



Trustees of Princeton University

Self-Determination: The New Phase

Author(s): Walker Connor

Source: *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Oct., 1967), pp. 30-53

Published by: [Cambridge University Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009726>

Accessed: 08/11/2013 18:06

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Cambridge University Press and Trustees of Princeton University are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *World Politics*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

SELF-DETERMINATION

The New Phase

By WALKER CONNOR

CAN two or more self-differentiating culture-groups coexist within a single political structure? The question may well seem clearly settled by the overwhelming factual evidence of contemporary international politics, for it is indeed a truism that political and ethnic borders seldom coincide. Thus, the very existence of a host of multinational states, including such a time-tested example as the Soviet Union, would appear to document an affirmative answer. On the other hand, a recent spate of political unrest within such geographically diverse and historically unrelated states as, *inter alia*, Canada, Guyana, India, Uganda, Belgium, the Sudan, Burma, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Rwanda, the United Kingdom, and Iraq, focuses attention on the common root cause of intrastate yet international conflict and again brings into question the assumptions of the multinational state.

These assumptions were never seriously challenged until the rise of *popular* national consciousness, and the issue is therefore of relatively recent origin. As Sir Ernest Barker noted: "The self-consciousness of nations is a product of the nineteenth century. This is a matter of the first importance. Nations were already there; they had indeed been there for centuries. But it is not the things which are simply 'there' that matter in human life. What really and finally matters is the thing which is apprehended as an idea, and, as an idea, is vested with emotion until it becomes a cause and a spring of action. In the world of action apprehended ideas are alone electrical; and a nation must be an idea as well as a fact before it can become a dynamic force."¹ Barker here provides us with the means of avoiding the labyrinthine question, What constitutes a nation? In the final analysis, the coincidence of the customary tangible attributes of nationality, such as common language or religion, is not determinative. The prime requisite is subjective and consists of the self-identification of people with a group—its past, its present, and, most important, its destiny.

What lent political force to the growth of national consciousness was the ancillary doctrine that political self-expression was a necessary concomitant of cultural consciousness, a doctrine that seriously chal-

¹ *National Character and the Factors in Its Formation* (London 1927), 173.

lenged, perhaps even totally denied, the legitimacy of the multistate structure. There is general agreement that the first indications of this concept of the right of nations to political self-expression can be detected in the fruits of the first Polish partition, and more evidently in the American and French revolutions. Denied by the Congress of Vienna and the Holy Alliance, national consciousness thrived on adversity, spreading throughout Europe and Latin America during the nineteenth century.² Although the peace settlements that followed World War I honored the concept more in the breach than in application, the numerous wartime and postwar public espousals of the doctrine by leading statesmen of the Allied Powers accorded to it a recognition of validity that would thenceforth prove difficult to ignore or deny. The doctrine, by this time expressed in the phrase "self-determination of nations," was clearly never intended by Wilson and other contemporary advocates to have universal application. Rather, it was intended by them to apply solely to areas formerly under the sovereignty of the defeated powers.³ However, the principle had been consistently stated in the broadest of terms,⁴ and it could therefore be cited with equal validity by any group desirous of repudiating foreign rule.⁵ The doctrine thereafter became both a catalyst and a defense for independence movements throughout the world and was instrumental in the post-World War II recession of European power from Africa and Asia.

There was, however, a unique feature to the African and Asian independence movements. Although they had been conducted in the name of self-determination of nations, they were, in fact, demands for political independence not in accord with ethnic distributions, but along the essentially happenstance borders that delimited either the sovereignty or the administrative zones of the former colonial powers. This fact combined with the incredibly complex ethnic map of Africa

² Lord Acton believed that 1831 was the "watershed" year. He considered revolutionary movements prior to that date to be based upon either rival empirical claims or the refusal of people to be misgoverned by strangers. He noted that prior to 1831, Turks, Dutch, or Russians were resisted not as "usurpers" but as oppressors, "because they misgoverned, not because they were of a different race" (John E. E. Dalberg-Acton, *The History of Freedom and Other Essays* [London 1907], 284).

³ See Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites Since the World War*, Vol. I (Washington 1933), 488.

⁴ See, for example, Wilson's speech before the League to Enforce Peace on May 27, 1916: "We believe these fundamental things: First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live . . ." (quoted in Wambaugh, 4).

⁵ Wilson was later to admit to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee his amazement and chagrin at the large number of requests for support of independence movements. Excerpts from his testimony are cited in Alfred Cobban, *National Self-Determination* (Chicago 1949), 21.

and Asia to create, in the name of self-determination of nations, a host of multinational states.⁶ Now in turn, these new political structures, along with some of the older European states, are the targets of growing demands that self-determination be carried a further step toward its natural conclusion. And the leaders of these new states, though recent espousers of national self-determination, are now perforce the defenders of multinationalism.

Multinationalism has had both its detractors and supporters among scholars. Although criticism of the logical bases of traditional political borders was inseparable from Locke's and Jefferson's insistence that government must rest upon the consent of the governed, it is in the writings of John Stuart Mill that the issue is first clearly posed in terms of nationality. His remarks, published in 1861 in *Considerations on Representative Government*, ignited a controversy among British scholars which was ultimately to include such notables as Lord Acton, Ernest Barker, and Alfred Cobban.

Mill maintained that "it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationality."⁷ This conclusion was predicated upon his fear of despotic government, for he believed that a multinational population would invite authoritarianism by lending itself to a divide-and-rule technique. He feared that the mutual antipathies and jealousies of the nationalities would prove greater than any distrust of governmental power. Mill was particularly concerned about the possible impact that multinationalism might have upon the army. Convinced that a major deterrent to despotism was the common bond of nationality between army personnel and the public at large, he foresaw the danger that a despot of a multinational state might employ troops of one ethnic strain against his subjects of another. According to Mill, in such event the soldiers "will have no more scruple mowing them down, and no more desire to ask the reason why, than they would have in doing the same thing against declared enemies."⁸

Mill's analysis spurred a strong rebuttal in an article published during the following year by Lord Acton.⁹ The contrast between the two men's

⁶ Although Europe is similarly afflicted, its present political borders are not the result of fulfilled "self-determination" demands.

