When I lose at life, I retreat as I deflate and I make myself smaller. My choices are more cautious. I spend more time alone. When I win in life, I expand and try new things. I’m happy to talk to everyone. I feel good and I want to help people. The world is my oyster. <\/p>\n
This maps onto geopolitical theory. In international relations, we often talk about states as if they were people\u2014we say they have “egos,” they feel “humiliated,” or they seek “prestige.”<\/p>\n
My experience of Expansion vs. Contraction captures the history of the Islamic Republic better than most academic papers.<\/p>\n
Here is how my experience with winning and losing applies to Iran\u2019s current trajectory.<\/p>\n
For two decades, Iran felt like it was “winning at life.” The US removed their enemies (Saddam in Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan). Their proxies were winning in Lebanon and Yemen. They felt invincible. They tried new things. They projected power all the way to the Mediterranean. They weren’t cautious; they were adventurous, sending General Soleimani everywhere to shake hands and build empires. They felt “big,” so they made themselves bigger.<\/p>\n
The events of the last two years\u2014the collapse of Assad, the decapitation of Hezbollah, and the direct strikes on Iranian soil\u2014were a massive psychological blow. The regime “lost.” Now we are seeing the contraction. Iran is pulling back its tentacles. They are no longer talking about “conquering Jerusalem” or controlling four Arab capitals. They are talking about survival. This is the “Fortress Iran” concept. They are abandoning the grandiose dream of a regional empire to focus strictly on the core: keeping the regime alive in Tehran. They are making their world smaller to make it defensible.<\/p>\n
The move toward a nuclear weapon is the ultimate act of a cautious, frightened entity. It is a tool for someone who doesn’t want to fight, but wants to be left alone. It says, “Don’t touch me.”<\/p>\n
When I lose, I spend more time alone. This is exactly what is happening to the regime internally.<\/p>\n
When a group (or a person) feels confident, they are open to outsiders\u2014they trade, they negotiate, they interact. When they feel threatened or “deflated,” they engage in extreme status closure.<\/p>\n
The regime is currently purging anyone who isn’t a hardliner. They are isolating themselves from their own population (the “outsiders”) and retreating into a small, tight circle of true believers (the “insiders”).<\/p>\n
Just as isolation can be dangerous for a person’s mental health, it is dangerous for a state. A regime that spends all its time “alone”\u2014talking only to its own generals, ignoring the world, stewing in its own paranoia\u2014tends to make miscalculations. They lose the reality check that comes from interacting with others.<\/p>\n
In psychology, when a person with a big ego suffers a defeat, it\u2019s called a “narcissistic injury.” They don’t just get sad; they get rageful and they hide.<\/p>\n
Iran is currently suffering a massive national narcissistic injury. The “Caution” is their attempt to prevent ever being hurt or humiliated like that again. They are building a nuclear wall so that no one can ever see them “lose” again.<\/p>\n
Iran is losing and contracting. Following the collapse of the Assad regime in 2024 and the degradation of Hezbollah’s capabilities during the June 2025 war, Iran’s traditional “forward defense” strategy\u2014relying on regional proxies to deter attacks\u2014has effectively dissolved.<\/p>\n
The regime is now pivoting inward, facing three likely trajectories as we move into 2026.<\/p>\n
1. The “North Korea” Trajectory: Nuclear Weaponization<\/p>\n
With its regional proxy network (the “Axis of Resistance”) dismantled or decentralized, Iran has lost its conventional deterrent. The logic of the regime likely dictates that the only remaining guarantee of survival is a nuclear umbrella.<\/p>\n
The Breakout Decision: Since the June 2025 conflict damaged the Parchin and Shahroud facilities, Tehran faces a binary choice: negotiate from a position of weakness or sprint for a bomb. The current trajectory suggests a covert acceleration. The regime may calculate that declaring itself a nuclear state is the only way to prevent further direct strikes by Israel or the US.<\/p>\n
