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REVIEW ARTICLE

In the Crosshairs of the Fourfold: Critical Thoughts on Aleksandr Dugin's Heidegger

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ABSTRACT

In Part 1, we situate Dugin's interpretation of Heidegger in relation to the better known, broadly left-liberal approaches to interpreting Heidegger's thought, stressing Dugin's unusual focus on the German thinker's "middle" or Nazi-era texts, and showing how this periodizing optic affects Dugin's culminating reading of Sein und Zeit and its key axiological notion of authenticity (Part 1). Part 2 examines Dugin's appropriation of Heidegger's radically pessimistic, trans-epochal critique of Western thought, centring around his striking reading of the esoteric notion of the "fourfold" or Gewiert. In this account, the essence of reality itself, the "crosshairs" of the fourfold, is provocatively depicted by Dugin as war, Polemos, Kampf, or Krieg, following the Heidegger of 1933–1936. In a move which echoes Heidegger's own post-1938 relativizations of all distinctions between Nazism, liberalism and socialism – as well as the Shoah and mechanized agriculture – the Russian thinker hence ends by obviating any distinctions between liberal or democratic and totalitarian regimes, war and peace, and genocide and consumerism. All must be overcome in the "another beginning" destined for the new Russia, if it has the ears to hear.

KEYWORDS
Dugin; Heidegger; Eurasianism; History of Being; Ereignis; fascism

> Geniuses can be forgiven for anything. (Aleksandr Dugin, *Martin Heidegger: Philosophy of Another Beginning*, 28)[1]

Aleksandr Dugin's *Martin Heidegger: Philosopher of Another Beginning* appeared in translation with Radix Press in 2014. It has so far failed to generate any concerted scholarly response. Michael Millerman's "Aleksandr Dugin's Heideggerianism"[2] is the closest to a systematic, clearly partisan account. Millerman moreover spends as much time situating Dugin's Heideggerianism within his Eurasianist "fourth political theory" as on close analyses of his reading of the German thinker. Differently, articles by Love and Meng and (in French) Gaëtan Pégny[3] each devote as much attention to the light Dugin's "Right Heideggerianism" throws on Heidegger's National Socialism as on Dugin as his own reader of the German thinker.

There are nevertheless good reasons to take Dugin's reading of Heidegger very seriously, beginning with the growing scope of Dugin's influence on the global antiliberal "*nouvelle*" or "Alt" Right.[4] Dugin's more extravagant political and internautic

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interventions notwithstanding, he has insisted that his "Eurasianism" is "first and foremost" a philosophy: "without philosophy, Eurasianism is incomplete, even impossible".[5] Since 2009, moreover, he has stressed the absolute centrality of Heidegger's philosophy to his thought, looking back at least to 1999.[6] Heidegger's notion of "*Dasein*"[7], "there-being", he insists, ought to become the subject and addressee of the "fourth political theory", succeeding the individual of liberalism, the class of communism, and the race of National Socialism. On the other hand, as the global antiliberal Right continues to rise and bid for hegemony, Dugin's openly Rightist uptake of Heidegger's thought stands as a timely challenge or wake-up call to generations of left-liberal readings of Heidegger.[8] Reading Dugin illustrates how Heidegger's thought has continued to inspire thinkers on the anti-liberal Right in ways which our present circumstances seem likely to make only more explicit.

This paper has two central parts. In Part 1, we situate Dugin's interpretation of Heidegger in relation to the better known, broadly left-liberal approaches to interpreting Heidegger's thought, stressing Dugin's unusual focus on the German thinker's "middle" or Nazi-era texts, and showing how this periodizing optic affects Dugin's culminating reading of *Sein und Zeit* and its key axiological notion of authenticity (Part 1). Part 2 examines Dugin's appropriation of Heidegger's radically pessimistic, trans-epochal critique of Western thought, centring around his striking reading of the esoteric notion of "the fourfold" or *das Geviert*. In this account, the essence of reality itself, the "cross-hairs" of the fourfold, is provocatively depicted by Dugin as war, *Polemos, Kampf,* or *Krieg*, following the Heidegger of 1933–1936. In a move which echoes Heidegger's own post-1938 relativizations of all distinctions between Nazism, liberalism and socialism – as well as the Shoah and mechanized agriculture – the Russian thinker hence ends by obviating any distinctions between liberal or democratic and totalitarian regimes, war and peace, and genocide and consumerism. The entire Western legacy, from Plato to NATO (sic.), must be overcome in the "another beginning" destined for the new Russia, if it has the ears to hear.

The concluding remarks consider the implications of our analysis in terms of the politics of Heidegger reception, on one hand, and Dugin's reception, on the other.

Part 1. Dugin's Heidegger, the Philosopher of Another Beginning

The task of reading Heidegger's philosophy was already difficult in the postwar decades, when a fraction of the now-published *Gesamtausgabe* was available. Most commentators focus on one text or at most one period, the "early" or "late" Heidegger. As Dugin stresses, Heidegger's work also conducts a radical critique of the philosophical and scientific rationality of the Western tradition, from Parmenides or Plato onwards (147, 236). His work presents itself increasingly as a series of disclosures of "Being" or "Beyng" itself, Heidegger's focal concern: or what (albeit in the language of faculty psychology that the German thinker rejects) we might say is a business of hieratic intuition, rather than evidential argumentation (see 342–3). Adding to these difficulties, Heidegger advertises the linguistic determination of thought ("language is the house of Being"), and that his own thought is only fully legible in his native German. So we must "make a leap", as Dugin explains, "trust words rather than concepts, sounds and guessed meanings rather than the strict philosophical discourse" (318).[9] In Dugin's suggestive formulation, Heidegger's "words are a

quiet and genuine flame that remains elusive for the devious strategies of an ice-cold rational mind" (388).

Dugin's way of reading of Heidegger's *oeuvre*, with this much said, represents an extremely provocative, unsettling contribution to the literature. Dugin shares with his teacher the image of the history of thought as deeply shaped by a small number of "great thinkers" of decisive importance. Far beyond the appreciation of ordinary subjects and merely "ontic" historians, these epochal figures' "understandings of Being" have shaped the presuppositions and cultures of entire historical periods (72–81). Heidegger, for Dugin, is the last and as such "the greatest" of the West's great thinkers (16–18). In his work the hidden determining essence of all Western history has been finally discerned.[10] Dugin's Heidegger hence presents a "requiem" or funeral oration for the epochal decline and final, catastrophic collapse of Western philosophy (and as such, Western civilization) into technological-liberal nihilism (31, 275).[11]

Due to his greatness, Dugin contends, we cannot rightly read Heidegger like other philosophers. As Heidegger had himself maintained in his 1933 lectures on the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, we must instead "put ourselves at the command" of the greatest thinker.[12] It is a matter for Dugin of "bowing" to Heidegger's authority in a "full and complete immersion" in his thought (17–18). When it comes to Heidegger, we are for Dugin dealing with "a figure in a new religious pantheon" (18), "an eschatological figure, the final interpreter and clarifier of the most profound and enigmatic subjects in world philosophy", "the last prophet" (18). When we accept this, we will understand Heidegger as "an envoy of Beyng itself", a herald of the great *event* which will see "another beginning" to philosophy and humanity more widely (18, 141–4). In this *Ereignis*, the old history of the European world will end and "a new history, which has yet to exist, will begin" (18, 147–50).

