Barack Obama (b. 1961) speaks in two registers and slides between them at will. One is the seminar room. He qualifies, he weighs, he sets up the other side’s argument before he answers it. The other is the pulpit. He builds, he repeats, he lets the room rise with him. The trick of his public voice is that he carries both at once. He sounds like a constitutional law lecturer who learned his rhythm in a Black church.
The pause does much of his work. He stops mid-sentence and holds the silence longer than most speakers dare. The hold signals control. It tells the listener that the man is thinking, not performing, that the next word arrives because he chose it. Reporters used to clock the length of his pauses. The cool comes from there.
His diction shifts with his audience. Before a policy crowd he reaches for the conditional, the subordinate clause, the careful “on the one hand.” Before a campaign crowd he strips the sentences down and leans on anaphora. “Yes we can.” “Fired up, ready to go.” He repeats a phrase at the head of clause after clause until the structure itself does the persuading. He code-switches by the room, and he does it without visible seams, which is part of why some listeners trust him and others distrust the ease.
The manner is calm to the edge of cool. He rarely shouts. He prefers understatement and the dry aside. He plays the straight man in his own jokes and lands the timing like a stand-up. The self-deprecation buys him room to be earnest later, since a man who can mock himself seems less likely to be selling something.
He built a persona around reconciliation. The man above the fray. The one who sees both sides and names the reasonable middle. He cast himself as post-partisan in 2004 and again in 2008, the adult in the room who could lower the temperature. That pose won him enormous loyalty. It also drew the sharpest complaints against him, from his own side, that the professor’s evenhandedness read as detachment, that the soaring cadence promised more than the governing delivered, that the reconciler’s instinct to weigh both sides looked like a refusal to fight.
Truth in his case sits in the gap between voice and result. The voice could outrun the man. The rhetoric of 2008 set a height that no presidency reaches, and he knew it, and he said so later in flatter, more rueful tones. The memoirist in Dreams from My Father shows the searching, reflective register under all of it, the writer turning himself over in his hands. That book is the source of the public voice. The cadence on the stump is the same cadence on the page, slowed down and read aloud.
The Set
Around him stand the Chicago friends who knew him before the Senate, the operatives who built the campaigns, the young men who wrote his words, the foreign policy hands who ran his wars and his deals, and the cultural figures who lent him glamour.
The Chicago core holds Michelle Obama (b. 1964), Valerie Jarrett (b. 1956), Marty Nesbitt (b. c. 1962), and Eric Whitaker. They share a city, a class, and a memory of Obama as a young lawyer. Jarrett guards the inner door. The operatives form the next ring: David Axelrod (b. 1955), David Plouffe (b. 1967), Jim Messina (b. 1969), Robert Gibbs (b. 1971), Dan Pfeiffer (b. 1975), and Rahm Emanuel (b. 1959), who brought a profane energy the set tolerated for his use. Denis McDonough (b. 1969) ran the staff with monkish discipline. Reggie Love (b. 1982) carried the bags and shared the court.
The word men define the set’s self-image. Jon Favreau (b. 1981), Ben Rhodes (b. 1977), Jon Lovett (b. 1982), and Tommy Vietor (b. 1980) wrote and spoke for the president, then left to tell the country how the room felt. Rhodes wrote The World as It Is. Obama wrote Dreams from My Father, The Audacity of Hope, and A Promised Land. The foreign policy hands include Samantha Power (b. 1970), who wrote A Problem from Hell, her husband Cass Sunstein (b. 1954), Susan Rice (b. 1964), and the attorney general Eric Holder (b. 1951). Pete Souza (b. 1954) photographed the whole thing and later turned his archive into a rebuke of the man who followed. The cultural allies orbit at a glittering distance: Oprah Winfrey (b. 1954), Bruce Springsteen (b. 1949), Jay-Z (b. 1969), and Beyoncé (b. 1981). Ta-Nehisi Coates (b. 1975) wrote the set’s most searching essays about its hero, then broke from the mood.
What they value reads off their résumés. They prize the credential above almost everything. Columbia, Harvard Law, the Law Review, Princeton, the Rhodes. The school you attended marks your worth and admits you to the room. They prize reason, deliberation, and the cool head. They admire the man who masters his temper and answers the heckler with a joke. They believe good words move history. They want to reform institutions and keep them standing. They hold the long view, the arc that bends toward justice, a line Obama took from King who took it from a nineteenth century preacher. They treat vulgarity as a moral failing.
Their hero is the reasonable man. He rises by merit from a hard start. He reads books. He keeps his composure when others rage. He holds two ideas at once and refuses the cheap certainties. He bridges factions and speaks to the better angels. He bends the arc. Obama embodies this hero, and the set measures itself against him. The villain plays on fear. He runs loud where the hero stays calm, crude where the hero stays eloquent, tribal where the hero claims the universal. Donald Trump (b. 1946) arrives as the perfect anti-hero, and much of the set’s later energy organizes around him.
Status in this set runs on proximity and credential. The first question concerns the room. Were you in it. Did you brief him. Did he ask your read. The memoir converts proximity into money and standing, so the set produces memoirs at a steady rate. The second currency runs on verbal facility. The set rewards the quick line, the dry aside, the reference that lands. The media men built a house on knowingness, on the pleasure of hearing insiders explain the game. The third currency runs on cultural fluency. You signal taste through the right music, the right reading, a casual command of the basketball court. Coolness ranks high. Earnestness without irony reads as a small embarrassment.
Their normative claims hold that progress is real, that inclusion widens, that America tells a story of growing welcome, and that norms and decency deserve protection. They hold that reason governs better than passion. Their essentialist claims run quieter and cut deeper. They believe some men carry decency in the grain and others lack it. They believe a patient man can reach the common ground that lies beneath disagreement. They believe their own temperament, schooled and calm, fits them to govern, and that their opponents’ temperament unfits them. They believe education reveals worth, and the belief shades into a conviction that the credentialed deserve the room and the rest do not.
