

NATION-BUILDING OR NATION-DESTROYING?

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SCHOLARS associated with theories of “nation-building” have tended either to ignore the question of ethnic diversity or to treat the matter of ethnic identity superficially as merely one of a number of minor impediments to effective state-integration. To the degree that ethnic identity is given recognition, it is apt to be as a somewhat unimportant and ephemeral nuisance that will unquestionably give way to a common identity uniting all inhabitants of the state, regardless of ethnic heritage, as modern communication and transportation networks link the state’s various parts more closely. Both tendencies are at sharp variance with the facts, and have contributed to the undue optimism that has characterized so much of the literature on “nation-building.”

It is not difficult to substantiate the charge that the leading theoreticians of “nation-building” have tended to slight, if not totally ignore, problems associated with ethnic diversity. A consultation of the table of contents and indices of books on “nation-building” will quickly convince the doubtful that the matter is seldom acknowledged, much less accorded serious consideration.¹ In order to be justified, such omissions

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¹ A representative sampling of the literature on integration theory might well include the following titles: (1) Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman, *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960); (2) Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston 1966); (3) Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston 1963); (4) David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965); (5) Willard A. Beling and George O. Totten, eds., *Developing Nations: Quest for a Model* (New York 1970); (6) Karl W. Deutsch and William Foltz, eds., *Nation-Building* (New York 1966); (7) Jason Finkle and Richard Gable, eds., *Political Development and Social Change* (New York 1966); (8) Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia 1964); (9) Lucian Pye, ed., *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton 1963); and (10) Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston 1966). The inclusion of five readers on the list, with an aggregate of well over fifty separate contributions, substantially broadens the sample.

None of these ten works dedicates a section, chapter, or major subheading to the matter of ethnic diversity. By contrast, the roles of the military, the bureaucracy, social classes, personality, industrialization, urbanization, and transaction flows and other modes of communication are common entries in tables of contents. In instances in which the tables of contents contain categories that might be expected to include a

must be occasioned either by the fact that most states are ethnically homogeneous or that ethnic diversity poses no serious problems to integration.

The former possibility is readily eliminated by reference to the actual ethnic composition of contemporary states. The remarkable lack of coincidence that exists between ethnic and political borders is indicated by the following statistics. Of a total of 132 contemporary states, only 12 (9.1 per cent) can be described as essentially homogeneous from an ethnic viewpoint. An additional 25 states (18.9 per cent of the sample) contain an ethnic group accounting for more than 90 per cent of the state's total population, and in still another 25 states the largest element accounts for between 75 and 89 per cent of the population. But in 31 states (23.5 per cent of the total), the largest ethnic element represents only 50 to 74 per cent of the population, and in 39 cases (29.5 per cent of all states) the largest group fails to account for even half of the state's population. Moreover, this portrait of ethnic diversity becomes more vivid when the number of distinct ethnic groups within states is considered. In some instances, the number of groups within a state runs into the hundreds, and in 53 states (40.2 per cent of the total), the population is divided into more than *five* significant groups.² Clearly,

serious discourse on the ramifications of ethnicity—categories such as “Internal Legitimacy” or “National Identity”—further investigation proved unrewarding.

The slighting of ethnicity is further evidenced by the indices. Six of the ten show not a single reference to ethnic groups, ethnicity, or minorities. Two make a single passing reference to ethnicity, and still another accords to all types of minorities less than two pages, limiting the discussion to their impact upon democracy. The tenth work, a collection of papers, represents only a partial exception. Discussion of the impediments that ethnicity, *per se*, poses to state-integration is limited to general comments in an introductory essay. Moreover, in this essay the author assumes that the matter is one of relatively short duration, in line with the second tendency described in this paper's introductory sentence.

It should be acknowledged that readers dealing with “nation-building” are apt to contain a few regional or country studies whose authors are well aware of the fissiparous impact of ethnic diversity therein. (In one of the above works, for example, a contribution on sub-Sahara Africa and another on Ceylon clearly demonstrate such an awareness.) But the significant fact is that the issue of ethnic diversity is not perceived by the editors as one that transcends the particular case(s). If the format of a book, as reflected in both its table of contents and index, fails to recognize the problem of ethnicity as more than a local phenomenon, the user of the book is hardly likely to do so.

The above ten works, as noted, are believed to be representative. But two decidedly nonrepresentative titles should be noted: The concept of ethnicity pervades Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Boston 1960); and an important segment of Charles W. Anderson and others, *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs 1967) is dedicated to a serious treatment of the issue.

²The 132 units include all entities that were generally considered to be states as of January 1, 1971, with the exception of a few microunits such as Nauru and Western Samoa. However, East and West Germany, North and South Korea, and North and South Vietnam were treated as single entities in the belief that such treatment would

then, the problem of ethnic diversity is far too ubiquitous to be ignored by the serious scholar of "nation-building," unless he subscribes to the position that ethnic diversity is not a matter for serious concern.

The validity of this position apparently also rests upon one of two propositions. Either loyalty to the ethnic group is self-evidently compatible with loyalty to the state, or, as mentioned earlier, ethnic identification will prove to be of short duration, withering away as modernization progresses. More consideration will be later given to the matter of the two loyalties (i.e., to the ethnic group and to the state), but clearly the two are not naturally harmonious. One need only reflect on the ultimate political dissection of what was once known as the Habsburg Empire, or contemplate the single most important challenge to the political survival of Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Guyana, Kenya, Nigeria, the Sudan, Yugoslavia, and a number of other multiethnic states. The theoretician of "nation-building" may well contemplate some proposal that he believes will reduce the matter of competing loyalties to manageable proportions (such as confederalism or cultural autonomy); but, if so, his proposal is an important element in his model and should occupy a prominent place in his writing.³

As to the assumption that ethnic identity will wither away as the processes collectively known as modernization occur, it is probable that those who hold this premise have been influenced, directly or indirectly, by the writings of Karl Deutsch. It is debatable, however, whether such an opinion concerning the future of ethnic identity can be properly inferred from his works. His perception of the intereffects

minimize their distorting effects. It should not be assumed that the inclusion of all microunits would substantially alter the statistics in favor of homogeneity. In the case of Nauru, for example, despite a population of only 6,500, the largest ethnic element fails to constitute a majority.

³ See, for example, Arnold Rivkin, *Nation-Building in Africa* (New Brunswick 1969). After reviewing a number of problems throughout Africa, many of which he readily acknowledges are essentially ethnic (e.g., pp. 35-37, 195, 196, and 226), the author concludes (p. 238): "Although the divided populations of Africa—of different tribes, ethnic origin (as the Watutsi and Bahutu in Rwanda and Burundi), religions (Christian, Islamic, animistic, etc.), and historical background—pose serious and major problems for nation-building, compared to the Latin American divisions, developed over centuries, and involving an intermixture of race, social structure, and economic status, they seem relatively manageable and over time susceptible of solution." No further details concerning a solution are offered, however, and the reader is therefore asked to accept this optimistic forecast solely on faith.

One of the most perplexing illustrations of a failure to confront a problem of ethnic diversity is offered by Lucian Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven 1962). Although the politically dominant Burmese have been involved in open ethnic warfare with that country's minorities almost uninterruptedly since that state achieved independence, and although this continuing struggle unquestionably represents that state's most visible and significant barrier to integration, a passing reference to some of the minorities is limited to a single page.

of what he calls "social mobilization" and of assimilation (i.e., "nation-building," so far as identity is concerned) is not always clear and appears to have undergone significant fluctuations. But given the magnitude of his influence, a closer scrutiny of his works appears warranted in order to define and evaluate more clearly his conclusions concerning the significance that ethnic identity possesses for "nation-building."

Deutsch's most famous work, *Nationalism and Social Communication*,⁴ illustrates the problem of defining his position with precision. On the one hand, this work contains a few passing acknowledgements that increasing contacts between culturally diverse people *might* increase antagonisms.⁵ On the other hand, there are several passages that might lead the reader to conclude that Deutsch was convinced that modernization, in the form of increases in urbanization, industrialization, schooling, communication and transportation facilities, etc., would lead to assimilation. Even the development and extensive discussion of the concept of social mobilization, in a book ostensibly dedicated to the analytical study of nationalism, implied an important relationship between the two. Moreover, it was in a chapter entitled "National Assimilation or Differentiation: Some Quantitative Relationships" that Deutsch discussed the factors that determined, in his view, the rate of social mobilization. Then, after discussing the rates of mobilization and of assimilation separately, he strongly intimated a causal or reinforcing interrelationship:

Thus far we have treated all the rates of change as completely independent from each other. . . . However, we already know empirically that the rate of assimilation among a population that has been uprooted and mobilized—such as immigrants coming to America—is usually considerably higher than the rate of assimilation among the secluded populations of villages close to the soil. . . . Probably the theoretical investigation of these quantitative aspects of the merging or splitting of nations could be carried still further. One reason to stop here might be that we know now what statistical information is worth looking for, but that there seems little point in going further until more of the relevant statistics have been collected.⁶

⁴ *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (Cambridge, Mass.). The first edition was published in 1953 and the second, which contains no substantive changes, in 1966. All references to page numbers in this paper correspond to the second edition.

⁵ See, for example, p. 126: "Linguistically and culturally, then, members of each group are outsiders for the other. Yet technological and economic processes are forcing them together, into acute recognition of their differences and their common, mutual experience of strangeness, and more conspicuous differentiation and conflict may result."

⁶ *Ibid.*, 152.

Later, in summarizing the same chapter, Deutsch noted:

A decisive factor in national assimilation or differentiation was found to be the process of social mobilization which accompanies the growth of markets, industries, and towns, and eventually of literacy and mass communication. The trends in the underlying process of social mobilization could do much to decide whether existing national trends in particular countries would be continued or reversed.⁷

In the following chapter, Deutsch discussed the rate of assimilation in terms of six balances of both quantitative and qualitative factors, and then restated what he conceived to be the relationship between the rates of mobilization and assimilation.

Assimilation among people firmly rooted in their own communities and their native setting usually proceeds far more slowly than it would among the mobilized population, but it does proceed even though it may take many generations. . . . Any more general quantitative comparison between the relatively high assimilation speeds among mobilized persons and the considerably lower assimilation speeds among the underlying population remains to be worked out. Likewise to be worked out would have to be the *mutual interaction* of the different rates of change which thus far have been discussed as if they were wholly independent of each other.⁸

Such citations would appear to justify the interpretation that Deutsch felt that modernization, by socially mobilizing large segments of the population, would increase both the likelihood and the tempo of their assimilation. Such a conclusion was lent further credence by Deutsch's optimistic view that the matter of assimilating diverse ethnic groups is subjectable to social engineering. Concluding a discussion of the role of the policy-maker, he noted: "Too often men have viewed language and nationality superficially as an accident, or accepted them submissively as fate. In fact they are neither accident nor fate, but the outcome of a discernible process; and as soon as we begin to make the process visible, we are beginning to change it."⁹

By 1961, Deutsch's view of the relationship between social mobilization and assimilation appeared to have undergone a fundamental change. Mobilization was now seen as being apt to have the opposite effect upon assimilation.