⁷ *Considerations on Representative Government* (New York 1873), 313.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 311. Similar fears concerning the ethnic composition of the army played a major role in Nigerian events during 1966.

⁹ Entitled "Nationality," it was published in *Home and Foreign Review* in July 1862 and is reprinted in Acton, *History of Freedom*, 270-300.

antithetical conclusions is the more remarkable because of the identity of goals. Acton, as Mill, desired foremost to prevent absolutism, but he envisaged the homogeneous population advocated by Mill as the natural ally of authoritarianism. In an argument not dissimilar to that advanced by Madison in *Federalist Paper No. 10* (if economic and geographic diversity be replaced by distinctions of nationality), Acton contended: "The presence of different nations under the same sovereignty . . . provides against the servility which flourishes under the shadow of a single authority, by balancing interests, multiplying associations and giving to the subject the restraint and support of a combined opinion."¹⁰ He added: "That intolerance of social freedom which is natural to absolutism is sure to find a corrective in the national diversities, which no other force could so efficiently provide. The co-existence of several nations under the same State is a test as well as the best security of its freedom."¹¹

In addition to recognizing its antidespotic function, Acton also supported the multinational state as the necessary vehicle of civilization. It was only within the larger crucible of the heterogeneous state that separate nations would interact, amiably compete, and contribute to the progress of one another. Small, homogeneous states were therefore viewed as "impediments to the progress of society, which depends on the mixture of races under the same government."¹² The word "mixture" should not be taken too literally, however, for Acton was certainly not making a case for assimilation. What he desired was stringent cultural autonomy. Although a state within which no mixture of nationalities occurred was described as "imperfect," a state that attempted to neutralize or absorb divergent cultures thereby, Acton maintained, "destroys its own vitality" and is "decrepit."¹³

Acton's analysis was criticized, in turn, by Ernest Barker, who found it wanting on pragmatic grounds. With the advantage of the knowledge provided by an additional sixty-five years of political history, Barker characterized Lord Acton's defense of the multinational state as abstract and controverted by facts. "But even in 1860," he contended, "it might have been perceived that in a multi-national State the government either pits each nation against the rest to secure its own absolutism [as maintained by Mill], or allows itself to become the organ of one of the nations for the suppression or oppression of others."¹⁴ Barker acknowledged that history provided examples of autocratic states that were composed of a number of nations, but he held that an unassimi-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 289.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 290.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, 298.

¹⁴ *National Character*, 16.

lated democratic state tended to dissolve into as many democracies as there were nationalities. This tendency, combined with what Barker perceived as a seemingly inexorable movement toward assimilation brought on by the rise of such forces as public school systems, mass communication facilities, and the need for a common statewide tongue, caused Barker to predict a worldwide "scheme of political organization in which each nation is also a State, and each State is also a nation."¹⁵

The redressing of the scholarly balance on the issue was undertaken by Alfred Cobban during World War II. Cobban unequivocally aligned himself with Lord Acton, holding that the nationally heterogeneous state "must re-enter the political canon, from which, as Acton many years ago declared, it should never have been dispelled."¹⁶ He shared Acton's sentiment that the nation-state had no logical relationship to freedom and noted that "the most prevalent solutions of the national problem in a world of competing nationalisms . . . are likely to be expulsion, massacre, or economic attrition."¹⁷

Despite his preference for multinationalism, however, Cobban recognized that the concept of the nation-state was growing in influence. But he vehemently denied that this development was necessary. Taking exception to Barker's contention that history proved that only autocratic states could remain multinational, Cobban enumerated a number of contemporary states that he held to be working examples of multinational democracies, and he felt compelled to the vastly different conclusion that in most instances political and ethnic borders could not possibly be made to coincide.¹⁸ Looking to the future, Cobban correctly anticipated the subsequent withdrawal of European political domination from most of Africa and Asia, and he expressed his belief that the popular misconception of a necessary link between political and ethnic borders would be particularly inapplicable and pernicious on these continents. Consistent with Acton's proposals, he favored for these areas transgroup political structures within which tribal and cultural sentiments would enjoy autonomy.

Aside from the more philosophic question of what ought to be the incidence of identity between nations and sovereign political entities, there remain two questions, the answers to which are intrinsic to the conclusions of each of the foregoing authorities, and both of which can be subjected to empirical investigation. The first involves the potentiality of the multinational state to survive as an effective political form.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 125-26.

¹⁶ *National Self-Determination*, 62.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 73.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 62, 63.

Is it essentially an anachronism, albeit a tenacious one, whose death knell sounded with the first indications of popular national consciousness? The second question involves the relationship between the nation-state, on the one hand, and democratic principles and institutions on the other. Is it the single-nation state or the multination state that manifests the greater adherence to democracy? Political developments since World War II may well indicate the appropriate answers to these questions, for although only two decades have elapsed since the publication of Cobban's study, an unprecedented quantity of pertinent data has emerged from that period. The number of states has multiplied, global research and reportorial coverage have been greatly expanded, and the forces of political change have accelerated. Moreover, the post-World War II experiences of multination states follow a remarkably uniform pattern, thus furnishing more definite answers to these questions. The pattern is particularly evident in relation to the question involving the potential for survival of the multination state.

As earlier noted, the policy of politically dividing Africa and Asia along the former political and administrative lines of empire created a large number of transcultural states. If the movement for political separatism had given evidence of culminating at this point, the faith in the sustaining power of the multination form, which was shared by Acton and Cobban, would appear vindicated. But the overwhelming weight of evidence indicates that the movement is still far from completion.

