From the below video: If deceit is fundamental to animal communication, then there must be strong selection to spot deception. And this in turn ought to select for a degree of self-deception\u2014rendering some facts and motives unconscious so as not to betray, through subtle signs of self-knowledge, the deception being practiced.<\/p>\n
The conventional view that natural selection favors nervous systems which produce ever more accurate images of the world is a very naive view of mental evolution. What Trivers is saying is that the brain is specifically designed to self-deceive when useful, and that it is foolish to assume evolution would select for accuracy per se.<\/p>\n
I think it\u2019s a beautiful, intriguing, and horrifying idea. We see this theme in science fiction. Battlestar Galactica had the Cylons, who didn\u2019t know they were Cylons so they could more effectively blend in with humans. They fell in love, and it was horrifying to learn they were Cylons all along. They were programmed to deceive themselves in order to deceive others.<\/p>\n
Total Recall has a similar premise, with Arnold Schwarzenegger tricked into thinking he\u2019s a rebel when he\u2019s actually working for the bad guys. And in Seinfeld, George tells Jerry, who\u2019s worried about passing a polygraph: \u201cIt\u2019s not a lie if you believe it.\u201d The point is that we\u2019re better liars when we believe the lie.<\/p>\n
Is there evidence for this? Unfortunately, it\u2019s spotty. One prediction of Trivers\u2019 theory is that we should be very good at detecting lies, and less good when the person believes the lie. The evolutionary story is that deceivers and the deceived are in an arms race: as deceivers get better, victims get better at spotting deception\u2014cues like sweat, shifty eyes, subtle signs of self-knowledge. So, because it became so hard to lie without leaking cues, a new strategy emerged: lie to oneself first, then to others.<\/p>\n
This predicts that people should be good at spotting conscious lies. But evidence doesn\u2019t support that. Studies on polygraphs and other cues show people are barely above chance at detecting lies. So one of the key predictions of Trivers\u2019 model is falsified.<\/p>\n
I\u2019ve argued in my own work that we don\u2019t so much lie and self-deceive as we bullshit. Lying is intentionally saying something false you know is false, for self-interest. Bullshitting is when you don\u2019t really know or care what\u2019s true\u2014you just say what you need to say to persuade, gain status, forgiveness, or advantage. Truth, if present, is incidental.<\/p>\n
Bullshitting is safer and more effective than lying because lying carries reputational risks. In small-scale societies, being exposed as a liar could be fatal. So lying tends to be a last resort, used when spin fails or when someone is so powerful they can lie with impunity. For most people, spin, exaggeration, selective evidence, and distortion are the preferred tools.<\/p>\n
This reframes self-deception. I think what we\u2019re really doing is self-persuasion, or self-bullshitting. Like lawyers preparing arguments, we rehearse stories in our heads. We practice responses to accusations. We construct narratives that present us as good, noble, and justified, so that when challenged, our answers are smooth, persuasive, and compelling.<\/p>\n
The prediction here is different: humans should be good not at spotting lies, but at spotting bullshit. Evidence supports this. Hugo Mercier, in Not Born Yesterday, shows humans are not gullible fools. We\u2019re vigilant, skeptical, constantly alert to hidden agendas. What looks like gullibility\u2014such as conspiracy theories\u2014often stems from hyper-skepticism: an overactive vigilance against deception.<\/p>\n
So, conspiracy theories don\u2019t come from gullibility; they come from the opposite. And the better story about self-deception is that it\u2019s not about lying to ourselves so we can lie better. It\u2019s about self-persuasion: rehearsing, spinning, bullshitting\u2014so that we can influence others more effectively.<\/p>\n