Other things assumed equal, the stage of rapid social mobilization may be expected, therefore, to promote the consolidation of states whose peoples already share the same language, culture, and major social in-

⁷ *Ibid.*, 188.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 162, 163; emphasis added.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 164.

stitutions; while the same process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life.¹⁰

The practical consequences of this altered view, in terms of what it portended for the survival of that preponderant number of non-industrialized states which are multiethnic, was blunted, however, by Deutsch's immediate addendum that all things, in any event, are not equal. More specifically, he contended that ethnic identity would prove no match for the power of self-interest.

In the last analysis, however, the problem of the scale of states goes beyond the effects of language, culture, or institutions, important as all these are. In the period of rapid social mobilization, the acceptable scale of a political unit will tend to depend eventually upon its performance. . . . At bottom, the popular acceptance of a government in a period of social mobilization is most of all a matter of its responsiveness to the felt needs of its population.¹¹

An essay written by Professor Deutsch two years later indicated a swing back to his earlier position. In a return to his earlier optimism concerning the impact of modernization upon ethnicity, he chided unnamed authors for maintaining that ethnic divisions constituted a long-run challenge to "nation-building."

Tribes, we know from European history, can change their language and culture; they can absorb other tribes; and large tribes come into existence through federation or mergers of smaller tribes or through their conquest and absorption by a larger one.

In contrast to this picture of plasticity and change, many writings on African and Asian politics still seem to treat tribes as fixed and unlikely to change in any significant way during the next decades. Yet in contemporary Asia and Africa, the rates of cultural and ethnic change, although still low, are likely to be faster than they were in early medieval Europe. . . . Research is needed to establish more reliable figures, but it seems likely from the experience of ethnic minorities in other parts of the world that the process of partial modernization will draw many of the most gifted and energetic individuals into the cities or the growing sectors of the economy away from their former minority or tribal groups, leaving these traditional groups weaker, more stagnant, and easier to govern.¹²

¹⁰ Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 501.

¹¹ *Ibid.* It may be instructive that Deutsch offered negative examples of this phenomenon (e.g., the secession of the U.S. and Ireland from Britain), but no examples of ethnic groups submerging their identity because of effective government.

¹² Karl Deutsch, "Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research," in Deutsch and Foltz (fn. 1), 4-5.

Later in the essay, Deutsch specified four stages by which he anticipated assimilation would take place:

Open or latent resistance to political amalgamation into a common national state; minimal integration to the point of passive compliance with the orders of such an amalgamated government; deeper political integration to the point of active support for such a common state but with continuing ethnic or cultural group cohesion and diversity; and, finally, the coincidence of political amalgamation and integration with the assimilation of all groups to a common language and culture—these could be the main stages on the way from tribes to nation. Since a nation is not an animal or vegetable organism, its evolution need not go through any fixed sequence of these steps. . . . Yet the most frequent sequence in modern Asia and Africa may well be the one sketched above. How long might it take for tribes or other ethnic groups in a developing country to pass through some such sequence of stages? We do not know, but European history offers at least a few suggestions.¹³

In sharp contrast to this optimistic prediction concerning the fate of the new states of Africa and Asia are the views expressed by Deutsch in his most recent work on nationalism,¹⁴ views which more closely approximate those expressed in his 1961 article. As in that article, and unlike the position he took in the still earlier *Nationalism and Social Communication*, Deutsch now treated assimilation and mobilization as two causally isolated processes.¹⁵ The only relationship between the two that was discussed is chronological, i.e., the question of which antedates the other:

The decisive factor in such situations is the balance between the two processes that we have been discussing. If assimilation stays ahead of mobilization or keeps abreast of it, the government is likely to remain stable, and eventually everybody will be integrated into one people. . . . On the other hand, where mobilization is fast and assimilation is slow the opposite happens.¹⁶

Although this position echoed that expressed by Deutsch in 1961,¹⁷ he no longer contended that the logical consequences of this analysis could be avoided by increasing state services and benefits. The result is

¹³ *Ibid.*, 8-9. It is worth noting that in discussing these prospective stages of assimilation, Deutsch cited several of his own works, including *Nationalism and Social Communication*, thereby indicating his feeling that that work was fully compatible with this view of the ultimate eradication of ethnic divisiveness.

¹⁴ Karl Deutsch, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (New York 1969).

¹⁵ One indication of a change of attitude toward the problem of assimilation is that while it played a central role in *Nationalism and Social Communication*, the process of assimilation is allocated less than two pages in his most recent work and is treated in terms of its "dimensions" rather than its "components." See pp. 25-27.

¹⁶ Deutsch (fn. 14), 27.

¹⁷ See above, pp. 323-24.

a note of pessimism not detected in his 1961 analysis, and one that seems to be diametrically opposed to his unequivocal optimism of 1963:

We have seen that the more gradually the process of social mobilization moves, the more time there is for social and national assimilation to work. Conversely, the more social mobilization is postponed, the more quickly its various aspects—language, monetization, mass audience, literacy, voting, urbanization, industrialization—must eventually be achieved. But when all of these developments have to be crowded into the lifetime of one or two generations, the chances for assimilation to work are much smaller. The likelihood is much greater that people will be precipitated into politics with their old languages, their old outlook on the world and their old tribal loyalties still largely unchanged; and it becomes far more difficult to have them think of themselves as members of one new nation. It took centuries to make Englishmen and Frenchmen. How are variegated tribal groups to become Tanzanians, Zambians, or Malavians in one generation?¹⁸

If Deutsch's most recent analysis of the interrelationship between social mobilization and assimilation is accepted, that is, if it is granted that the connection between the two is in no way causal but purely chronological, then it is difficult to perceive what predictive value the concept of social mobilization holds for the "nation-builder." To say, "if assimilation stays ahead of mobilization or keeps abreast of it . . . eventually everybody will be integrated into one people" is in fact to say very little. If assimilation progresses, then clearly assimilation will be achieved.¹⁹ And to add, as Deutsch does, "where mobilization is fast and assimilation is slow, the opposite happens," is not to furnish the state planner with a guide for action, but is to deny that the matter is subjectable to social engineering. If assimilation, in those cases where and when it can be achieved, is a lengthy process requiring generations, and if Professor Deutsch is not recommending that the states of the third world be immunized from modernization (and in the preceding quotation he states that such an immunization is impossible), then what is left is the conclusion that where assimilation has not yet been achieved, it is highly unlikely to be.

Professor Deutsch's most recent book therefore provides no brief for

¹⁸ Deutsch (fn. 14), 73.

¹⁹ Another example of this tautology can be found on page 68, *ibid.* Referring to earlier cases of national integration, Deutsch concludes that "*the combined processes of social mobilization and assimilation eventually turned them into consolidated peoples and nations.*" If the italicized words are omitted, the statement is an evident truism in that it defines assimilation. Indeed, to the degree that social mobilization presupposes the industrial age and relatively modern transportation and communication networks, the statement as worded is false. The Chinese nation, and nearly all others, antedate the Industrial Revolution.

those who assume that ethnicity will wane as modernization progresses. The opposite is the case. On the other hand, some of his earlier comments, and particularly those in which he propounded four stages of assimilative growth, could indeed be cited as supporting this school of thought. Regardless of the interpretation one places upon Deutsch, however, the doctrine that modernization dissolves ethnic loyalties can be challenged on purely empirical grounds.

If the processes that comprise modernization led to a lessening of ethnic consciousness in favor of identification with the state, then the number of states troubled by ethnic disharmony would be on the decrease. To the contrary, however, a global survey illustrates that ethnic consciousness is definitely in the ascendancy as a political force, and that state borders, as presently delimited, are being increasingly challenged by this trend.²⁰ And, what is of greater significance, multiethnic states at all levels of modernity have been afflicted. Particularly instructive in this regard is the large proportion of states within the technologically and economically advanced region of Western Europe that have recently been troubled by ethnic unrest. Examples include (1) the problems of Spain with the anti-Castilian activities of the Basques, the Catalans, and on a lesser level, the Galicians; (2) the animosity indicated by the Swiss toward foreign migrant workers, and the demands of the French-speaking peoples of Berne for political separation from the German-speaking element; (3) the South Tyroleans' dissatisfaction with Italian rule, currently muffled by recent concessions on the part of the Italian Government; (4) evidence of Breton unhappiness with continued French rule; (5) the resurgence of Scottish and Welsh nationalism, the conflict in Northern Ireland, and the wide-scale popularity of anti-immigrant sentiments epitomized in the figure of Enoch Powell—all within the United Kingdom; and (6) the bitter rivalry of the Walloon and Flemish peoples within Belgium. Outside of Europe, the challenge to the concept of a single Canada represented by the Franco-Canadian movements, and the existence of black separatist movements within the United States also bear testimony that even the combination of a lengthy history as a state and a high degree of technological and economic integration does not guarantee immunity against ethnic particularism.

That social mobilization need not lead to a transfer of primary allegiance from the ethnic group to the state is therefore clear. Can we go beyond this to posit an inverse correlation between modernization

²⁰ For a treatment of this trend as a global phenomenon, see Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, xx (October 1967), 30-53.

and the level of ethnic dissonance within multiethnic states? Admittedly, there is a danger of countering the assumption that the processes of modernization lead to cultural assimilation with an opposing iron law of political disintegration which contends that modernization results, of necessity, in increasing demands for ethnic separation. We still do not have sufficient data to justify such an unequivocal contention. Nonetheless, the substantial body of data which is available supports the proposition that material increases in what Deutsch termed social communication and mobilization *tend* to increase cultural awareness and to exacerbate interethnic conflict. Again, the large and growing number of ethnic separatist movements can be cited for substantiation.

There are many statesmen and scholars, however, who would protest this macroanalytical approach because the data cited for support contain a number of former colonies. The inclusion of former dependencies in a list purporting to substantiate a correlation between modernization and ethnicity is improper, they would contend, because ethnic consciousness was deliberately kept alive and encouraged by the colonial overseers as an element in a policy of divide-and-rule. The prevalence of ethnic consciousness and antagonism in these territories is therefore held to be the product of the artificial stimuli of colonial policy. Otherwise, ethnicity would not constitute a serious problem for the new states.

