I love the news. I subscribe to Apple News Plus, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times and numerous book reviews (such as the New York Review of Books, London Review of Books, Claremont Review of Books, etc). Most of the time, I get my money’s worth. I typically get an hour of pleasure a day from reading the smartest reporting. Sometimes, however, I’m disappointed by the group think. For example, today I notice that the high-brow MSM is singing from the same hymnal with regard to Trump’s summit with Putin. How could the reaction be so uniform with regard to such a complicated topic? <\/p>\n
In college I read a book on this topic by Irving L. Janis that has stayed with me: Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes<\/a>.<\/p>\n This thesis matches my experience of life — that the cool kids often arrive at a consensus and the social pressure to conform to maintain one’s seat at the cool kids table tends to overwhelm independent thought. <\/p>\n Another dominant life experience of mine is that people usually hate it when you change. We all like predictability in our relationships. Bosses and peers want you to be predictable. If you are predictable, you cause other people less stress.<\/p>\n \nPeter Baker of the New York Times<\/a>: Trump Bows to Putin\u2019s Approach on Ukraine: No Cease-Fire, Deadlines or Sanctions FT<\/a>: No concessions, no ceasefire: how Putin outplayed Trump in Anchorage<\/p>\n WP<\/a>: Trump\u2019s pursuit of a quick deal makes it easier for Putin to dictate the terms<\/p>\n WP<\/a>: Russia sees victory as Trump adopts Putin\u2019s approach to ending Ukraine war<\/p>\n WSJ<\/a>: Putin Returns to Moscow With Air of Triumph After Summit NYT<\/a>: Ukrainians Fleeing Russia\u2019s Attacks Say the Alaska Summit Was an Insult Are there any elite journos saying anything different about this summit?<\/p>\n ChatGPT and the work of Stephen Turner<\/a> helped me with this post:<\/p>\n They\u2019re uniform for the same reason they were on Biden\u2019s senility, the lab-leak, Russiagate, etc.: elite journalism isn\u2019t primarily a contest of scoops anymore, it\u2019s a prestige economy. The safest way to maintain status is to align with the consensus line, especially on \u201cbig stakes\u201d foreign policy where deviation risks being branded na\u00efve, soft on dictators, or unpatriotic.<\/p>\n Here\u2019s why you\u2019re seeing the hymnal effect on Trump\u2013Putin Anchorage summit coverage:<\/p>\n Shared frame from wire services and the \u201ccathedral\u201d papers. Once the New York Times and Washington Post fix a frame (\u201cTrump bows, Putin triumphs\u201d), others echo it. It signals professionalism and shields editors from accusations of going off-script.<\/p>\n Pack journalism under time pressure. Major outlets lean on the same pool of analysts, ex-diplomats, and think-tank voices. Their talking points get laundered into nearly identical ledes.<\/p>\n Foreign policy priesthood. The U.S. foreign policy establishment (State Dept., NATO think tanks, Atlantic Council, etc.) sets the \u201crespectable\u201d range of opinion. Journalists amplify it because dissent risks loss of access.<\/p>\n Prestige mimicry. Reporters read each other more than they read events on the ground. If the FT and NYT say \u201cPutin outplayed Trump,\u201d you look unserious if you write \u201cTrump gained leverage.\u201d<\/p>\n Audience capture. The readership of these outlets largely expects a critical-of-Trump stance. Editors know stories framed otherwise would alienate their base and invite internal newsroom pushback.<\/p>\n So the result: five different mastheads, one narrative \u2014 Putin won, Trump lost. Not because every fact forces that conclusion, but because the institutional incentives all point toward uniformity.<\/p>\n How does this happen?<\/p>\n 1. Closure<\/p>\n Stephen Turner<\/a> argues that expert communities (including journalists) achieve closure by narrowing the range of acceptable positions. Once a dominant interpretation is established\u2014\u201cPutin outplayed Trump\u201d\u2014alternative framings (\u201cTrump shifted the negotiating field\u201d or \u201cTrump extracted concessions\u201d) are effectively excluded. Closure isn\u2019t about truth, but about agreement, which provides stability and authority.<\/p>\n Anchorage example: NYT, FT, WP, WSJ all closed around the line that Trump \u201cbowed\u201d and \u201cPutin triumphed,\u201d foreclosing debate about U.S. strategic interests or alternative measures of success.<\/p>\n 2. Prestige Economy<\/p>\n For Turner, academia (and by extension elite journalism) isn\u2019t a neutral marketplace of ideas but a prestige economy: credibility flows from status, not empirical competition. Reporters and outlets gain legitimacy by echoing the consensus of the \u201cserious\u201d press and foreign policy establishment.<\/p>\n Anchorage example: By mirroring the Times and Post\u2019s framing, the FT and WSJ ensure they\u2019re inside the \u201cserious\u201d club. Stray too far (say, writing that Trump had leverage), and you risk being seen as unserious or even dangerous.<\/p>\n 3. Anti-Neutrality<\/p>\n Turner stresses that expertise today isn\u2019t just knowledge\u2014it\u2019s moralized. To appear neutral in a polarized climate can itself be seen as bias. The \u201ccorrect\u201d stance for elite outlets is skeptical of Trump, wary of Putin.<\/p>\n Anchorage example: A neutral frame like \u201cTalks produced no deal, further negotiations planned\u201d would be attacked as whitewashing Putin. So the moralized consensus\u2014that Trump\u2019s eagerness for a deal empowered Putin\u2014was the only safe stance.<\/p>\n 4. Institutional Peer Pressure<\/p>\n Turner notes that expert credibility is fragile\u2014it depends on shared trust within a community. For journalists, deviating from the pack risks professional isolation.