Risk of Preemption: This trajectory carries the highest risk. As Iran attempts to rebuild its centrifuge capacity, the window for a second, more definitive Israeli or US strike is wide open. Expect high-tension “nuclear brinkmanship” in early 2026.<\/p>\n
2. The Succession Crisis: A Militarized Transition<\/p>\n
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei\u2019s increasingly rare public appearances and reported health issues have turned the succession question from a theoretical future event into an active, behind-the-scenes power struggle.<\/p>\n
The Rise of Mojtaba: The trajectory points toward a hereditary succession favoring Mojtaba Khamenei, backed heavily by the IRGC. This would likely finalize the transition of the Islamic Republic from a clerical theocracy to a military dictatorship with a clerical veneer.<\/p>\n
Internal “Status Closure”: To secure this transition, the regime is engaging in aggressive “status closure”\u2014rigidly defining who is “in” and who is “out.” We are seeing a purge of pragmatists and traditional conservatives from key positions, concentrating power within a tight circle of security elites. This ensures loyalty during the transition but alienates the merchant class and the broader public, as seen in the recent Bazaar strikes.<\/p>\n
3. The “Garrison State” Economy<\/p>\n
The economic situation has shifted from “managed decline” to acute crisis. The record devaluation of the rial (hitting new lows against the dollar this week) and the strikes in the Tehran Grand Bazaar signal that the traditional social contract\u2014obedience in exchange for subsidies\u2014is broken.<\/p>\n
Resource Hoarding: The government’s 2026 budget indicates a shift toward a war economy. Resources are being diverted from civil infrastructure and subsidies to the security apparatus and missile reconstruction.<\/p>\n
Social Explosion: With the “safety valve” of emigration tightening and purchasing power collapsing, the likelihood of spontaneous, leaderless unrest is high. Unlike the 2022 protests, which were ideological, the next wave will likely be driven by sheer survival anxiety (food, fuel, medicine).<\/p>\n
The most probable immediate trajectory is a defensive consolidation. Iran will likely avoid direct conventional war in 2026 while it furiously attempts to rebuild its missile stocks and enrich uranium. The regime is effectively retreating behind its borders, turning into a “fortress Iran” that is more repressive domestically and more reliant on nuclear blackmail internationally.<\/p>\n
While Israel achieved a clear tactical victory in the 12-Day War of June 2025, most serious analysts view the strategic outcome as inconclusive, or even a long-term liability.<\/p>\n
The “victory” narrative relies on the visible destruction of Iranian hardware. The “doubt” narrative relies on the fact that the Iranian regime\u2014and its nuclear ambition\u2014survived.<\/p>\n
Here is why the “win” is heavily debated:<\/p>\n
Israel\u2019s stated (or at least implied) maximalist goals were to trigger regime collapse and permanently “decapitate” the nuclear program. Neither happened.<\/p>\n
Regime Survival: The strikes humiliated the IRGC and killed senior commanders, but they did not break the regime’s grip on power. In fact, as often happens, the external attack allowed the hardliners to rally a “defense of the motherland” narrative, temporarily silencing domestic dissent.<\/p>\n
Nuclear Knowledge Persists: You can bomb centrifuges (which Israel did at Natanz), but you cannot bomb engineering knowledge. Intelligence assessments from late 2025 suggest Iran has already moved surviving assets to deeper, harder-to-strike locations and is sprinting toward weaponization because they now feel they have nothing left to lose.<\/p>\n
One of the most alarming takeaways for Israeli defense planners was the economic asymmetry of the missile exchange.<\/p>\n
Interceptor Depletion: During the 12 days, Israel burned through a significant portion of its Arrow and David\u2019s Sling interceptor stockpiles.<\/p>\n
Cost Ratio: Iran fired relatively cheap, mass-produced ballistic missiles. Israel engaged them with multimillion-dollar interceptors. By the end of the conflict, Israel was dangerously low on munitions. The war ended in a ceasefire largely because Israel could not sustain the economic and logistical rate of fire needed to defend its cities for another month. Iran proved it could bankrupt Israel’s air defense shield simply by volume.<\/p>\n