The validity of such a conviction can be tested by contrasting the experience of former colonies with that of industrially retarded, multiethnic states that did not undergo a significant period as a colony. No important distinctions are discernible on this basis. Consider, for example, the cases of Ethiopia and Thailand, both of which have enjoyed very lengthy histories as independent states.²¹ Diverse ethnic elements were able to coexist for a lengthy period within each of these states because the states were poorly integrated, and the ethnic minorities therefore had little contact, with either their (mostly theoretic) state-governments or with each other. Until very recent times, then, the situation of the minorities was not unlike the situation of ethnic groups within colonies where the colonial power practiced that very common colonial policy of ruling through the leadership of the various ethnic groups. In all such cases, the conflict between alien rule and the ethnic group's determination to preserve its lifeways was minimized. The governments of these underdeveloped states may well have long desired to make their rule effective throughout their entire territory, but advances in communications and transportation were necessary before

²¹ It is assumed that Ethiopia's very short period of domination by Italy in the 1930's does not invalidate its use as an example of a state without a colonial history.

a governmental presence could become a pervasive reality in the remote territories of the minorities.

As a result of this new presence, resentment of foreign rule has become an important political force for the first time. In addition, quite aside from the question of who rules, there is the matter of cultural self-preservation. An unintegrated state poses no serious threat to the life-ways of the various ethnic groups. But improvements in the quality and quantity of communication and transportation media progressively curtail the cultural isolation in which an ethnic group could formerly cloak its cultural chasteness from the perverting influences of other cultures within the same state. The reaction to such curtailment is very apt to be one of xenophobic hostility.

Advances in communications and transportation tend also to increase the cultural awareness of the minorities by making their members more aware of the distinctions between themselves and others. The impact is twofold. Not only does the individual become more aware of alien ethnic groups; he also becomes more aware of those who share his identity. Thus, the transistor radio has not only made the formerly isolated, Lao-speaking villager of northeast Thailand aware of linguistic and other cultural distinctions between himself and the politically dominant Siamese-speaking element to the west; it has also made him much more aware of his cultural affinity with the Lao who live in other villages throughout northeast Thailand and across the Mekong River in western Laos.²² Intraethnic as well as inter-ethnic communications thus play a major role in the creation of ethnic consciousness.

As an end result of these processes, Thailand is today faced with separatist movements on the part of the hill tribes in the north, the Lao in the northeast, and the Malays in the south.²³ Similarly, as a result of growing cultural self-awareness by minorities and an increasing presence of the central government, the state of Ethiopia, despite its three-thousand-year history, is also currently faced with a number of ethnic separatist movements.²⁴ Other underdeveloped, multiethnic states

²² For a more complete discussion of the relationship of communications distance to physical distance, see Connor, "Myths of Hemispheric, Continental, Regional, and State Unity," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXIV (December 1969), particularly 565-67.

²³ For a fascinating account of how increased contacts have strengthened Lao identity, see Charles F. Keyes, "Ethnic Identity and Loyalty of Villagers in Northeast Thailand," *Asian Survey*, VI (July 1966), 362-69.

²⁴ See the perspicacious comment concerning Ethiopia by a newspaper reporter: "Lack of communications helped hold this empire together. Now developing communications and the political awareness they encourage are straining its unity." (Frederick Hunter in the *Christian Science Monitor*, January 8, 1970.)

Problem areas include not just the rather recently acquired Eritrea, but also Bale and Gojam Provinces. See the *New York Times*, April 1, 1969.

without a history of colonialism indicate a similar pattern.²⁵ The colonial and noncolonial patterns are not significantly different.

Another challenge to the contention that modernization tends to exacerbate ethnic tensions may also be anticipated. As was noted earlier, the recent upsurge in ethnic conflict within the more industrialized, multiethnic states of Europe and North America seriously challenges the contention that modernization dissipates ethnic consciousness. But does not this upsurge also run counter to the assertion that modernization increases ethnic consciousness? Given the fact that the Industrial Revolution was introduced into each of these states more than a century ago, should not the high-tide mark of ethnic consciousness have appeared long ago? Part of the answer may be found in what Marxists term "The Law of the Transformation of Quantity into Quality," a paraphrase of which might read "enough of a quantitative difference makes a qualitative difference." The processes of modernization prior to World War II did not necessitate or bring about the same measure of international contacts as have developments in the postwar period. With fewer and poorer roads, far fewer and less efficient private cars, local radio rather than state-wide television as the primary channel of non-written mass communications, lower levels of education and of knowledge of events beyond one's own experience, and lower general income levels that kept people close to home, ethnic complacency could be maintained: Brittany's culture appeared safe from French encroachment, Edinburgh felt remote and isolated from London, most Walloons and Flemings seldom came into contact (including artificial contact through media such as television) with members of the other group. In short, the situation of ethnic groups within these states was not totally dissimilar from that which was described earlier with regard to non-industrialized societies.²⁶ The difference was only one of degree until that point was reached at which a qualitative change occurred. However, the point at which a significant number of people perceived that the cumulative impact of the quantitative increases in the intensity

²⁵ Cases in point would include Afghanistan, Iran, and Liberia. Many of the Latin American States would also qualify. For a treatment of the latter, see Anderson and others (fn. 1), 45-56. For more details on growing ethnic awareness in Thailand and South Asia, see Connor, "Ethnology and the Peace of South Asia," *World Politics*, xxii (October 1969), 51-86.

²⁶ One piece of evidence that there are substantial distinctions in the pervasiveness of pre- and post-World War II *intergroup*, *intrastate* contacts is offered by American regionalism. As will be noted below, regionalism, in contradistinction to ethnicity, does tend to evaporate in direct proportion to the intensity of interregional communication and transportation networks. Yet regionalism, as manifested in concepts like "states' rights" and in voting blocs and voting patterns, was still strong following World War II. The most enduring manifestation of American regionalism, "the Solid South," has shown symptoms of dying only in recent years.

of intergroup contacts now constituted a threat to their ethnicity represented, in political terms, a qualitative transformation.

Perhaps an even more important factor in explaining the recent upsurge of militant ethnic consciousness in advanced as well as less advanced states involves not the nature or density of the communications media, but the message. Although the expression "self-determination of nations" can be traced to 1865,²⁷ it did not receive great attention until its endorsement by a number of world-renowned statesmen during the World War I era. Moreover, by their failure, after the war, to apply this doctrine to the multiethnic empires of Belgium, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, the statesmen indicated that they did not consider self-determination an axiom of universal validity. Not until after World War II was the doctrine officially endorsed by an organization aspiring to global jurisdiction.²⁸ It is therefore of very recent vintage. But despite its short history, it has been widely publicized and elevated to the status of a self-evident truth. Today, lip service is paid to it by political leaders of the most diverse persuasions. Admittedly, the doctrine has often been misapplied, having been regularly invoked in support of all movements aimed at dissolving a political allegiance, regardless of the basis for secession. But in its pristine form, the doctrine makes ethnicity the ultimate measure of political legitimacy, by holding that any self-differentiating people, simply because it *is* a people, has the right, should it so desire, to rule itself. In recent years, with its wide acceptance as a universal truth, the doctrine has induced minorities in Europe and North America, as well as in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to question the validity of present political borders. It has therefore been more than a justification for ethnic movements: it has been a catalyst for them. The spreading of effective communications has had an evident impact upon ethnic consciousness, but the full impact of the communications media did not precede the message of self-determination.

Still another element contributing to the upsurge in ethnic consciousness is the evident change in the global political environment, which makes it much more unlikely that a militarily weak polity will

²⁷ The expression appeared as part of the Proclamation on the Polish Question, endorsed by the London Conference of the First International. The Proclamation noted "the need for annulling Russian influence in Europe, through enforcing the right of self-determination, and through the reconstituting of Poland upon democratic and social foundations." Cited in G. Stelkloff, *History of the First International* (New York 1968), 85. For a reference to a still earlier use of the expression by Karl Marx in his *Herr Vogt* (1860), see Stefan Possony, "Nationalism and the Ethnic Factor," *Orbis*, x (Winter 1967), 1218.

²⁸ United Nations Charter, art. I, par. 2.

be annexed by a larger power. During the age of colonialism, the probability of that eventuality was sometimes so great as to encourage independent units to seek the status of a protectorate in order to be able to select rule by the lesser evil. By contrast, a number of relatively recent developments, including what is termed the nuclear stalemate, cause independence to appear as a more enduring prospect for even the weakest of units. Thus, a favorable environment, the generating and justifying principle of self-determination, an expanding list of successful precedents, and a growing awareness of all these factors because of increased communications, are all involved.

A summary of our findings thus far would consist of the following points. The preponderant number of states are multiethnic. Ethnic consciousness has been definitely increasing, not decreasing, in recent years. No particular classification of multiethnic states has proven immune to the fissiparous impact of ethnicity: authoritarian and democratic; federative and unitary; Asian, African, American, and European states have all been afflicted. Form of government and geography have clearly not been determinative. Nor has the level of economic development. But the accompaniments of economic development—increased social mobilization and communication—appear to have increased ethnic tensions and to be conducive to separatist demands. Despite all this, leading theoreticians of “nation-building” have tended to ignore or slight the problems associated with ethnicity.

If we turn to an analysis of the reasons for this wide gap between theory and reality, twelve overlapping and interrelated possibilities offer themselves.

(I) CONFUSING INTERUTILIZATION OF THE KEY TERMS, NATION AND STATE:

It may appear whimsical to begin with the often picayune matter of semantics. It is very doubtful, however, that any discipline has been more plagued by the improper utilization of its key terms than has international relations. Anthropologists often bemoan the nebosity underlying the concept of race—an ambiguity which has been reflected in many unscientific theories, which, in turn, have required time-consuming repudiations. But, though the concept of race is a matter of great significance to anthropology, it is not the key concept, that being *man*. By contrast, the concept of the state and of man's relationship to the state are at the heart of international relations. Yet, despite their key roles, both of these concepts are shrouded in ambiguity because of careless use of terms.

