

World 3 is the world of the creative products of the human mind. The assertion is that none of these worlds underlie the others, but rather all are equally fundamental in the representation of the truths of the universe.

Summarizing my main criticism of this pluralistic point of view, I argued that one cannot define the domains near the lines of demarcation between these three worlds in a logically consistent fashion. That is to say, there is no logically consistent prescription for *precisely* locating the lines of demarcation between Popper's three worlds, that together, pluralistically, represent the actual universe.

In this addendum, Popper also repeats his earlier appeal to Gödel's theorem⁵ to claim an intrinsic incompleteness in the laws of the universe, a claim that is also made in the body of this text. I have criticized this view earlier (see note 4 above) by saying that Gödel's theorem, which is actually a theorem in arithmetic, is only as true as the axiomatic basis of it. But these axioms are not necessarily in correlation with the axioms that underlie the laws of nature!

It is my claim that there is nothing to prevent the scientist from postulating at the outset a closed universe, *including himself*, and then deducing in theoretical fashion the asymptotic properties of this universe, when he may approximate his own inclusion in it as very weakly coupled to the rest of the universe—as though he were *almost* looking down on the universe as an outside observer. The point here is that so long as the 'observer' is still coupled to the universe, no matter how weakly, the predictions of this view (of a closed universe) would differ in some applications from the predictions of a model of an open universe, in which the 'observer' is totally uncoupled from the outset, though he may be allowed to interact weakly in the course of his act of observing. Indeed, it is the former view that is close to Einstein's philosophy of general relativity, as a theory of the universe as a whole, including all of its manifestations, from the domain of elementary particles to that of the universe as a whole—that of cosmology. The latter view of an open universe, the view of Popper, is close to the contemporary view of the quantum theory. In my view, the verification of one of these approaches *or* the other will depend on further theoretical analyses, from first principles (rather than only from phenomenological studies) as well as further experimentation, that would be crucial to the validity of a fundamental theory of matter that is based on determinism or one that is based on indeterminism.

5 K. R. Popper, 'Indeterminism is not Enough', *Encounter*, 40, 1973, 20-26.

BOOK REVIEWS

Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Volume 2: The Antinomies of Classical Thought: Marx and Durkheim. BY JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. 564. \$39.50*

The four volume work of which this book is a part has been praised as one of the great monuments of theoretical scholarship in sociology of the century. The praise has come largely from the older generation of students of Parsons and Merton. A great deal of dispraise has come from Alexander's own generation. Alan Sica's (1983) brilliant, biting review of Volume I speaks for many of Alexander's peers. Volume II is likely to be even more controversial. This volume begins the substantive task of the text, the reinterpretation of the 'theoretical logic' of the classical sociologists, a reinterpretation governed by the intention of transcending the errors and limitations of the 'presuppositional' reasoning of the classical thinkers. For Alexander's sociological audience the second volume is the beginning of what really counts, and Volume II is indeed quite a different affair from the first, 'philosophical' volume: the prose tightens, and the air of getting down to work is palpable. Alexander's effort, his hard thought and wide reading is apparent. The result is a volume that begins to live up to its billing and its *magnum opus* trappings. The sheer volume of material that Alexander has digested in order to write the book begins to work for him, rather than, as in the first volume, against him. The range is matched only by Anthony Giddens, and this comparison is perhaps the root of Alexander's appeal to his mentors: he appears to take back the high ground of sociological theory lost by American sociological theory, during the seventies, to Lukes and Giddens. Giddens, indeed, figures for these American sociologists as a kind of competitor for legitimacy. Parsons was irritated by Giddens, and Alexander, in his turn, is snide (e.g., p. 491). The Giddens leitmotif is continued in both volumes, and perhaps must be said to mark a major fault line in contemporary sociological theory.

