{"id":162771,"date":"2025-08-14T06:51:50","date_gmt":"2025-08-14T14:51:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=162771"},"modified":"2025-08-16T18:41:03","modified_gmt":"2025-08-17T02:41:03","slug":"the-ideological-brain-the-radical-science-of-flexible-thinking","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=162771","title":{"rendered":"The Ideological Brain: The Radical Science of Flexible Thinking"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Ideological-Brain-Radical-Flexible-Thinking\/dp\/B0DCQ7PJXW\/ref=tmm_aud_swatch_0\">From this 2025 book by smoking hot Cambridge University neuoroscience and politics professor Leor Zmigrod<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>I believe that we can judge an ideology based on what believing in it does to human bodies and brains; on whether being a passionate believer narrows our movements, lassoes our flexibility, restricts our responses, or triggers us to commit violence. If we have less scope for plasticity and change and less direct access to our sensations, we are at risk of dehumanizing ourselves and others. We become less sensitive, less elastic, less authentic. If we see reality through an ideological lens, we end up avoiding the richness of existence in favor of a more reduced, stereotyped experience. By studying the ideological brain with neuroimaging devices and cognitive tests, we can illuminate previously invisible forms of domination. With the tools of science, we can develop new ways to critique ideologies.<br \/>\n Perhaps some ideologies will pass our critical tests. Many will not. We might accidentally become suspicious of our most treasured ideological possessions. A science of ideology can inspire us to question our idols, our icons, our metaphors, our imagined utopias. It can stimulate careful analysis and honest self &#8211; reflection. It can even become the basis for personal or social action. Examining the neurocognitive origins and consequences of our beliefs \u2014 where they come from and how they transform our bodies \u2014 will offer clues regarding the kind of belief systems we might wish to keep and which ones we might be persuaded to let go.<br \/>\n Believing passionately in a rigid doctrine is a process that spills into our neurons, flowing into our bodies. Ideologies are not mere envelopes for our lives; they enter our skins, our skulls, our nerve cells. Totalizing ideologies shape the brain as a whole, not simply the brain when it is confronted with political propositions or debates. Science is beginning to reveal that the profound reverberations of ideologies can be observed in the brain even when we are not engaging with politics at all. Since our brains learn to embody indoctrination in deep and insidious ways, the social rituals we learn to enact can become the biological realities of our minds and bodies. There is therefore a danger that when an individual is immersed in rigid ideologies, it is not only their political opinions and moral tastes that are being sculpted \u2014 their entire brain is being sculpted to.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>All beliefs are just unnecessary muscular tension, according to a perspective I heard in the Alexander Technique.<\/p>\n<p>I don&#8217;t see how any ideology could promote flexibility?<\/p>\n<p>You can experience the difference yourself when you shift between awareness and judgment. Whenever you judge, you tighten up. When you move out of judgment into awareness, your body frees up.<\/p>\n<p><A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.leorzmigrod.com\/\">Leor Zmigrod&#8217;s website<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Not all beliefs are inherently negative or tension-inducing; some can be adaptive or motivating without causing physical or mental rigidity. The Alexander Technique\u2019s focus is less on eliminating beliefs and more on cultivating awareness to avoid unnecessary effort\u2014whether that effort is physical (like tensing muscles) or mental (like clinging to unexamined assumptions).<\/p>\n<p> In the Technique, rigid mental habits (like clinging to fixed ideas) often translate into physical holding patterns, such as tightened shoulders or a clenched jaw, restricting ease and movement. Zmigrod&#8217;s work takes this a step further by using neuroscience to show how ideologies\u2014broad belief systems\u2014can either entrench this rigidity across brain, body, and behavior or, conversely, cultivate flexibility and release. You&#8217;re right to question how a belief system could actively promote physical flexibility and release, as the quote primarily critiques restrictive ideologies; however, drawing from her research and related discussions, we can infer what &#8220;flexible&#8221; belief systems might look like and how they could foster that release.Understanding Rigidity vs. Flexibility in BeliefsZmigrod argues that rigid doctrines &#8220;spill into our neurons, flowing into our bodies,&#8221; sculpting the brain holistically and reducing plasticity\u2014the brain&#8217;s ability to adapt and reorganize. <\/p>\n<p> This isn&#8217;t just metaphorical: neuroimaging and cognitive tests reveal that dogmatic thinking correlates with less neural adaptability, even in non-political tasks, leading to narrowed movements, restricted responses, and diminished access to sensations. <\/p>\n<p> For instance, stress from ideological adherence can rigidify thought patterns, making individuals more habitual and less responsive, which might physically manifest as tension or reduced bodily awareness\u2014echoing the Alexander perspective. <\/p>\n<p> In essence, such beliefs create a &#8220;lassoed&#8221; state, where the body embodies the mental constriction, potentially increasing muscular tension as a stress response.On the flip side, Zmigrod suggests that belief systems promoting cognitive flexibility\u2014measured through tasks like the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, where adaptable people shift rules fluidly\u2014can counteract this. <\/p>\n<p> Flexible thinkers are open to