Large news organizations learn from the last war. They rarely evaluate each conflict in isolation. Instead they carry forward the moral lessons they believe they failed to apply previously.
\nBefore the first Gulf War in 1990-91, much of the elite press was skeptical of military intervention. The Vietnam experience still dominated elite thinking. Journalists were wary of being seen as cheerleaders for war and questioned the administration’s motives and strategy.
\nThen the war ended quickly with a decisive coalition victory. That outcome created a perception in parts of the press that the skepticism had been excessive and that American military power had been underestimated.
\nBy the time of the 2003 Iraq invasion the media environment was different. The shock of 9\/11, strong elite consensus in Washington, and the desire not to appear unpatriotic all reduced adversarial scrutiny. Many major outlets accepted claims about weapons of mass destruction and gave substantial airtime to pro-war voices. After the war turned disastrous, journalists and editors openly concluded they had failed to challenge the government strongly enough.
\nThat failure produced a reputational trauma inside the profession. It became a cautionary tale taught in journalism schools and repeatedly invoked in newsroom discussions.
\nSince then, elite media outlets lean toward skepticism whenever military intervention is proposed. The Iraq experience created a standing narrative template: leaders exaggerate threats, intelligence gets politicized, and wars launched with confidence spiral into costly quagmires.
\nBecause of that institutional memory, coverage of new conflicts often begins from a critical frame. Reporters ask about unintended consequences, escalation risks, civilian casualties, and opportunity costs early in the reporting cycle. The pattern reflects a kind of institutional pendulum. After each major conflict, the press recalibrates its posture to avoid repeating the mistake it believes it made last time.
\nThe incentives are clear. Being too supportive of a war that later becomes a disaster damages a media outlet’s reputation far more than being overly cautious about a war that later succeeds. That asymmetry pushes the system toward skepticism after major failures. The result is a recurring cycle where journalists react to the last reputational lesson rather than approaching each new conflict fresh.
\nCharles Taylor’s idea of the buffered self describes a person who experiences themselves as insulated from the world by reason, procedure, and internal reflection. The buffered individual believes that outcomes are largely shaped by ideas, arguments, and decisions made through rational deliberation rather than by fate, tribe, or raw power. Elite institutions in the modern West are built almost entirely around that psychological model. Academia, law, journalism, diplomacy, and policy analysis all operate in environments where status comes from verbal and analytical performance. People gain prestige by writing, speaking, debating, and producing frameworks. Words become the currency of the system.
\nIf you live in a world where influence flows through reports, memos, speeches, panels, and articles, it feels natural to assume that rhetoric and logic are the primary drivers of events. People who succeed in those environments develop a strong belief that careful language and reasoning shape reality. That helps explain the elite fixation on terms like “reckless rhetoric,” “dangerous language,” “strategic signaling,” “dialogue,” and “narrative.” In their professional ecosystem, words really do have consequences because reputations, alliances, and policy positions get negotiated through language.
\nBut that worldview drifts away from how most people experience politics. Outside the buffered professional environment, individuals tend to interpret events through more immediate forces such as loyalty, identity, fear, honor, and material incentives. Words matter, but they usually come second to power relationships and lived conditions.
\nThe result is a persistent gap between elite interpretation and mass perception. Elites often treat rhetoric as causal. Ordinary people often treat rhetoric as commentary on underlying forces.
\nThe difference also ties into the social position of elites. People who live in stable, highly institutionalized environments are shielded from many forms of risk and violence. Because their daily lives revolve around discussion and negotiation, it becomes intuitive to see discourse as the main engine of change. The world appears governable through reasoned conversation and correct framing.
\nThat emphasis on language serves a practical function too. Words are the primary tool elites use to coordinate large coalitions. Shared narratives, moral vocabulary, and intellectual frameworks help maintain cooperation among people who may never meet face to face. So the fetishization of words is not just intellectual style. It reflects the ecology of elite life. Their power flows through institutions where language is the central instrument for building alliances, signaling status, and managing conflict.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Large news organizations learn from the last war. They rarely evaluate each conflict in isolation. Instead they carry forward the moral lessons they believe they failed to apply previously. Before the first Gulf War in 1990-91, much of the elite … Continue reading