This volume is concerned with the 'presuppositional' thought of Marx and Durkheim, and proposes interpretations of each figure in terms of his 'commitments' to various solutions to what Alexander considers the two core presuppositional questions in sociology, the problem of the 'voluntarism' of individual action and the problem of the source of social order. For Alexander, the story of the presuppositional development of these thinkers, the story he is concerned to tell, is the story of their attempts to resolve ambiguities created by their conflicting presuppositional commitments. In the case of Marx, the development begins with a youthful notion of collective order as 'civil society' (i.e., an order sustained by normative commitment), goes through various twists and turns, and arrives at a deterministic collectivism in which 'order' is a result of the coercive forces of the market. The backbone of this story is, of course, familiar: It is the story of Marx renouncing his bourgeois upbringing and youthful Hegelianism and becoming a more or less mechanistic economic determinist.

Alexander disagrees with attempts to deny that Marx went through fundamental changes in the course of his intellectual development. Indeed, the narrative structure of Alexander's analyses depends on his showing that the thinkers he

* Professor Turner's review of Volume I is at 15, 1985, 77-82.

discusses are in the grip of deep internal presuppositional conflicts which drive them hither and yon. For reasons that I will explain more fully below, this narrative method itself makes the relation of Alexander's results to ordinary historical interpretation highly ambiguous.

In the book, Alexander discusses a wide range of Marx's writings, stressing the juvenalia, for it is here that Marx is most 'normative', and gives a large number of explications in which the aim is to translate Marx's language into Alexander's own language of presuppositional commitment. In Alexander's scheme, the two 'presuppositional' problems can be dealt with by certain standard solutions: Action can be construed as instrumental-rational or not, and collective order can be fundamentally normative or coercive. He assays the writings of Marx for signs of commitment to one choice or another, or for signs of ambivalence, as well as for attempts to 'conflate' the problems of action and order, i.e., to reduce one to the other. Some of the discussions of the later texts, where Alexander sticks to the task of exposition, are quite good—clearly written, forceful, compact, and true to the texts. These passages show Alexander's talent as a simplifier and explicator, a talent shared with his nemesis Giddens. After each exposition, he translates the results into his 'presuppositional choice' schema, and goes on to another text, or to a discussion of the biographical and historical circumstances of the period, or to a kind of psychohistorical discussion of the ambivalences driving Marx in one presuppositional direction or another. The rhetorical effect of the discussion depends heavily on the piling up of material, and not at all on either the blinding insight or the knock-down argument, and this is even more true of the longer Durkheim discussion. Alexander does not deploy a particularly wide array of weaponry in dealing with texts: there is none of the heavy artillery of an Althusser or Lukács, and none of the careful sniper shooting of analysts like Norman Geras, whose recent *Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of a Legend* (1983) focuses with great effect on the sixth of Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*. Instead, Alexander deploys light artillery, generates a lot of fire, and ignores the principle of concentration of force—something like U.S. Army counter-insurgency strategy. Sometimes the complexity of the exposition, its main rhetorical tactic, gets away from him, and the thread is lost.

Alexander is not a serious Marx scholar, and the discussion of works after the 1844 manuscripts—usually the starting point for serious interpretation—is schematic. There are some howlers. In discussing alienation, he says that Marx has a thesis of the 'exceptionalism' of capitalism (p. 29; cf. also p. 31), and the text suggests that Alexander thinks it is Marx's view that man is alienated *only* under capitalism. This 'exceptionalism' thesis, Alexander claims, 'provides him... with the basis for his radical ideological indictment. In capitalism, he argues, species-being has been replaced by "natural man". This reversal has occurred because of alienation' (pp. 29-30). This is a revealing error, for it indicates a limit to Alexander's apparently vast range of reading. No one who knew the parallel discussion in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* of lordship and bondage and the consciousness of the bondsman would imagine that this could have been Marx's meaning. This suggests that Alexander's acquaintance with the traditional canon of social and political thought is not deep, and that the apparently vast reading he has done is largely, as the bibliography also suggests, within the limits of sociological writing. And this impression is supported by his peculiar elevation of the opuscula of certain obscure social scientists to the level of 'important works'. Bertell Ollmann, an American political scientist of modest reputation, is transformed by Alexander into the author of 'the most detailed and original investigation into Marx's social philosophy' (p. 14).