Martin Heidegger: The Philosophy of Another Beginning is, accordingly, primarily addressed specifically to a Russian-reading audience. Its 2014 translation by Nina Kouprianova for Radix Press was clearly not part of its original intention (see 32–6, 75, 93). Not only is a continuing feature of the text Dugin's etymological ruminations on how to translate Heidegger's key terms into his native tongue. For Dugin, the "another beginning" which Heidegger's attempts to overcome Western metaphysics looked towards failed to happen in the Germany of the middle-twentieth century, as the great thinker had hoped when he embraced National Socialism after 1930 (275–6).[13] This is because its destined locale was always the Russia of the twenty-first century, as Dugin feels licensed to prophesy: a new Eurasian dawning after Europe and the West have fallen completely into "night" (145, 204–5, 331, 390).[14] For this new Eurasian beginning to occur, however, Heidegger's suprarational, linguistic way of thinking must be mobilized on new soil: "to unseal the virgin treasure of the Slavo-Russian language in order to create new meanings and to reach new horizons, based upon the newly grasped Russian antiquity" (36).[15]

Dugin's translation of Heidegger into Russian is then, in its fullest ambition, its own post-Heideggerian, eschatological act. "To master Heidegger is the main strategic task of the Russian people and Russian society in the near term", he will claim, "the key to the Russian tomorrow" (Dugin, 2018: 9). *Philosophy of Another Beginning* is itself the opening salvo in a larger prophetic attempt to enable the "21st century" and the new millennium to "in essence" begin (277, 390).[16] The metapolitical stakes could hardly be

higher, even as it seems that Dugin, not Heidegger, is truly the last prophet in this configuration.

In more concrete terms, the reading of Heidegger's texts which issues from out of these quasi-mystagogic axioms is structured into three parts. Each Part focuses on the work of a particular period of Heidegger's thought. Several things deserve stressing about this, Dugin's periodizing optic for reading Heidegger, in contrast to other, better known approaches.

First, Dugin rejects the key interpretive motif, encouraged at times by Heidegger himself, that his thought had only an early period, associated with the thought of *Sein und Zeit* (1927), and then a later period. In between was a *Kehre* or "turning" whose exact date scholars dispute, but which took place at some point between 1928 and 1945. Dugin reads Heidegger, as other of the thinker's remarks would suggest, as involved in a deeply unitary project, from its beginning to end.[17]

Second, the three periods of Heidegger's thought for Dugin turn around what he calls the "middle period" associated with his Nazi-era works, preceded by the early works including *Sein und Zeit*, and followed by the post-1945 texts.[18] The political situation of Germany, that is – turning around the NSDAP years of 1933–1945 – is determinative in shaping what Heidegger was able to think and say, on Dugin's vision, in contrast to most other readers of Heidegger. In this light, Dugin flirts with devaluing the later works, since they "demanded the revision of certain metaphysical expectations of the thinker, which could not be done openly and transparently" (286). Dugin suggests that a political self-censorship "under the influence of external factors" (286) was in play here, rather than any substantive change towards the kind of ecological or poetic thinking which Heidegger has been widely read as embracing after 1945. Within the literature on Heidegger, it is notable that it has hitherto only been the sternest critics of Heidegger's politics that have made this claim concerning the shaping force of historical politics on what Heidegger thought and wrote.[19]

For Dugin, Heidegger's middle period, which saw the development of the "history of Beyng" (see below), and which for political reasons has only been fully published since 1998, is Heidegger's most decisive. It "contains the keys to his thought in its entirety" (286). This is true, not despite but *because* of its participation in the Weimar-period "conservative revolution" characterized, as Dugin lucidly recounts, by (1) Germanist "political romanticism", (2) the sense that Europe must return from reason and science to tradition and myth, (3) the imperative of a two-fronted war against liberalism and socialism as twin avatars of modern "nihilism", and (4) "a Nietzschean diagnoses of Europe's humanitarian disease and the need to establish a 'new heroism', etc." (24, 171–4).[20]

Dugin equivocates about the relationship of this ostensibly benevolent "conservative revolution" and Nazism. The latter, he recognizes, drew deeply from the same wells of cultural *pessimismus* as that which animated the conservative revolutionaries, and Heidegger is not the only intellectual who crossed the line into the NSDAP.[21] On one hand, Dugin wants at least exoterically to reject Nazi racism, certainly in its quasi-biologistic, quasi-scientific forms. This is a move which echoes Heidegger himself, and also Julius Evola,[22] and for which today someone like Gregory Johnson has criticized Dugin from the (Alt-) Right.[23] On the other hand, Dugin maintains that Heidegger's post-Jüngerian "National Socialism", rooted in the recovery of existential authenticity and solidary community by the front line soldiers of the Great War, under conditions of total mobilization,

was "perfectly acceptable" (25).[24] Indeed, it was the portal "offering hope" for an 11th hour regeneration of the Occident, just as Heidegger discerned (25, 174–4, 276–7).

With these considerations in view, Dugin understands the relative silence of postwar commentators in liberal countries concerning Heidegger's middle period, since its political message is so militantly anti-liberal (175). At the same time, he rejects all such approaches to Heidegger's *oeuvre*. If the new beginning enabled by the Russian fulfilment of the Heideggerian prophecy is to be achieved, we must cast aside the illusions of the liberal Heidegger commentators which have served to cover over the full epochal radicality of the German thinker's eschatological summons.

Given the tendencies to read only parts of Heidegger in isolation from the whole, and to largely omit the (admittedly until-recently mostly-unavailable) works of the period between 1933 and 1945, the novelty of Dugin's reading of Heidegger starting from the texts of this period must be credited. With a completely opposed normative assessment, Dugin repeatedly confirms the diagnoses of Heidegger's *oeuvre* made by Emmanuel Faye, Charles Bambach, Dominic Losurdo, Johannes Fritsche, François Rastier and other critics of Heidegger's "introduction of Nazism into philosophy".[25] What these thinkers describe but urge readers to condemn, Dugin enjoins his readership to both understand and enthusiastically embrace.