Consider first the concept of the state and the manner in which it is commonly treated as synonymous with the vastly different concept of the nation. The League of Nations, the United Nations, and, indeed, the expression *international relations* are but a few of the many available illustrations of the fact that statesmen and scholars are inclined to the indiscriminate interuse of the two concepts.²⁹ Why this confusion in terminology has been perpetuated is difficult to explain, for authorities are certainly well aware of the distinctions between the state and the nation. Thus, a dictionary designed for the student of global politics defines the state as "a legal concept describing a social group that occupies a defined territory and is organized under common political institutions and an effective government."³⁰ By contrast, a nation is defined as "a social group which shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity." It carefully adds: "A nation may comprise part of a state, be coterminous with a state, or extend beyond the borders of a single state." Writers of textbooks and monographs in international relations generally also detail these same distinctions between state and nation. Unfortunately, however, these same writers are then apt to revert to the indiscriminate interutilization of the two terms.³¹

It is probable that the tendency to equate the two expressions de-

²⁹ *The Worldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations* [sic], 3d ed., I (New York 1967), 254-57, lists fifty intergovernmental organizations whose names begin with *International*. Not one of them has anything to do with nations.

³⁰ Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary* (New York 1969).

³¹ See, for example, A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (2d rev. ed., New York 1968), 12: "The story we are about to tell is a tale of nations. Nations are the major characters, and it is with their actions, their goals and plans, their power, their possessions, and their relations with each other that we shall be concerned." See also Deutsch (fn. 14), where, despite defining the word nation to mean a people (i.e., an ethnic group) in charge of a state (p. 19), the author refers to the multiethnic populations of Spain (p. 13), and of Belgium (p. 70), as nations. See, too, the concluding paragraph of Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington 1967) in which he notes that "more than 130 nations, real or so-called, will each make its contribution to the history of the late twentieth century." The author had earlier (e.g., p. 36) differentiated between state and nation. For evidence that studies dealing specifically with the problems that ethnic diversity poses for state integration are also not necessarily immune from improper interuse of terminology, see Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution," *World Politics*, xxii (July 1970), particularly 597-98. "First, in spite of the oft-used distinction between a fairly coercive domestic order and a fairly noncoercive international order, the jockeying for power of ethnic groups within states corresponds markedly to that of *nation* and *nation*. . . . New and more productive 'decades of development,' with their presumed attempts at re-allocation, may be as indispensable to the comity among ethnic groups within the state as they are among the *nations* of the world." (Emphasis added.) Examples abound of this tendency to use key terms improperly, so the authorities who are singled out in this and the following footnotes are *not* selected because they have been unusually uncircumspect in their terminology. On the contrary, they have been selected, in part, because they are acknowledged scholars.

veloped as alternative shorthand substitutes for the hyphenate, *nation-state*. This term is also supposed to have a precise meaning, referring to a situation in which the borders of the nation approximate those of the state. We have noted that, technically speaking, less than 10 per cent of all states would qualify as essentially homogeneous. But authorities nevertheless tend to refer to all states as nation-states.³²

The confusion wrought by the misuse of these terms has long hampered the study of many aspects of interstate relations, but it has especially impeded the understanding of nationalism. More particularly, loyalty to the nation has often been confused with loyalty to the state. Again, this confusion has been reflected in, and largely caused by, inappropriate terminology.

The definitions of state and nation quoted above make clear that what we have thus far been calling self-differentiating ethnic groups are in fact nations. Loyalty to the ethnic group, therefore, should logically be called nationalism. But nationalism, as commonly employed, refers to loyalty to the state (or to the word *nation*, when the latter has been incorrectly substituted for state).³³ Thus, the same dictionary whose precise definitions of state and nation we have just cited defines *nationalism* as a mass emotion that "makes the *state* the ultimate focus of the individual's loyalty." (Emphasis added.) With the term *nationalism* thus preempted, scholars have felt compelled to offer a substitute to describe loyalty to the nation. Regionalism, parochialism, primordialism, communalism, ethnic complementarity, and tribalism are among those that have been advanced. Unfortunately, however, the perpetuation of the improper use of the word *nationalism* to refer to devotion to the state, while using other terms with different roots and with fundamentally different connotations to denote devotion to the nation, is hardly conducive to dissolving the confusion surrounding the two loyalties.³⁴ On the contrary, it is conducive to dangerously

³² See for example Norman J. Paddleford and George A. Lincoln, *The Dynamics of International Politics* (2d ed., New York 1967), 7: "The actors in the international political system are the independent nation-states." Or Louis J. Halle, *Civilization and Foreign Policy* (New York 1952), 10: "A prime fact about the world is that it is largely composed of nation-states." And Elton Atwater and others, *World Tensions: Conflict and Accommodation* (New York 1967), 16: "Since there are some 120 different nation-states in the world . . ." Karl Deutsch also regularly refers to all states as nation-states. See, for example, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (fn. 14), 61, 125, and 176. For his description of the multiethnic states of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia as nation-states, see 62-63.

³³ Meanwhile, expressions such as *statism* or *étatisme*, which should refer to loyalty to the state, have been assigned still other meanings that have little to do with loyalty of any sort.

³⁴ See, for example, the section in Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague 1968), entitled "Parochialism, Nationality, and Nationalism," 32-

underestimating the magnetism and the staying power of ethnic identity, for those terms simply do not convey the aura of deeply felt, emotional commitment that *nationalism* does. Every schoolboy is made aware, for example, that the German and Celtic tribes of antiquity became obliterated in a higher identity; that regionalism within the United States or Germany has steadily receded in significance. By contrast with these vanquished forces, the schoolboy learns that nationalism is a vibrant force that has largely shaped the direction of global politics for the past two hundred years. But since *nationalism* is equated with loyalty to the state, the student has been preconditioned to perceive the state as the certain ultimate victor in any test of loyalties with these lower-form anachronisms that have been proven to be ephemeral.

If the nation-state were in fact the universal form of polity, the confusion would not be important. In those cases in which the nation and the state essentially coincide, the two loyalties mesh rather than compete. A common pitfall of scholarship, however, has been to equate the resulting emotional attachment to a nation-state with loyalty to the state alone. The study of nationalism in the late twentieth century has been heavily influenced by the experiences of Germany and Japan, perceived as illustrations of the extreme dedication that nationalism is able to evoke. The implication is that other states have the potential for evoking the same type of mass response, though, it is to be hoped, in a less fanatical form. Largely ignored is the fact that these two states are among the very few that are ethnically homogeneous.³³ As such, *Deutschland* and *Nippon* have been something far more profound to their populations than mere territorial-political units called states; they have been ethno-psychological inclinations called nations. To perceive German or Japanese nationalism as loyalty to the state is to miss the mark badly. It is also to distort beyond recognition the power to evoke loyalty to the state in the absence of a linking of state and nation in the popular psyche. With that linkage, the leaders can voice their appeals in terms of the state (*Deutschland*) or the nation (*volksdeutsch*, *Volkstum*, *Volksgenosse*), because the two trigger the same associations. The same is true for members of the politically dominant group in some multiethnic states. Thus, the Han Chinese are apt to view the state of China as the state of their particular nation, and are there-

33. As used therein, parochialism refers to loyalty to the ethnic group, and nationality and nationalism refer to identity with, and loyalty to, the state.

³⁵ One manifestation has been the grouping of the *nationalism* of Japan and Germany during the 1930's and early 1940's with that of Italy and of multiethnic Argentina and Spain under the single rubric of Fascism, a doctrine positing the superiority of the corporate state.

fore susceptible to appeals either in the name of China or in the name of the Han Chinese people. But the notion of *China* evokes quite different associations, and therefore quite different responses, from Tibetans, Mongols, Uighurs, and other non-Han people. The confusing use of terminology has diverted scholars for some time from asking the key question: How many examples come to mind of a strong "state-nationalism" being manifested among a people who perceive their state and their nation as distinct entities?

The likelihood of contemporary scholars being diverted from the posing of this question would have been greatly reduced had the misnomer, "nation-building," not been adopted. Since most of the less developed states contain a number of nations, and since the transfer of primary allegiance from these nations to the state is generally considered the *sine qua non* of successful integration, the true goal is not "nation-building" but "nation-destroying." Would scholars have been less sanguine concerning the chances of success if proper terminology had been employed? Certainly they would have been less likely to ignore, or to dismiss lightly, the problem of ethnic identity, the true nationalism.³⁶

(2) A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND A RESULTING TENDENCY TO UNDERRATE ITS EMOTIONAL POWER:

In its broadest implications, this reason for the failure of authorities to pay proper heed to ethnicity is the end product of all other reasons. If so understood, it is a statement of the problem rather than an explanation. However, as used here, it is intended to point to the tendency of scholars to perceive ethnic nationalism in terms of its overt mani-

³⁶ See, for example, Rothchild (fn. 31), 598. "Second, the interethnic confrontation raises questions about the unifying potential of nationalism. Although nationalism has effectively repulsed the claims of metropolitan hegemony in a number of crucial confrontations, it has still to demonstrate the ability to overcome 'primordial sentiments' and to foster a sense of common purpose." By equating nationalism with loyalty to the state, Rothchild is unwittingly criticizing nationalism for not being able to overcome itself. Nonetheless, if his pessimism persisted, his basic analysis concerning the relative strength of ethnic and state loyalty would be sound. However, he later criticizes the authors of a number of books dealing with ethnic problems for emphasizing the depth of the cleavages rather than the positive possibilities for "ethnic balancing." They represent "an all-too-general preoccupation with the nature of past cleavages and conflicts instead of with the evolving dimensions of the process of political integration" (p. 612). "They tell us more about cleavages than about links, more about conflict than about cooperation and reciprocity. Their details are sharply delineated; however, the complete picture requires somewhat greater attention to adjustment, interrelatedness, adaptation, and exchange" (p. 615). One suspects that the author might have been more likely to question whether he was not asking for answers to the unanswerable if he had been aware that nationalism was on the side of state-disintegration rather than state-integration.

festations rather than in terms of its essence. The essence of the nation is not tangible. It is psychological, a matter of attitude rather than of fact.

In accordance with an earlier quoted definition, we can describe the nation as a self-differentiating ethnic group. A prerequisite of nationhood is a popularly held awareness or belief that one's own group is unique in a most vital sense. In the absence of such a popularly held conviction, there is only an ethnic group. A distinct group may be very apparent to the anthropologist or even to the untrained observer, but without a realization of this fact on the part of a sizable percentage of its members, a nation does not exist.

