{"id":162442,"date":"2025-07-27T17:22:56","date_gmt":"2025-07-28T01:22:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=162442"},"modified":"2026-04-25T07:00:53","modified_gmt":"2026-04-25T15:00:53","slug":"making-democratic-theory-democratic-democracy-law-and-administration-after-weber-and-kelsen","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=162442","title":{"rendered":"Making Democratic Theory Democratic: Democracy, Law, and Administration after Weber and Kelsen"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Here are some highlights from this <A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Making-Democratic-Theory-Democracy-Administration-ebook\/dp\/B0BRQWF685\/\">2023 book by Stephen Turner and George Mazur<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>* The term \u201cadministrative state\u201d is now being treated as an invention of the paranoid Right and a misunderstanding of the nature of the state itself.<\/p>\n<p>* The administrative state from its origins has aimed at making public opinion ineffective or undermining its independence, often in the name of leading it, educating it, or providing \u201cjustice,\u201d that is to say, something beyond mere \u201copinion.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>* The administrative state&#8230;does not limit itself. <\/p>\n<p>* In the decades after John Rawls\u2019 A Theory of Justice (1971) and especially over the past 20 years or so, many books have been published with the same aim: to vindicate and explicate something that is usually called social democracy on philosophical or social science grounds. After the intense ideological rivalries of the twentieth century, this political ideal has become the default position of virtually all academic thinkers in relevant areas. A century that began with the frank acceptance of the irreconcilability of political value choices, and proceeded with extraordinarily intense ideological warfare, ended with a surprisingly broad, though loose, consensus. One could list such works as Philip Pettit (1997), Amartya Sen (2009), and Alan Gewirth (1978) as examples. And in sociology, one could give Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 2008; Wacquant, 2005) and J\u00fcrgen Habermas (2001) as more or less full members of this consensus.<\/p>\n<p>* These writers all reject the idea of freedom as non-interference or choice as inadequate or wrong; they all decry great wealth, the power of money or the power that money gives people, as a form of injustice; and all involve some idea of autonomy governed by reason.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Who are the major thinkers today in the West who deny the great god of &#8220;[personal] autonomy governed by reason&#8221;?<\/p>\n<p>ChatGPT says: <\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<ul>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Alasdair_MacIntyre\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Alasdair MacIntyre<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    <em>Key works:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/After-Virtue-Study-Moral-Theory\/dp\/0268035040\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">After Virtue<\/a>,<br \/>\n    <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Whose-Justice-Which-Rationality-MacIntyre\/dp\/0268006110\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Whose Justice? Which Rationality?<\/a><br \/>\n    Argues modern liberal autonomy is incoherent without traditions; emphasizes virtue ethics over individualism.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Michael_Sandel\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Michael Sandel<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    <em>Key work:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hup.harvard.edu\/books\/9780674537512\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Liberalism and the Limits of Justice<\/a><br \/>\n    Critiques Rawlsian liberalism for ignoring social\/moral context; autonomy is not a sufficient foundation for justice.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Charles_Taylor_(philosopher)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Charles Taylor<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    <em>Key works:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hup.harvard.edu\/books\/9780674824261\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Sources of the Self<\/a>,<br \/>\n    <a href=\"https:\/\/www.hup.harvard.edu\/books\/9780674026764\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">A Secular Age<\/a><br \/>\n    Rejects the Enlightenment\u2019s autonomous reason; identity is always shaped by moral and historical context.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Patrick_Deneen\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Patrick Deneen<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    <em>Key work:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Why-Liberalism-Failed-Politics-Culture\/dp\/0300223447\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Why Liberalism Failed<\/a><br \/>\n    Liberalism\u2019s worship of autonomy erodes community and virtue; it contains the seeds of its own undoing.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/John_Milbank\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">John Milbank<\/a><\/strong> &#038; the Radical Orthodoxy movement<br \/>\n    <em>Key work:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wiley.com\/en-us\/Theology+and+Social+Theory:+Beyond+Secular+Reason,+2nd+Edition-p-9781405127053\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Theology and Social Theory<\/a><br \/>\n    Rejects secular reason; autonomy is a theological error. Proposes return to Christian metaphysics and ecclesial order.