Dugin's opening account of the middle-period "History of Beyng" in Part I of *Philosophy of Another Beginning* will not by itself surprise readers familiar with other, more widely known Western commentators on "the Master of Messkirch". Commentators like Hans Blumenberg have criticized this epic tale of decline and fall as a secularization of Christian eschatology.[26] Dugin openly embraces the idea (104–5). In the preSocratic philosophies, what Heidegger calls "Beyng" was figured as *physis*, that which emerges and grows. The full wonder of the existence of humanity and the world hence remained open to "the Greeks" (93–101, 107–8). With Plato, however, "Beyng" was "catastrophically" refigured as the most universal, abstract attribute of any and all beings (49–50, 83, 144): already less something that "happens" in the human experience of the world, than something humans can stand before and "re-present" (108, 131–4, 295–6). Moreover, Beyng was rethought by Plato in terms of the "Ideas": specific beings, albeit the highest and most eternal beings, participation in which enables the material world to take on order and form (107–8) – rather than the disclosive, "lightning-fast" event or "explosion" of the emergence of sense to human-beings in the world (97). This is the Heideggerian fall (104–5).[27]

From this "first beginning" in the fourth century BCE to the high technology of today, Plato's refiguring of ("ontological") Beyng as a highest "ontic" being then remains essentially unchallenged. Philosophy remains "metaphysics", metaphysics "ontotheology", elevating some particular highest being (like the medieval *Theos*) in place of forgotten *Seyn*.[28] Indeed, making a trans-epochal mockery of what Quentin Skinner has called the fallacy of prolepsis,[29] Dugin takes Heidegger to have shown the inevitable shape of all of Western history. Herein, we are instructed, Being has been refigured as "the Semitic Creator-God" of the mediaevals (113, 296–8), the Cartesian *subjectum* of the early moderns (113–17, 298–9), the "will to power" of Nietzscheanism (123–5, 306–7) and the "*Gestell*" or "standing reserve" of late modern, technological societies (53, 206, 255–75, 389). The single overarching meaning of this evolution is the disastrous decline from the first beginning to contemporary nihilism. This is a fate or destiny (*Geschick*) in

which forgotten Seyn Itself, as Dugin will anthropomorphize, exacts a kind of fateful revenge on its prodigal occidental denizens (224, 257). In a thought whose political implication is vital for Dugin, this fate is deemed by Heidegger to be irreversible, except through the eschatological advent of the "another beginning" of Dugin's subtitle, which he will add must come from the Eurasian East (141–4, 240–1).

The critical credentials of Heidegger's translation of the keynotes of German cultural pessimism into the language of philosophy cannot concern us here.[30] As we have indicated, Dugin's novelty in the Heideggerian literature is to take this epic narrative of decline, and the key Nazi-era texts in which it emerged, and use them as the interpretive key to read both Heidegger's post-war (Part II), and his pre-1933 work (Part III). The terms of Dugin's remarkable reading of Heidegger's later, semi-poetic notion of the "fourfold" or *Geviert* of God(s), mortals, sky and earth in light of the *Seynsgeschichte* will concern us in Part 2 below, since we will see that this reading points most directly to how Dugin mobilizes Heidegger towards his own political ends. We restrict ourselves in the remainder of this Part to his rereading of *Sein und Zeit* in Part III of *Philosophy of Another Being*.

We commented above that Dugin since 2009 has argued that Heidegger's notion of *Dasein*, the latter's German term of art for human beings, as the subject of his own "fourth political theory", Eurasianism. The term "there-being" was used by Heidegger in *Sein und Zeit* as a natural language, German term to describe human beings, in conscious opposition to the technical designations of human nature, like *animal rationale* or *res cogitans*, inherited from Western metaphysics. These other terms are rather "suspended" by Heidegger, with a view to what at this time he still announces as a "phenomenological" attempt to return to things themselves, shorn of the inherited meanings that have accumulated around them.* **Q6**

The term "*Dasein*" is also meant to capture the way in which humans are not simply objects, like tables or chairs – a thought which, alongside Heidegger's language of conscience and guilt, has encouraged many commentators to see in the term an affirmation of specific human dignity, in a more or less post-Kantian register. In their Being, Heidegger explains, *Daseine* have an understanding of Being more widely, however pretheoretical this understanding may remain. Even the most uneducated person does not encounter bare things, "present at hand", and then add meanings to them. Rather, we see things "as" tables, chairs, tools, other people, etc. *Sein und Zeit* then sets out to understand the basic *existentialia* or attributes of *Dasein*, as such a being who, in its being, has an understanding of the "there" around itself: that we are always "in" some cultural-historical "world", characterized by a temporalized "matrix of significations"; that our conception of this world is always shaped by the way that we are "with" others, "thrown" into some community; that we always experience the world in some mood, within a particular language(s), and are always "concerned" with some task or other, in turn pre-shaped by the cultural context into which we are thrown, and the kinds of "possibilities" (tasks, vocations, actions …) this particular world projects as being legitimate to pursue.[31]

The articulation of these *existentialia*, focusing sometimes exclusively on Division I (of the two divisions) of *Sein und Zeit*, has been the task of a good deal of commentary on Heidegger in the post-1945 West.[32] Much of Part III of *Another Beginning* likewise again involves Dugin giving more or less uncontroversial introductions of these *existentialia* to his Russian readers (313–62). His framing approach to the text, in light of the middle

period writings, however pushes Dugin towards two more singular interpretive claims of particular interest with a view to Dugin's Rightist metapolitical project.

First, Dugin reads *Dasein* as not simply a more or less methodological device, introduced by Heidegger on the way to posing the "question of Being" which the Introduction to *Sein und Zeit* moots, but which would only become focal after the *Kehre*.[33] The standard narrative of early-then-late Heidegger indeed argues that what characterizes Heidegger's post-1928 "turn" is a *turn away* from the focus on *Dasein* to a focus on "Being" itself. For Dugin, in light of the History of Beyng, *Dasein* should be seen firstly as a kind of residua: a zero-degree, minimal designation of human beings that, in contrast to other philosophical descriptors, survives the "colossal *nihilation*" of Western metaphysics (293, 314).

One has traditionally seen *Dasein* as an historically neutral term, so Heidegger will speak of Greek, Roman, German *Dasein*, although Heidegger's *Black Notebooks* make clear that he could speak of the Jews as lacking a "world" (*weltlos*), ostensibly a universal exisentialia.[34] For Dugin, at least in its fullest sense, *Dasein* can only emerge at the end of the History of Being, when we are beset by the culminating "nihilism" of the age of *Technik* in which human beings allegedly encounter all beings as empty of any intrinsic significance (314, 317–18, 319–20).[35] In this vein, *Dasein* can be described by Dugin as something that later moderns alone must "live through" or "dwell inside" (294): "*Dasein* is what records nihilism without corresponding to it" (319). It is not a descriptive category, aiming at all human beings, always, so much as "a sudden and explosive discovery of *Being-this*" (319), which presumably may not occur everywhere, or for all. Dramatically, it can only ever be approached, Dugin says, through an "illumination, shock, direct confrontation with the *presence* even before it becomes obvious *what* this *presence* is, *who* encounters it, and *where* it occurs" (293, cf. 294). Whatever else can be said, one struggles to directly place these Duginian remarks concerning *Dasein* alongside the early sections of *Sein und Zeit* in which Heidegger announces his own deployment of this notion at that moment.[36]

Secondly, in line with this rethinking of *Dasein*, there is Dugin's unorthodox reading of Heidegger's key axiological distinction in *Sein und Zeit*: that between the "authentic" and "inauthentic" ways of Being available to *Daseine* (345–85). Again, more liberal commentators have tended to see this distinction both in broadly individualist terms, and in ways more or less divorced from the particular culturo-political world of Weimar Germany in which *Sein und Zeit* was produced.[37] On this liberal or postmodern reading of Heidegger, one recognizes that one must die, that one therefore has an unavoidable responsibility for what one does with one's life. One is thus enabled to challenge the hold of the conformist "*das Man*" ("the They"), with its idle chatter, ambiguity and vacuous curiosity (345–62) over one's understanding of who one is, and what is to be done. One can self-actualize, as we say.