Because the essence of the nation is a matter of attitude, the tangible manifestations of cultural distinctiveness are significant only to the degree that they contribute to the *sense* of uniqueness. Indeed, a sense of vital uniqueness can come about even in the absence of important, tangible cultural characteristics of a distinctive nature, as evidenced by the ethnopsychological experience of the American colonists, the Afrikaners, and the Taiwanese with regard to their former British, Dutch, and Han Chinese identities. Conversely, the concept of a single nation can transcend tangible cultural distinctions, such as the Catholic-Lutheran division within the German nation.³⁷

Any nation can, of course, be described in terms of its particular amalgam of tangible characteristics, for example, in terms of the number of its members, their physical location, their religious and linguistic composition, and so forth. But one can so describe any human grouping, even such an unimportant categorization as the New Englander. By intuitively valuing that which they have in common with other Americans more than that which makes them unique, the New Englanders have self-relegated themselves to the status of a subnational element. By contrast, the Ibos clearly place greater importance on being Ibo than on being Nigerian. It is, therefore, the self-view of one's group, rather than the tangible characteristics, that is of essence in determining the existence or non-existence of a nation.

The abstract essence of ethnic nationalism is often not perceived by the observer. There is an understandable propensity, when investigating a case of ethnic discord, to perceive the struggle in terms of its more readily discernible features. Thus, Ukrainian unrest is popularly re-

³⁷ Since the concept of the nation does not preclude significant internal divisions, it actually embodies two important levels of attitudes. Relative to *intranational* distinctions and similarities, the stress, when need be, is upon those traits that unite; relative to distinctions and similarities among nations, the ultimate stress is upon those that divide.

ported as an attempt to preserve the Ukrainian language against Russian inroads; Belgium's major problem is also viewed as essentially linguistic; the Ethiopian-Eritrean, as well as the Northern Ireland conflict, is seen as religious; the Czecho-Slovak, the West Pakistani-Bengali, and the Serbo-Croatian disputes are characterized as essentially matters of economic differentiation. Linguistic, religious, and economic distinctions between peoples are all easily discerned and, what is of at least equal moment, are easily conveyed to one's audience.

This propensity to perceive an ethnic division in terms of the more tangible differences between the groups is often supported by the statements and actions of those most involved. In their desire to assert their uniqueness, members of a group are apt to make rallying points of their more tangible and distinguishing institutions. Thus, the Ukrainians, as a method of asserting their non-Russian identity, wage their campaign for national survival largely in terms of their right to employ the Ukrainian, rather than the Russian, tongue in all oral and written matters. But would not the Ukrainian nation (that is, a popular consciousness of being Ukrainian) be likely to persist even if the language were totally replaced by Russian, just as the Irish nation has persisted after the virtual disappearance of Gaelic, despite pre-1920 slogans that described Gaelic and Irish identity as inseparable?³⁸ Is the language the essential element of the Ukrainian nation, or is it merely a minor element which has been elevated to *the symbol* of the nation in its struggle for continued viability? National identity may survive substantial alterations in language, religion, economic status, or any other tangible manifestation of its culture. Nevertheless, not only do those involved in an ethnic dispute tend to express their own national consciousness in terms of tangible symbols, but they also tend to express their aversion to the other nation in terms of ostensibly readily identifiable attributes. Seldom will a person acknowledge that he dislikes a member of another group simply because the latter is Chinese, Jewish, Ibo, Afro-American, Italian, or what have you. There is a very common compulsion to express what are fundamentally emotional responses to foreign stimuli (prejudices) in more "rational" terms. "They" are inclined to laziness (or aggressiveness), crime, having too many children, and, if a minority, to disloyalty. "They" are prejudiced toward us, haughty in their dealings, disparaging of our culture, determined to take unfair economic advantage, intent on forcing their

³⁸ Still other examples would include the resurgence of Scottish and Welsh nationalism even among those who are linguistically assimilated to English.

culture and standards upon us, and relegating us to an inferior status.³⁹ Employment, crime, birth, income, emigration, life-expectancy, and bilingual statistics of varying reliability and applicability are among the data commonly advanced as tangible evidence of such allegations. Thus is the "idea" made flesh.

As a result of the tendency for both participant and reporter to describe ethnopsychological phenomena in terms of tangible considerations, the true nature and power of ethnic feelings are not probed. Indeed, in many cases analysts fail to realize they are dealing with ethnic nationalism. Northern Ireland offers a contemporary case in point.

Strife in the northern six counties of Ireland has been treated almost exclusively as a religious conflict, a quaint echo of the intranational religious wars of a bygone age that saw Frenchmen pitted against Frenchmen, German against German, and so forth. To the degree that Northern Ireland's problem has not been viewed as religious, it has been treated as a civil rights struggle for political and economic reform. In fact, it is neither in its essence; rather, it is a struggle predicated upon fundamental differences in national identity. Contrary to the typical account, the people of Northern Ireland do not uniformly consider themselves Irish.⁴⁰ Indeed, a survey, conducted in 1968 by representatives of the University of Strathclyde, indicates that a majority do not. Although 43 per cent of the respondents thought of themselves as being Irish, 29 per cent considered themselves to be British, 21 per cent Ulster, and the remaining 7 per cent considered themselves to be of mixed, other, or uncertain nationality.⁴¹

³⁹ The pioneering efforts of the late Hadley Cantril in the study of the stereotype images that one group holds of another are of great pertinence and value to the study of ethnic nationalism. The value of the work of Cantril and of those scholars most influenced by him is lessened only slightly because the objects described are the populations of countries rather than ethnic groups. When asked to select those adjectives that best describe the people of another country, it is probable that the respondent envisages the politically dominant ethnic group of that state (e.g., British is perceived as English, South African as Afrikaner, Czechoslovakian as Czech, etc.). A more important limitation lies in the fact that the responses are not tabulated according to the ethnicity of the respondents. There is still another factor: the adjectives which are usually employed in such studies cannot adequately convey the depth of irrational hatred which may be involved. Negative attributes, such as *backward*, *domineering*, *conceited*, and even *cruel*, are of a different order than are the unarticulated passions that can cause Cambodians to massacre huge numbers of unarmed Vietnamese civilians; Balinese, Javanese, and Malays to massacre Chinese; the Bahutu to massacre the Watusi; the Hausa, the Ibo; or the Turks, the Armenians.

⁴⁰ For an example of a typical account, see Linda Charlton's article in the *New York Times*, August 15, 1969, in which she describes the crisis as "Irishman against Irishman" and "Prods" (Protestants) against Catholics.

⁴¹ Richard Rose, *The United Kingdom as a Multinational State* (Glasgow 1970), 10.

Unfortunately, the survey failed to correlate national identity with the religion of the respondents, but it is safe to assume, on the basis of the ethnic and religious histories of the island, that there exists a close correlation between self-identification as Irish and adherents to Catholicism.⁴² The important distinction, however, lies between those who consider themselves Irish, and those who either do not so consider themselves or are not so considered by the bulk of the Irish element. That the religious issue is largely extraneous helps to account for the fact that the consistent urging of tolerance by all but a handful of religious leaders has gone unheeded.⁴³ Indeed, with at least as much accuracy, the conflict could be described as one of surnames rather than religions. Despite some intermarriage, the family name remains a relatively reliable index to Irish heritage, as compared to English or Scottish.⁴⁴ It is for this reason that a surname is apt to trigger either a negative or positive response. One tragic manifestation of this phenomenon has been the tendency of militant Irishmen (described as Catholics) to be particularly aggressive toward Scottish units of the British forces sent from the island of Great Britain, because of the preponderance of Scottish names among Northern Ireland's non-Irish population.⁴⁵ In popular Irish perception, their local enemies and the Scottish troops are linked in their common foreignness and Scottishness.

To the knowledge of this writer, there has been only one account of the strife in Northern Ireland that has placed it in its proper context:

In Ulster, especially, much of the tension dates to the 17th century. After yet another round of fighting the Irish Catholics, the British encouraged Englishmen and Scotsmen to settle in Northern Ireland

⁴² The religious composition is 35 per cent Catholic, 29 per cent Presbyterian (Church of Scotland), 24 per cent Episcopal (Church of England), 10 per cent other Protestant, and 2 per cent other. *Ibid.*, 13.

⁴³ See the *New York Times*, January 24, 1971, for an account of a protest demonstration by Belfast women before a Catholic Bishop's house because he had given a sermon advising Catholics not to have anything to do with the outlawed Irish Republican Army.

Evidence that the basic driving force of Irish militancy has been not simply the desire for civil reform is offered by the fact that reforms promoted by the moderate government of Chichester-Clark were followed by greater militancy on the part of the Irish element.

⁴⁴ A notable exception is Terrence O'Neill, the former, moderate Prime Minister. An awareness within Northern Ireland's political community that strong emotions are often associated with surnames caused his colleagues to presume that his name would prove a real asset in gaining the respect and trust of the Irish minority.

⁴⁵ See the *New York Times*, April 30, 1970. See also the *New York Times* of two days earlier, where it was reported that order was restored in Belfast only after Scottish troops were replaced by English troops.

As is evident from the above-mentioned survey on national identification, the term Scotch-Irish is a misleading ethnic description. It simply refers to people whose Scottish ancestors emigrated to Ireland, but it need not indicate any Irish ancestry.

and tame the natives. The native Catholics have hated these invading Protestants ever since—not only as Protestants but also as outsiders with different customs and greater privileges. Then as now, the friction was as much social as religious.⁴⁶

If one substitutes *ethnic* or *nationalistic* for *social* in the last sentence, one will perceive that the conflict in Northern Ireland is not very distinct in its primary cause from the struggle between Flem and Walloon in Belgium, between *les Anglais* and *les Canadiens* in Canada, Lao and Thai in Thailand, Ibo and Hausa in Nigeria, or “Asian” and “African” in Guyana. But how different is the image of the nature, depth, and intractability of Northern Ireland’s problem raised by this analysis from the image raised by C.L. Sulzberger’s statement that “they are all Irish and therefore love a fight: formidable men and easily stirred to passion. . . . All Irish, whether they favor Green or Orange, enjoy a fight.”⁴⁷

In summary, ethnic strife is too often superficially discerned as principally predicated upon language, religion, customs, economic inequity, or some other tangible element. But what is fundamentally involved in such a conflict is that divergence of basic identity which manifests itself in the “us-them” syndrome. And the ultimate answer to the question of whether a person is one of us, or one of them, seldom hinges on adherence to overt aspects of culture. This issue has been at the core of the Israeli Government’s long and still unsuccessful attempt to define a Jew. For political and legal purposes, the government may demand adherence to one of the denominations of the Judaic faith as a test of Jewishness. But, as the government is well aware, there are many self-proclaimed agnostics, atheists, and converts to other faiths who are, in the most thorough and psychologically profound sense of the word, Jewish. And there are practicing members of the Judaic faith who are not ethnically Jewish. The Judaic faith has, of course, been an important element of Jewish nationalism, as, to a lesser degree, Catholicism and Irish nationalism are related. But an individual (or an entire national group) can shed all of the overt cultural manifestations customarily attributed to his ethnic group and yet maintain his fundamental identity

⁴⁶ *Wall Street Journal*, August 16, 1969. A somewhat similar analysis appeared in the letter to the editor column of the *New York Times* on July 12, 1970, signed John C. Marley. “But the religious persuasions of the opposing elements are only incidental to the underlying political question, which is whether the six counties of Northern Ireland shall be ruled by a foreign power. The overwhelming majority of the Irish people, North and South, are united in their desire that the British get out of Ireland. The only exception to this view comes from a British ethnic group which constitutes a local majority, not in the entire six occupied counties, but in a small enclave within a thirty mile radius of Belfast.”