evidence, plurality, and change without being easily swayed, leading to greater mental elasticity that &#8220;rebounds&#8221; post-stress and enhances sensitivity to experiences. <\/p>\n<p> This ties directly to physical release: just as physical fitness values elasticity to prevent injury and enable fluid movement, mental flexibility can reduce the embodied tension of dogma, allowing for more authentic, expansive living. <\/p>\n<p>How Belief Systems Could Promote Physical Flexibility and Release<\/p>\n<p>Based on Zmigrod&#8217;s framework, a belief system that &#8220;passes critical tests&#8221; would encourage plasticity and direct access to sensations, avoiding the dehumanizing effects of stereotypes or totalizing views. Here&#8217;s how such systems might work, with connections to bodily release:<\/p>\n<p>Encouraging Self-Reflection and Questioning: Beliefs rooted in honest self-examination\u2014 like scientific inquiry or mindfulness practices\u2014prompt us to &#8220;question our idols&#8221; and metaphors, as per the quote. This reduces mental clinging, which in Alexander terms releases unnecessary tension. For example, a belief in ongoing personal growth (e.g., via cognitive behavioral approaches) could train the brain to interrogate habits, correlating with less rigidity in daily routines and more physical ease. <\/p>\n<p>Fostering Open-Mindedness and Plurality: Ideologies that value diversity and evidence over conformity promote neural adaptability, making individuals less prone to the &#8220;profound reverberations&#8221; that sculpt the brain rigidly. Zmigrod&#8217;s studies link this to disbelief in absolute doctrines (e.g., flexible religiosity or atheism), where cognitive persistence gives way to openness, potentially easing physiological responses like stress-induced tension. <\/p>\n<p> Physically, this might manifest as greater bodily awareness and release, akin to how Alexander lessons teach inhibiting fixed reactions for freer movement.<\/p>\n<p>Nurturing Elasticity Through Habits: Zmigrod highlights that flexible belief systems resist polarization by embracing complexity, leading to a &#8220;fluid, expansive state of existence.&#8221; <\/p>\n<p> Practices like meditation or philosophical skepticism could embody this, reducing the &#8220;insidious&#8221; indoctrination that affects sensations and promoting rebound plasticity. In body terms, this aligns with releasing tension by not &#8220;adhering to scripts,&#8221; allowing for more elastic responses in posture and action.<\/p>\n<p>Ultimately, Zmigrod envisions a &#8220;science of ideology&#8221; as a tool for choosing beliefs that enhance authenticity and sensitivity, rather than narrowing existence. If a system inspires action through reflection without demanding conformity, it could promote the very release you&#8217;re pondering\u2014mentally unclenching to physically unwind. <\/p>\n<p>Yes, there\u2019s emerging evidence from neuroscience, psychology, and somatic practices like the Alexander Technique that certain belief systems\u2014those fostering cognitive flexibility, open-mindedness, and self-awareness\u2014can promote physical flexibility by reducing stress-induced tension and enhancing mind-body integration.<\/p>\n<p>1. Cognitive Flexibility and Physical Relaxation<\/p>\n<p>Belief systems that encourage cognitive flexibility\u2014adaptability in thinking, openness to new evidence, and reduced attachment to rigid doctrines\u2014have been linked to lower stress responses, which directly influence physical flexibility. Zmigrod\u2019s research, as discussed in The Ideological Brain (2025), uses neuroimaging and cognitive tests (e.g., Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) to show that flexible thinkers exhibit greater neural plasticity, allowing them to shift mental frameworks fluidly. This mental elasticity correlates with reduced physiological stress, as rigid ideologies (e.g., dogmatic political or religious beliefs) can elevate cortisol levels, leading to muscle tension and restricted movement.<\/p>\n<p>Evidence: <\/p>\n<p>Studies show that cognitive flexibility, measured by tasks requiring rule-switching, is associated with lower sympathetic nervous system activation (e.g., reduced heart rate variability stress markers). Less stress means less involuntary muscle bracing, promoting physical ease. For example, a 2020 study in Frontiers in Psychology found that individuals with higher cognitive flexibility had better stress recovery, which could translate to less chronic tension in muscles like the neck or shoulders.<\/p>\n<p>Alexander Technique Connection: The Technique emphasizes \u201cinhibition\u201d of habitual reactions, which aligns with cognitive flexibility. By letting go of fixed mental patterns (e.g., \u201cI must always be right\u201d), practitioners often report reduced muscular tension, as seen in studies where Alexander lessons improved posture and reduced pain in conditions like back pain.<\/p>\n<p>2. Mindfulness-Based Beliefs and Bodily Awareness<\/p>\n<p>Belief systems rooted in mindfulness or self-reflection, such as those inspired by meditation or somatic practices, enhance bodily awareness and reduce tension, fostering physical flexibility. Zmigrod notes that beliefs promoting \u201cdirect access to sensations\u201d counteract the desensitizing effects of rigid ideologies. Mindfulness practices, which often embody flexible, non-judgmental beliefs, have been shown to lower muscle tension and improve movement range.Evidence: A 2018 meta-analysis in Scientific Reports found that mindfulness meditation reduces cortisol and improves vagal tone, leading to relaxed muscle states and better joint mobility in practitioners. Another study in Pain Medicine (2019) showed that mindfulness-based interventions improved physical flexibility in chronic pain patients by reducing fear-avoidance behaviors, which often manifest as muscular guarding.<\/p>\n<p>Alexander Technique Connection: The Technique trains individuals to notice and release unnecessary tension during movement, akin to mindfulness. A belief in the process of \u201cnon-doing\u201d (a core Alexander principle) fosters a relaxed, open state, with studies showing improved flexibility in musicians and office workers after lessons.