For Dugin, by contrast, the breakthrough to authenticity which comes from the individual's "lightning fast" recognition of their own finitude or mortality ("being-towards-death") (97, 367) is to be read in light of the History of Beyng, in a way which will point directly away from any individualist reading of *Sein und Zeit*. According to Dugin, authentic being-towards-death is above all individuals' means to open up the possibility of the "event" of the "new beginning" that awaits us, optatively, after the final overcoming of the West's total nihilism.[38] Dugin thus stresses the linguistic proximity

in Heidegger's German of *Er-eignis*, this "later" notion, and the *eigene* ("one's own") of *eigentlichkeit* from *Sein und Zeit* (147–8). The mood in which this opening up to what is most *eigene* occurs, Heidegger's *Angst*, Dugin's translators render suggestively as "terror". So what we have in the individual's recognition that s/he will die is "the peaceful triumph of *terror* (*Angst*) faced with clearly contemplated death" (368, see 196).[39] In this revelatory mood (*Stimmung*), Dugin argues, *Dasein* can enter into "dialogue" with "the element of pure *Nothingness*" that Heidegger saw as contained within Seyn, but forgotten by post-Platonic metaphysics. It is a matter of assuming in full the "non-being outside itself, i.e. death" (368, 199). One thereby, and only thereby, becomes fully what one is: "[p]hilosophy gives us the opportunity to think about *Dasein*, the experience of terror – *to dwell inside Dasein*" (294).

More than this, though, what such authenticity thereby reveals is one's essential, destinal belonging within a specific linguistic, historical and cultural collective. Since different peoples have different languages, Dugin follows the "later" Heidegger, "then the people (*Volk*) with their Earth and their Sky (world) always represents a unique attitude to *Seyn-Being*. It is the people, not a single individual (the subject), that is relevant … " (204) As Dugin puts it elsewhere, echoing critics of section 74 of Heidegger's *SZ*, with its invocation of a *Gemeinschaft, des volkes*[40] who see this section as marking the culminating, proto-National Socialist moment in the early text:

> … in this existential understanding of Being (*Dasein)*, there is no atomized existence, meaning parts or individuals, nor a sum of individuals as in totalitarianism (*sic.*). In the Fourth Political Theory, living in association with others means to exist and constitutes Being – living in the face of death. We are together only when we are facing our own death. Death is always personal and, simultaneously, it is something common to us all. It is necessary for us not to talk about totalitarianism, which is merely a mechanical conception of how one should connect all the parts to the whole, but rather about an organic and existential holism. Its name is the People. *Dasein existiert völkisch* … For a Being-before-death, *Mit-sein.* We are the People.[41]

With Dugin's collective reading of authentic dasein as always a *völkisch*, collective with-being, we are ready to turn more directly to the question of how Dugin puts Heidegger's radical anti-liberal, anti-modernist philosophy to his own revolutionary metapolitical purposes.

Part 2. If the World is War, What Then?

As the previous quote illustrates, Dugin participates in many of the common post-war feature of thinkers of the anti-liberal Far Right. One of these is that of understandably, politic-ally denying any suggestion of sympathy with "fascist", "Nazi" or "totalitarian" politics. Certainly, Heidegger's or Dugin's invocation of an "organic" *Gemeinschaft*, in opposition to the soulless *Gesellschaft* of liberal and socialist regimes, was a shared trope amongst thinkers of the German interwar Right, not restricted either to Heidegger or the National Socialists.[42] Nor is the demonstration, which has been well made by Emmanuel Faye,[43] that Heidegger's understanding of *Dasein* in increasingly openly collective, *völkisch* terms after 1927 by itself sufficient to demonstrate the essentially "Nazi" credentials of Heidegger's thought.[44] As we closed Part 1 by seeing, Dugin is himself quite clear that *Dasein* as he sees it is deeply collective, not individual, just as Heidegger's

sternest political critics, Faye, Fritsche, and Wolin have claimed in the face of extraordinary polemics.[45] Different *ethnoi* each have their own distinctive kind of *Dasein* that could be authentically or inauthentically lived. The "Da" in "Dasein", Dugin will stress, means in German "somewhere here", "not too far", between "here" and "there" (315). It cannot be universal, cosmopolitan, "rootless", or far away.

Nevertheless, as for Heidegger, the primary conception of an *ethnos* is not reductively biological or racial, a point Dugin stresses. It is "historical" (*Geschichtliche*) or "destinal" (*Geschickliche*) (67–8), in a thought which has attracted criticism from some in the Alt-Right. "An ethnos is generally any set of individuals or any 'collective': a people, population, nation, tribe, or family clan, based on a common historical destiny", Dugin writes, evoking Heidegger's telltale language of destiny or *Geschick*.[46] Since their histories differ, however, as well as their linguistic, "spatial" or "geographical" foundations, these *ethnoi* are essentially different, just as they are for more biologically based positions.[47] And this ontological postulation is a metapolitical thought with decisive political implications (204).

In some formulations, Dugin will advertise his postulation of ontologically different *ethnoi* as pointing to a benevolent multipolar pluralism, reaching out to the New or postmodern Left – in a move reflective of the French *Nouvelle Droite*, with who Dugin has longstanding relations.[48] On the other hand, as we have already sketched, Russia as an *ethnos* nevertheless retains a specific, elevated destiny amongst the nations.[49] It is this *Geschick* which Dugin thinks Heidegger's narrative of the decline of the West allows to be adequately discerned, and which the actualization of a new Eurasian "authenticity", presumably in some collective form of terror (*Angst*), will optatively consummate. Where Heidegger had wished Nazi Germany to be, there the new Eurasianist Russia shall come to pass. In Millerman's words:

> Eurasianism is not just the idea that Russia is located in physical space between Europe and Asia. It is the idea that … "Russia is a doctrine, Russia is an order, Russia is mysticism, Russia is a cult […] Russia is a sacred concept" [Dugin] – or Eurasia is the place where a spiritual awakening occurs, where a person accomplishes "the journey to the country of the East from the country of the West", effecting "a spiritual return" that is "at the same time physical, historical, political, cultural, intellectual, psychological, and aesthetic" [Dugin].[50]

So, how are we to evaluate the political significance of Dugin's reading of Heidegger, and his open embrace of many of the positions more liberal interpreters of the latter have long denied?: notably, the collective dimensions of *eigentlichkeit*, the proximity of Heidegger's conception of being-towards-death, as its portal, with interwar German discourses celebrating the front experience, as the possible basis for renewed *Volksgemeinschaft*, and above all, Heidegger's deep immersion in the thought-world of the interwar conservative revolution which directly informed the development of National Socialism?