Consider Asia: Reports persist that the Chinese Communist government is turning the Turkic peoples of Sinkiang Province into a minority by promoting an intensive migration of Chinese into the province in order to ensure the region's allegiance to Peking. Moreover, earlier Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule has led to the continuous military occupation of that region since 1959. On Taiwan there are rumblings of dissatisfaction on the part of the indigenous population, who tend to look upon the ruling group of mainland expatriates as aliens. Despite Indonesia's recent preoccupation with the question of internal communism, it should not be forgotten that regionalism underlay the rebellion waged between 1958 and 1961 and that common awareness of cultural distinctions remains a source of resistance to rule from Djakarta.¹⁹ In the case of Vietnam, the intra-Vietnamese (Annamese) struggles have tended to obscure an active "self-determination" movement on the part of tribal hill peoples who populate more than half of the country's

¹⁹ See, for example, George Kahin and others, *Major Governments of Asia*, 2nd ed. (Ithaca 1963), 674.

territory. Popularly but mistakenly grouped under the single designation "Montagnards," they have made evident, by a number of open revolts against Vietnamese rule and by the creation of a liberation front, that the internal political problems of Vietnam would not terminate even with the highly unlikely creation of a government acceptable to all the ethnic Vietnamese.²⁰ In Laos, the confused and many-sided civil war has in no small part been due to the absence of transcultural identification with the Laotian state on the part of the diverse population.²¹ In Thailand, the effectiveness of Bangkok's writ diminishes rapidly when one leaves the culturally compatible Chao Phraya Valley for the Lao-speaking northeast, for the Karen-populated hills of the west, or for the Malay- and Chinese-populated regions of the Malay Peninsula. In neighboring Malaysia, cohesion suffers from the antagonisms between the Malays and a strong Chinese minority, antagonisms that have already led to the expulsion of Singapore from the Federation.²² In the case of Burma, it has been estimated that Rangoon controls only half of its territory; the remaining territory is populated by dissident, non-Burmese groups such as Shans, Kachins, Karens, Chins, and Mons.²³ Within East Pakistan, the inhabitants have long voiced strong dissatisfaction with their political ties to the peoples of West Pakistan from whom they are differentiable on practically every basis other than religion. In Ceylon, state unity has been frustrated by the intense rivalry between Sinhalese and Tamils which has periodically manifested itself in riots. Indian history has been even more often marred by eruptions of violence caused by the dissatisfaction of linguistic and cultural groups, and major governmental concessions concerning the delineating of provincial borders and the recognition of official languages have been the price of a return to order. In India's eastern areas, Naga and Mizo tribesmen are in open rebellion against rule by New Delhi. Iraq is riven by the Kurdish movement for self-determination, a problem that cannot be dissociated from the continuation of Kurdish territory into neighboring Iran and Turkey. Perhaps the most publicized failure of multinationalism since World War II

²⁰ The name of the liberation front is FULRO, a French acronym for the United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races. For references to two of the more important revolts of the tribesmen, see the *New York Times*, September 21, 1964, and December 20, 1965.

²¹ For a description of the various ethnic strains and their relations, see Frank LeBar and others, *Laos* (New Haven 1960).

²² For a report that Sarawak may also attempt to withdraw from the Federation because of ethnic considerations, see the *New York Times*, November 17, 1966.

²³ Robert McCabe, "When China Spits, We Swim," *New York Times Magazine* (February 27, 1966), 48.

involves an Asian and a non-Asian people on Cyprus; the only noteworthy interlude to the communal warfare there between Greek and Turk coincided with the ill-fated attempt at transnational government in the period 1960-1963.

Sub-Sahara Africa's short history of broad-scale independence has also provided a number of challenges to the concept of the multiculture state. Indeed, there is very little evidence of the existence of supratribal allegiance to the new political entities that have been created south of the Sahara, and much contrary evidence, such as the entire anarchic history of the Congo. The rejection of transnation principles has been particularly pronounced in situations coinvolving "Europeans" and "Africans." Antagonisms between a white, ruling minority and a Negro majority within the southern tier of states and territories are one manifestation of the relative weakness of transracial sentiments; the pursuit of "Africanization" (the replacement of non-Negroes by Negroes in all endeavors as rapidly as possible) throughout much of the remaining area of sub-Sahara Africa is another. Nor has the presence of "Europeans" been a necessary prerequisite for racial tensions. Thus, the now rather lengthy insurrection waged by the Negro peoples of southern Sudan against the politically dominant Arabs of the northern sector, the overthrow and expulsion of the ruling Arab minority on Zanzibar in early 1964, the almost total elimination within Rwanda of the formerly dominant Watusi by the Bahutu between 1959 and 1963, sporadic genocidal conflicts between the same two peoples for political control of neighboring Burundi, the revolt during 1966 of the important Buganda tribe against the centralization of rule in Uganda, the Somali irredentist movements in Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya, and the general resentment of East Coast Negroes toward settlers of Asian ancestry are all cases in which consciousness of race (in the minimal sense of readily visible distinctions) has proved antithetical to the concept of the multination state. Although less apparent a source of intra-state dissension than either tribalism or race, a third cultural division that seriously affects a number of states is that between the coastal and riverine people, who were most influenced by European ways and institutions during the period of colonialism, and the more isolated people of the interior. This bifurcation helps to explain, for example, the demise of the Mali Federation brought about by the withdrawal of Senegal in 1960, as well as the animosity between the Hausas and Ibos which threatens the survival of Nigeria. Yet a fourth division of Africa, which cuts across state lines and which appears to be growing in political significance, is that between Islamic and non-Islamic cul-

tures. This distinction is perhaps the most important factor in an Eritrean movement for independence from Christian Ethiopia, and it is also a contributing element in Somali irredentism within Ethiopia and Kenya, in attitudes toward political independence within French Somaliland, and in the internal strife of both Nigeria and the Sudan.

The most warranted conclusion to be drawn from a review of recent developments throughout Africa and Asia would therefore appear to be that the concept of self-determination has proved more powerful than could be appreciated from the vantage point of the 1940's. If the evidence were limited to these two continents, a demurrer could be made on the ground that analysis had been limited to societies in which political institutions are in an inchoate and therefore ephemeral and inconclusive stage; it could be contended that analysis of long-range trends should logically give greater weight to the time-tested, modern states of Europe and of regions politically dominated by people of European background. However, the recent history of multinationalism in such cases does not differ appreciably from the Afro-Asian experience. This becomes particularly evident when one examines the subsequent history of those states that were deemed successful examples of multinationalism by Mill, Acton, Barker, and Cobban. The purpose of such examination is not to sit in hindsight judgment of their observations, but to illustrate the acceleration of cultural-political consciousness, for cultural tensions have surfaced even where competent observers could not detect them at earlier points in history.