⁴⁷ *New York Times*, July 10, 1970.

as a member of that nation. Cultural assimilation need not mean psychological assimilation.

(3) AN UNWARRANTED EXAGGERATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF MATERIALISM UPON HUMAN AFFAIRS:

A number of authorities have noted a propensity on the part of American statesmen and scholars of the post-World War II era to assume that economic considerations represent the determining force in human affairs. Programs of foreign assistance, for example, have been promoted and defended on the ground that the economic status of a state correlates directly with its form of government, political stability, and aggressiveness.⁴⁸ Policy-makers in the United States have also attempted to defuse a number of highly charged interstate (and interethnic) conflicts by making cooperation between the adversaries a condition of material recompense (for example, the Jordan, Indus, and Mekong River projects). The Marshall Plan, Point Four, the Eisenhower Doctrine, and the Alliance for Progress could all be interpreted as attempts to alter attitudes by appealing to material self-interest.

This presumption—that economic considerations constitute the primary force which shapes the basic ideas and attitudes of man—has had an evident impact upon much of the literature concerned with political integration. An ethnic minority, it is implicitly or explicitly held, will not secede from a state if its living standards are improving, both in real terms and relative to other segments of the state's population.⁴⁹ Such a prognosis again underestimates the power of ethnic feelings and ignores contrary evidence: With regard to the matter of economic inequity among groups, for example, there are a number of cases in which the ethnic consciousness of a minority and its animosity toward the dominant element became accentuated although the income gap between the group and the dominant element was being rapidly closed. The Flemish of Belgium and the Slovaks of Czechoslovakia are cases in point.⁵⁰ Indeed, there are even cases in which separatist movements exist despite the fact that the group from which they emanate is more advanced economically than is the politically dominant element. The Croatians and Slovenes of Yugoslavia and the Basques and Catalans of Spain exemplify this situation. As to the matter of real rather than

⁴⁸ For descriptions of this tendency, see Hans Morgenthau, "The American Tradition in Foreign Policy," in Roy C. Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (3d ed., Englewood Cliffs 1967), 254, and Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles in the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York 1968), 120-21.

⁴⁹ As noted earlier, Karl Deutsch explicitly held this opinion in 1961.

⁵⁰ Afro-Americans within the United States may offer a comparable case.

comparative economic status, we have noted earlier that multiethnic states at all economic levels have been troubled by growing ethnic discord. Economic considerations may be an irritant that reinforces ethnic consciousness. And, as noted, those most involved in the conflict may present the issue in economic terms. But economic factors are likely to come in a poor second when competing with the emotionalism of ethnic nationalism. Numerous colonial ties were severed irrespective of whether or not they were economically beneficial to the colonial people. Separatists (whether Anguillan, Eritrean, Naga, or Welsh) are not apt to be dissuaded by the assertion that the nation is too small to comprise an economically viable unit. There is a simple, yet profound message of the broadest applicability in the slogan, "Better a government run like hell by Filipinos than one run like heaven by Americans."

(4) UNQUESTIONED ACCEPTANCE OF THE ASSUMPTION THAT GREATER CONTACTS AMONG GROUPS LEAD TO GREATER AWARENESS OF WHAT GROUPS HAVE IN COMMON, RATHER THAN OF WHAT MAKES THEM DISTINCT:

A number of authorities have also noted that American foreign policy is heavily influenced by an optimistic view of human affairs in which man is seen as essentially rational and possessed of good will, and therefore preordained to find reasonable answers to problems.⁵¹ As applied to ethnicity, this optimism is manifest in the conviction that misunderstandings among nations are due to lack of knowledge concerning each other. Greater contacts, it would follow, should lead to greater understanding and harmony. One manifestation of this belief is the person-to-person diplomacy that forms the rationale of the Peace Corps and official sanctioning of massive cultural and educational exchange programs. It is also evident in the lack of official concern that the presence of large numbers of Americans in a foreign state is apt to trigger a xenophobic response.⁵² This view also probably helps to account for the slighting of ethnicity in works dealing with political in-

⁵¹ Particularly significant for the present discussion is the comment of Gabriel Almond: "This overt optimism is so compulsive an element in the American culture that factors which threaten it, such as failure . . . are pressed from the focus of attention and handled in perfunctory ways." *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York 1961), 50-51. See also Frederick Hartman, *The New Age of American Foreign Policy* (New York 1970), 58.

⁵² Contrast, for example, the American practice of encouraging huge numbers of American troops to furlough in Bangkok, to the Soviet practice of minimizing the Russian presence in such states as the United Arab Republic. For a discussion of the impact of a foreign presence upon a guerrilla struggle, and the sharp contrast in awareness of this impact between the United States on the one hand, and China, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam on the other, see Connor (fn. 25), 51-86.

tegration. If greater contacts, brought about by more intensive communication and transportation networks, promote harmony, ethnic heterogeneity is not a matter worthy of serious consideration.

We have noted, however, that the contacts occasioned by modernization have in fact had the opposite tendency. The optimistic position fails to consider that, while the idea of being friends presupposes knowledge of each other, so does the idea of being rivals. Indeed, the self-awareness which is the *sine qua non* of the nation requires knowledge of non-members. The conception of being unique or different requires a referent, that is, the idea of "us" requires "them." Minimally, it may be asserted that increasing awareness of a second group is not certain to promote harmony, and is at least as likely to produce, on balance, a negative response. With an empirical eye to the evidence of growing ethnic consciousness and discord, we can add that the latter is much more likely.

(5) IMPROPER ANALOGIZING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES:

Many works on political integration contain direct reference to the successful assimilationist history of the United States as evidence that the basic identity of people can be rather easily transferred from the ethnic group to a larger grouping coterminous with the state.⁵³ It is probable, moreover, that the "melting pot" idea has had an unarticulated influence upon much larger numbers. If broad-scale assimilation could occur within the United States, practically without design, why not elsewhere? If an extremely diverse ethnic hodgepodge became quite naturally a single American nation, one may well expect the same process to occur quite naturally elsewhere. The analogy is a dangerous one, however.

A denial of the pertinence of the American experience does *not* rest upon the recent surge of interest in ethnic matters within the United States. There has been a recent spate of monographs and articles clearly documenting that the melting process has not yet caught up with the myth, and that pre-American national heritage remains an important index to neighborhood, voting patterns, associations, and so forth.⁵⁴ Moreover, large numbers of people within the United States who formerly played down their pre-American heritage have recently been demonstrating a new pride in it. But these facts are not necessarily germane to the study of ethnic nationalism. Nor do they materially

⁵³ See, for example, Karl Deutsch's comment, cited above on p. 322.

⁵⁴ Particularly recommended for their incisiveness are the works of Norman Glazier, Milton Gordon, and Daniel Moynahan.

alter the fact that an impressively high level of assimilation has been achieved within the United States. Total melting has not yet occurred and may never occur, but it has made great strides and is progressing on a significant scale. In addition, even if the upsurge in ethnic pride should prove to be more than a vogue, it does not follow that the upsurge is a manifestation of ethnic nationalism. It was noted earlier that the concept of a single nation does not preclude internal divisions. Lesser "us-them" relationships can exist within a single nation, so long as in any test of allegiance the larger "us" of the nation proves more powerful than the divisive call of a particular region, religion, pre-American ethnic heritage, or whatever. There is nothing necessarily incompatible between stressing one's Italian or Polish cultural heritage and the American nation.

Black nationalism, by contrast, may directly challenge the larger "us" of the American nation. Although many diverse attitudes and goals are cloaked under the single rubric of black nationalism, an essential element is its insistence that what has hitherto been known as the American nation has in fact been a white nation. In refusing to identify with the American nation, and in postulating a rival black nation, black nationalism constitutes a nationalism in the most correct sense of the word.⁵⁵ This is so whether the nationalist advocates "two nations, one state" or actual political separation. Black nationalism is therefore a legitimate object of inquiry in the study of ethnicity as a global phenomenon. But, as noted, assimilation among white Americans is not an appropriate model for situations elsewhere.

The key factor that differentiates the process of assimilation in the United States is that the impetus for assimilation has come principally from the unassimilated, not from the dominant group. The typical non-African immigrant *voluntarily* left his cultural hearth and traveled a substantial distance, in both a physical and a psychological sense, to enter a different ethnopolitical environment which recognized no notable political or psychological relationship with his former homeland. Moreover, in any one generation, he and other immigrants of

⁵⁵ It is not implied that most Afro-Americans are black nationalists. The percentage is not known. An incisive study would have to learn also what percentage of black nationalists are separatists. It is highly probable that a substantial percentage of those who would be apt to identify themselves as black nationalists have not speculated concerning the precise goal they have in mind beyond a concept of true equality. Attitudes concerning the desirability of various forms of assimilation (schools, business, sports, marriage, etc.) would probably represent the best index as to whether or not one envisaged a separate nation. But it does not follow that attitudinal surveys can validly determine such attitudes. For a thoughtful critique of such surveys by an experienced practitioner, see Arnold Rose, *Migrants in Europe* (Minneapolis 1969), 100 ad passim.

his particular ethnicity were few in number relative to the dominant, Anglo-Saxonized, American population. Although he may well have lived (and his descendants may still live) in an ethnic ghetto where his native language and customs lingered on, the ghetto was neither sufficiently large nor economically adequate to permit the fulfillment of his most ambitious aspirations, whether of an economic-, prestige-, or power-oriented nature. He was constantly aware of being part of a larger cultural entity that pervaded and shaped the ghetto in countless ways,⁵⁶ and he realized that cultural assimilation was necessary if the more obvious limits to his ambitions were to be pushed back. As a result of all this, ethnic problems within the United States have not been characterized primarily by the resistance of minorities to assimilation, but by the unwillingness or inability of the dominant group to permit assimilation at the rate desired by the unassimilated.