If Roger Griffin's famous definition is to be followed, a thought becomes "fascist" – that so contested, and so polemical a notion – when it posits as the one thing needful a national rebirth (*palingenesis*) from liberal corruption, engendered by malign external and internal agents (like the Jews for Nazism, but immigrants and Moslems today).[51] For this reason, Griffin has been consistently sceptical that we can insulate a benevolent interwar "conservative revolution" from the regimes of Mussolini and Hitler, in contrast to Dugin and others in the *Nouvelle Droite*.[52]

By itself, the sufficiency of Griffin's definition can however be contested in different ways. What concerns us here is that, taken by itself, it overlooks a further, distinct or even "*archê*-fascistic" set of motifs which emerge with great clarity in Dugin's reading of Heidegger. These motifs centre around what can be termed the *polemical militarization* of thought and language.[53] War in such a polemical vision is the deepest truth of human things, and perhaps of all things. As such, the truest or most authentic regime will ~~be one of~~ permanent, total mobilization against the internal and external foes, rather than an inauthentic pining for a peace whose ultimate fruits can only be "decay" and a falling away from the deepest sources (38). Let us now track what Dominic Losurdo calls this "ideology of war" as it emerges in Dugin's reading of Heidegger, and the way that it intersects with Dugin's Eurasianist appropriation of Heidegger's eschatological *Seyngeschichte* to yield extreme political consequences.[54]

In Heidegger's 1933–1934 lectures on Heraclitus' saying "war is the father of all things", Heidegger notoriously designated *Kampf, Krieg* or *Polemos* as "the essence of truth".[55] It is in this context that, in an astonishing passage delivered in the months after the first measures against German Jews had been implemented, the thinker also chillingly calls for a long campaign against the unnamed "inner enemy" of the *Volk* aiming at their "total annihilation" (*völligen Vernichtung*).[56] Whereas the thought contained in this passage continues to be avoided by most liberal Heidegger commentators (the text was for a long time unavailable), when we turn to Part II of *Martin Heidegger: Philosophy of Another Beginning*, we see quickly that Dugin feels no such timidity. His advertised submission to the authority of the greatest philosopher holds true here also, if not above all, remembering that Dugin is himself the author of a 1994 *Philosophy of War (Filosofiia voiny)* (16–18).[57] Especially intriguing is how Dugin places his own most radically "polemical" reflections in this vein in the central Part of his own work, ostensibly on Heidegger' postwar works, which more liberal readers of the latter have tended to see as apolitical, or even as opening a way towards (albeit always somewhat ill-defined) progressive avenues.

Commentators have remained unsure of what to make of Heidegger's enigmatic post-1945 publications.[58] In these, the language of decision, *Dasein*, and authenticity, as well as 1930s preoccupations with the "History of Beyng" withdraw before more poetic ruminations on "building, dwelling, thinking" and what Heidegger calls the *Geviert* or "fourfold" characterizing the *Lichtung* of Seyn-*Being* (192): of God(s) and men, the sky (*Himmel, ouranos*) and the earth (195). It is fair to say that the literal centrality that Dugin accords to the notion of the *Geviert* in Heidegger is also comparatively unusual in the scholarship. "Among the many mysteries surrounding the 'fourfold' is the almost total absence of any attempt by Heidegger scholars to explain what it is", Julian Young has wryly commented.[59] However we interpret the postwar Heidegger's refiguring of the Gods who have "fled" as divinities who have a "need" for "Seyn-Being" and "*Seyngeshichtliche* thought" (at 207), Dugin's account of the fourfold is accordingly one of the more extended, striking exegeses of this enigmatic "fourfold", drawing on the mystagogy of Julius Evola, Jungian numerology, and esoteric Christian symbolism (194, 206). Indeed, and again in contrast to other commentators, Dugin draws our attention to how the motif appeared in Heidegger as early as the late 1930s, in "lecture and book notes for a cycle related to the subjects of *Seynsgeschichte* and *Ereignis*", before being developed in his writings after the fall of the Third Reich. For Dugin, therefore, in another break

with interpretive convention, the fourfold is not properly understood as a "later" Heideggerian notion at all:

> the issue of *Geviert* comprises the culmination for his thoughts of the middle period (1930s-1940s) about *Ereignis* and *another Beginning*. At its core, *Geviert* is a flash illuminating the entire structure (*Gefüge*) of Heidegger's philosophy with a final light. (193)

To clearly see the eschatological light this "flash" casts on Heidegger's work, we must conceive of the fourfold on two "axes", Dugin contends. These axes can be depicted along the lines of Saint Andrew's cross (221) (Figure 1).

The two axes, Dugin then argues, can respectively be described in the following terms. The vertical axis is the axis of "anthropotheomachy" (210–13). It names the "war" or "battle" (*machê*) between men and the Gods "located on the other side of Seyn-Being, on the other side of the sacred zone (*Heilige*)" (222), whatever "war" could designate in this context. The horizontal axis, in its turn, is that of "uranogeomachy" (204–5). This is what Dugin calls the war between "the sky", associated with the opening up and intelligible ordering of human worlds (200) and "the earth", associated with the self-occluding dimension of Beyng, which conceals itself behind the beings it allows to become present. The intersection of these axes form what Dugin evocatively calls the "crosshairs of *Geviert*" (228).

This somewhat discordant catachresis, invoking as it does modern firearms technology, is nonetheless significant. For what lies at this intersection of the anthropotheomachic and uranogeomachic axes *is nothing other than "war" itself.* It is a matter of the Heraclitean *Polemos* central to Heidegger's most militant statements of 1933–1934, but whose ontological centrality is apparently renounced after 1945: "the fundamentally *fourfold beings* outstretched in front of us are created through *the pressure of war*, present in every point, in every section of *Geviert*" (198). In a passage at almost the exact numerical centre of *Another Beginning*, Dugin is clear that this definitively polemical thought is at the absolute heart of what he considers to be Heidegger's thinking. It directly links Heidegger's fundamental ontology and notion of *Ereignis* (what he can call the event of Being's "explosion" (243)) to the earlier axiology of authenticity, disclosed to men "in the terror of absolute loneliness" when facing their own mortality (196):

> War – *polemos* – is the name of Being as *Seyn*. According to Heidegger, herein lies the actual depth of fundamental ontology as such. The roots of understanding Being as *war* traces back to the problem of *Nothingness*. Heidegger defines *Nothingness* in the structure of fundamental-ontology as the "*nihilation of Seyn-Being*" (*das Nichten im Seyn*) … in order to break the illusion of guaranteeing its immortal existence, it [Seyn-Being] turns to *beings* and man with its "nihilating" side. Thus, it proves the mortality of the mortal, the finitude of the finite, and the uniqueness of itself as an event (*Ereignis*) … Separating "Nothingness" and "nihilation"

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

Figure 1. The fourfold or *Geviert*.

> from *Seyn-Being* we lose it in itself, because we deprive it of the opportunity to occur and, therefore, [of] *beings* to be born in battle and for battle … *Geviert* is specifically *Seyn-Being*, which, occurring in *Ereignis*, brings war into everything, establishing tension of the great axes of the world. The world is war. (199, cf. 243)

Some readers of Heidegger have contended that to argue that war or *Kampf* names the essence of truth, at the ontological level, does not imply any philosophical vindication or normalization of "ontic" war and battle, over the gentle civic arts of peace (Figure 2). At the same time, as Pierre Bourdieu long ago analysed, Heidegger's choices of particular ontic phenomena (as here, war and battle) to describe the deepest truths of all phenomena (including, here, those usually opposed to war and battle), nevertheless depend for their force upon the ontic significations they at once draw upon and deniably translate.[60] It is after all war, with its destruction of the norms and distinctions that govern civil life, and not peace, with its pursuits of dialogue, creation, community or love, that we are being invited to reconsider as absolutely basic to what Dugin calls Seyn's "creative power to transform *beings* into *non-beings* in order to bring *non-beings to beings*", whatever this may ontically signify (199).

