{"id":175822,"date":"2026-03-16T17:27:44","date_gmt":"2026-03-17T01:27:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=175822"},"modified":"2026-03-17T09:34:49","modified_gmt":"2026-03-17T17:34:49","slug":"decoding-the-institute-for-national-security-studies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=175822","title":{"rendered":"Decoding The Institute for National Security Studies"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv sits at a particular point in Israel\u2019s alliance ecosystem. If you look at it through David Pinsof\u2019s Alliance Theory<\/a>, the key question is not \u201cwhat is the think tank\u2019s ideology?\u201d but \u201cwhich coalitions does it help coordinate, and which audiences does it signal to?\u201d
\nINSS functions as a bridge institution. It connects three overlapping alliances: The Israeli security establishment, Western policy elites and global academic and think-tank networks.
\nBecause it sits at the intersection of these coalitions, its language and positioning are carefully calibrated. The first layer is domestic Israeli alliance maintenance. INSS is closely tied to Israel’s former security leadership. Many fellows are ex-IDF generals, Mossad officials, and national security bureaucrats. That creates a credibility alliance with the Israeli defense establishment. Its publications frame arguments in the language of national security consensus. The function is not just analysis. It stabilizes elite agreement inside Israel. When a retired general at INSS says a policy is necessary or dangerous, it signals to the Israeli political class that responsible security elites lean a certain way. This protects the prestige of the security establishment as a governing coalition.
\nThe second layer is the alliance with American policy elites. INSS writes heavily in English and participates in Washington think-tank circuits. It collaborates with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Atlantic Council, Brookings, and major U.S. universities. The implicit message is that Israel’s security establishment shares the analytic language and norms of the American national security community. U.S. political support is Israel’s most important external alliance, and INSS helps translate Israeli security thinking into terms acceptable to Washington elites.
\nThe third layer is prestige within the global think-tank hierarchy. INSS hosts large international conferences and publishes policy journals. These are status signals. In Alliance Theory<\/a> terms, status markers help maintain coalition credibility. If INSS were seen as purely partisan or propagandistic, it would lose access to Western academic networks. So the institution performs a style of analysis that looks technocratic, data-driven, and sober. That style is part of the alliance maintenance.
\nThe fourth layer is controlled criticism inside the Israeli coalition. INSS sometimes criticizes Israeli government policy, including right-wing governments. This signals to Western elites that Israel’s strategic community is pluralistic and self-critical. But the criticism stays within the boundaries of the Israeli security consensus. It rarely challenges core premises such as Israel’s strategic alliance with the United States, the centrality of military deterrence, or the legitimacy of the Israeli security establishment. The criticism reinforces coalition legitimacy rather than undermining it.
\nThe fifth layer is narrative authority during crises. During wars or regional crises, think tanks like INSS compete to supply the interpretive frame. Journalists, diplomats, and analysts rely on these frameworks. Whoever supplies the frame gains coalition influence. If policymakers quote INSS reports, that strengthens the institute’s status inside both Israeli and Western alliances. That is why INSS invests heavily in rapid analysis during conflicts.
\nThe sixth layer is its position within Israel’s think-tank ecosystem. The Begin-Sadat Center aligns more with nationalist and right-leaning political networks. The Israel Democracy Institute connects more to liberal legal and constitutional elites. INSS sits closer to the traditional Israeli security establishment, reflecting the worldview of generals, intelligence officials, and strategic planners. Its authority rests on professional military prestige rather than ideological activism.
\nThe seventh layer is the management of dissent within the professional class. The institute functions as a transition zone for high-ranking officers moving from active duty to the private or political sectors. This is a personnel pipeline that ensures ideological continuity. By providing fellowships to recently retired generals, INSS keeps these individuals within the responsible security coalition. This prevents them from becoming rogue critics who might undermine the establishment from outside. The institute captures their prestige and ties it to the institutional brand.
\nThe eighth layer is the credentialing of the next generation of policy elites. Internships and junior fellowships serve as a vetting process. Young analysts learn the specific linguistic markers and analytic frameworks that the Western policy community requires. This ensures that the future managers of the Israel-U.S. alliance speak a common language. The institute does not just coordinate existing elites. It manufactures the next cohort. The institute’s reports provide the justifications that allow the Israeli security coalition to maintain its standing with American partners. The logic of the analysis is often secondary to its function as a tool for social coordination. That the institute uses data-heavy, sober language is a strategic choice to meet the justification requirements of the global think-tank network.
\nTo distinguish INSS further within the Israeli ecosystem, you can look at the alliance logic of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA) and the Kohelet Policy Forum.