Events have already furnished conclusive answers to the fate of Acton's major examples, the Austro-Hungarian and the British empires. Of the former, Barker has noted: "Unfortunately they tried to unite a territory which, if one may use a geological term, was full of 'faults'; and they inevitably failed. A nation can only be made by a State if the population on which it works already possesses some homogeneity. The mixture of Magyar, German, and Slav was too rebellious to the potter's hand."²⁴ Barker's commentary would apply with equal validity to the British Empire, for—whether in a particular region the impetus for independence was indigenous or came from Britain, whether or not the new state opted for membership within the loose structure of the British Commonwealth—the basic cause of the disintegration of empire was the refusal of people to accept political rule by those deemed aliens.

But what of those "Western" multinational states that are still in

²⁴ P. 123.

existence? As previously noted, Alfred Cobban took exception to Barker's assertion that history indicated that democratic, multinational states could not survive. His empirical case on this point rested essentially upon the examples of Great Britain, South Africa, Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland.²⁵

The inclusion of Britain as an example of multinationalism is puzzling; although Barker also acknowledged Britain to be an exception to his rule, it is an exception that cannot go unchallenged. Both Barker and Cobban had the transnationalism of the Scotch and Welsh in mind, but the view of most authorities holds that the self-identification of these people with London is the product of assimilation rather than of the continuing coexistence of prospering cultures. Indeed, authorities have customarily emphasized the remarkable homogeneity of Britain's major island.²⁶ Moreover, when this homogeneity was challenged by the postwar influx of immigrants from the West Indies and southern Asia, the result was racial friction and the passage of restrictive immigration legislation, antithetical to the concept of multinationalism. And in Northern Ireland, the attempts by the Catholic minority to express through the electoral process their long-standing discontent with political rule by a religiously and culturally distinct people, as well as the attempts of the moderate government to move toward equalization of opportunity for the minority, resulted in a series of violent reactions during 1966.²⁷

As to the example of South Africa, it is assumed that this state would not have been included by Cobban could the subsequent governmental adherence to the policy of apartheid been prophesied. If, on the other hand, Cobban was referring solely to the relations between the two white minorities—Briton and Boer—it must be noted that fundamental differences of attitude persist, even though currently suffused by the overriding issue of black-white relations.²⁸ The political outcome of the

²⁵ P. 63.

²⁶ See, for example, Gwendolen Carter and others, *Major Foreign Powers*, 3rd ed. (New York 1957), 7, 8. The degree of assimilation is evidenced by the fact that only a minority of Welshmen and an insignificant number of Scotsmen are able to converse in their original languages, and all but a handful of these are fluent also in English. In both regions there have been recent nationalist movements whose goals range from minor alterations in administrative forms and school curricula to total independence. However, these movements are not considered to pose a serious challenge to "British nationalism," and, in any event, are a manifestation more of a resurgence of nationalist particularism than of cooperative multinationalism.

²⁷ J. H. Huizinga, "Captain O'Neil and the Anti-Papist," *The Reporter* (October 20, 1966), 43-44.

²⁸ Paul Fordham, *The Geography of African Affairs* (Baltimore 1965), 207.

cultural division between Englishmen and Boer therefore awaits a more normal environment.

The examples of Canada and Belgium are more instructive because of the elongated period during which two distinct cultures have survived within their borders on an apparently harmonious basis. Thus, Cobban wrote that French and British Canadians "have achieved a common political nationality without abandoning their characteristic cultural differences."²⁹ Tracing the unity of Canada back almost two hundred years to the French and Indian Wars, he credits its success to the wisdom of the British peace terms under which demands for compulsory anglicization were eschewed in favor of guarantees of cultural autonomy to the French community.³⁰ Similarly, with regard to Belgium, Mill, although the proponent of the nation-state, acknowledged more than a century ago the existence of a common national consciousness shared by the Flemish and Walloons; and Cobban, as late as 1944, could detect "no reason at all" for believing that cultural consciousness would lead to the disintegration of the state.³¹ The contrast between these observations and recent events is striking. Contemporary relations between the two Belgian groups have been characterized more by street violence and demands for strict separation than by harmony. The breadth and fervor of the "Flanders for the Flemish" movement have been illustrated by broadly supported demands that French-speaking faculty members and students of Louvain University be forced to leave Flanders for Wallonia and by Flemish insistence on legislation that would preclude desirous Flemish parents from "denationalizing" their offspring by sending them to French schools.³² Canada, meanwhile, has been troubled by (1) separatist movements, (2) the insistence of the culturally French province of Quebec for increased independence of the central government and a greater share of governmental revenues, (3) demands for a balancing of opportunities between French and non-French people, (4) resistance to a governmental requirement that civil servants be bilingual, and (5) even by a question of the degree to which the traditional flag (since replaced) did and should symbolize the hegemony of "Anglo" culture.

Cobban's final example, Switzerland, is the most commonly employed illustration of a multinational "going concern." Here again, mid-nineteenth- and mid-twentieth-century assessments are in accord, for Mill perceived a powerful sentiment of Swiss nationality which "went beyond different races, different languages, and different reli-

²⁹ P. 60.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 79.

³¹ Mill, 308; Cobban, 144.

³² See, for example, the *New York Times*, October 9 and October 30, 1966.

gions,”³³ and Acton, after noting the ethnological division of the population into French, Italian, and German components, concluded that “no nationality has the slightest claim upon them, except the purely political nationality of Switzerland.”³⁴ It is tempting to pass over Switzerland as a rule-proving exception attributable to the peculiarities of its size, location, topography, and special historical circumstances. And, admittedly, Swiss unity does not appear as seriously challenged by cultural cleavage as does that of Canada and Belgium. Nevertheless, the assertion that the subnationalities do not have the “slightest claim” upon the allegiance of the Swiss populace cannot be accepted as a valid characterization of the situation. It should be remembered that, as a result of Swiss neutrality, allegiance to Switzerland has not been severely tested against ethnic ties to Germany, France, or Italy. While the reasons for Swiss neutrality are multifold, there is reason to speculate upon the degree of adherence that the central government could have expected had it elected to enter the Franco-Prussian War or either of the World Wars. In each instance, even a policy of impartiality was threatened by considerable sympathy for France or Germany, particular preference following linguistic-cultural lines.³⁵ Vastly more significant, however, is the evidence that Switzerland has not been immune to the growing intrastate tensions that have recently plagued other multinational states. In Berne, the only canton with a substantial French-speaking minority (more than five percent, less than fifty percent), there has been an active secessionist movement in recent years, despite the fact that the boundaries of this canton were fixed more than 150 years ago.³⁶

In addition to the foregoing states, Cobban also referred to the Soviet Union as an example of successful multinationalism. Although aware that Barker’s analysis differentiated between “autocratic” and “democratic” states, Cobban felt the inclusion justified because the Soviet Union was, in his opinion, at least more democratic and yet more cohesive than had been the tsarist regimes. No matter where one places the Soviet Union on the democratic-authoritarian spectrum, however, it cannot be accepted as an exemplar of cultural cooperation. Authorities may disagree on the level of assimilation that has been attained within the Soviet Union, but it is generally held that the Soviet government

³³ P. 308.