In fact, as *Philosophy of Another Beginning* proceeds, Dugin's language is far more openly bellicose than Heidegger's after around 1936. In a May 1934 speech to old school colleagues commemorating the first world war, shortly after resigning the rectorate at Freiburg, Heidegger would speak of the need to "burn" decadent liberal culture "into ashes" (at Altman, 2012, 289). Dugin's comparable incendiary animus towards liberal modernity is one of the features which the self-professed Neonazi commentator Gregory Johnson singles out at as most "entertaining" in Dugin's *Heideggerbuch*.[61] It makes Love and Meng's assessment of Dugin's "utter disgust" at Western modernity seem too mild by half.[62] Indeed, in this book as in all other places, Dugin does not raise Western modernity except to denigrate it. But what is significant in *Philosophy of Another Beginning* is how his recourse to Heidegger's vocabulary allows him to at once philosophically sanction and metapolitically radicalize this longstanding animus. Not only will Dugin hence declaim the present postmodern era in Heideggerian as a period of decadence, destitution, planetary idiocy, imbecility, abandonment, desertification, nihilism, total nihilism (e.g. 124–5, 144, 161–9, 250–70). He also sanctions such diagnoses with reference to Heidegger and the *Seynsgeschichte*, within which such Western decay is positioned as unavoidable, at the same time as it represents the nihilistic nadir of human possibility. Following Heidegger, our present *malaise* becomes a fated occidental inevitability looking back to preSocratic Greece. As such, it be overcome only from the outside, and this is where the other Eurasian beginning will come into it.

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

Figure 2. The fourfold or *Geviert*, with *polemos* in the crosshairs

The task of describing what has become of the fourfold today, and the denizens of postmodernity, Dugin tells us, is "terrifying" (295). He has the good grace to "thank God" that Heidegger himself did not live long enough to have to witness what it now falls to Dugin to decry (265).[63] The later modern world has filled the divine sky with satellite dishes mirroring back the vacuous culture industries to an earth denuded of all significance and mystery. The gods have long ago fled, in a process looking back to Plato's crowding of the heavens with ontical Ideas. The very "God" of *das Man* (with the inverted commas) is a lazy, peace-loving *deus otiotis* (357). As for human beings, Dugin darkly echoes Primo Levi when he waxes mordant on the "eviscerated man creating images on the screen … Who is he? After all, we cannot call 'this' a 'man' from any one of the topographies known to us" (264). He is instead a new "chimera of a man-beast": or again, in a standard reference for thinkers of the anti-liberal Right, the "Last Man" announced by Nietzsche in *Thus Spake Zarathrustra*.[64] Such a figure has the dignity of neither "beast" nor "demon" (265). He is at once an *Ubermensch*-technician "loading information streams with data" at the same time as he is a consumer-*Untermensch* enslaved to the endless *ephemera* of "fashion" (268) and engaged in a vacuous "internautic wandering through simulated winking objects; staring at the screen … " (265). At most, such a chimerical animal of the species *homo sapiens* can aspire to modest, wholly unheroic, bourgeois virtues (357). But the civic virtues and practical reason celebrated by ancients or moderns are "worse than poison" for the absent, nameless Gods of the Russian Heideggerian (242)[65] who " … observe men through the light of war … on the other side of *Seyn*-Being" (212).

In the "final light" issuing from out of the violent heart of the fourfold, the distinctions between war and peace, life and death, liberal and totalitarian regimes cannot hold. Dugin's book is silent about how the Nazism Heidegger happened to have embraced engaged in "genocide" of an unprecedented scale, reducing human beings to things in order to then annihilate them and deny their very memory. The term "genocide" is reserved in *Philosophy of Another Beginning* for contemporary Western societies. Through the unfolding of Western metaphysics into the technological age, Western man *in toto* "becomes irritated with natural things (these he tries to exterminate as a class)" (256), Dugin claims. As for the ceaseless becoming of fashion, "the change in things is their death factory, their planned and systematic genocide. Behind the entropy of things, behind the transition to the regime of total *simulacrum*, stands a culture's readiness to completely annihilate *Geviert*" (269). To be sure, it is nonhuman things which are being "annihilated" here, *en masse* (258). But then, the use of these terms (extermination, genocide, death factory) associated for seven decades with the Nazis' mass murder of human beings, in a work on a philosopher closely associated with National Socialism, but to describe the planned obsolescence of objects serves to whitewash these terms' moral, historical and human charge. For those with ears to hear, Dugin is quietly suggesting that the liberal-modern "annihilation" of the fourfold, and non-human things is far worse than killing decadent human beings, just as Heidegger after the war would suggest that the "so-called 'guilt'" for the Shoah paled in the face of Germany's "guilt" for having failed to achieve its historical mission.[66]

Of course, someone might protest that these Duginian word-choices are only ill-advised catachreses, albeit in an author who will find it significant to specify the "Semitic origin of the *Bible*" (110, cf. 113), and that the disastrous translation of Platonism into Christianity

was carried out by the "Hellenized Judaism" inaugurated by Philo of Alexandria (236).[67] In the context of a reading of Heidegger, though, it is impossible not to think of the German thinker's infamous 1949 comment at Bremen equating the "manufacture of corpses" at the death camps with mechanized agriculture.[68] Heidegger's statement depicts the Shoah as the outcome of the same technological rationality, fated by Sein, that enables the mass production of crops and, as the quote continues, the Russian blockade of East Berlin and the American production of Hydrogen bombs. In this way, the ontological perspective of the History of *Seyn* serves quietly to allow the thinker to obviate any differences between the actions of the Nazi, communist and liberal regimes. More deeply, it allows him to deny any moral difference between the systematic mass murder of children, women and men according to a programme of exterminatory antisemitism, and the engineered growth of foodstuffs for mass consumption.[69] In the Germany of 1949, this fundamental ontology hence delivers Heidegger's audience the comforting metapolitical message that the German people are in no way especially guilty for the genocide of European Jewry. This genocide itself is but one fated manifestation of a modern *Technik* whose unfolding also governs and will soon enough undermine the victors.[70]

In a classic study of totalitarian language, Julian Young has maintained that the dehumanization of human beings is one of its most distinct forms.[71] What Dugin's work highlight is how the perspective of the History of Being, by taking aim at the putative ontological grounds of ethicopolitical actions, provides a fertile, possible basis for such dehumanization. Dugin in fact passes beyond his teacher in this register when he claims that in Postmodernity, the earth ceases even to be *Gestell*, a stockpile of standing resources (including "human resources") for technological domination. Now, it has become "a garbage dump" (266); a place where we bury waste, including "bodies who died or were cremated", in a suggestive open disjunction (266). This garbage dump preeminently includes "human garbage" (266): in Dugin's terms, "those very Nietzschean 'people of the End' who 'obtained happiness' … identical people with tattoos and piercing, chatting, drinking beer, using the internet, and doing drugs" (266), "the slaves of tolerant, alienating, nihilating, and poisonous fashions", etc. (278). "The Last Men are men of the End", Dugin intones: "[b]y producing mountains of garbage, they become garbage themselves … " (262)[72] Or else, they are as insects or vermin: "simply swarming amidst its ruins [the ruins of the fourfold], stealing everything they can" (262).[73]