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Roger_Scruton\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Roger Scruton<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    <em>Key works:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Soul-World-Roger-Scruton\/dp\/0691169288\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Soul of the World<\/a>,<br \/>\n    <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomsbury.com\/us\/fools-frauds-and-firebrands-9781472920031\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Fools, Frauds and Firebrands<\/a><br \/>\n    Defends tradition and sacred order over liberal individualism; autonomy is not the highest good.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Pierre_Manent\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Pierre Manent<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    <em>Key works:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/City-Man-Pierre-Manent\/dp\/0691009602\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The City of Man<\/a>,<br \/>\n    <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/World-Beyond-Politics-Pierre-Manent\/dp\/0691115009\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">A World Beyond Politics?<\/a><br \/>\n    Critic of secularism and the ideal of absolute autonomy; emphasizes political and religious traditions.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Oliver_O%27Donovan\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Oliver O&#8217;Donovan<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    <em>Key works:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Desire-Nations-Rediscovering-Roots-Political\/dp\/0521665164\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Desire of the Nations<\/a>,<br \/>\n    <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Ways-Judgment-Oliver-ODonovan\/dp\/0802805126\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Ways of Judgment<\/a><br \/>\n    Grounds moral reasoning in theological authority rather than autonomous reason or liberal neutrality.\n  <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Most of these thinkers are <strong>not centrally concerned with domination<\/strong> in the modern liberal-left sense\u2014i.e., oppression as lack of recognition, microaggressions, or identity-based exclusion. Here&#8217;s a breakdown:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n    <strong>MacIntyre, Taylor, Sandel<\/strong><br \/>\n    Some concern with domination, but understood through tradition, community breakdown, and moral fragmentation rather than identity politics.<br \/>\n    Taylor is closest to liberal recognition theory, especially in <em>Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition<\/em>.<br \/>\n    MacIntyre and Sandel care more about the loss of moral language and community than &#8220;recognition&#8221; per se.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>Deneen, Milbank, O&#8217;Donovan<\/strong><br \/>\n    Skeptical or critical of the modern focus on domination as identity-based humiliation.<br \/>\n    They worry more about spiritual or metaphysical alienation\u2014how liberalism\u2019s elevation of autonomy fractures tradition, religion, and authority.<br \/>\n    Milbank and O\u2019Donovan explicitly critique modern secular liberalism for replacing theological truth with \u201crecognition\u201d discourse.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>Scruton<\/strong><br \/>\n    Opposes the idea that society owes identity affirmation or recognition.<br \/>\n    Emphasizes duty, beauty, sacredness, and the conservation of institutions\u2014not freedom from domination as defined by progressive politics.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>Manent<\/strong><br \/>\n    Sees liberal focus on identity as a symptom of moral and political fragmentation.<br \/>\n    Concerned with the <em>loss of shared political purpose<\/em>, not domination in the recognition-theory sense.\n  <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Bottom line:<\/strong><br \/>\nThese thinkers mostly reject the liberal shift toward defining freedom as the absence of domination via misrecognition.<br \/>\nTheir critiques aim higher: the spiritual, moral, and metaphysical breakdown behind modern individualism\u2014not the interpersonal slights or systemic marginalizations that dominate current progressive discourse.\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Back to Turner &#038; Mazur: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>* The right thing is collective; the tension is between the collectively acknowledged good and the distorted private good, which is distorted because it is at heart a quest for something like autonomy and recognition but expresses itself in greed and power seeking, which are the things that need to be collectively controlled.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>ChatGPT: <\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>That quote reflects a progressive or Marxian moral-political view<\/strong>: that private desires (like autonomy or recognition) are distortions, and the collective must correct them through control or reeducation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The thinkers in question reject that paradigm.<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n    <strong>MacIntyre<\/strong> believes the good is <em>teleological<\/em> and tradition-based, not a collective imposition on private distortion. He critiques liberal individualism, but not in favor of collective correction\u2014rather, a return to virtues embedded in practices and communities.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>Sandel and Taylor<\/strong> see selves as socially situated, but not in need of being corrected by the collective. They critique procedural liberalism, not to elevate collectivism, but to recover deeper sources of meaning and moral depth.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>Deneen<\/strong> would argue that the collective (as structured under liberalism) is the very thing producing distorted private goods. He\u2019s not calling for collective regulation of desire, but for cultural renewal through tradition and virtue.