³⁴ Pp. 294-95.

³⁵ George Coddling, Jr., *The Federal Government of Switzerland* (Boston 1961), 154 and *passim*.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 39. See also the article in the *New York Times* of March 19, 1966, which describes the sentencing of secessionists for terrorism, together with the judge’s admission of a general climate of political tension.

has steadfastly followed a policy of russification. It is difficult to assess actual results because the government has purposefully tolerated the continued use of minority languages, while simultaneously eroding the wellsprings of the minority cultures, such as the Islamic religion. Thus, through a number of devices—some coercive, others seductive—the Soviet Union has moved toward assimilation while maintaining the most superficial guise of cultural autonomy.³⁷ Moreover, authorities anticipate an acceleration of the russification program which will include the denigration of non-Russian languages.³⁸ Such a move would be consonant both with Lenin's prerevolutionary plan that a short period of linguistic autonomy would be followed by the establishment of a single state language and with the statement in the new party program that "full-scale communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations in which the nations will draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved."³⁹ But a compelling reason for governmental acceleration of the assimilation process may well be the continuing discordant impact of culture-group orientation. Thus, a number of Latvian notables were accused in 1961 of fanning local nationalist sentiments. In a similar vein, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan Communist party was quoted in *Pravda* in early 1963: "There is no ground—either social or political or economic—for nationalism in our land. But we cannot forget that vestiges of it are still tenacious among a certain segment of politically immature people . . . [and are] always ready to break out to the surface. . . ."⁴⁰ The government also felt constrained to censure nationalist groups in the Ukraine during the spring of 1966.⁴¹ Assuming that the Soviet Union would prefer to conceal such problems for both internal and external reasons, the few such official acknowledgements of the existence of nationalistic attitudes are probably indicative of what the

³⁷ For a historical account of this process as applied to the Turkic peoples of the USSR, see Michael Rywkin, "Central Asia and the Price of Sovietization," *Problems of Communism*, XIII (January-February 1964), 7-15. For a more general treatment of russification, see also the articles by Richard Pipes and Hugh Seton-Watson in the same issue.

³⁸ This was the consensus at a conference of specialists held at Brandeis University in the fall of 1965, as reported in the *New York Times*, October 31, 1965.

Confirmation of such a program was furnished at a meeting of the Ukrainian Writers Congress in early 1967. In response to complaints that heavy pressures to have Russian replace Ukrainian and other minority languages had been exerted during the early 1960's, a visiting secretary of the Russian Writers Union apologized for the haste with which the program of "merging the cultures" had been introduced (*New York Times*, January 29, 1967).

³⁹ Quoted by Richard Pipes, "The Forces of Nationalism," *Problems of Communism*, XIII (January-February 1964), 4.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴¹ *New York Times*, April 16 and April 20, 1966.

government conceives to be a problem of serious magnitude. At the minimum, it can be said that Soviet policy-makers have not yet solved "the minority problem."

The elusiveness of a solution is illustrated by contrasting the experiences of two other nondemocratic European states, Yugoslavia and Spain. Following the Soviet example, the Yugoslavian government has paid at least limited homage to the concept of cultural autonomy. Thus, the ostensible form of government is a federation of six ethnically delineated republics and two autonomous areas, and the use of diverse languages and alphabets is permitted. However, Yugoslavia has not been as successful as the Soviet Union in preventing the public airing of intercultural enmity. The prevalence of ethnic tensions became a major issue in the mid-1966 purge of Vice-President Rankovic and his followers. This group was accused of "Great Serbian chauvinism," thereby intensifying the hostility that Croats, Slovenes, Albanians (Shiptars), Macedonians, and the other minority peoples felt toward the dominant Serbs. Even a year prior to these disclosures, the government had been forced to suppress a Croatian Liberation Movement, the average age of whose members, most of whom could not have remembered a pre-Tito regime, indicates that the movement represents a resurgence rather than a vestige of Croatian aspirations for independence. It is evident, then, that the Yugoslav policy of granting limited autonomy to culture groups has not furthered the cause of unity.

Franco's response to cultural division was enforced homogeneity. Although the Catalan and Basque minorities had enjoyed a short period of linguistic autonomy under the Spanish Republic, Franco ordered that only the Spanish language could be taught in the schools and used by the communications media. However, despite three decades of implementation, the policy continued to meet strong resistance and the government has recently retreated from its earlier position and become more permissive toward the use of minority tongues. Thus, the Spanish attempt at forceful eradication of minority cultures failed.

Additional evidence of European failure to accommodate multinationalism within a single state might include the often-expressed dissatisfaction of the German-speaking people of the Italian Tyrol, the strained relations between Rumanians and the Magyars of Rumanian Transylvania,⁴² and the reappearance of the "Macedonian question," which involves minorities within Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia.⁴³ It is also pertinent to note that "European" Australia and New Zealand have determinedly resisted multinationalism. Although seri-

⁴² *Ibid.*, February 5, 1966.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, September 18, 1966.

ously underpopulated, both countries maintain barriers against the influx of non-Caucasoids while proffering a variety of allurements to the more readily assimilable people of northwestern Europe.

European experience, therefore, only tends to confirm a broad-scale trend toward political consciousness along lines of nationality. If the desires of nationalities were controlling, the second part of Ernest Barker's prediction of a global political division "in which each nation is also a State, and each State is also a nation" would therefore rapidly be approaching realization. Yet, as indicated, seldom do political and ethnic borders coincide.