Given Dugin's political perspective, this astonishing dehumanizing hyperbole is telling. Liberals may lecture the Russians and other non-Western peoples concerning "tolerance" and "human rights", it will allow him to argue. They may loudly criticize the infractions non-liberal regimes visit upon their subjects, up to and including the annihilation of political foes or minorities. Yet Dugin's post-Heideggerian appeal to an ontological critique of (post)modernity as the age of completed nihilism, like Heidegger's Bremen remarks, relativizes all distinctions between liberal regimes, with their putative individual and group rights, and the most militant, openly illiberal regimes wherein individuals have no such protections from executive discretion, such as that which has emerged since the millennium in his motherland, Russia.[74] To the extent that subjects within liberal regimes can be presented as already in effect less-than-human, "in essence" soulless, vapid and empty – indeed, "dying without dying" (277), an "unrecognized dying" (258), as Dugin will darkly rhapsodise – any concern becomes void for the greater civil and political rights they may enjoy, relative to subjects in openly authoritarian regimes.

Indeed, the open emergence of regimes that would seek to physically exterminate designated enemies is in essence no worse than liberal nations with their humanitarian lawyers, international courts and globe-trotting NGOs. As we have seen, when viewed through the lens of Duginian-Heideggerian fundamental ontology, the latter's moralism conceals their role in spreading the night of *Seynsvergessenheit*, and preventing the new beginning Heidegger's thought directs us to discern. Any regime that should use war to challenge the present international order may likewise be represented, given Dugin's Heideggerianism, as engaged in the ontological project of liberating us from the "death-giving constructions of man's rational mind" (256). This is an epochal task in whose name almost anything can be forgiven.

By the end of *Another Beginning*, it remains only for Dugin to enjoin "the living breath of *Ereignis*" to "cross out today's world with a life-giving cross", if the decision to enable *Geviert*'s "arrival" is not activated despite the "very presence of Heidegger's philosophy" (278, cf. 241, 257).[75] That such a living breath might breathe death upon thousands or even millions of human beings is a point of little ontological significance, except perhaps as the necessary price that Seyn demands from us to access the other beginning.

Concluding Remarks

Dugin tells us at one point that his task has been to develop Heidegger's implicit political philosophy into an explicit one (114). The singularity of this intention, and the boldness of its execution, ought to command the attention of those engaged in the study of Heidegger's work. Nevertheless, the fate of Heidegger's reception in the West, governed by the political circumstances surrounding Heidegger's *oeuvre*, has meant that until the reemergence of the anti-liberal Right in the last decade, Heidegger's reception has largely been amongst commentators associated with the old and new Left.[76] If Dugin is right, these thinkers have been forced to read Heidegger selectively in order to accommodate his radical antiliberal thinking to the modern political horizons he rejected (175). The post-2014 disclosures of the extent of the proximity of Heidegger's "Freiburg National Socialism" to that of Hitler's regime, including the deep anti-semitism expressed in the *Black Notebooks*, have indeed proved deeply embarrassing for progressive appropriations of Heidegger. In this light, as Backman comments, "it must be said to Dugin's credit that his reading of Heidegger is more comprehensive and in many ways more true to Heidegger's own 'intentions' and visions, than many of the Left Heideggerian interpretations".[77] Heidegger himself was a Right Heideggerian, and reading a figure like Dugin today may be a discomforting but necessary means both to challenge the adequacy of other approaches to the German thinker's work, as well as to prompt hard questions concerning the fundamental orientations opened up, and closed down by post-Heideggerian theorizing.

Our aim here has accordingly been to take Dugin's credentials as a commentator on Heidegger's philosophy unapologetically seriously. We agree with Millerman that "it should be a conclusion, not an *a priori* position, that Dugin's concepts and projects are best understood as fascistic".[78] Nevertheless, as we have tried to show as we moved from Part 1 to Part 2 of our analysis, this conclusion can safely be reached *a posteriori*, when we look at Dugin's reading of Heidegger on authenticity and the *Geviert*, and his post-Heideggerian presentation of the postmodern world in the darkling light of the History of *Seyn*. Of course, the term "fascism" has by now become so polemicized that

it threatens to generate more heat than light, and is perhaps best left aside. What Dugin's reading of Heidegger makes manifest, in any event, is that he is committed to a "philosophy of war", an unrelentingly radical criticism of the decadence of modern culture, which is presented as already "death-dealing" and totalitarian, and whose denizens are depicted as already effectively dead, trash, or subhuman; and moved by an apocalyptic hope for an eschatological "regeneration" of humankind, led by the Russian *narod*[79], if they can be made aware by his own post-Heideggerian prophetology of their own trans-epochal mandate to launch "another beginning". For such a politico-philosophical vision, the term "conservative revolutionary", let alone "traditionalism", is not radical enough.[80]

Notes

1. Due to frequency of citation, all numbers in brackets in the text refer to page numbers from Aleksandr Dugin, *Martin Heidegger: Philosophy of Another Beginning*.
2. Millerman, "Alexander Dugin's Heideggerianism."
3. See Love and Meng, "Heidegger and Post-colonial Fascism"; Pégny, "Alexandre Dougine."
4. See Laruelle, *Eurasianism and the European Far Right*.
5. Dugin, *The Rise of the Fourth Political Theory*, 113
6. Ibid., 2.
7. Dugin's translator presents the term in italics and with capitals, so we will follow that convention here.
8. See Göpffarth, "Rethinking the German Nation as German Dasein."
9. Love and Meng, "Heidegger and Post-Colonial Fascism," 3, 11.
10. Millerman, "Alexander Dugin's Heideggerianism," 6.
11. Cf. Altman, *Martin Heidegger and the First World War*.
12. Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 96.
13. Love and Meng, "Heidegger and Post-Colonial Fascism," 6–7.
14. Pégny, "Alexandre Douguine," 117; Love and Meng, "Heidegger and Post-Colonial Fascism," 2.
15. Millerman, "Alexander Dugin's Heideggerianism," 4–5.
16. Love and Meng, "Heidegger and Post-Colonial Fascism," 3.
17. Cf. "In interpreting Platonic philosophy, one has said rather often that Plato gave up the idea of the good in his late period. This way of thinking is typical of philosophy professors, who change their view every year and think that with this, they are developing. What is essential in a philosophy is that it is the same from its inception to its end." Heidegger, "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," GA 36/37, 204.
18. Pégny, "Alexandre Douguine," 122–3.
19. Cf. Faye, *The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy*; Rastier, "Le rouge et le brun"; Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots*.
20. Umland, "Fascist Tendencies," 15; cf. Woods, *The Conservative Revolution*.
21. See Bourdieu, *Political Ontology*, 8–39; Morat, *Von Der Tat Zur Gelassenheit*.
22. See Bell, "Julius Evola's Concept of Race."
23. Johnson, "Dugin on Heidegger."
24. Cf. Altman, *Martin Heidegger and the First World War*.
25. See Faye, *Introduction of Nazism*; Altman, *Martin Heidegger*; Bambach, *Heidegger's Roots*; Bourdieu, *Political Ontology*; Losurdo, *Heidegger and the Ideology of War*; Fritsche, *Historical Destiny and National Socialism*; Raster, "Le rouge et le brun"; Rastier, *Naufrage d'un prophète*; Knowles, *Heidegger's Fascist Affinities*.
26. Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age,* 191–2.
27. Cf. Love and Meng, "Heidegger and Post-Colonial Fascism," 4–5.
28. Dugin differentiates between Being (*Sein*), which he associates exclusively with the "metaphysical" understanding that all beings are grounded in some highest being (after the