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>Milbank and O&#8217;Donovan<\/strong> reject both private autonomy and secular collective authority. For them, the only legitimate &#8220;collective&#8221; is the ecclesial body (the Church), not the state or society acting as moral enforcer.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>Scruton<\/strong> champions traditional institutions and duties, but deeply distrusts any collective effort to &#8220;fix&#8221; individuals. He believes in cultivation, not coercion.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>Manent<\/strong> sees the political as a shared moral space, but one that arises from history and religion\u2014not abstract notions of correcting private distortion.\n  <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Bottom line:<\/strong><br \/>\nThese thinkers reject the idea that private goods are inherently distorted and need to be overridden by a collectively defined good. They are skeptical of both radical individualism and collectivist moral engineering. Their goal is neither unrestrained autonomy nor collective control\u2014but the recovery of meaning through tradition, virtue, and transcendent sources of order.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Turner and Mazur write: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>* There are many other explanations of why \u201csocial democracy\u201d has not happened: the media, the pre-existing culture (which is racist, patriarchal, anti-egalitarian, suffused with false beliefs derived from religion, or scientism), a failed public sphere, or other sources.<\/p>\n<p>* They want a social matrix in which the bad effects of competitiveness and striving are tempered, or replaced, by a regime of personal relations in which dignity is respected, autonomy is granted, and people trust each other\u2015a decent society, as Avishai Margalit calls it (1996). All of the \u201csocial\u201d goals involve more discretionary power for officials. These authors all embrace the idea of an activist, paternalist, benevolent state. Health care is often the model for the proper role of the state. Where it is done correctly, it combines dignity, compassion, paternalism, efficiency, the proper use of expertise, universalism, respect for autonomy, and sufficient provision with a rational allocation of scarce resources.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>ChatGPT says: <\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p><strong>Why would a reasonable, decent person object to this vision?<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n    <strong>1. It expands discretionary power dangerously.<\/strong><br \/>\n    The more discretion officials have, the more room there is for bias, coercion, and mission creep. What starts as \u201cbenevolent\u201d paternalism can easily morph into soft authoritarianism. Good intentions don\u2019t guarantee just outcomes.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>2. It assumes the state can embody moral virtue.<\/strong><br \/>\n    Critics argue that the state is a blunt instrument. It\u2019s built for enforcing rules, not embodying compassion, dignity, or trust. Trying to make it do so often leads to bureaucratic overreach and unintended consequences.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>3. It infantilizes citizens.<\/strong><br \/>\n    A paternalist state may protect, but it also disempowers. Critics like <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Friedrich_Hayek\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Hayek<\/a> or <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Philip_Rieff\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Rieff<\/a> would say: the more the state manages your moral and social life, the less you develop responsibility, virtue, or independence.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>4. It replaces organic trust with engineered dependency.<\/strong><br \/>\n    Real trust grows in families, associations, and local communities\u2014not by central planning. Making dignity and compassion into functions of state design risks undermining real social fabric.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>5. It idealizes health care as a political model.<\/strong><br \/>\n    Health care is important, but its goals (efficiency + compassion + universalism) don&#8217;t translate well to education, family life, religion, or moral development. Many fear a technocratic mindset creeping into areas where it doesn\u2019t belong.\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong>6. It fails to limit itself.<\/strong><br \/>\n    Once you justify \u201cmore state\u201d for one good (like health or dignity), where do you stop? Critics worry this logic gives the state a mandate to do everything in the name of the good, which is inherently dangerous\u2014even if benevolent at first.\n  <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Bottom line:<\/strong><br \/>\nGood people can want dignity, trust, and compassion\u2014<em>and still oppose a paternalist state<\/em>\u2014because they believe these values flourish better under limits, subsidiarity, and moral traditions that lie outside politics.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Turner and Mazur write: &#8220;They err on the side of protecting the culture of the minority group. For the dominant culture, however, matters are different: it needs to be reformed to accord with reason.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Who are the most eloquent spokesmen on behalf of the majority culture of America, England, Australia and don&#8217;t think it needs to be reformed to accord with reason?<\/p>\n<p>ChatGPT says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Here\u2019s a list of eloquent and influential voices in the U.S., U.K., and Australia who defend the legitimacy and value of the majority culture\u2014without insisting it must be reformed to meet abstract rational ideals or minority-driven frameworks.<\/p>\n<p>They argue that traditions, inherited norms, and majority ways of life deserve respect\u2014not just critique.