Moral Foundations Theory shows left and right weight different moral “taste buds”—care/fairness vs. loyalty/authority/sanctity—which predicts stances on policing, protest, sexuality, and school rules better than pocketbook appeals. Overview here and empirical paper here.

3) War and national security: sacred values override incentives

People will risk life and treasure for sacred causes and comrades. “Devoted actor” studies show willingness to fight and die rises when values are seen as non-negotiable, and material incentives have little effect. See PNAS 2014 and Science 2021.

4) Culture wars outpull class wars

Frank’s Kansas thesis—cultural conflict eclipsing economic interest—sparked debate, but even critics concede identity often outruns material interest in vote choice. Achen & Bartels synthesize decades of data showing group identity and partisan attachment drive politics, with policy specifics often as post-hoc rationalizations. See their work here and Bartels’ Kansas critique here.

5) Technocracy vs. popular will: why the administrative state keeps clashing with publics

Post-Rawls democratic theory tends to justify expansive administrative discretion in the name of expertise and justice. Turner & Mazur argue this inevitably sidelines public opinion and casts dissent as misinformed—fuel for populist backlash against “rule by experts.” See book page here.

Why instincts beat ideology under stress

Biopolitical research in Predisposed and psychophysiology studies show rapid, emotional reactions to threat and disgust shape political judgments, with reasoning often coming after. This is why identity threats—outsiders, desecration, status loss—carry more political weight than economic trade-offs. See the book here and a disgust reactivity study summary here.

Playbook: speaking to people as they are

• Lead with moral membership. Define who the policy protects and unites before explaining how it redistributes.
• Translate spreadsheets into values. Link budgets to loyalty (“for those who do their part”), authority (“clear rules, fair enforcement”), and sanctity (“protecting kids/heritage”).
• Anticipate sacred values. If a policy touches identity or dignity, material offsets won’t persuade—use recognition, rituals, and trusted messengers.
• Respect, then redirect. Affirm the moral concern (order, belonging, fairness to contributors) before showing how your approach honors it without scapegoating.
• Mind the technocracy gap. Pair expert solutions with visible accountability and citizen control so policies don’t look imposed by distant administrators.