The principal reason for the wide gap between anticipation and realization in matters involving self-determination is the universal tendency of governments to render decisions upon the implicit assumption of the need to preserve the entire political unit. As against a claim of the right of self-determination, the government proclaims the right to stamp out rebellion and the duty to prevent secession. What is a self-evident truth to those desiring independence is treason to those in custody of the government. This polarization in the attitudes of the "ins" and the "outs" toward self-determination is most evident in the about-face of those former proponents of self-determination who led successful independence movements. As earlier noted, the African and Asian leaders who once castigated European domination as violative of the right of self-determination are not now prepared to recognize such a right on the part of their own minorities.⁴⁴

A survey of multinational states does not indicate that any particular form of government has solved this dichotomy between the need for unity and the fissiparous impact of ethnic consciousness. It will be remembered that Ernest Barker was willing to concede that nondemocratic governments might impede the rise of political consciousness among ethnic groups. Yet despite great variations in the form and effectiveness of their respective governments, most of the Afro-Asian states that are troubled by ethnic tensions are clearly not democratic. Nor, as we have noted, are nondemocratic states such as the Soviet Union, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Spain free of such problems. The inability of authoritarian governments to cope successfully with multinationalism must therefore be considered still another testament to the increasing power of ethnic aspirations, for it indicates that the immunity believed to be enjoyed by authoritarian governments four decades ago is no longer effective.

⁴⁴ For a penetrating treatment of this phenomenon, see Rupert Emerson, *Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), esp. 28.

The prevalence of ethnic dissonance within so many authoritarian systems must be considered significant because authoritarianism does enjoy real advantages in combating nationalist movements. Among the more formidable weapons at the disposal of such governments are a clandestine reporting apparatus and the ability to intern leaders for long periods without bringing formal charges. Control of communications is also important, for, if effective, it permits the government to cut the leadership off from possible domestic and foreign support. Such a government, if it acknowledges at all the presence of a self-determination movement, will typically describe it as the activity of a few provocateurs or malcontents. In such cases, evaluation of the actual situation is difficult, perhaps impossible. The problem of assessing ethnic movements within the Soviet Union has already been touched upon, but it should be noted that a number of movements elsewhere were excluded from earlier consideration because of the unavailability of dependable data. How strong, for example, is the Kashmiri desire for independence? How strong the movement within India for a Dravidistan? Tamilstan? Sikhistan? How much support is there within West Pakistan or, for that matter, within Afghanistan for an independent Pushtunistan? In southwestern Iran for an independent Arabistan? In eastern Turkey for an independent Armenian state? In eastern Ethiopia for an independent Eritrea? In northwestern Algeria for Berber independence? In each of these instances, and the list could be greatly expanded, it is known that an ethnic movement does, in fact, exist, but lack of information prevents a valid assessment of its strength. However, it is safe to conclude that the political consciousness of various ethnic groups is even much more prevalent than we can document.

This trend obviously conflicts with the widely held opinion that nationalism has proved too parochial for the modern age and that its zenith is now well passed. This position has been lent credence by the postwar proliferation of multistate organizations, which ranged, in their original aims, from limited military or economic cooperation to complete unification. However, although the goals of a transstate organization may be contrary to national aspirations, they need not be so. One factor will be the degree of integration that is anticipated. There is nothing in military or economic cooperation that is inconsistent with extreme national consciousness, when the results of such cooperation are viewed as beneficial to the national interest. But the nearer one moves toward the erection of a multinational state, the sharper becomes the conflict between the organization and nationalism.

For example, De Gaulle's nationalism does not blind him to the economic advantages that might flow to the French from regional economic cooperation under the EEC, but it explains his resistance to any proposed transfer of the decision-making power away from the individual states. Similarly, he supports limited military cooperation, but refuses to accept a position of national dependence concerning any aspect of military strategy. In short, there is nothing intrinsically incompatible between the growth of national consciousness and organizations of such limited goals as the European or Latin American Free Trade Associations. Significant, however, is the fact that in the case of those organizations whose goals have most clearly conflicted with nationalism, it is the organization that has been forced into retreat. The EEC structure remains, but few are still optimistic about its supranational objectives. Similarly, the amazingly short-lived "Sino-Soviet bloc" foundered on the incompatibility of Chinese and Soviet national aspirations. Subsequent attempts by the Soviet Union to perpetuate the monolithic nature of the geographically more limited Eastern European multinational structure (including the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact) have experienced a series of major setbacks due to the rising nationalism of the Poles, Rumanians, Czechs, Bulgars, and other East European peoples. In interstate relations, as within the typical multinational state, the centrifugal forces of national aspirations are proving more powerful than the centripetal forces of transnationalism.

There is, moreover, considerable reason to expect a further proliferation of self-determination movements. For most people, ethnic consciousness still lies in the future. National consciousness presupposes an awareness of other culture-groups, but, to a majority of the world's population, the meaningful world still ends with the village.⁴⁵ If the past and present are instructive, it can be expected that cultural and political consciousness will spread with increased communications and that the ethnic hodgepodes that are Asia and Africa will produce a host of new demands for the redrawing of political borders.

Should such demands for self-determination be met? The question can be viewed within two quite distinct contexts—the one, moral; the other, practical. If the question means whether each nationality, simply because it is a self-distinguishing culture-group, has a right to self-rule, then the question defies a provable conclusion. Axioms, such as "the

⁴⁵ A 1962 UNESCO survey estimated that seventy percent of the world's population is essentially unaware of happenings beyond the village. See also Emerson, 36.

right of self-determination," appear as moral imperatives until countered with opposing maxims. As earlier indicated, a "principle" of self-determination can be countered by other "principles," such as the right of states to preserve themselves, to protect their territorial integrity, to maintain internal order, to legislate against treasonable acts, and so forth. If, on the other hand, the question is intended to ask whether it is reasonable or even possible to grant statehood to each nation, it is doubtful that even those who are most sympathetic to the principle of self-determination would answer in the affirmative. Mill and Barker, for example, were both prepared to acknowledge the impracticality of self-determination in the case of two or more groups who were so geographically intermingled as to preclude a clear-cut geographic separation. Another possible objection to self-determination is that the people in question are not prepared for self-rule. Other critics have raised the issue of minimum standards, maintaining that self-determination should be denied when the group is too small, or the territory too limited, or the possibility of maintaining a viable economy too remote.