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Roger_Scruton\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Roger Scruton (UK)<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    Philosopher of tradition and place. Defended English cultural inheritance, patriotism, and national identity against progressive universalism and elite cultural critique.<br \/>\n    <em>Key works:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/England-An-Elegy-Roger-Scruton\/dp\/0826472951\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">England: An Elegy<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Fools-Frauds-Firebrands-Thinkers-Left\/dp\/1472920044\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Fools, Frauds and Firebrands<\/a>\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Patrick_Deneen\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Patrick Deneen (USA)<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    Critiques liberalism for hollowing out the cultural core of America. Defends inherited norms and practices from elite attempts at rational reordering.<br \/>\n    <em>Key work:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Why-Liberalism-Failed-Politics-Culture\/dp\/0300223447\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Why Liberalism Failed<\/a>\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Melanie_Phillips\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Melanie Phillips (UK)<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    Journalist and critic of multiculturalism. Argues that majority British culture has been unfairly pathologized and should be defended, not dismantled.<br \/>\n    <em>Key work:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Londonistan-Melanie-Phillips\/dp\/1594031444\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Londonistan<\/a>\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Douglas_Murray_(author)\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Douglas Murray (UK)<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    Argues Western majorities have a right to their cultural continuity and are under attack from elites driven by guilt and rationalist ideology.<br \/>\n    <em>Key works:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Madness-Crowds-Gender-Race-Identity\/dp\/1635579988\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Madness of Crowds<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Strange-Death-Europe-Immigration-Identity\/dp\/163557580X\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Strange Death of Europe<\/a>\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/quadrant.org.au\/author\/keith-windschuttle\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Keith Windschuttle (Australia)<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    Historian and editor of <em>Quadrant<\/em>. Defends traditional Australian identity and criticizes efforts to rewrite national history to fit progressive ideologies.<br \/>\n    <em>Key work:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Fabrication-Aboriginal-History-Keith-Windschuttle\/dp\/1921421803\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Fabrication of Aboriginal History<\/a>\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Mark_Lila\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Mark Lilla (USA)<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    Not a traditionalist per se, but critiques the left\u2019s obsession with identity and refusal to engage with majority culture or national cohesion.<br \/>\n    <em>Key work:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Once-Future-Liberal-After-Identity\/dp\/0062697438\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Once and Future Liberal<\/a>\n  <\/li>\n<li>\n    <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Yoram_Hazony\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Yoram Hazony (USA\/Israel)<\/a><\/strong><br \/>\n    Philosopher of nationalism who defends the value of national tradition, majority culture, and inherited moral order over rationalist universalism.<br \/>\n    <em>Key work:<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Virtue-Nationalism-Yoram-Hazony\/dp\/1541645383\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">The Virtue of Nationalism<\/a>\n  <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>Bottom line:<\/strong><br \/>\nThese thinkers argue that the dominant culture isn\u2019t just a power structure to be rationally critiqued\u2014it\u2019s a moral inheritance to be respected. They reject the elite stance that says only minorities need cultural protection, while the majority must justify itself by reason.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p><A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Monty_Python_and_the_Holy_Grail\">Monty Python and the Holy Grail<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>King Arthur: (to the peasant) Will you shut up! Will you shut up! [Arthur grabs and shakes him]<br \/>\nDennis the Peasant: Ah, now we see the violence inherent in the system!<br \/>\nKing Arthur: Shut up!<br \/>\nDennis the Peasant: Oh! Come and see the violence inherent in the system! Help! Help! I&#8217;m being repressed!<br \/>\nKing Arthur: Bloody peasant!<br \/>\nDennis the Peasant: Oh, what a giveaway! Did you hear that? Did you hear that, eh? That&#8217;s what I&#8217;m on about! Did you see him repressing me? You saw him, didn&#8217;t you?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Stephen Turner writes: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>* Economic power for Ringen seems to be defined simply to mean the influence of business money on political campaigns and lobbying. The fact, for example, that Swedish politics is dominated by a major union confederation which owns a controlling interest in the most important newspaper, is the main force in the party that has ruled with only slight interruptions for decades, and is well represented on government panels is apparently not an instance of economic power for Ringen. If one scaled up its membership to fit the population of the United States, this confederation would be a mind-boggling 66 million strong. This kind of overwhelming power would produce \u201cconsensus\u201d even in the United States. Obama, who received the highest vote total in American history, had only 63.25 million votes.