<\/p>\n<p>3. Open-Minded Belief Systems and Stress Reduction<\/p>\n<p>Beliefs that embrace complexity and pluralism, as Zmigrod advocates, reduce the \u201classoing\u201d of flexibility by avoiding polarized thinking. Such beliefs\u2014e.g., valuing evidence over dogma or embracing philosophical skepticism\u2014lower psychological stress, which can manifest as physical suppleness.Evidence: Zmigrod\u2019s studies suggest that individuals with less dogmatic beliefs (e.g., flexible religiosity or openness to diverse perspectives) show greater cognitive persistence and adaptability, linked to lower stress-induced muscle tension. A 2021 study in Nature Communications found that open-mindedness correlates with reduced amygdala activation (a stress marker), which could decrease physical bracing. Additionally, practices like yoga, often tied to non-dogmatic beliefs in holistic well-being, improve flexibility through combined mental and physical training, as shown in a 2020 Journal of Bodywork and Movement Therapies study.<\/p>\n<p>Alexander Technique Connection: The Technique\u2019s emphasis on releasing \u201cend-gaining\u201d (rigid pursuit of goals) mirrors open-minded beliefs, reducing tension. Practitioners often report feeling \u201clighter\u201d and more flexible, as mental openness translates to physical release.<\/p>\n<p>4. Neuroscientific Insights on Ideology and Embodiment<\/p>\n<p>Zmigrod\u2019s work highlights that ideologies sculpt the brain holistically, affecting even non-political tasks. Rigid beliefs can entrench neural pathways, reducing plasticity and increasing embodied tension (e.g., through chronic stress responses). Conversely, beliefs that foster curiosity and adaptability enhance neural flexibility, which may promote physical flexibility by reducing stress-related muscle tightness.Evidence: Neuroimaging studies show that rigid ideological adherence (e.g., extreme political views) correlates with heightened activity in the default mode network and reduced prefrontal cortex flexibility, linked to stress and physical tension. In contrast, beliefs encouraging exploration (e.g., scientific inquiry) enhance prefrontal activity, supporting adaptive responses and potentially reducing somatic tension. A 2022 study in Neuroscience &#038; Biobehavioral Reviews suggests that flexible cognitive styles improve sensorimotor integration, aiding fluid movement.<\/p>\n<p>Alexander Technique Connection: The Technique\u2019s focus on mindful movement retrains sensorimotor habits, aligning with beliefs that prioritize adaptability. This can lead to measurable improvements in flexibility, as seen in trials where Alexander training enhanced mobility in older adults.<\/p>\n<p>Practical Implications<\/p>\n<p>Belief systems that promote physical flexibility often share traits like openness, self-reflection, and non-attachment to rigid outcomes. Examples include:Mindfulness or meditation-based beliefs, which reduce stress and enhance bodily awareness, leading to relaxed muscles and improved range of motion.<br \/>\nScientific or skeptical frameworks, which encourage questioning and adaptability, lowering stress and its physical manifestations.<br \/>\nSomatic practices (e.g., Alexander Technique, yoga), which integrate beliefs in mind-body unity with physical training to release tension.<\/p>\n<p>Limitations and Considerations<\/p>\n<p>While evidence supports that flexible beliefs reduce stress and tension, direct studies linking specific ideologies to physical flexibility (e.g., joint range of motion) are sparse. Most data focus on stress reduction or cognitive outcomes, with physical flexibility inferred through reduced tension. Additionally, individual differences (e.g., baseline fitness or psychological resilience) may mediate these effects. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>ChatGPT says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>How <A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Stephen_Park_Turner\">Stephen P. Turner<\/a> might critique Leor Zmigrod\u2019s <em>The Ideological Brain: The Radical Science of Flexible Thinking<\/em> <\/p>\n<p><strong>Book:<\/strong> Leor Zmigrod, <em>The Ideological Brain<\/em> (on sale Mar 25, 2025). See publisher page <a href=\"https:\/\/us.macmillan.com\/books\/9781250344595\/theideologicalbrain\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">here<\/a>, and coverage in the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/098e1e80-6df7-4025-8ebe-cb2e9a6558e7\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Financial Times<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.vox.com\/the-gray-area\/412187\/ideological-brain-zmigrod-politics-biology\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Vox<\/a>, an <a href=\"https:\/\/news.harvard.edu\/gazette\/story\/2025\/05\/excerpt-from-the-ideological-brain-by-leor-zmigrod\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">excerpt<\/a> in the Harvard Gazette, and a profile via <a href=\"https:\/\/www.gatescambridge.org\/about\/news\/exploring-the-ideological-brain\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Gates Cambridge<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2>The short version<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>Turner would applaud the book\u2019s interdisciplinary reach (neuroscience, psychology, politics) but argue it overdraws on biology at the expense of sociology and institutional analysis (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/098e1e80-6df7-4025-8ebe-cb2e9a6558e7\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">FT review<\/a>).<\/li>\n<li>He\u2019d insist that ideology is forged in practices, institutions, and expert systems\u2014not just inside individual brains (<a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURTST\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>The Social Theory of Practices<\/em><\/a>).