<\/p>\n Anchorage example: If one major reporter had written \u201cTrump\u2019s gambit could pressure Putin later\u201d, they\u2019d face ridicule from peers and editors. Safer to harmonize with the chorus.<\/p>\n 5. Esoteric vs. Exoteric (Straussian Layer)<\/p>\n Exoterically, the public-facing story is simple: Putin triumphed, Trump blundered. Bottom line:<\/p>\n Turner might say the Anchorage summit coverage isn\u2019t an accidental chorus but a textbook case of how a prestige economy with built-in closure mechanisms produces uniform narratives. What looks like \u201cdumb groupthink\u201d is, in his sociology, the rational outcome of institutions trying to maintain credibility, neutrality-as-moral-stance, and professional status.<\/p>\n According to Stephen Turner\u2019s The Politics of Expertise<\/a> and Making Democratic Theory Democratic<\/a>, three ideas are central for understanding things like Russiagate and elite journalism\u2019s \u201csinging from the same hymnal\u201d: closure, neutrality, and credibility.<\/p>\n Closure: Turner describes how expert communities attempt to \u201cclose off\u201d debate by defining certain questions as already settled. Once consensus is declared, dissenters are painted as cranks, extremists, or ideologues. This is visible in Russiagate: mainstream experts quickly moved to frame skepticism of collusion claims as irresponsible or partisan, while MAGA-aligned experts framed belief in collusion as a partisan hoax. Both sides attempted closure, but with different \u201ccommunities of credibility\u201d policing the boundary .<\/p>\n Neutrality: Turner repeatedly notes that the liberal state and expert communities claim neutrality, yet are inevitably accused of ideology. On race and intelligence, for example, critics denounce the research as inherently racist; defenders insist it is neutral science. In politics, Russiagate plays out similarly\u2014MSM journalists frame their reporting as neutral truth-seeking, while opponents see it as partisan warfare in disguise. Turner\u2019s point is that neutrality itself is a contested claim, not a secure foundation .<\/p>\n Credibility and the Prestige Economy: Turner emphasizes that academia and expert culture operate less like free markets of ideas and more like prestige economies, where credibility is distributed through networks of status and institutional authority rather than open contestation. In Russiagate, the prestige media (NYT, WP, CNN) and security-state veterans (CIA, FBI) carried enormous authority, allowing their claims to dominate\u2014even when later walked back. Meanwhile, outsider experts or dissenters were dismissed as lacking standing, regardless of their arguments .<\/p>\n In short: Turner might say Russiagate is a perfect case of dueling closures. Each side claimed neutrality but was accused of ideology. Each side policed credibility by appealing to its own prestige economy\u2014mainstream institutions on one side, alternative media and political figures on the other. What looked like a clash of facts was really a clash of authorities.<\/p>\n The media is a prestige economy, not a truth economy. Journalists at the top outlets don\u2019t compete for accuracy, they compete for status inside their professional subculture. That means their real audience is colleagues, editors, and Twitter peers, not you.<\/p>\n Here are the dominant dumb ways of thinking that reinforce this sameness:<\/p>\n Pack journalism (herd instinct)<\/p>\n Reporters fear being \u201cthe odd one out.\u201d If everyone calls something a \u201cconspiracy theory,\u201d you\u2019d risk career death challenging that\u2014even if it\u2019s true. They\u2019d rather be wrong together than right alone.<\/p>\n Narrative over fact<\/p>\n Stories must fit a moral arc\u2014heroes, villains, progress, reactionaries. Anything that breaks the story structure (like Biden\u2019s decline) gets downplayed because it\u2019s \u201coff-script.\u201d<\/p>\n Deference to authority<\/p>\n Elite outlets outsource judgment to credentialed experts, government officials, or \u201cstudies.\u201d This absolves them of personal responsibility\u2014\u201cwe just reported what the experts said.\u201d<\/p>\n Fear of audience offense<\/p>\n Elite news brands sell a lifestyle to a demographic (college-educated, urban, liberal). Anything that jars that identity is filtered out. Truth that offends the subscriber base is \u201cbad business.\u201d<\/p>\n Performative neutrality<\/p>\n They confuse neutrality with repetition of consensus. Saying \u201cboth sides\u201d on safe issues while parroting elite cues on taboo issues allows them to look \u201cprofessional\u201d while avoiding real risk.<\/p>\n Prestige mimicry<\/p>\n Just as in academia, prestige flows from being cited by the right peers. Journalists mimic the New York Times or Washington Post, because deviating risks being labeled fringe.<\/p>\n So: they\u2019re not dumb in the literal sense\u2014many are clever\u2014but they\u2019re trapped in a cognitive monoculture where independence is punished. The result sounds dumb from the outside, because they\u2019re really performing loyalty to the guild rather than truth-seeking.<\/p>\n
\nThe net effect of the Alaska summit was to give President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia a free pass to continue his war against his neighbor indefinitely without further penalty, pending talks on a broader peace deal.<\/p>\n
\nThe meeting with Trump helped give the Kremlin leader much of what he wanted, including putting Russia on an equal footing with the U.S.<\/p>\n
\nEvacuees at a shelter in eastern Ukraine reacted angrily to talk that land that has long been theirs could be given to Russia in exchange for peace.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\nEsoterically, insiders may recognize more nuance (Trump\u2019s disruptive diplomacy could unsettle old NATO patterns, or create bargaining chips). But these subtler takes don\u2019t make print, because they risk undermining closure and prestige.<\/p>\n