The Durkheim discussion is a more important test for Alexander, for in the case of Durkheim there is no set of convenient received opinions to restate in 'presuppositional' terms. Durkheim is also a tougher test from the point of view of his primary audience, American sociological theorists oriented to the mainstream sociology of the American Sociological Association, an audience to which Durkheim is a living presence—as Marx, especially the Marx of the Parisian intellectuals, is not. In another way, however, Durkheim is an easier test, for Durkheim, like Weber and Parsons, employs a thinly veiled Kantian terminology like Alexander's own, and interpretation need not be as forced.

Alexander's thesis is that Durkheim started out entertaining the possibility of an 'individualist' account of morals, as well as entertaining the alternative of a 'collective' account. By the time of the *Division of Labor in Society*, he had turned to 'materialism', i.e., a sociology devoted to showing 'the moral consequences of material organization' (p. 296). According to Alexander, this turn led to unpalatably 'deterministic' consequences, so Durkheim shifted back to his earlier emphasis on ideas, in part under the influence of new ways of thinking about the relation between 'individual subjectivity and collective structure'. Alexander places great stress on a letter written in 1897 by one of Durkheim's associates to another, in which a conversation with Durkheim is reported. According to the letter, Durkheim 'explains everything, at this moment, by religion' (Besnard 1983, p. 64). Alexander takes this to be an accurate assessment of Durkheim's final views, of which *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* is the most prominent expression. Like Marx, Durkheim's final views 'conflated' the problems of action and order, but for Durkheim the conflation was a 'tendency', and not complete, for he never quite eliminated the last strand of utilitarianism and instrumental action from his social vision. Durkheim did, however, eliminate 'materialist' explanation from his social vision, and for Alexander this is decisive, for it shows that he failed to achieve a 'multidimensional' solution to the 'presuppositional' problems.

As in Volume I, the meaning of the term 'multidimensional' is not specified, and this is another rhetorical feature of the project: The criticisms Alexander makes are underwritten by the suggestion that there is a 'solution' to the presuppositional problems, which Durkheim and Marx failed to arrive at. This places a great burden on the argument, the burden of coming up, in subsequent volumes, with a convincing solution meeting these vague specifications. The 'problem', as Alexander has gradually set it up—largely by hints rather than direct statements—contains a paradox which his hinted 'solution' merely deepens. The positions he rejects for their one-dimensionality are, in large measure, reductive programmes: Marx, at least as Alexander construes him, aims at the reduction of modern social life to bourgeois coercion; Durkheim aims at a grand reduction to religion. Put differently, these writers seek to unmask social life and reveal it to be, under the mask, something else. One approach to these thinkers might be to reject the project of reductive 'unmasking'. For example, one might argue that the authority of the Crown was in part a matter of the coercive power exercised in its name, in part a matter of the collective ideals it signified, in part a matter of the theatre of the Royal, its theological trappings and claims, and so on. Bagehot says something like this. One might then say, 'There is no problem of "what is the monarchy really"', for it is all of these things'. Alexander, however, cannot argue thus. The point of his volumes is to show the significance of, and recapture, the 'presuppositional problems' of these thinkers. So, in effect, he defends the *project* of reduction, and considers the crucial 'presuppositional' issue to be *what* one chooses to reduce to—coercion, 'normation', calculation, or whatever. To give, as he hints he will give, a

'multidimensional' solution to this problem would amount to taking the mask off of social life, but finding under it all the things that were on the mask in the first place. The pointlessness of this is concealed by the fact that he proposes to substitute a slightly altered and systematized theoretical vocabulary for the vocabulary of ordinary social description—so that we use words like 'normation' and 'internal order' instead of 'patriotism', 'civility', 'common courtesy', and so on. But if unmasking civility and finding bourgeois coercion can be regarded as an advance (of some sort), unmasking civility to find voluntarist normation seems like an advance into obscurity.

ALEXANDER'S METHOD OF INTERPRETATION

Alexander's interpretive technique, which this volume is the first to reveal, has, as I have suggested, some peculiarities. Alexander quotes a passage from Marx—sometimes a famous one, sometimes an obscure one—and interprets it in terms of the commitments it shows with respect to the 'presuppositional' questions. The quoted passages often diverge from what Alexander says about them, as in these short examples.