Platonic "catastrophe"), from Beyng (*Seyn*), the idiosyncratic spelling Heidegger gives to his own "non-metaphysical" understanding of the Event or emergence of sense. Heidegger begun using the later spelling to single out his own conception of "Beyng" in the 1930s. See 77–9, 109–10.

29. I refer to the classic Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," esp. 22–3.
30. Bourdieu, *Political Ontology*, 75–87, cf. 42–53, 57–8, 67–9; Knowles, *Heidegger's Fascist Affinities*, esp. 39–49.
31. The preceding sentence of course summarizes the key claims of Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §§ 9–39 and 45.
32. See for a classical example Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*. The difficulty of explaining the contents of Division 1, and the length of the academic semester, also legislate in practical favor of teaching only the first 45 sections of Division 1 of *Being and Time*. With the exception of the sections on the They (*Being and Time*, secs. 26–27, 34b-38), which are readily presented as wholly "ontological" designations, rather than "ontological" translations of characteristic claims of the interwar Right (the liberal public sphere as vacuous, relativistic, characterized by endless inconsequential chatter and spiritual depthlessness, etc.), the contents of this Division is largely non-political, unless the student is already versed in the history of the interwar conservative revolution.
33. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §§ 9-1-4, 9–11.
34. See Di Cesare, *Heidegger and the Jews*, 161–9.
35. Love and Meng, "Heidegger and Post-Colonial Fascism," 8.
36. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §§ 9–11.
37. See esp. Fritsche, "From National Socialism to Postmodernism."
38. See Pégny, "Alexandre Douguine," 123–4.
39. Ibid., 124.
40. Heidegger, *Being and Time,* § 74, 436; See Pégny, "Alexandre Douguine," 124–5; Wolin, *Politics of Being*, 32–46; Fritsche, *Historical Destiny*, 1–28; Faye, *Introduction of Nazism*, 15–18.
41. Dugin, *Eurasian Mission*, 83.
42. Fritsche, *Historical Destiny*, 68–148; Losurdo, *Ideology of War*, 11–35.
43. Faye, *Martin Heidegger*.
44. "By itself", which is not to deny Faye's larger assessment, on the basis of the many other features of Heidegger's texts he and other critics have unearthed and examined.
45. See Faye, *Martin Heidegger*, 15–18; Wolin, *Politics of Being*, 53–66; Fritsche, *Historical Destiny and National Socialism,* 1–148.
46. Dugin, *Eurasian Mission*, 16.
47. We note but cannot pursue the real question of whether a racism being metaphysically based differs in its political implications from biologically founded positions, as well as the *de facto* and *de jure* questions concerning whether biologically-based forms of racism exclude a "spiritual" or phenomenological dimension.
48. Noordenbos, "Ironic imperialism"; Love and Meng, "Heidegger and Post-Colonial Fascism," 10; Backman, "Postmetaphysics and the Global Order," 3.
49. Laruelle, "Aleksandr Dugin," 19–20; Love and Meng, "Heidegger and Post-Colonial Fascism," 9–10.
50. Millerman, "Alexander Dugin's Heideggerianism," 26; cf. Dugin, *Another Beginning*, 128–9.
51. Griffin, "Palingenetic Core," 97–122.
52. Griffin, *Fascism*, 351–7. This is another Hindenberg line in the apologetic literature which Griffin contests.
53. Blain, "Fighting Words"; Ferrari, *Rhetoric of Violence*.
54. Losurdo, *Heidegger and the Ideology of War*, esp. 11–35.
55. The revealing equivocation surrounding *Krieg* or *Kampf* is present in the original, being Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 92–3; see Heidegger at Altman, *Martin Heidegger and First World War*, 290.

56. Heidegger, *Being and Truth*, 92–3; Heidegger at Altman, *Heidegger and First World War*, 289–90; Pégny, "Alexandre Douguine," 125–6.
57. See Laruelle, "Aleksandr Dugin," 21–2.
58. See Mitchell, *The Fourfold*.
59. Young, "The Fourfold," 373.
60. Bourdieu, *Political Ontology*, 75–87, see 42–53, 57–8, 67–9.
61. Johnson, "Dugin on Heidegger."
62. Love and Meng, "Heidegger and Post-Colonial Fascism," 6.
63. Ibid.
64. For the predominance of this Nietzschean diagnosis of liberal subjectivity in fascist and protofascist writing, see Landa, *Fascism and the Masses: The Revolt against the Last Man, 1848–1945*
65. See Perry, "Rhetorical Functions of Infestation Metaphor," 232.
66. See Knowles, *Heidegger's Fascist Affinities*, 24, 173–5.
67. Pégny, "Alexandre Douguine," 120–2.
68. Heidegger's "Enframing" ["Die Gefahr"] lecture, cited for example at Rockmore, *Heidegger's Nazism*, 241.
69. See Rastier, "Heidegger aujourd'hui: ou le movement reaffirmé," 281–90.
70. See Sharpe, "Wherewith to Draw Us," 90–1; Daniel Morat, "No Inner Remigration," 661–79; Olick, In the House of the Hangman, 297–320; Payk, "A Post-Liberal Order?," 681–98.
71. Young, *Totalitarian Language*, 73–114. See Livingstone Smith, *Less Than Human*,138–52; Musloff, "What Role do Metaphors Play"; Szilagyi, "Dangerous Metaphors."
72. See Livingstone Smith, *Less Than Human*, 138.
73. See Perry, "Rhetorical Functions of the Infestation Metaphor," 230–2; Livingstone Smith, *Less Than Human*, 138–52; Musloff, "What Role Do Metaphors Play"; Szilagyi, "Dangerous Metaphors."
74. Hence, critics of the illiberal actions of other states are the true totalitarians, and we will be free to describe every feature of liberal public life as "totalitarian", as Dugin exemplifies in *Another Beginning* (eg: 349). Cf. Bar-On, *Where Have All the Fascists Gone?*, 6, 185–6.
75. Love and Meng, "Heidegger and Post-Colonial Fascism," 3.
76. Backman, "Postmetaphysics and the Global Order," 9–10.
77. Ibid., 10
78. Millerman, "Alexander Dugin's Heideggerianism," 2.
79. Ibid., 12–14.
80. Shekhovtsov and Umland, "Is Aleksandr Dugin a Traditionalist?"

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