<\/li>\n<li>He\u2019d caution against biological determinism: neural findings matter, but social structures entrench or loosen rigidity (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.usf.edu\/arts-sciences\/departments\/philosophy\/about-us\/faculty\/stephen-turner.aspx\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">USF bio<\/a>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Where Turner would agree\u2014and where he\u2019d push back<\/h2>\n<p>Zmigrod synthesizes evidence that \u201ccognitive rigidity\u201d correlates with ideological dogmatism and extremism, drawing on tasks like the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and research on dopaminergic systems (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.vox.com\/the-gray-area\/412187\/ideological-brain-zmigrod-politics-biology\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Vox<\/a>; <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Wisconsin_Card_Sorting_Test\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">WCST<\/a>; <a href=\"https:\/\/direct.mit.edu\/jocn\/article\/34\/1\/153\/107690\/Dopamine-Cognitive-Flexibility-and-IQ-Epistatic\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">JOCN 2021<\/a>; overview in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/098e1e80-6df7-4025-8ebe-cb2e9a6558e7\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">FT<\/a>). Turner wouldn\u2019t dispute that these correlations are interesting. His critique is about framing:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>From brains to practices:<\/strong> Turner\u2019s work treats ideology as emerging from socially transmitted <em>practices<\/em>, institutional routines, and expert regimes of knowledge\u2014not primarily from individual neurobiology (<a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURTST\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Turner 1994<\/a>).<\/li>\n<li><strong>Institutional epistemics:<\/strong> He\u2019d argue the book underplays how institutions define what counts as \u201cknowledge,\u201d shape incentives, and thereby stabilize or unsettle ideological commitments (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.usf.edu\/arts-sciences\/departments\/philosophy\/about-us\/faculty\/stephen-turner.aspx\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">USF bio<\/a>).<\/li>\n<li><strong>Against determinism creep:<\/strong> Even where Zmigrod is careful to say nature and nurture interact, Turner would press that social organization can <em>manufacture<\/em> rigidity or flexibility irrespective of baseline neural differences (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/098e1e80-6df7-4025-8ebe-cb2e9a6558e7\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">FT<\/a>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>The role of the tacit (Turner\u2019s centerpiece)<\/h2>\n<p>Turner\u2019s mature view puts the <em>tacit<\/em> at the center: the unarticulated skills, norms, and background presuppositions that guide how people see and act. He develops this across <a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURUTT\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>Understanding the Tacit<\/em> (2014)<\/a> and later essays (e.g., <a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURNTT\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cNaturalizing the Tacit,\u201d 2017<\/a>). Think Polanyi, but sociologized: ideology lives in what goes without saying (<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Tacit_knowledge\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">tacit knowledge<\/a>), learned through participation in practices, not just explicit doctrines.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Socially acquired:<\/strong> Neural flexibility may shape how quickly we learn, but the <em>frames<\/em> are transmitted tacitly via institutions and communities (<a href=\"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1177\/0048393115579157\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">review of <em>Understanding the Tacit<\/em><\/a>).<\/li>\n<li><strong>\u201cWhat goes without saying\u201d:<\/strong> Deep commitments are often invisible to believers because they\u2019re embedded in background routines, not in articulated propositions (<a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURUTT\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Turner 2014<\/a>).<\/li>\n<li><strong>Methodological upshot:<\/strong> You can\u2019t MRI a person\u2019s unspoken social assumptions; you study them historically and sociologically (<a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURTST\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Turner 1994<\/a>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Does the neuroscience still matter?<\/h2>\n<p>Yes\u2014especially where it\u2019s careful. Zmigrod\u2019s empirical program linking flexibility\/rigidity to ideological styles is serious work (e.g., reviews and studies in <a href=\"https:\/\/www.sciencedirect.com\/science\/article\/pii\/S2352154619301147\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences<\/em> 2020<\/a>; <a href=\"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/full\/10.1177\/0963721421993820\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>Current Directions in Psychological Science<\/em> 2021<\/a>; and dopaminergic correlates in <a href=\"https:\/\/direct.mit.edu\/jocn\/article\/34\/1\/153\/107690\/Dopamine-Cognitive-Flexibility-and-IQ-Epistatic\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience<\/em> 2021<\/a>). Turner\u2019s point is proportionality: don\u2019t let brain data crowd out the institutional and tacit scaffolding that actually generates ideological life.<\/p>\n<h2>Stephen Turner might say about this new book: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p> Great neuroscience\u2014but brains don\u2019t think in a vacuum. Ideology is born in social practices, expert institutions, and the tacit distribution of know-how. Biology matters\u2014but only in dialogue with the social world. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h2>Further reading<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>Leor Zmigrod, <em>The Ideological Brain<\/em> (Macmillan\/St. Martin\u2019s, 2025): <a href=\"https:\/\/us.macmillan.com\/books\/9781250344595\/theideologicalbrain\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">publisher<\/a> \u2022 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/098e1e80-6df7-4025-8ebe-cb2e9a6558e7\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">FT review<\/a> \u2022 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.vox.com\/the-gray-area\/412187\/ideological-brain-zmigrod-politics-biology\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Vox interview<\/a> \u2022 <a href=\"https:\/\/news.harvard.edu\/gazette\/story\/2025\/05\/excerpt-from-the-ideological-brain-by-leor-zmigrod\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Harvard Gazette excerpt<\/a> \u2022 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.socialsciencespace.com\/2025\/07\/leor-zmigrod-on-the-ideological-brain\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Social Science Space Q&amp;A<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Stephen P. Turner, <em>The Social Theory of Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions<\/em> (1994): <a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURTST\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">PhilPapers<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Stephen P. Turner, <em>Understanding the Tacit<\/em> (2014): <a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURUTT\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">PhilPapers<\/a> \u2022 Review in <a href=\"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1177\/0048393115579157\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>Philosophy of the Social Sciences<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<li>Background on cognitive flexibility and dopamine: <a href=\"https:\/\/direct.mit.edu\/jocn\/article\/34\/1\/153\/107690\/Dopamine-Cognitive-Flexibility-and-IQ-Epistatic\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">JOCN (2021)<\/a>; overview review <a href=\"https:\/\/pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\/articles\/PMC3817373\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Klanker et&nbsp;al., 2013<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Rony Guldmann on <em>The Ideological Brain: The Radical Science of Flexible Thinking<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Based on Guldmann\u2019s framework in <a href=\"https:\/\/ronyguldmann.com\/conservative-claims-cultural-oppression\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression<\/em><\/a>, his critique of Leor Zmigrod\u2019s <em>The Ideological Brain<\/em> would likely focus less on the book\u2019s neuroscience and more on the implicit cultural politics it enacts. He would view Zmigrod\u2019s framing of \u201ccognitive rigidity\u201d as an implicit moral hierarchy that mirrors how liberal elites\u2014what he calls the \u201cprogressive Clerisy\u201d\u2014use ostensibly neutral scientific concepts to naturalize their own cultural dominance.<\/p>\n<h2>1. The hidden politics of \u201cflexibility\u201d<\/h2>\n<p>In Guldmann\u2019s account, liberalism often cloaks its moralistic impulses behind universalist ideals. A research program that correlates ideological rigidity with neurological traits risks recapitulating what he calls the \u201cliberal hero-system\u201d\u2014a secularized moral hierarchy in which openness and flexibility are marks of higher civilization, while rigidity is pathologized as a relic of a pre-modern, less disciplined self. In this light, Zmigrod\u2019s work could be read as supplying a new, neuroscientific vocabulary for an old liberal trope: the conservative as less evolved.<\/p>\n<h2>2. The asymmetry problem<\/h2>\n<p>Guldmann would be alert to how <em>The Ideological Brain<\/em> might treat conservative dispositions as deficits to be explained away, while treating liberal dispositions as the unmarked norm. He has argued that this asymmetry mirrors the way dominant groups in history have pathologized the consciousness of the \u201cOther\u201d while leaving their own worldview unexamined. In neuroscience form, this could look like studying the biology of \u201crigidity\u201d without equally probing the biology of \u201chyper-flexibility\u201d and its potential downsides.<\/p>\n<h2>3. Cultural oppression in scientific guise<\/h2>\n<p>From his perspective, even if Zmigrod\u2019s data are robust, the interpretation may unwittingly enact what he terms <a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/GULCCO\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">cultural oppression<\/a>: the imposition of a liberal form of selfhood\u2014disciplined, cosmopolitan, self-reflective\u2014on those who have not internalized it, and the stigmatization of resistance as cognitive pathology. The very framing of \u201cflexible thinking\u201d as an unquestioned good could, for Guldmann, exemplify the liberal \u201ccivilizing mission\u201d in secular-scientific form.<\/p>\n<h2>4. The tacit liberal anthropology<\/h2>\n<p>Guldmann\u2019s theory stresses that liberalism\u2019s self-image as neutral and purely rational is historically contingent\u2014a product of what he calls the secularization of religious asceticism and courtly sociability. He might say that <em>The Ideological Brain<\/em> relies on this unexamined anthropology, taking for granted that the ideal mind is detached, adaptive, and open to novelty, rather than recognizing this as one culturally specific way of being human.<\/p>\n<h2>5. A possible reframing<\/h2>\n<p>Rather than using neuroscience to sort citizens into more or less cognitively \u201cfit\u201d for democracy, Guldmann would push for a symmetrical study of ideological styles that treats liberal and conservative cognitive profiles as parallel adaptations to the modern social order. This would shift the emphasis from curing rigidity to understanding the social and historical conditions that make different cognitive styles adaptive for different groups.