<\/p>\n<p>* Title IX and anti-discrimination law have generated oaths of their own. These take the form of \u201cdiversity statements,\u201d which faculty are required either to sign or to submit as part of the job application process (Oregon Association of Scholars, 2017; for guidelines, see UC, 2015). The statements are designed to compel the applicant to both affirm and prove their commitment to diversity. This form of oath taking has yet to be tested in court, although the requirement of oath taking to demonstrate commitment to diversity is widespread, and the statements are taken seriously. As sociologist Tanya Golash-Boza (2016), in an Inside Higher Ed article, advises job applicants: Many faculty members truly care about diversity and equity and will read your statement closely. I have been in the room when the diversity statement of every single finalist for a job search was scrutinized. The candidates who submitted strong statements wrote about their experiences teaching first-generation college students, their involvement with LGBTQ student groups, their experiences teaching in inner-city high schools and their awareness of how systemic inequalities affect students\u2019 ability to excel. Applicants mentioned their teaching and activism and highlighted their commitment to diversity and equity in higher education. <\/p>\n<p>A typical statement (from a sociologist), which was recommended as a model on the official website of the University of California system, includes this example of evidence of one\u2019s commitment: \u201cIn my advising capacities, I encouraged my students to ponder the roles they might play in the alleviation of the vast inequities that continue to shape our world\u201d (UCSD, n.d.). Are these oaths political tests of the kind rejected in the California loyalty case? It depends. If diversity is a political issue, these are political tests. To the extent that doctrinal statements of political beliefs, such as a conviction regarding the evils of inequality, are considered as a basis for employment, there are First Amendment issues, at least in a public institution. If it is a policy commitment, it is plausible for an employer to require adherence to the employer\u2019s policies. Separating the two presents the same kinds of difficulty as harassment guidelines.<\/p>\n<p>Some of these oaths are simple affirmations that have to be signed off on by the applicant. It is an open question as to whether they are enforceable after employment\u2014i.e., whether someone could be said to have violated the oath, have made it falsely, or have renounced it. Nonetheless, the requirement is designed to have an effect on hiring. The act of assessing a person\u2019s commitment to a policy\u2014even if this were an appropriate requirement, consistent with academic freedom is a matter of largely arbitrary personal judgment, exercised by people who are unconstrained by rules or the possibility of appeal.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The Bogan Verdict<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<h2>What Would a Bogan Say About Turner&#8217;s Take on Diversity Oaths?<\/h2>\n<p>\u201cSo lemme get this straight: you want a job teachin\u2019 kids, and now you gotta write a bloody essay swearin\u2019 you&#8217;re down with every social cause under the sun? Sounds like a cult, not a uni.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cTurner\u2019s spot on\u2014this is just a loyalty oath in new wrapping. Used to be \u2018do you hate Communism?\u2019 Now it\u2019s \u2018do you love Diversity\u2122?\u2019 Same crap, different cause. You\u2019re not judged on whether you can teach, but on whether you know the right activist codewords.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cAnd all this talk about whether it\u2019s a \u2018policy commitment\u2019 or a \u2018political belief\u2019? Mate, that\u2019s lawyer-speak for tryin\u2019 to cover your arse while you still make people pass an ideological purity test. If you can get fired or not hired for not writing some poetic crap about \u2018alleviating inequity,\u2019 then yeah\u2014it\u2019s political. And it stinks.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u201cI\u2019ve read resumes that say \u2018team player\u2019 and \u2018works well under pressure.\u2019 Now we\u2019re sayin\u2019 you have to pledge to save the bloody world before you can teach Sociology 101? Give me a break. No wonder the unis are full of soft-spoken clones who all think the same.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><strong>Bogan verdict:<\/strong> \u201cIt\u2019s not about teaching anymore, it\u2019s about showin\u2019 you belong to the club. Turner calls it oath-taking. I call it brown-nosing with a side of culty bullshit.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Turner: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The progressives of the early twentieth century wanted the support and enthusiasm of \u201cthe people\u201d and envied populism for this. But they wanted to lead the people themselves. And they asserted themselves not in the name of people\u2019s interests and wishes, but in the name of expertise. Progressivism was to be the alliance of experts and an aroused \u201cpeople\u201d (Turner, 1996). And this followed an emerging practice of social movements based on expertise, notably the prohibition movement, which employed the techniques presently associated with climate science under the heading alcohol science&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>The progressives of the early twentieth century wanted the support and enthusiasm of \u201cthe people\u201d and envied populism for this. But they wanted to lead the people themselves. And they asserted themselves not in the name of people\u2019s interests and wishes, but in the name of expertise. Progressivism was to be the alliance of experts and an aroused \u201cpeople\u201d (Turner, 1996). And this followed an emerging practice of social movements based on expertise, notably the prohibition movement, which employed the techniques presently associated with climate science under the heading alcohol science&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>* Populism is intrinsically a denial of the special superiority of rulers and elites.