While the “Ring of Fire” (Hezbollah, proxies in Syria\/Iraq) was shattered, it wasn’t erased.<\/p>\n
Hezbollah’s Survival: Hezbollah took a beating that set it back a decade, but it retains thousands of fighters and is already engaging in “strategic dormancy”\u2014hiding, smuggling, and rebuilding.<\/p>\n
The Syrian Gap: The collapse of the Assad regime was a blow to Iran, but it also created a chaotic vacuum that Israel now has to police. Instead of a stable enemy, Israel now faces a somalized border region that is harder to deter because there is no central address to threaten.<\/p>\n
Paradoxically, the war may have saved the Iranian regime from total diplomatic isolation.<\/p>\n
Victim Narrative: By striking Iranian soil directly and arguably “starting” the high-intensity phase, Israel allowed Tehran to frame itself as a victim of aggression in the Global South. This has complicated US efforts to build a global coalition for “snapback” sanctions.<\/p>\n
Saudi Hesitation: The Arab states, seeing the ferocity of the missile exchange, have pulled back from normalization with Israel, fearing they will be caught in the crossfire of Round Two.<\/p>\n
Israel won the battle (June 2025) decisively, destroying key infrastructure and proving technological dominance. But it likely lost the war of strategic positioning. It is now stuck in a “waiting game” for a nuclear-armed Iran that is more paranoid, more militarized, and arguably more dangerous than it was before the first shot was fired.<\/p>\n
The chances of a democratic overthrow of the clerics in the immediate term are low, but the chances of a regime transformation (a coup from within) are high.<\/p>\n
The “clerical regime” as we knew it\u2014a theocracy run by religious scholars\u2014is arguably already dead. It is being replaced by something else.<\/p>\n
Here is the breakdown of the likely scenarios for overthrow or change:<\/p>\n
The IRGC pushes the Clerics aside. This is the most distinct trajectory for 2026. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) now controls the economy, the nuclear program, and domestic security.<\/p>\n
The Logic: The clerics are now a liability. They are the face of unpopular religious restrictions (hijab laws) that spark riots. The IRGC commanders, who view themselves as nationalists rather than just Islamists, may decide that to save the state (and their own financial empires), they must shed the clerical skin.<\/p>\n
The Mechanism: This likely happens during the succession of Supreme Leader Khamenei. The IRGC will install a puppet (likely Mojtaba Khamenei) or a military council, effectively ending the rule of the Marja’iyya (religious establishment) and turning Iran into a secular military dictatorship with Islamic window dressing\u2014similar to Egypt or Pakistan, but more ideological.<\/p>\n
Economic collapse triggers a security defect. Revolutions usually succeed not when the people are angry, but when the police stop shooting.<\/p>\n
The Trigger: As noted in the Bazaar strikes, the economy is contracting violently. If the regime cannot pay the salaries of the lower ranks of the security forces (the Basij and conscripts), discipline will fracture.<\/p>\n
The “Status Closure” Problem: The regime has engaged in extreme “status closure,” purging anyone not 100% loyal. This makes the inner circle cohesive but very small. If the outer circle of enforcers (police, army) feels the economic pain of the common citizen, they may refuse orders during the next uprising, causing a Romanian-style collapse (sudden, violent, total).<\/p>\n
Could democracy triumph? Yes, if the “Woman, Life, Freedom” coalition succeeds. Despite the bravery of the 2022 and 2025 protests, a popular overthrow faces massive structural hurdles right now.<\/p>\n
The opposition remains leaderless. Figures like Reza Pahlavi or activists like Narges Mohammadi have not formed a unified “government in exile” that the West can back or the Iranian people can rally around.<\/p>\n
The regime has successfully “atomized” the population\u2014surveillance prevents large-scale organizing.<\/p>\n
The regime has proven it is willing to kill 500 or 5,000 people to stay in power. Unarmed populations rarely win against a state willing to use unlimited violence, unless the military splits (see Scenario 2).<\/p>\n