<\/p>\n<p>In Guldmann\u2019s idiom: <em>The Ideological Brain<\/em> may think it\u2019s mapping a universal cognitive virtue, but it\u2019s really drawing a prestige map of the liberal self. Without equal scrutiny of the liberal brain, it risks becoming a high-tech iteration of the very cultural domination it cannot see.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Does Leor Zmigrod&#8217;s new book equate liberalism with flexibility and adaptability? ChatGPT says: <\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p>No, she does not equate political liberalism with cognitive flexibility. Instead, she studies flexibility as a psychological trait\u2014how people process information, tolerate ambiguity, and update beliefs. That trait can be present in individuals across all ideological positions.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Zmigrod is clear that it\u2019s about \u201chow you think,\u201d not \u201cwhat you believe\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.vox.com\/the-gray-area\/412187\/ideological-brain-zmigrod-politics-biology\" target=\"_blank\">Vox<\/a>).<\/li>\n<li>She asserts ideological rigidity can be found on both ends of the spectrum, not just on the conservative side (<a href=\"https:\/\/socialsciencespace.com\/2025\/07\/leor-zmigrod-on-the-ideological-brain\/\" target=\"_blank\">Social Science Bites<\/a>).<\/li>\n<li>The \u201cliberal children\u201d example reflects cognitive outcomes tied to rigid thinking, not a claim that liberal ideology equals adaptability (<a href=\"https:\/\/medium.com\/@alysion42\/the-ideological-brain-57a9e24f7674\" target=\"_blank\">Interview excerpt<\/a>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Here are more excerpts from this new book: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\n* \u201cAll real living is meeting,\u201d poeticized the philosopher Martin Buber in his 1937 book I and Thou . \u201cWhere there is no sharing there is no reality.\u201d<br \/>\n The word \u201ccommunicate\u201d originates from the Latin verb \u201cto share\u201d \u2014 and when we speak, gesture, or listen, we engage in the act of sharing attention. We greet by shaking hands, bumping fists or elbows, bowing heads in synchrony, feeling our faces come together nose &#8211; to &#8211; nose or cheek &#8211; to &#8211; cheek. To trusted friends, we open up, we make ourselves physically and emotionally vulnerable when we begin an exchange.<br \/>\n To mark how and with whom we should enter conversation, humans develop rituals. Social rituals establish trust by demanding that we come into communion. Oaths of allegiance, a scout\u2019s salute, proudly sung anthems, the daily adornment of sacred symbols, totems, and piercings. To constitute effective signals of communicative trust, rituals must be transmissible and exclusive. We develop visual, musical, linguistic, and tactile signatures to signal This is me! This is us! And no one else! Like code words, rituals signify a shared and unique identity. If I move like you, I must be like you, and so maybe I should like you and invite you in. Rituals facilitate synchrony: they force us to move in unison, to coordinate our thoughts and feelings, to repeat the idiomatic mantras that become the basis for our shared reality. When we chant together, sing together, rhythmically march or dance or sway together, pray or om or exhale together, the lines between us become fuzzy. After participating in collective gatherings or social movements, many individuals report: \u201cI felt bigger than myself.\u201d Their eyes sparkle from the memory of how skins seemed to melt and bodily borders became more porous. Together with others, the individual feels bigger, mightier, better.<br \/>\n The sociologist \u00c9mile Durkheim endowed this emotional energy with the name \u201ccollective effervescence\u201d in 1912 to capture the vivacious aura of communicating as a group. No one is immune to the enlarging and euphoric effect of raucously applauding for a musician\u2019s encore \u2014 One more song! One more song! We become united in a shared mission, a joint purpose. Our movements are mirrored back to us, swelling and swallowing us up. Gaining confidence, we march more boldly, sing more loudly, dance more enthusiastically, as though infected by a new kind of joy or passion or peace. Our desires merge and multiply; the resulting wave is stronger than the sum of its parts.<br \/>\n Solidarity is contagious. Our social brain longs to feel part of a story, part of a group. When minds communicate, they transcend the confines of skulls and skins. No one is alone. Everybody can be understood. Everything is shared.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>One of these examples is different from the other: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>If a person has internalized a nationalistic doctrine in which there are essential differences between people residing on either side of a border, then a potential national threat appears to excuse the killing of innocent civilians. If averting an ecological collapse becomes the sole existential concern, then there is nothing too drastic, no sacrifice too excessive, to fight on behalf of the environment \u2014 innocent lives can be endangered if it directs people\u2019s attention toward the havoc of climate catastrophe. The ideological premise explains why an action is necessary and excuses its unpalatable dimensions. If one follows the urgent logic, all actions that lead to victory are valid. An ideology begins to be practiced extremely when the premises justify even the most radical of means.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Nationalism is not primarily a doctrine. It is primarily something that is felt, not thought. Belief in an ecological catastrophe requires far more abstract thought than nationalism. It is much more top down, the brain commanding the body. My conception of nationalism is that it is a concentric extension of loyalty to family and tribe, which is not primarily ideological. We do not love our families and our people for primarily intellectual reasons but because they are like us. We are usually biologically bonded in addition to other ties. Studies show that the more closely related we are, the more likely we are to sacrifice for each other.