<\/p>\n<p>* Populist movements happen when political parties, traditional leaders, elites, and politics as usual fail to deliver the expected goods, or fail to accord with the popular sense of reality, or are perceived as untrustworthy and corrupt.<\/p>\n<p>* Populist tendencies are prone to co-optation and typically do not outlast the situations that produced them, though they do represent a reserve of general sentiment against elites and particular ruling groups that can be activated in new situations. They differ from ideologies and ideological parties in that they are situational rather than analytic, in the sense that they have concrete targets and grievances rather than a developed analysis of political life that is extended to new situations and refined and elaborated. This accounts for many of the distinctive features of populist movements, especially the preference for leaders who promise to act decisively, in contrast to normal \u201cpoliticians,\u201d and their hostility to \u201cpolitics as usual.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Populisms are situation-driven rather than analysis-driven, or to put it differently, driven by specific crises or grievances, rather than by a permanent ideological viewpoint&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>* Elite solidarity is essential to elite rule; division among the elite is a typical cause of elite failure (Shipman et al., 2018). Elites rule through alliances between the elite and a significant non-elite group. The most stable of these alliances have been with the middle classes, normally under an ideology of meritocracy, property rights, and support of business, an alliance that is played off against the demands of the excluded group, the poor. But an upstairs-downstairs alliance is always possible, and the upper hand the elite has in dealing with the non-elite segments of society depends on its ability to choose alternative groups to ally with. Thus pluralism favors the elite because it provides more opportunities to change alliances. Populism, in contrast, must produce enough unity in the population to effectively counter the elite, and must therefore transcend differences between segments of society in the name of the people. Both Left and Right populisms are anti-pluralist, as a simple consequence of the dynamics of elite alliance-making: neither kind of Populism could succeed if the elite used its alliance-making power to divide the movement. To the extent that elite rule depends on manipulating and shifting alliances with non-elite groups, as is the norm (Shipman et al., 2018), an attack on pluralism is a threat to elite rule as a political system itself.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<h2>Stephen Turner\u2019s Elite Theory and the Current American Landscape (2024)<\/h2>\n<p>In <em><a href=\"https:\/\/rowman.com\/ISBN\/9781666923441\/Making-Democratic-Theory-Democratic-Democracy-Law-and-Administration-after-Weber-and-Kelsen\">Making Democratic Theory Democratic<\/a><\/em> (2023), Stephen Turner observes that <strong>elite solidarity is the precondition of elite rule<\/strong>. When elites fracture, their rule becomes unstable. In America today, that solidarity remains strong\u2014especially among cultural, bureaucratic, and corporate elites\u2014but is increasingly under pressure.<\/p>\n<h3>1. The Shift from Middle-Class Alliance to \u201cUpstairs-Downstairs\u201d Coalition<\/h3>\n<p>Historically, American elites allied with the middle class through shared commitments to <strong>meritocracy, property rights, and entrepreneurial capitalism<\/strong>. But Turner\u2019s point is that this alliance is contingent\u2014elites can swap allies. That\u2019s precisely what\u2019s happening: elite institutions have shifted toward <strong>\u201cupstairs-downstairs\u201d alliances<\/strong>, embracing activist segments of the poor, marginalized, or identity-based groups while sidelining middle-class interests (e.g., deindustrialized workers, suburban parents, independent contractors).<\/p>\n<p>This can be seen in elite support for DEI bureaucracies, urban non-profits, and progressive prosecutors\u2014all justified in the name of equity, but materially aligned with preserving elite control of institutions. As <a href=\"https:\/\/americanaffairsjournal.org\/2021\/11\/dei-credentialism-and-the-end-of-meritocracy\/\">critics like Richard Hanania and Christopher Rufo have noted<\/a>, this arrangement sacrifices traditional meritocratic norms in favor of performative inclusion\u2014consolidating elite control under the banner of progress.<\/p>\n<h3>2. Pluralism as Elite Strategy<\/h3>\n<p>Turner points out that <strong>pluralism benefits elites<\/strong> because it gives them more non-elite groups to play off each other. In today\u2019s U.S., this dynamic is supercharged: cultural elites promote hyper-pluralism\u2014racial, gender, sexual, linguistic, and legal fragmentation\u2014knowing that division makes populist unity harder to achieve. The Balkanization of the working class (white, black, Latino, native-born, immigrant) ensures that no broad-based \u201cpeople\u201d can unite to challenge elite dominance.<\/p>\n<p>Policy-wise, this is evident in the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.niskanencenter.org\/why-populists-dont-like-pluralism\/\">Niskanen Center\u2019s defense of technocratic pluralism<\/a>, or the embrace of \u201cmosaic\u201d identities in elite academic spaces. Even corporate America, via ESG and DEI policies, benefits from a divided and distracted public, while consolidating its grip on institutions.