For collective order to be complementary to freedom, it must be internal order: 'As society itself produces man as man, so it is produced by him'. [p. 39.]

'The ruling ideas are nothing more', Marx asserts, 'than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas'. Social ideas, then, are the result of a calculation to defend material position. . . . [p. 42.]

In these examples, the nuggets Alexander gleans from the quotes are simply not there in the texts: The first remark suggests nothing about 'internal order', the second nothing about 'calculation'.

There are similar instances in the Durkheim discussion. Indeed, one eminent Durkheim scholar is said to have remarked, in response to one of the papers on Durkheim which preceded this volume, that Alexander had invented a new genre, 'the self-refuting paper', for his own quotations refuted the interpretations he placed on them. Usually the interpretations are not blatantly wrong. But they are often forced, and the egregiousness of the blatant ones raises a question about Alexander's intent. These questions are not easily settled by Alexander's own sayings about interpretation. Echoing the rhetoric of the current revolution in literary criticism, he remarks that: '... readings are always, implicitly, polemical statements. They are not simply objective empirical assessments but are launched from presuppositions of their own. Every reading, then, is a critical reading, a theoretical argument written from a particular perspective. . . .' (p. 3). If we were to take this remark seriously, we might construe Alexander himself as giving a 'strong misreading' of the classical sociologists. Parsons' *Structure of Social Action*, Alexander's model, might be construed this way as well: The interpretive premiss of the book, that Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, and Marshall were all converging on a general theory of action, is an absurdity, but an interesting and sometimes revealing one, as Parsons uses it. Similarly, perhaps, for Alexander's 'presuppositions' schema.

Yet this is clearly not how Alexander sees his own interpretations. When he is discussing specific texts, he uses a quite different rhetoric. Other writers on Marx, he says, '... have seen what they would like to see, what they hoped Marx would say rather than what he actually said' (p. 193). Elsewhere he says that other people's styles of narrative 'distort the true nature of sociological thought' (p. 6). In comments following both these remarks, the 'true nature' of the texts is apparently equated to Alexander's reading. 'Crisis' narratives are accused of

'creating a much tighter relationship between cognitive and ideological elements than theoretical logic actually allows' (p. 6). Similarly, 'To establish the truth of the matter [of what Marx actually said] we must scrutinize the presuppositions by which Marx's account is informed' (p. 193). One way to take these remarks is to treat Alexander as a kind of essentialist, and to take all his uses of 'actually' and 'the true nature' as something analogous to Frege's assertion sign. One might even say that he is a particular kind of essentialist, who, like believers in a *philosophia perennis*, regards certain problems as eternally there. Alexander often talks this way, as when he says of the 'presuppositional problems' that 'all the different combinations that can logically be constructed by matching individualistic or collective ideas about order and instrumental or normative understandings of action have, in fact, been proposed as legitimate and correct' (p. 292). He also says things congenial to this 'perennialist' interpretation when he criticizes others for not reaching the presuppositional level, and more generally when he grants the 'presuppositional problems' ontological status apart from mere talk. But there is more to it than this.

Traditional interpreters practise a polite fiction that allows them to speak of texts in a psychological way, e.g., in such usages as 'Smith believed that. . . .' or 'Smith was torn between the claim that. . . and the conviction that. . . .' without meaning anything more than 'the text says. . . .' or 'sometimes the text seems to suggest the contrary view that. . ..'. Alexander seems to go beyond this. When he portrays Durkheim as struggling with materialism, for example, the description of the struggle relies on a distinctive psychological language which makes it appear that the conflicting 'presuppositional commitments' he is concerned with are not merely 'in the text' (or accessible to us through the rational reconstruction of authorial intent from the text) but are *psychological facts* with causal consequences for the thinkers' doings and development, even of their fears and anxieties. Durkheim, we are told, argues for a voluntaristic moral order, but 'quickly begins to worry that this moral order is simply not collective enough. . . the fear that individual choice and social control are irreconcilable. . . leads Durkheim away from his vision of a voluntaristic moral order' (p. 102). Elsewhere, we are told that: 'presuppositional ambivalence, this constant back and forth movement between aggressive assertion and just as aggressive denial, colored Durkheim's writings from the beginning of his career' (p. 231). So Alexander treats Durkheim's ambivalence as a psychological rather than merely a textual reality, as when he says that it 'moved him to anger and dismay' (p. 231).