Elsewhere, the typical ethnic problem is reversed, with the pressure for assimilation popularly being viewed by the minority as originating with the dominant group. Consider the case of a French-Canadian living within the large, predominantly French Province of Quebec. He lives in an ethnic homeland, which has been continuously inhabited by Frenchmen since before the coming of *les Anglais* and which is laden with emotional overtones. English-speaking people and their culture are therefore seen as invaders, aliens in a French-Canadian land. Moreover, the French-Canadian community is sufficiently large to accommodate visionary success totally within the ethnic confines.⁵⁷ As a result, there is little to entice the individual to surrender his own culture, and much—in terms of the reinforcing quality of the forces and symbols of his environment—to cause him to resent and resist the intrusion of the outside culture. In contrast to the United States where assimilation has, on balance, been viewed by the minority as a voluntary act, anything that necessitates a degree of assimilation takes on an aura of either physical or psychological coercion.⁵⁸ The universality of this response has led to the rapid spread of the expression “cultural imperialism.” And the response is self-generating, as it exacerbates ethnic sensibilities and causes what was considered innocent yesterday

⁵⁶ Government institutions and services (particularly schools), trans-ghetto communications media, advertising, and elections are but a few of the outside forces affecting the ghetto.

⁵⁷ This aspect of size helps to account for the fact that professional people are often disproportionately represented among those desiring total separation. Belgium, Canada, and Ceylon all offer cases in point. Since goals in a less sophisticated society are apt to be of lesser magnitude, a smaller community may suffice in less modern situations.

⁵⁸ The need to be fluent in the dominant tongue in order to obtain a decent position in the central bureaucracy is a common example.

to be perceived as offensive today. Interethnic tensions are thereby magnified and the pale hopes of assimilation made still more dim.

In sum, then, analogies drawn from the experience of the United States are apt to be specious. A proportionately small number of people who have voluntarily left their cultural milieu to enter an alien politico-cultural environment in which cultural assimilation is perceived positively as indispensable to success is one thing; a situation characterized by two or more large groups, each ensconced in a territory it considers its traditional homeland and cultural preserve is something quite different. The second situation characterizes the overwhelming number of ethnic struggles.

(6) IMPROPER ANALOGIZING FROM THE FACT THAT INCREASES IN COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION HELP TO DISSOLVE CULTURAL DISTINCTIONS AMONG REGIONS WITHIN WHAT IS FUNDAMENTALLY A ONE-CULTURE STATE, TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SAME PROCESS WILL OCCUR IN SITUATIONS INVOLVING TWO OR MORE DISTINCT CULTURES:

It is evident that increased contacts between regions of the United States have tended to weaken sectionalism. Country-wide media of communication (particularly television and motion pictures), the interregional movement of people, the geographic suffusion of industry and its products, and the increasing standardization of education have all tended to homogenize the United States. Among the more evident factors that attest to this trend are the fading of formerly clear election patterns along sectional lines (for instance, "the Solid South," or Republican northern New England) and the progressive elimination of sharp distinctions among local customs in matters such as dialect, humor, dress, and music. But if one is dealing not with variations of a single culture-group, but with distinct and self-differentiating culture groups, then increased contacts, as we have noted, tend to produce disharmony rather than harmony. Discord between the Basques and Castilians, the Czechs and Slovaks, the Russians and Ukrainians, the Walloons and Flemish, the Welsh and English, the French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians, and the Serbs and Croats has increased with increased contacts. The same development has been noted in the case of Thailand and of Ethiopia. Increased contacts tend to have one impact in a one-culture situation, and quite a different impact in a variegated culture area.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ This inverse relationship causes the use of the term *regionalism* to be a particularly dangerous and inappropriate substitute for *ethnic nationalism*.

(7) THE ASSUMPTION THAT ASSIMILATION IS A ONE-DIRECTIONAL PROCESS:

If assimilation is assumed to be irreversible, then any evidence of a move toward assimilation becomes an irrevocable gain and a basis for optimism. Thus, because the Scottish and Welsh people had undergone generations of acculturation, including almost total linguistic assimilation, and because the concept of a British national identity did indeed possess an important measure of meaning to the preponderant numbers of Scots and Welshmen, authorities were for years almost unanimous in their conviction that homogeneity of identity had once and for all been achieved.⁶⁰ The sudden upsurge in Scottish and Welsh nationalism during the 1960's illustrates, however, that assimilation may indeed be reversed so long as some glimmer of a separate ethnic identity persists.

(8) INTERPRETATION OF THE ABSENCE OF ETHNIC STRIFE AS EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF A SINGLE NATION:

The existence of a single national consciousness that is shared by all segments of the population of a state *cannot* be deduced simply from the absence of overt ethnic conflict. Such a conclusion is always dangerous, for, just as the fervor with which ethnic nationalism is embraced and the form in which it is manifested can vary substantially among individuals, so too, can it fluctuate widely within a particular nation over time. Few would contend that German nationalism is dead, although it is obviously more subdued, and following different channels, than was the case in the 1930's. Periods in which nationalism takes on more passive forms may be followed by periods of militant nationalism and vice versa. In addition, the bilateral relations between ethnic groups, just as those between states, vary greatly. They may range along a continuum from a genocidal relationship to a symbiotic one. The fact that Canada and the United States have dwelt for generations alongside one another without warfare has not meant that they

⁶⁰ Richard Rose is among those authorities. In 1964 he observed that "today politics in the United Kingdom is greatly simplified by the absence of major cleavages along the lines of ethnic groups, language, or religion. . . . The solidarity of the United Kingdom today may be due to fortuitous historical circumstances; it is nonetheless real and important." *Politics in England* (Boston 1964), 10 and 11. But by 1970, the situation had changed so drastically that Professor Rose entitled a work *The United Kingdom as a Multi-National State* (fn. 41). On page 1, Rose lists L. S. Amery, Samuel Beers, Harry Eckstein, Jean Blondel, and S. E. Finer as recent writers who have failed to detect the potential significance of ethnic divisions within the United Kingdom. These men were hardly unique in their failure to anticipate the great change in attitude about to manifest itself in Scotland and Wales. See, for example, Connor (fn. 20), 39n., in which this author acknowledged but underestimated the imminent power of the Scottish nationalist idea. See, also, J. D. Mackie, *A History of Scotland* (Baltimore 1964), 367-70, in which a scholar also fails to appreciate the submerged but emerging power of Scottishness among his own people.

form a single state. So, too, the absence of hostilities between neighboring ethnic groups does not confirm a single transgroup identity. We have already noted that separate ethnic groups may coexist, at least for a time, within the same political structure. Influential factors include the degree of cultural self-awareness, the minority's perception of the nature and magnitude of the threat to the preservation of the group as a unique entity, and the reputation of the government for the relative ruthlessness with which it is apt to respond to "treasonable" acts. But coexistence—even when peaceful—should not be construed as proof of a single nation.

The error of misconstruing the absence of strife between ethnic groups as indicative of national unity has not been restricted to peaceful situations. Another common pitfall has been to impute a single national consciousness to militant movements whose ranks include members of different ethnic groups. Ethnic consciousness is not an automatic bar to cooperative, nor even to coordinated or integrated, activities against a mutually perceived enemy or in pursuit of a mutually desired goal. A number of ethnic groups can, and often do, march under the same banner and shout the same slogans. All too often, however, such a composite movement has been misidentified as a manifestation of a single, all-embracing nationalism. In the waning days of colonialism, for example, diverse segments of the population of British India were agreed upon the desirability of ridding the subcontinent of alien rule, and this movement for the eradication of British control was generally described as Indian nationalism (further subdivided into Indian and Moslem nationalism after 1930). It would have been more accurate to characterize the movement as a wartime alliance, similar in many respects to those entered into by states. Just as alliances among states tend to weaken as the threat recedes or the goal nears attainment, so too the period dating from the British announcement of intention to withdraw has been one of rather steady deterioration of the inter-ethnic bonds within the successor states. Comparable multiethnic, anti-colonial movements exist today in a few remaining colonies, such as Angola and Mozambique. They also prevail in a number of post-colonial situations, as in Burma, northern Borneo, western New Guinea, and throughout the cordillera of Indochina. Any such multiethnic alliance is comprised of a number of national movements, but it is not itself coincidental with a single nation. The absence of ethnic discord between specified ethnic groups—whether manifested by passivity or by positive, cooperative action—cannot be assumed to be evidence of one national consciousness.

The tendency to see ethnic unity in the absence of overt ethnic discord has had an important impact upon theories of "nation-building." It helps to explain the very common habit of describing Western Europe as though it were composed of fully integrated states, which, as we have noted, most certainly is not the case. Western Europe is therefore held up as a model of something it is not, as proof that something can be achieved elsewhere that is in fact far from achieved there.⁶¹ A second outgrowth of this tendency is to view outbreaks of ethnic nationalism on an *ad hoc* basis rather than as only one contemporary manifestation of a more enduring global phenomenon. An outbreak of ethnic hostilities in Malaysia, in Jamaica, in Burundi, in Spain, or in Canada is viewed as an isolated phenomenon, soon forgotten by most outside observers after a more peaceful relationship has been reinstituted. The ubiquity and significance of ethnic nationalism are therefore not fully appreciated.

(9) IMPROPER REGARD FOR THE FACTOR OF CHRONOLOGICAL TIME AND INTERVENING EVENTS WHEN ANALOGIZING FROM ASSIMILATIONIST EXPERIENCES PRIOR TO "THE AGE OF NATIONALISM":

In emphasizing the manner in which the nations of Western Europe and Eastern Asia were created from rather disparate ethnic materials, authorities have failed to consider that the fact that the models predate the nineteenth century may obviate their pertinence to the current scene. No examples of significant assimilation are offered which have taken place since the advent of the age of nationalism and the propagation of the principle of self-determination of nations.