<\/p>\n<h3>3. Populism as Anti-Pluralist Threat<\/h3>\n<p>Turner clarifies that <strong>populism must reject pluralism<\/strong> to unify \u201cthe people\u201d against elite power. This is what terrifies the elite: not Trump himself, but the possibility of cross-ethnic class solidarity. Movements like 2016-era Sandersism and 2020s-style national conservatism both attempted this unification\u2014from Left and Right\u2014but both were undermined by elite-led coalition fracturing (e.g., race-based wedge issues, elite control of media narratives, technocratic gatekeeping).<\/p>\n<p>This dynamic aligns with political scientist <a href=\"https:\/\/press.princeton.edu\/books\/hardcover\/9780691174219\/what-is-populism\">Jan-Werner M\u00fcller\u2019s<\/a> description of populism as morally exclusionary\u2014but Turner reframes that: it\u2019s not exclusion, it\u2019s <em>strategic unity<\/em>. Pluralism here isn\u2019t democratic richness; it\u2019s a method of elite survival.<\/p>\n<h3>4. Bottom Line: Attacking Pluralism Is Attacking the Elite&#8217;s Operating System<\/h3>\n<p>Turner\u2019s insight lands clearly: if elite power depends on managing fragmented allies, then populist attacks on pluralism threaten the <strong>structural logic of elite rule itself<\/strong>. That\u2019s why populist calls for national unity, civic nationalism, or re-industrialization provoke such aggressive elite resistance\u2014they\u2019re not just political threats, they\u2019re systemic ones.<\/p>\n<p>Next I move to some thought experiments that slide away from Turner&#8217;s framework. Turner&#8217;s point about elite pluralism and alliance-shifting is an analytical claim about how power works, not a prediction about what replaces it. The MAGA projection assumes a cleaner break than Turner&#8217;s principal-agent logic would predict. New populist elites face the same metamorphosis problem as old ones. The discretionary power does not disappear; it changes hands and generates new ideologies to justify itself. Turner&#8217;s framework predicts that, whatever replaces the current regime, it will develop its own rationalizations and its own principal-agent gaps. The Bogan would have notes about that too.<\/p>\n<h2>What America Might Look Like Under Full MAGA Institutional Rule<\/h2>\n<h3>1. End of Managerial Elitism<\/h3>\n<p>The expert class\u2014academics, NGO directors, DEI bureaucrats, HR technocrats, legacy media editors\u2014would lose their cultural and administrative power. Universities would be defunded or restructured to serve \u201cnational priorities\u201d like trade skills, classical education, and civic nationalism. Think <em>Hillsdale meets land-grant colleges<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>Institutions like the CDC, DOJ, and FBI would undergo mass purges or reorganizations, with loyalty to national-populist ideology prioritized over traditional credentialism. Think less \u201cPhD in public policy,\u201d more \u201cAmerica First bureaucrat.\u201d<\/p>\n<h3>2. Pluralism Crushed in Favor of Majoritarian Unity<\/h3>\n<p>MAGA populism, by nature, demands cohesion. The multicultural framework would be dismantled. <strong>English-only policies<\/strong> could be enforced. Immigration would be restricted to culturally \u201cassimilable\u201d groups. Affirmative action, DEI programs, and identity-based hiring would be banned at the federal and likely state level.<\/p>\n<p>Instead of diversity statements, public employees might be required to sign <strong>patriotic loyalty pledges<\/strong> or oaths to uphold \u201ctraditional American values.\u201d Dissent wouldn&#8217;t be criminalized\u2014but it would be institutionally marginalized, as conservative populism replaces liberal managerialism as the dominant moral code.<\/p>\n<h3>3. Realignment of State and Federal Power<\/h3>\n<p>The federal bureaucracy would shrink, with more authority pushed to states\u2014especially red ones. But cultural authority would be centralized around a \u201ccommon American identity.\u201d Washington might remain powerful on trade and border issues but yield cultural policy to states like Florida or Texas, which could become laboratories for populist governance.<\/p>\n<h3>4. Media and Education Overhaul<\/h3>\n<p>Public funding for NPR, PBS, and elite universities could be cut or conditioned on \u201cviewpoint neutrality.\u201d K-12 education would pivot to nationalist civic curricula\u2014think <a href=\"https:\/\/floridastandards.org\/\">Florida\u2019s state education standards<\/a>, but nationwide. NEA and AFT influence would collapse. Journalism as a credentialed profession might give way to independent populist media ecosystems backed by legislation and funding shifts.<\/p>\n<h3>5. New Cultural Orthodoxy<\/h3>\n<p>Just as elite liberalism had its sacred language (inclusion, equity, systemic bias), MAGA populism would enforce its own liturgy: <em>God, country, family, tradition<\/em>. Hollywood, academia, and major corporations would face direct or indirect pressure to align\u2014or else be replaced by parallel institutions that do.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Cancel culture wouldn\u2019t disappear<\/strong>\u2014it would just change targets. Instead of professors being fired for misgendering someone, they might be sacked for denigrating America or opposing the new moral order.<\/p>\n<h3>6. Policy Outcomes: Material and Cultural<\/h3>\n<ul>\n<li>Massive investment in domestic manufacturing and energy independence<\/li>\n<li>Tariffs, trade realignment, and possibly an industrial policy aimed at reshoring jobs<\/li>\n<li>Criminal justice policy swinging back toward retribution and order<\/li>\n<li>Reduction or elimination of race-conscious government programs<\/li>\n<li>Social policy defined by a fusion of Christian traditionalism and populist nationalism<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>7. Political Climate<\/h3>\n<p>Polarization would deepen. Blue states might form a de facto \u201cinternal resistance,\u201d and cultural secession (divided norms, media, and economic paths) would intensify. But MAGA populism doesn\u2019t aim for compromise\u2014it seeks replacement.