The basis of these usages is the view that:

Theories are vulnerable not only to historical and empirical 'pressure', but to a very different source of strain as well. They change partly because of internal strains that are generated purely on the conceptual level itself. If his presuppositional position is one-sided, or only weakly multidimensional, the theorist may feel uneasy, and he will experience the need to introduce certain qualifications. [p. 300.]

This claim underwrites the strange style of textual interpretation Alexander practises. For him, texts are *not* the ultimate object of interpretation—they are only clues to the deeper presuppositional goings-on of the authorial mind. It should be evident that this is a radical departure from familiar traditions of interpretation, in which the author's specific choices of language are themselves the central clues to his intentions or to the meanings of the text. It does not matter to Alexander that Marx carefully avoids using the Kantian vocabulary of Alexander's 'presuppositions'. He knows that these problems are *really* what is causing Marx or Durkheim to go in one direction or another. So his only difficulty is to construct the texts as clues to these deeper goings-on.

216 Book Reviews

If we read Alexander in the light of his assertions about the relativistic character of interpretation, we can sense that quibbles with his readings of specific texts or with the oddity of his Durkheimian image of ideas pushing thinkers into 'anger' and 'anxiety' are beside the larger point. Indeed, the errors and peculiarities underline that the central claim of the text is to produce a novel unifying interpretation. Alexander's primary audience, academic sociologists, will judge this interpretation as a 'usable past', and ignore Alexander's thesis that the textual essences and the usable past are one and the same. For this audience the test will be primarily a matter of successful use, and only secondarily a matter of the fine points of the original texts.

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Psychology and Psychiatry Today: A Marxist View. BY JOSEPH NAHEM. New York: International Publishers, 1981. Pp. 264. \$15.00

Over the years, International Publishers, closely associated with the C.P. U.S.A., has had occasion to throw its hat into the ring on the subject of psychiatry and psychology. Its last effort, about twenty years ago, was a lengthy discussion, by Harry K. Wells,¹ of the relative merits of psychoanalysis and Pavlovian behaviourism, with the rather foregone conclusion that psychoanalysis in general and the Oedipus complex in particular were 'unscientific'. This most recent effort, by Joseph Nahem, is rather more broad in scope and seems intended for an audience much less familiar with the nuances of personality theory and the methodological problems psychology as a discipline entails. This, in itself, is no defect; books intended for a general audience that explain Marxian views on psychology and psychotherapy are certainly desirable. What is in question is whether someone committed to the proposition that the Soviet Union is the worker's paradise, and that everything in it, including its therapeutic institutions, are the cat's pyjamas is capable of providing any worthwhile commentary on this extraordinarily difficult and contentious subject.

The general layout of the book is relatively simple. It is divided into three parts, the first of which is a general and critical account of the various psychologies and psychotherapies commonly found in the capitalist countries in general and the United States in particular. The main emphasis here is on the weakness of these theories, some of which he accurately describes as 'fads'. The thrust of his criticism, however, is not so much on particular theories as the assumptions which underlie them, in particular introspection and insight as useful categories in the study of the psyche.

¹ See, in particular, Harry K. Wells, *Sigmund Freud: A Pavlovian Critique*. New York 1960, the middle and most important of his three-volume study. In passing, and for what it is worth, the dedication reads, 'In Memory Of My Mother Who Loved Science Readers may make of this what they will.'

The second part is more critical and is concerned with the social consequences of psychology as a scientific discipline as practised in the west. The emphasis here is on the reactionary implications of much of the so-called research that has, in the past few years, come into vogue. His comments on the re-emergence of theories based on the idea of racial and sexual temperament and on the role of psychotherapy as an integrative and socially repressive instrument are trenchant and, at times, quite accurate and to the point, though, one would suggest, hardly original. The British communist philosopher, John Lewis has covered much the same territory in his excellent and critically alive work, *The Uniqueness Of Man*.²

The final section, and by far the weakest, is an effort to compare western and Soviet approaches to the problem, much, as one would expect, to the advantage of the latter. The general tenor of the book is a defence of Soviet behaviourism in psychology and psychotherapy and the 'materialist' and 'scientific' nature of the intellectual method on which it rests. Tied in with this, is the counter-hypothesis that introspective therapies are false and part of a wicked plot on the part of the capitalists to mislead the workers from their historically destined path. These scant notes are simplifications, but not inaccurate ones, of Mr. Nahem's convictions on the matter.