The interesting point is that such practical considerations have seldom had much influence upon ethnic aspirations. Even the absence of a clear geographic base has not necessarily prevented self-determination movements from arising. In the case of the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus and that of the Hindus and Moslems in British India, there was a high degree of geographic suffusion of the two cultures, but this intermingling did not prevent intergroup violence in the first instance and actual partition in the second. So, too, the proposition that lack of readiness for self-rule is a legitimate bar to immediate independence: although accepted by Mill and later institutionalized in the mandate system of the League and the trusteeship system of the UN, this principle has been increasingly depicted as predicated upon bias and, consequently, is decreasingly heard in public debates concerning independence. With regard to criteria of size, it is again instructive to turn to Cobban in order to illustrate how self-determination has altered international affairs over the past two decades. In the course of emphasizing the impracticality of granting independence to each small nation, Cobban raised, as a *reductio ad absurdum*, the specter of granting independence to Malta and Iceland. The fact that these areas have been granted statehood and that they have been joined in this successful endeavor by such other tiny entities as Gambia, the Maldives Islands, Barbados, Trinidad-Tobago, and Western Samoa again illustrates that

practical considerations are not apt to prove a match for the emotional power of self-determination in those cases in which the sentiments of the national group are decisive.

But are the sentiments of a national group apt to prove decisive? The last stages of the colonial era have produced a number of instances in which a realistic Britain and France took the initiative in ceding independence to overseas territories. Nevertheless, as Rupert Emerson has noted, history clearly establishes that governments are not apt to grant self-determination, and that cases in which it has been granted are rare indeed.⁴⁶ But history also clearly indicates that the refusal to grant self-determination hardly eradicates the problem. The peace-makers of 1920 may have thought that they could dictate the proper limits of self-determination in Eastern Europe, stopping short of balkanization, but ferment for a furtherance of the self-determination principle plagues the area a half-century later. The appeal and the power of self-determination are quite independent of considerations of what a government ought to do or what it is apt to do. It is granted that the governments of multination states will continue to resist their minorities' requests for independence, but, in such cases, it is also expected that the states' existence will be increasingly challenged by secessionist-minded groups.

A quite natural response to this challenge is assimilation. If the coexistence of differing cultures appears incompatible with continued unity and yet partition is deemed unthinkable, policies to further homogeneity would seem to be in prospect. Moreover, this negative, albeit compelling, reason for instituting a policy of assimilation may be joined by positive considerations, in that marked heterogeneity represents an impediment to the statewide social and economic integration demanded by the modern state. This is particularly evident when linguistic differences are present. Certainly the Soviet Union must find a multiplicity of languages an efficiency-sapping nuisance, requiring countless oral and written translations of orders, blueprints, directions for the use of machinery, and so forth. So, too, a tendency for people to identify themselves with a particular culture and territory must constitute a most serious impediment to the mobility of labor. Aside, then, from the need to combat the divisiveness that springs from ethnic factionalism, the demands of modernization also exert pressure upon the government to eradicate its multinational character.

It would be a mistake, however, to underestimate the resistance to

⁴⁶ Pp. 63-64.

assimilation which governments can be expected to encounter. A number of governments have discovered belatedly that the enmity of groups toward acculturation represented a more formidable adversary than had been contemplated. Thus, the Indian and Pakistani governments have both been forced to backtrack on their plans for a single, official language; and Franco, by discarding many features of his assimilation program, has confessed failure to overcome Basque and Catalan resistance. On the other hand, the example of the American "melting pot" is often employed to illustrate that the assimilation of diverse cultures can be accomplished within a relatively short time. But it is highly questionable whether the experience of the United States is germane elsewhere.⁴⁷ A number of important factors peculiar to United States history points up by their very presence some of the major hindrances to assimilation that are faced by other states. For example, the American policy of conquest eliminated the indigenous people as cultural competitors; the pattern of early settlement created a dominant, almost exclusive, Anglo-Saxon culture; upon this firmly entrenched cultural base, representatives of other cultures, on their own initiative,⁴⁸ were periodically added in relatively small numbers. As a result, ethnic problems in the United States have not been primarily characterized by minorities resisting assimilation, but rather by the unwillingness of the dominant group to permit assimilation at the tempo desired by the minorities. Dealing with a proportionately small number of people who have voluntarily left their homeland to enter an existent cultural-political structure within which acceptance of the mores and language is a *sine qua non* of success is one matter; treating the relations between two large and neighboring ethnic groups, each possessing impressive title to its respective territory, is something quite different. The second situation more closely characterizes Canada, Belgium, and, for that matter, most of the ethnic problems to which reference has been made.

The continuous spread of modern communication and transportation facilities, as well as statewide social institutions such as public school systems, can be expected to have a great influence upon programs of assimilation. But can the nature of that influence be predicted? It is a truism that centralized communications and increased contacts help to dissolve regional cultural distinctions within a state such as the United States. Yet, if one is dealing not with minor variations of the

⁴⁷ Recent studies have even questioned the degree of melting that has occurred within the American pot. See, for example, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

⁴⁸ The major exception was the Negro slave.

same culture, but with two quite distinct and self-differentiating cultures, are not increased contacts between the two apt to increase antagonisms? Improvements over the last two decades in what was an already effective transportation and communications network within Belgium have not been accompanied by improved relations between the Walloon and Flemish people. And in the less modern states, we have noted that cultural consciousness precedes political consciousness, and that cultural consciousness presupposes an awareness of other cultures. Is it not at least possible, then, that increased awareness of alien cultures on the part of the Baluchi people who inhabit either side of the Pakistani-Iranian border will result in Baluchistan's becoming a slogan rather than just the name of a geographic area?

The obvious point is that assimilation is even more of a natural foe to self-determination than is the multination state. The growing emotional power of ethnic consciousness, which threatens the multination state, also casts serious doubt upon the probable success of assimilation programs. Nonetheless, partly in resistance to the divisiveness of growing national consciousness and partly in response to the demands of modernization, an increased emphasis upon assimilation appears in prospect. As a consequence, the multination state faces a dual threat, consisting of demands for self-determination from below and governmental programs of assimilation from above.