By and large, those peoples who, prior to the nineteenth century, were seduced by the blandishments of another culture—those who became "them"—were not aware of belonging to a separate culture-group with its own proud traditions and myths. There was no keen competi-

⁶¹ For a number of illustrations of this tendency to confuse the absence of ethnic warfare with the presence of nation-states throughout Western Europe, see Connor (fn. 20). Those who have been confused include such notables as John Stuart Mill, Lord Acton, Ernest Barker, and Alfred Cobban; their errors extended *inter alia* to the United Kingdom, Belgium, Switzerland, and Spain. Similarly, the perspicacious Frederick Engels once wrote: "The Highland Gaels (Scottish) and the Welsh are undoubtedly of different nationalities to what the British are, although *nobody* will give to these remnants of peoples *long gone* by the title of nations, any more than to the Celtic inhabitants of Brittany in France. . . ." Cited in Roman Rosdolsky, "Worker and Fatherland: A Note on a Passage in the Communist Manifesto," *Science and Society*, xxix (Summer 1965), 333; emphasis added. In his most recent work, *Nationalism and Its Alternatives* (fn. 14), Karl Deutsch also employs Western Europe as a regional model of successfully integrated states. And in both editions of *Nationalism and Social Communication* (fn. 4), Deutsch describes the Bretons, Flemish, Franco-Canadians, Franco- and German-Swiss, Scots, and Welsh as totally assimilated.

tion for group allegiance. By contrast, peoples today are everywhere much more apt to be cognizant of their membership in a group with its own mythical genesis, its own customs and beliefs, and perhaps its own language, which *in toto* differentiate the group from all others and permit the typical individual to answer intuitively and unequivocally the question, "What are you?" The spontaneous response, "I am Luo" rather than Kenyan, or "Bengali" rather than Pakistani, does not bode well for the architect of a nation-state.

As we have noted, there are numerous reasons for this increase in ethnic consciousness since the early nineteenth century, among them the great increase in the frequency, scope, and type of interethnic and intraethnic group contacts. At least in terms of "assimilationist time" (the time required to produce full assimilation), the radio, telephone, train, motor vehicle, and aircraft are recent innovations, postdating the advent of the age of nationalism and its standard of ethnicity as the basis of political legitimacy. As noted, there is little evidence of modern communications destroying ethnic consciousness, and much evidence of their augmenting it. The movement prior to the nineteenth century appears to have been toward assimilation into a number of larger nations, but since that time the movement appears to be toward the freezing of existing ethnic groups. Examples from the other side of the watershed must therefore be approached most cautiously.

(10) IMPROPER REGARD FOR DURATIVE TIME BY FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT ATTEMPTS TO TELESCOPE "ASSIMILATIONIST TIME," BY INCREASING THE FREQUENCY AND SCOPE OF CONTACTS, MAY PRODUCE A NEGATIVE RESPONSE:

If the matter of chronological time could be overcome, there would remain the matter of durative time. As indicated by the resurgence of Scottish nationalism, the total assimilation of a large people predominating in a particular territory requires a period of long duration extending over several generations. To be successful, the process of assimilation must be a very gradual one, one that progresses almost without visibility and awareness.⁶² Since the essence of national identity is psychological and involves self-acceptance, a greater intensity of contacts, whether by accident or design, will conceivably not only fail to speed up the process, but will prove to be counterproductive. By their very numbers, the Han Chinese furnish proof of being history's most successful assimilators; but the many people of riverine and coastal China were sinified only over many centuries. Programmed attempts

⁶² This statement presupposes that the government is not prepared to take such extreme measures as coercive population transfers and forced intermarriages.

since 1949 to speed up the process of sinifying the remaining minorities has led to increased ethnic consciousness and anti-Han resentment on the part of the minorities. So, too, the Soviet Union, despite more than a half-century of programmed assimilation, finds its "national question" not only unresolved but growing in intractability. Similarly, Franco's stepped-up attempt to eradicate Basque, Catalan, and Galician self-consciousness seems only to have magnified them. Rather than telescoping the process, more intensive contacts appear to generate a psychological rebuff. Variations in the tempo of contacts may determine whether a people moves slowly toward assimilation or rapidly toward ethnocentrism.

This relationship of assimilation to durative time casts serious doubt on whether the process of assimilation is subjectable to social engineering. Planning is more geared to action than to inaction, and more to a time span of one generation or less than to a multigenerational period. More important, however, is the fact that modernization largely dictates its own timetable. There is an inbuilt accelerator in the technological advances and other forces that causes a continuous "shrinking of the world" and the shrinking of its states as presently defined. The frequency and pervasiveness of intergroup contacts appear, therefore, to be fated to increase exponentially, regardless of the desire of the planner.

(II) CONFUSING SYMPTOMS WITH CAUSES:

Most of the theoretic writings on political integration, as noted earlier, have been characterized by an unwarranted degree of optimism. But as the newly formed states proved less cohesive than had been anticipated, explanations for their political disintegration have become increasingly common. Many of these explanations, however, confuse some of the symptoms and minor contributing elements of political decay with its primary cause.

For example, a paper dealing with political decay in sub-Sahara Africa⁶³ lists among its causes, in addition to colonialism and neocolonialism, (a) exaggerated notions of the actual power of the centralized government, (b) the weakening of "mass parties," (c) the lessening of political mobilization, (d) the reduction of the links between the state government and segments of the population, (e) inability of the state to satisfy the perceived needs of its human components, (f) the loss of

⁶³ Christian P. Potholm, "Political Decay in Post-Independence Africa: Some Thoughts on its Causes and Cures." Paper presented at the 1970 Annual Meeting of the New York State Political Science Association.

charismatic aura earlier enjoyed by the key figure, and (g) a "praetorian impulse." The question of primary loyalty and, more particularly, of ethnic identity, is not listed. And, clearly, those factors which are listed do not constitute causes, but either symptoms [(a), (b), (d), (e), (f)] or minor elements applicable to only a few specific situations [(c) and (g)]. A giant step toward identifying the primary cause would be made by asking *why* the power of the central government proved to be exaggerated, *why* the "mass" parties proved unstable, *why* the government was not able to forge solid links with all segments of the population, and *why* the father-figures could not retain their popularity.

The prime cause of political disunity is the absence of a single psychological focus shared by all segments of the population. Admittedly, ethnic homogeneity is not in itself sufficient to guarantee such a consensus. The intraethnic Vietnamese struggle illustrates this point. But in the case of the multiethnic state, we have noted that, for most of the inhabitants, primary identity will not extend beyond the ethnic group. And all but a handful of the new states are multiethnic.

To illustrate the importance of ethnic consciousness as a barrier to the political integration of the multiethnic state, let us return to the example at hand. Surely ethnic nationalism is the single most momentous political fact of sub-Sahara Africa, and the fundamental identity that it posits goes far toward answering the questions we have posed. Earlier estimates of the strength of the central governments proved exaggerated because the loyalty of the people seldom extended beyond their own ethnic group. Indeed, considering sub-Sahara's short, post-colonial history, a remarkably large number of states (more than one-third) have already experienced ethnic fragmentation in its most flagrant form of civil war along ethnic lines.⁶⁴ Similarly, in most states the mass party has been primarily a means of masking ethnic rivalry; identification of the individual with the party has been missing.⁶⁵ As to the father-

⁶⁴ Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania (Zanzibar), Uganda and Zambia. Congo (Brazzaville) also experienced open ethnic warfare on the eve of independence and Nkrumah suppressed Ashanti and Ewe separatist movements within Ghana early in his reign. Coups that took place in Dahomey and Sierra Leone were also justified as a means of avoiding ethnic warfare. Within Liberia, Tubman's government found an official guilty of treasonably attempting to start a civil, ethnic war. Ethnicity also plays an important role within the anti-Portuguese struggle in Angola and Mozambique, and ethnic violence has occurred in the French Territory of Afars and Issas.

⁶⁵ Edward Feit has orally referred to African political parties as "the continuation of tribal warfare by other means." See also his comment to this effect in "Military Coups and Political Development: Some Lessons from Ghana and Nigeria," *World Politics*, xx (January 1968), 184.

figures, they have tended to retain their position in the eyes of those who see them as ethnic leaders. Kenyatta still possesses charisma for the Kikuyu; his problem is with the Luo and other non-Kikuyu who see him as one of "them."⁶⁶

It bears repeating that ethnic homogeneity is not by itself sufficient to guarantee a bond of unity so infrangible that it can withstand any and all fissiparous forces. The impact of institutions, economic opportunities, geography, literacy, urbanization, and a host of other factors may therefore be very germane to the study of the components of an efficacious identity. But the experience of multiethnic states, past and present, strongly suggests that the ethnic nation may well constitute the outer limits of that identity. If there are means of transferring primary identification and allegiance from the nation to the state, or if there are ways of satisfying national aspirations within a multiethnic state, these possibilities should certainly be explored. But the potent fissiparous force of ethnic particularism should not be obscured by ascribing its role of prime mover to its symptoms.

(12) THE PREDISPOSITIONS OF THE ANALYST:

The last in this list of possible contributing factors to the broadscale underassessment of the ramifications of ethnic nationalism is the most difficult to document: it involves the influence that the ideals of the analyst exert upon his perception. Given the multitude of overt manifestations of ethnic nationalism throughout Africa and Asia (as well as elsewhere), it is difficult to reconcile its total absence or cursory treatment in so many studies on development. Even *in toto*, the preceding eleven considerations do not satisfactorily account for this failure to recognize the significance of the ethnic factor. Eventually it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the predispositions of the analyst are

⁶⁶ Although not involving an African state, the overthrow of Norodom Sihanouk offers an instructive case concerning a very popular figure who for many years purposefully played the role of—and was popularly viewed by the Khmer people of Cambodia as—the foremost national (read "ethnic") leader. Following the palace coup, it was essential for the coup's leadership that Khmer loyalty to Sihanouk be transferred rapidly to the new government. To this end, the new government publicized a number of charges against the character and record of Sihanouk, most of which were false or exaggerated. The most effective charge, however, was, in effect, that Sihanouk had been "soft on Vietnamese," permitting the Viet Cong and other Vietnamese to violate the Khmer homeland with impunity. This charge, together with the unleashing of a general hate campaign against all ethnic Vietnamese, posed a dilemma for Sihanouk: How to maintain the mantle of Khmer nationalism while simultaneously acknowledging an alliance with Hanoi and the Viet Cong—an alliance he needed if he were to counter the forces at the disposal of the new Cambodian government. The anti-Sihanouk strategy was, therefore, to turn Khmer ethnic nationalism against its former foremost figure by depicting him as a traitor who was aiding the cause of an ethnic enemy of long standing.

also involved; that the “nation-builder” passionately wishes the people of his academic purview well; that he is convinced that their ultimate well-being is tied to the vehicle of the state as presently constituted; and that his compassion has colored his perception so that he perceives those trends that he deems desirable as actually occurring, regardless of the factual situation. If the fact of ethnic nationalism is not compatible with his vision, it can thus be willed away. A related factor is the fear that ethnic nationalism will feed on publicity. In either case, the treatment calls for total disregard or cavalier dismissal of the undesired facts. Such an approach can be justified for the policy-maker, but not for the scholar.