Roughly speaking, virtually everything in this book falls into one of two categories; the false and the trivially true. For instance, the long section devoted to criticism and censure of the theories of Shockley, Jensen and others on the heritability of intelligence is reasonably well organized and intelligently presented. There is very little here that a Marxist could take exception to. In fact there is relatively little here that a Marxist would not have met with before; the whole, in fact, being little more than a summary of left criticism on the subject over the past decade. It is on the other questions under discussion, all of them of enormous consequence, that the book's major failings lie. On the strengths and weaknesses of psychoanalysis, on the relative importance of insight and learning in the therapeutic situation, on the problems involved in the statistical study of competing therapies, on the appropriate method, from a Marxian point of view, of conceiving the nature of human personality, on the relative merit to be given socio-genetic and bio-genetic explanations of the psychoses, and, finally, what epistemic and ontic assumptions ought to be brought to bear on the study of the person: it is in these areas that the book is a resounding failure.

Running silently through its pages, is the unspoken assumption that the reductive scientism, representationalist epistemology and metaphysical materialism of Lenin's *Materialism And Empirio-Criticism* and, allied to it, Pavlovian stimulus-response theory, is the highpoint in the evolution of human thought. 'Thus', Mr. Nahem writes, 'Marxist materialism holds that psychological theories which separate the mind from the brain, or which deny the primacy of the brain and nervous system are unscientific. The work of Pavlov and others in physiology is viewed as a confirmation of materialist epistemology since it confirms the reliance of mental processes on physiological processes.'

It is almost as though Mr. Nahem has not heard of the vast and extended debate in the foundations of Marxism and its implications for individual and

² John Lewis, *The Uniqueness of Man*, London 1974. The curious thing about Lewis' book is that where it is accurate it is not consistent with the theoretical premisses of Leninist communism that, supposedly, Lewis as a member of the British Communist Party would be committed to. It belongs more to 'third force' or 'humanistic' psychology than anything else. Whether this says anything about the relative degree of intellectual freedom in the British Communist Party is an open question.

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DES
SCIENCES
SOCIALES

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juin 1985

CONTENTS

- | | | |
|------------------------|-------------------|---|
| 125 | W. H. Dray | Narrative versus Analysis in History |
| 147 | Fred D'Agostino | Ontology and Explanation in Historical Linguistics |
| 167 | Trevor Pinch | Theory Testing in Science—The Case of Solar Neutrinos |
| <i>Discussions</i> | | |
| 189 | Warren Schmaus | Reasons, Causes, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Knowledge |
| <i>Article-Reviews</i> | | |
| 197 | Fred Matthews | Ontology and Chicago Sociology: A New Approach to the History of Social Science |
| 205 | Mendel Sachs | <i>The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism</i> |
| <i>Reviews</i> | | |
| 211 | Stephen P. Turner | <i>Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Volume 2: The Antinomies of Classical Thought: Marx and Durkheim</i> by Jeffrey C. Alexander |
| 216 | Murray Smith | <i>Psychology and Psychiatry Today: A Marxist View</i> by Joseph Nahem |
| 221 | Jeanne Schuler | <i>Lukács, Marx and the Sources of Critical Theory</i> by Andrew Feenberg |
| 224 | Hans Bakker | <i>Positivism and Sociology: Explaining Social Life</i> by Peter Halfpenny |
| 228 | Brian Baigrie | <i>Science and Society</i> by Joseph Agassi |
| 232 | Paul Diesing | <i>Creating a Dialectical Social Science</i> By Ian I. Mitroff and Richard O. Mason |
| 235 | Sheldon Richmond | <i>Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Volume 2: The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences</i> by Roy Bhaskar |

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