Their moral grammar speaks in the cadence of the sermon and the seminar. They say our better angels. They say the arc bends toward justice. They say this is not who we are. They say hope and joy and decency. They reach for empathy as the master virtue and for cruelty as the master sin. They strike the opponent on temperament more than on argument. The man across the aisle reads as unserious, a clown, a danger to the norms. The grammar flatters the speaker as the adult in the room. It carries warmth and condescension in the same breath, and the set rarely hears the second note.
The Great Delusion
In his 2018 book, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:
My view is that we are profoundly social beings from the start to the finish of our lives and that individualism is of secondary importance… Liberalism downplays the social nature of human beings to the point of almost ignoring it, instead treating people largely as atomistic actors… Political liberalism… is an ideology that is individualistic at its core and assigns great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This concern for rights is the basis of its universalism—everyone on the planet has the same inherent set of rights—and this is what motivates liberal states to pursue ambitious foreign policies. The public and scholarly discourse about liberalism since World War II has placed enormous emphasis on what are commonly called human rights. This is true all around the world, not just in the West. “Human rights,” Samuel Moyn notes, “have come to define the most elevated aspirations of both social movements and political entities—state and interstate. They evoke hope and provoke action.”
[Humans] do not operate as lone wolves but are born into social groups or societies that shape their identities well before they can assert their individualism. Moreover, individuals usually develop strong attachments to their group and are sometimes willing to make great sacrifices for their fellow members. Humans are often said to be tribal at their core. The main reason for our social nature is that the best way for a person to survive is to be embedded in a society and to cooperate with fellow members rather than act alone… Despite its elevated ranking, reason is the least important of the three ways we determine our preferences. It certainly is less important than socialization. The main reason socialization matters so much is that humans have a long childhood in which they are protected and nurtured by their families and the surrounding society, and meanwhile exposed to intense socialization. At the same time, they are only beginning to develop their critical faculties, so they are not equipped to think for themselves. By the time an individual reaches the point where his reasoning skills are well developed, his family and society have already imposed an enormous value infusion on him. Moreover, that individual is born with innate sentiments that also strongly influence how he thinks about the world around him. All of this means that people have limited choice in formulating a moral code, because so much of their thinking about right and wrong comes from inborn attitudes and socialization.
If John J. Mearsheimer (b. 1947) has it right, the set’s portrait of itself comes apart.
The set sells one story above all others. A man can reason his way out of his tribe and stand on universal ground. Obama serves as the proof of concept. He crosses races, crosses classes, reads everyone’s books, holds the contradictions, and arrives at principles that bind all men everywhere. The human rights creed gives the set its foreign policy and its moral confidence. Samantha Power builds a career on it. Cass Sunstein builds a science on the reasoning individual whose errors a smart planner can correct. The whole set treats reason as the faculty that lifts a man above the herd.
Mearsheimer takes the herd as the truth. He puts socialization and inborn sentiment first and reason last. If he has it right, the set carries the order of operations backward. Reason does not steer these men. Their milieu steers them, and reason supplies the speeches afterward. The value infusion arrived in childhood, in the striving home, the good school, the seminar room, long before the critical faculty woke. By the time these men could think for themselves, the thinking stood already furnished. The credential they worship does not reveal a free mind. It certifies a completed socialization. Harvard Law School turns out a tribe with shared sentiments and a shared accent, and the tribe mistakes its accent for the voice of reason.
Their universalism reads, under Mearsheimer, as one tribe’s local creed dressed as human nature. The rights of man, the citizen of the world, the arc that bends. These read as the totems of a particular Western elite, learned the way any boy learns the gods of his people. The set cannot see this because the creed tells them they have no tribe, that they speak for everyone. Mearsheimer says no one speaks for everyone. He says the lone universal individual is a fiction, and a society built on the fiction keeps crashing into the social truth.
The foreign policy follows. Power’s responsibility to protect, the Libya intervention, the faith that a man can carry rights into other men’s countries and build them a liberal home. Mearsheimer reads these as the delusion in his title. Other peoples hold their own tribes, their own sentiments, their own gods, and they resist the gift. The set keeps offering and keeps failing and keeps explaining the failure as a problem of execution rather than a problem of the premise.
The set codes its enemy as tribal. Obama’s line about men who cling to guns and religion does the work in one breath. The opponent clings. The set transcends. The opponent feels. The set reasons. Mearsheimer dissolves the line. Both are tribes. The set’s universalism serves as its war paint. Trumpism names its tribe and fights for it without shame, and the set finds this grotesque because it cannot admit that its own bonds run on the same fuel. The loyalty to Obama, the memoirs that turn proximity into gold, the in-group knowingness of the media men, the long friendships out of Chicago. These are the tribal attachments Mearsheimer puts at the center of human life. The set lives the tribal truth every day and preaches the individualist creed every day, and rarely marks the gap.
There sits the irony Mearsheimer hands them. They form the most tightly bonded tribe in American public life, and their bond is the belief that they have risen above tribe. Their hero, the reasonable man who masters his passions, runs on the faculty Mearsheimer ranks dead last. Strip the flattering self-portrait and you find what you find in any human group. Men shaped by their people, moved by sentiment, reaching for reasons after the heart has already chosen.
One honest reply stays open to the set, and Obama himself sometimes reached for it. He governed with more restraint than his creed demanded. He mocked the stupid war. He hesitated in Syria. That caution looks like a man who half suspected Mearsheimer might have it right and could not say so to his own people, because the creed forms the tribe’s bond, and a man does not burn the thing that holds his people together.