<\/p>\n<p>ChatGPT says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Evolutionary biology calls this kin selection\u2014the idea that organisms are more likely to help relatives because it increases the chances that shared genes get passed on. The closer the genetic relationship, the stronger the tendency. Classic research by W.D. Hamilton quantified it with Hamilton\u2019s rule: altruism is favored when the cost to the helper is less than the benefit to the recipient multiplied by the coefficient of relatedness (how genetically similar they are).<\/p>\n<p>This shows up in human behavior studies, too\u2014people tend to invest more time, resources, and even risk their lives more often for close kin than for distant kin or strangers.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Sometimes our ideological choices will override our natural reactions, but I suspect that our innate reactions are usually stronger than our ideologies. <\/p>\n<p>ChatGPT says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Our evolved, automatic responses\u2014especially those tied to survival, kinship, and threat detection\u2014tend to kick in faster and with more intensity than abstract ideological commitments. Ideologies are learned, culturally mediated frameworks; our instinctive reactions come from older neural systems that operate largely outside conscious deliberation.<\/p>\n<p>When the two conflict, people often rationalize afterward to make their gut reaction fit their ideology. In high-stakes or high-stress moments\u2014danger, injury, kin in trouble\u2014the brain\u2019s fast, emotional systems (amygdala, hypothalamus) tend to dominate over slower, prefrontal \u201cbelief-based\u201d reasoning. Ideology can override instincts in some situations, but that usually takes conscious effort and stable social reinforcement.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>I&#8217;m halfway through Leor&#8217;s book. It seems that liberal is always good and the ideal flexible brain is that which shares her lefty hero system, which matches the dominant hero system of academia.<\/p>\n<p>How can I translate my porous embodied reaction to Leor&#8217;s book in the language of careful critical discourse?<\/p>\n<p>Ask ChatGPT to do it for me: <\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<h1>Does <em>The Ideological Brain<\/em> smuggle a liberal hero-system into \u201cflexibility\u201d?<\/h1>\n<p>You\u2019re not crazy: read a certain way, \u201cflexible = good\u201d tracks closely with mainstream liberal-academic sensibilities (openness, cosmopolitanism, tolerance of ambiguity). That can make \u201crigidity\u201d feel like a polite synonym for dissent from that ethos. Below is a tight read that blends your observation with Guldmann\u2019s and Turner\u2019s lenses\u2014while noting what Zmigrod herself says she intends.<\/p>\n<h2>What Zmigrod says she\u2019s doing<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>Focus is on <em>how<\/em> people think (flexible vs. rigid), not <em>what<\/em> they think politically\u2014extremism and dogmatism exist across left and right (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.vox.com\/the-gray-area\/412187\/ideological-brain-zmigrod-politics-biology\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Vox interview<\/a>; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.socialsciencespace.com\/2025\/07\/leor-zmigrod-on-the-ideological-brain\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Social Science Space Q&amp;A<\/a>).<\/li>\n<li>She frames flexibility as a psychological capacity tied to brain and environment, not a partisan label (<a href=\"https:\/\/us.macmillan.com\/books\/9781250344595\/theideologicalbrain\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">publisher page<\/a>; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/098e1e80-6df7-4025-8ebe-cb2e9a6558e7\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">FT review<\/a>; <a href=\"https:\/\/news.harvard.edu\/gazette\/story\/2025\/05\/excerpt-from-the-ideological-brain-by-leor-zmigrod\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Harvard Gazette excerpt<\/a>).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Where the slippage creeps in<\/h2>\n<ol>\n<li><strong>Construct creep:<\/strong> If \u201cflexibility\u201d is operationalized with tasks and values that mirror the academy\u2019s own ideals, the measure quietly enshrines one side\u2019s virtues. That\u2019s how a neutral metric becomes a prestige map of the liberal self (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/098e1e80-6df7-4025-8ebe-cb2e9a6558e7\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">FT review summary<\/a>).<\/li>\n<li><strong>Criterion contamination:<\/strong> If \u201cgood citizenship\u201d or \u201ctolerance\u201d is scored in ways that already code for liberal stances, dissent looks like pathology rather than a rival normative style (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.vox.com\/the-gray-area\/412187\/ideological-brain-zmigrod-politics-biology\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Vox<\/a>).<\/li>\n<li><strong>Institutional echo:<\/strong> Findings are interpreted inside institutions that reward the same \u201cflexible\u201d traits, which can tilt narratives about what counts as mature reasoning (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.socialsciencespace.com\/2025\/07\/leor-zmigrod-on-the-ideological-brain\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">S3 Q&amp;A<\/a>).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h2>Guldmann\u2019s lens: the asymmetry problem<\/h2>\n<p>Rony Guldmann argues that liberal culture often turns its own identity into the unmarked norm\u2014casting opponents as benighted or \u201crigid.