The most likely “overthrow” is not a transition to democracy, but a transition to a Praetorian State. The clerics (the turbaned class) will gradually lose actual power to the Generals (the booted class). The Iran of 2027 will likely look less like a Seminary and more like a Garrison.<\/p>\n
From a strictly “cost-benefit” analysis\u2014viewing the relationship between the citizenry and the state as a contract\u2014the value proposition of the clerical establishment (“the Mullahs”) for the average Iranian has effectively collapsed into the negative.<\/p>\n
For the average Iranian in 2026, the clergy are no longer seen as spiritual shepherds, but as expensive intermediaries who extract wealth and incur risk without providing security or prosperity in return.<\/p>\n
Here is the breakdown of that “value” equation:<\/p>\n
Historically, the clergy managed charity networks. Today, they manage holding companies.<\/p>\n
The “Bonyads” (Foundations): Approximately 60-70% of the Iranian economy is controlled by state-linked entities, largely opaque religious foundations (like the Setad or Astan Quds Razavi). These entities pay no taxes and answer only to the Supreme Leader.<\/p>\n
The Cost: For the average entrepreneur or worker, these foundations add zero value. They are monopolies that crush small businesses. They act as a massive “tax” on the economy, extracting wealth from the oil and industrial sectors to fund clerical networks and seminaries rather than public infrastructure or healthcare.<\/p>\n
Result: The average Iranian sees the clergy not as adding value, but as skimming off the top of the nation’s natural resource wealth.<\/p>\n
The primary “product” of the clerical regime is its specific brand of revolutionary ideology (exporting the revolution, hostility to the West\/Israel).<\/p>\n
The Cost: The “price” the average Iranian pays for this ideology is global isolation. The sanctions regime is a direct result of clerical foreign policy.<\/p>\n
The Calculation: An average engineer or teacher in Tehran earns a fraction of what they would in a globally integrated economy because of the currency devaluation driven by sanctions. Effectively, every Iranian pays a heavy “ideological tax” from their paycheck to subsidize the regime\u2019s worldview.<\/p>\n
Usually, a government provides “services” (roads, safety, courts). The clerical establishment, however, spends vast resources on “negative services”\u2014policing behavior.<\/p>\n
The Friction: The Gasht-e Ershad (Morality Police) and other enforcement bodies create daily friction. They don’t protect the citizen; they police the citizen.<\/p>\n
The Resentment: For a young population (highly educated and secularizing), the clergy provides no cultural value. Instead, they actively obstruct the lifestyle the average citizen wants (internet access, music, social freedom, clothing choices). This creates a relationship of pure antagonism.<\/p>\n
It is important to note who does benefit, because this explains why the regime survives.<\/p>\n
The Patronage Network: The clergy provides immense value to a specific slice of the population (perhaps 10-15%): the families of the security forces, the bureaucracy, and the rural pious poor who receive direct cash handouts and subsidies. For this group, the Mullahs are the “guarantors of status”\u2014without the regime, these groups would lose their economic privileges and social standing.<\/p>\n
The clerical establishment is a textbook example of a group engaging in extreme status closure. They have monopolized the definition of “legitimate citizen” and “moral authority” to protect their own economic interests. They add no value to the open market or the open society; they maintain their position only by closing off opportunities to anyone who is not part of their specific theological-political circle.<\/p>\n
For the average Iranian, the Mullahs are currently a liability on the balance sheet\u2014a management class that has bankrupted the company.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
When I lose at life, I retreat as I deflate and I make myself smaller. My choices are more cautious. I spend more time alone. When I win in life, I expand and try new things. I’m happy to talk … Continue reading