\nBESA coordinates an alliance between the academic world and the more hawkish, nationalist elements of the Israeli political and military elite. Where INSS leans into the national security consensus of the traditional establishment, BESA signals toward a more realist and Zionist agenda. Its primary function is to provide intellectual respectability to policies that diverge from the liberal internationalist norms INSS often upholds. BESA scholars coined the term “mowing the grass” to describe a strategy of containment. This terminology justifies a long-term military status quo, signaling to a domestic nationalist audience that the establishment has a coherent, unsentimental plan. It coordinates a coalition that prioritizes military self-reliance and remains skeptical of the two-state paradigm.
\nThe Kohelet Policy Forum operates on a different logic entirely. It coordinates a coalition of conservative, libertarian, and religious-nationalist actors. Unlike INSS, which seeks to stabilize existing elite agreement, Kohelet was built to disrupt it. Its primary audiences are the political right and its American libertarian donors. Kohelet’s work on judicial reform is a massive coordination signal. By providing the legal frameworks and policy papers for these reforms, it allowed disparate right-wing groups to align behind a single, concrete program. This is a textbook example of creating a patchwork narrative to unify a coalition.
\nThrough the lens of Mercier and Sperber, the difference among these three institutions lies in the specific justifications each provides. INSS provides justifications that appeal to the Western policy class: rational, technocratic, and sober. BESA provides justifications that appeal to the nationalist realist class: unapologetic, Zionist, and security-centric. Kohelet provides justifications that appeal to the ideological right: libertarian, anti-elitist, and majoritarian. Each institution uses a style of reason optimized to keep its specific coalition together. The data and facts they select often serve as tools for social coordination within their respective networks rather than as ends in themselves.
\nDuring the current 2026 war with Iran, the coordination roles of these institutions have grown more distinct. The February 2026 strikes under Operation Roaring Lion and the subsequent death of Ali Khamenei created a high-stakes environment where each institution must supply a narrative that holds its respective coalition together.
\nINSS has focused on the Israeli-American alliance. Since the February 28 strikes, it has produced flash surveys showing that 81 percent of the Israeli public supports the operation. This is not just data collection. It signals to the Trump administration that the Israeli home front is unified and prepared for a sustained conflict. INSS also provides the technocratic justification for the decapitation strategy. By framing the war as a necessary move to stop nuclear weaponization before a 2026 point of no return, it translates Israeli military actions into a strategic logic the American security establishment can endorse. Its reports currently emphasize the functionally defeated status of Iranian missile production to justify the ongoing costs of the war to Western skeptics.
\nBESA has taken a different approach, focusing on the broader regional coalition. It pushes the narrative that Iranian drone and missile strikes on Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, have collapsed regional neutrality. Its publications frame the war not as an Israeli-Iranian conflict alone but as a regional liberation from Iranian intimidation. This justification coordinates a coalition between Israel and Sunni Arab states. By highlighting Iranian President Pezeshkian’s apologies to neighbors as a sign of regime weakness, BESA signals to the Israeli right that nationalist realism is winning and that the regional order is being rewritten in Israel’s favor.
\nKohelet, less focused on tactical military analysis, coordinates the coalition interested in what comes after. Its influence appears in the push for a paradigm shift that moves beyond containment toward regime change. Kohelet signals to its domestic base that the current war vindicates their long-standing critique of the old security establishment’s caution. It provides the legal and political justifications for expanding war aims. Where INSS works to stabilize the consensus, Kohelet uses the state of exception created by the war to argue for a permanent restructuring of Israel’s strategic posture and its internal governance.
\nEach institution justifies the war differently. INSS frames it as a calculated preemptive strike to preserve the U.S.-led order and eliminate an existential nuclear threat. BESA frames it as a regional turning point that forces Arab states into a definitive alliance against a collapsing revolutionary regime. Kohelet frames it as a moral and ideological necessity to finally destroy the head of the octopus and validate a more assertive nationalist doctrine. Each of these justifications works to prevent defection within a specific coalition. INSS uses its data to keep the liberal wing of the security alliance from calling for a premature ceasefire. BESA uses its analysis to keep the nationalist alliance focused on the total defeat of Iranian regional influence. Kohelet keeps the ideological right committed to the most expansive vision of what the war might achieve.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv sits at a particular point in Israel\u2019s alliance ecosystem. If you look at it through David Pinsof\u2019s Alliance Theory, the key question is not \u201cwhat is the think tank\u2019s ideology?\u201d … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[183,37],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-175822","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-iran","category-israel"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/175822","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=175822"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/175822\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":175878,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/175822\/revisions\/175878"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=175822"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=175822"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=175822"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}