\u201d In this view, a neuroscience of flexibility risks re-branding that asymmetry in scientific language: flexibility as \u201cour\u201d virtue; disagreement as \u201ctheir\u201d cognitive shortfall. That\u2019s his <em>Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression<\/em> thesis in a nutshell (<a href=\"https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2907830\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">SSRN outline<\/a>; author page <a href=\"https:\/\/ronyguldmann.com\/conservative-claims-cultural-oppression\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">overview<\/a>).<\/p>\n<h2>Turner\u2019s lens: the tacit and the institutional<\/h2>\n<p>Stephen P. Turner would say the book underplays the <em>tacit<\/em>\u2014the background practices and institutional norms that define what \u201cflexible\u201d even means. Brains don\u2019t think in a vacuum; cognition is scaffolded by habits and expert systems. So a full account needs sociology of practices, not just psychology of traits (<a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURTST\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>The Social Theory of Practices<\/em><\/a>; <a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURUTT\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>Understanding the Tacit<\/em><\/a>; background via Polanyi\u2019s classic <a href=\"https:\/\/press.uchicago.edu\/ucp\/books\/book\/chicago\/T\/bo6035368.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>The Tacit Dimension<\/em><\/a>).<\/p>\n<h2>A fairer reframing (so we don\u2019t pathologize dissent)<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><strong>Symmetry check:<\/strong> Test for downsides of \u201chyper-flexibility\u201d (conformity to elite cues, faddishness, over-persuadability) alongside downsides of rigidity.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Context sensitivity:<\/strong> Report how \u201cflexibility\u201d scores shift with incentives, threat, identity cues, and institutional settings\u2014not just in lab tasks.<\/li>\n<li><strong>Value transparency:<\/strong> Separate descriptive findings (\u201cwho switches rules faster?\u201d) from normative claims (\u201cwho\u2019s a better democrat?\u201d).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>Practical questions to bring to the second half of the book<\/h2>\n<ol>\n<li>Does any metric of \u201cflexibility\u201d also predict <em>uncritical<\/em> uptake of authority when the authority matches elite consensus? (Symmetry test.)<\/li>\n<li>Are left and right both scrutinized for their preferred forms of myopia (e.g., utopianism vs. status-quo bias)?<\/li>\n<li>Do interpretations acknowledge that institutions define what counts as \u201cadaptive\u201d thinking (Turner\u2019s tacit)?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<blockquote><p>One-liner you can use: \u201cGreat neuroscience\u2014but if flexibility is just the university\u2019s self-portrait, we\u2019ve measured prestige, not virtue.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<h2>Sources worth linking<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>Leor Zmigrod, <em>The Ideological Brain<\/em>: <a href=\"https:\/\/us.macmillan.com\/books\/9781250344595\/theideologicalbrain\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">publisher<\/a> \u2022 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/098e1e80-6df7-4025-8ebe-cb2e9a6558e7\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">FT review<\/a> \u2022 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.vox.com\/the-gray-area\/412187\/ideological-brain-zmigrod-politics-biology\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Vox interview<\/a> \u2022 <a href=\"https:\/\/news.harvard.edu\/gazette\/story\/2025\/05\/excerpt-from-the-ideological-brain-by-leor-zmigrod\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Harvard Gazette excerpt<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Rony Guldmann, <em>Conservative Claims of Cultural Oppression<\/em>: <a href=\"https:\/\/papers.ssrn.com\/sol3\/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2907830\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">SSRN<\/a> \u2022 <a href=\"https:\/\/ronyguldmann.com\/conservative-claims-cultural-oppression\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">author overview<\/a><\/li>\n<li>Stephen P. Turner on the tacit\/practices: <a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURTST\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>The Social Theory of Practices<\/em><\/a> \u2022 <a href=\"https:\/\/philpapers.org\/rec\/TURUTT\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>Understanding the Tacit<\/em><\/a> \u2022 Polanyi\u2019s <a href=\"https:\/\/press.uchicago.edu\/ucp\/books\/book\/chicago\/T\/bo6035368.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><em>The Tacit Dimension<\/em><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>From this 2025 book by smoking hot Cambridge University neuoroscience and politics professor Leor Zmigrod: I believe that we can judge an ideology based on what believing in it does to human bodies and brains; on whether being a passionate &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=162771\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[29646,42731,24,42905],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-162771","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-biology","category-brain","category-politics","category-stephen-turner"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/162771","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=162771"}],"version-history":[{"count":17,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/162771\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":162819,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/162771\/revisions\/162819"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=162771"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=162771"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=162771"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}