Contemporary political forces, therefore, clearly move in the direction of that second part of Barker's prophecy that envisaged a world order in which "each State is also a nation." However, the first part of his prophecy, holding that "each nation is also a State," is clearly not upheld by the present political division of either the Arab world or the Spanish-speaking region of Latin America. The conclusion appears to be that diversity of cultures tends to preclude political unity but that sameness of culture does not preclude political division.

On the other question that divided Mill, Acton, Barker, and Cobban—whether heterogeneity promotes authoritarianism or democracy—postwar developments indicate a link between multinationalism and pressure for nondemocratic actions. This is not to say that one can predict the form of government simply by the degree of cultural homogeneity within a state. Most of the governments of the multinational states merit, on balance, characterization as authoritarian. But so, too, did the prewar governments of highly homogeneous Germany and Japan, as well as the present governments of most of the Arab states. It is evident, then, that there are many factors that combine in a varying

and unpredictable mixture to determine form of government. However, the aforementioned tendency of governments to stress their political and territorial integrity has not been conducive to democratic responses to the growing problem of cultural-political consciousness.

There is a logical relationship between the *self*-determination of nations and the democratic concept that popular opinion should determine political allegiance. It is therefore ironic that while so many governments pay lip service to self-determination, the instances in which a government has permitted a democratic process to decide a question of self-determination within its own territory are rare indeed.⁴⁹ The general position of African governments with respect to Rhodesia during 1965 and 1966 offers a striking illustration of this inconsistency. Motivated by the pragmatic desire to rid Africa of "white rule," they insisted that British cession of independence, prior to the instituting of popular government, would be a travesty of the self-determination principle. Yet, at the same time, these governments were not prepared to permit the popular will to determine the political allegiance of segments of their own territories.

The natural repugnance of governments toward democratic solutions to questions involving the political allegiance of minorities has been underlined by instances of the refusal to grant plebiscites despite prior promises. India, for example, has suffered years of international embarrassment rather than honor its promises concerning a vote for the Kashmiri. Similarly, there were those who suspected that Sukarno never intended to hold a plebiscite in West Irian (the former Netherlands New Guinea), even though his promise to this effect was a basic condition of the UN's support for the Indonesian takeover in 1963. The subsequent abortive Communist coup brought into power a moderate group who were disposed to disagree with the major planks of Sukarno's domestic and foreign policies; but it was, nonetheless, under the authority of this group that the pledge for a plebiscite was in fact renounced during late 1966. It seems clear that governments believe that questions involving the political allegiance of groups residing within the sovereign territory are much too important to be left to popular opinion.

The methods by which governments have combated national movements have, in the main, been coercive. Where expedient, governments have shown little hesitancy in conducting military campaigns against

⁴⁹ The actions of France and the United Kingdom with respect to their overseas territories, after it became evident that the days of empire were numbered, are not considered true exceptions to this statement.

such movements. Present or recent cases in point include Algeria (the Berbers), Burma, Burundi, mainland China (Tibet), the Congo, Cyprus, India (Mizos, Nagas), Indonesia, Iraq, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Vietnam (the "Montagnards"), and Uganda. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the leaders of self-determination movements have seldom been accorded the legal safeguards that would be deemed minimal to meet democratic requirements. Often their only choices have been to live in exile, as do the Dalai Lama and many of the leaders of the Formosan movement, or, like Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (an advocate of an independent state of Pushtunistan within present Pakistan), to be committed periodically to long terms of imprisonment without legal process. Viewing self-determination movements as threats to survival, governments have tended to react violently and to justify the cruelest of treatment accorded to implicated leaders by branding them as rebels or traitors and therefore something worse than criminals. Admirably suited to such attitudes are the emergency acts and detention acts authorizing, in the broadest and most ambiguous terms, the internment without due process of law of persons acting in a manner inimical to the interests of the state. Such laws are extremely common in multinational states and, in some cases, are found even within countries whose political system is ostensibly democratic.⁵⁰ Whether or not such responses are justified, either in general or in a particular instance, is not at issue; the point is that multinational states have tended to become less democratic in response to the growing threat of nationalistic movements.

Political developments since World War II clearly establish that national consciousness is not on the wane as a political force, but is quite definitely in the ascendancy. Its force is currently being felt throughout sub-Sahara Africa and Asia, as ethnic consciousness de-

⁵⁰ Typical is a so-called Security Bill passed by the government of Guyana in late 1966 and obviously intended by the Negro-controlled government to restrict the activities of the East Indian segment of the population. Under its terms, the prime minister is empowered to intern without trial, for eighteen months, anyone he believes has acted or *will* act "in any manner prejudicial to public safety or public order or the defense of Guyana" (*New York Times*, December 9, 1966).

Within India, Kashmiri leaders have been periodically interned by the Indian government under an "emergency" measure. Moreover, in 1963, essentially in response to a Dravidian movement, the Indian government passed the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution which sought to "prevent the fissiparous, secessionist tendency in the country engendered by regional and linguistic loyalties and to preserve the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity" of the Indian union (cited in Robert L. Hardgrove, Jr., "The DMK and the Politics of Tamil Nationalism," *Pacific Affairs*, xxxvii [Winter 1964-65], 397).

mands political recognition, in place of the present political division that reflects colonial patterns. Moreover, the influence of nationalism is expected to increase greatly throughout these continents as the multitude of ethnic groups, many of whom are not yet cognizant of their identity, further acquire national awareness. The multination states of Europe and of areas settled by Europeans are also experiencing an increase in nationalistic orientations.

No multinational structure has been immune to this surge of nationalism. Authoritarian and democratic, Communist and non-Communist societies have been similarly affected. Nor does the postwar proliferation of transstate organizations and blocs repudiate the influence of nationalism; indeed, recent interstate developments further attest to the increasing tendency to think in nationalistic terms.

No government of a multination state has found the solution to the dilemma posed by the goal of state unity on the one hand and the centrifugal tendencies of growing national consciousness on the other. Motivated both by the desire to prevent partition and by the demands of modernization, such governments can be expected to resist nationalistic movements, with coercive methods if need be, while concurrently promoting assimilation.

The outcome of such programs is unpredictable, but the proven tenacity and emotional power of nationalism make this abstraction a most formidable opponent. In any event, that pernicious and perhaps unrealistic principle termed "self-determination of nations" is far from spent as a significant force in international politics.