<\/p>\n<p>Whether the country holds together under that tension would depend on how far institutional capture goes\u2014and how willing the new regime is to tolerate <strong>residual pluralism<\/strong> in the private sphere.<\/p>\n<h3>In Turner\u2019s Terms:<\/h3>\n<p>This would be the destruction of elite pluralism and its replacement with <strong>hegemonic majoritarianism<\/strong>. Elite fluidity\u2014managing alliances between groups\u2014would be eliminated. The new regime would say: \u201cNo more playing factions against each other. You&#8217;re either with the people, or you&#8217;re not.\u201d<\/p>\n<h2>A Different America: Post-Pluralist, Nationalist, and Cohesive<\/h2>\n<h3>1. National Identity as the Unifying Principle<\/h3>\n<p>The dominant cultural logic centers on American nationalism\u2014civic pride, historical continuity, and a sense of shared fate. National holidays, founding documents, and patriotic rituals are foregrounded across institutions. Public messaging emphasizes unity over difference, downplaying multicultural narratives in favor of assimilation and loyalty to a common American identity.<\/p>\n<p>Immigrants are still admitted, but selectively\u2014based on perceived cultural fit and national interest. Policies reward assimilation: English fluency, economic contribution, and civic participation. Ethnic enclaves are discouraged in favor of cultural integration.<\/p>\n<h3>2. A Shift in Social Trust and Outgroup Boundaries<\/h3>\n<p>Social trust is higher within the national in-group, defined less by race or class and more by perceived cultural alignment. People who \u201cbuy in\u201d to national ideals\u2014flag, faith, military service, work ethic\u2014are trusted across lines that previously divided Americans.<\/p>\n<p>There is, however, greater suspicion of perceived internal outsiders: transnational elites, activist NGOs, university administrators, and journalists who are seen as unpatriotic or disconnected from common life. Globalist language and institutional neutrality are viewed with skepticism. \u201cAre you on our side?\u201d becomes a cultural litmus test in business, education, and media.<\/p>\n<h3>3. Public Institutions Reflect National Cohesion<\/h3>\n<p>Government institutions at all levels emphasize responsiveness to \u201cthe people.\u201d Bureaucracies are streamlined and tasked with enforcing national priorities\u2014domestic manufacturing, secure borders, law enforcement, civic education. DEI offices are disbanded. Public school curricula focus on American history, constitutional principles, and classical literature, with a narrative arc of national progress and redemption.<\/p>\n<p>Public broadcasting is nationalist and moralistic rather than cosmopolitan and ironic. Art and culture institutions receive funding for projects that affirm traditional values, heroism, sacrifice, and national pride.<\/p>\n<h3>4. Media and Communication<\/h3>\n<p>Legacy media outlets have lost trust and market share. News is decentralized, with independent nationalist outlets\u2014many rooted in local communities or religious institutions\u2014offering coverage aligned with shared values. Algorithms are regulated to prioritize \u201cconstructive speech\u201d and reduce conflict. Tech firms are pressured to avoid censoring political speech unless clearly unlawful.<\/p>\n<p>There is less tolerance for ideological dissent in public-facing roles. Social sanction comes not through cancellation, but through exclusion from influence and advancement. The cultural expectation is not uniformity of thought but <strong>alignment with national purpose<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<h3>5. Economic Policy and Class Structure<\/h3>\n<p>Trade is protectionist. Strategic industries\u2014steel, energy, semiconductors\u2014are domestically subsidized. Unions regain influence, but within a nationalist frame: workers and owners are seen as partners in national renewal, not adversaries in class struggle.<\/p>\n<p>The middle class is central. Working-class jobs have political prestige. Credentialism is in retreat; skilled trades and military service are elevated. Elite institutions that hoarded symbolic capital (Ivy League, think tanks, big philanthropy) are viewed with skepticism or irrelevance.<\/p>\n<h3>6. Religion and Morality<\/h3>\n<p>Religious observance rises modestly, particularly within Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox traditions that affirm family, order, and responsibility. Public expressions of faith are common and respected. Moral education returns to schools in the form of character-building curricula\u2014discipline, duty, and civic virtue.<\/p>\n<h3>7. Foreign Policy<\/h3>\n<p>Foreign entanglements are limited. Alliances are judged strictly by national interest. Military engagement is minimal but unapologetic: \u201cwe don\u2019t intervene unless it\u2019s about us.\u201d There is strategic competition with China, economic decoupling, and a reset of global leadership expectations.<\/p>\n<h3>8. Cultural Tone<\/h3>\n<p>The culture is earnest, not ironic. There\u2019s less appetite for boundary-pushing art or transgressive humor. National pride is assumed, not defended. Heroes are elevated. Victim narratives, though still present, are framed within the context of overcoming adversity to become part of the national story.<\/p>\n<h3>9. Social Norms<\/h3>\n<p>People are expected to contribute, be polite, and show respect for country and community. Dress codes are more traditional. Public behavior is more regulated by informal expectations\u2014less tolerance for disruption or disorder. The cultural atmosphere is more masculine, more religious, and more duty-oriented.<\/p>\n<p><strong>It\u2019s a different America<\/strong>: still diverse, still free, but with a narrowed moral bandwidth, clearer lines between insiders and outsiders, and a strong narrative about who we are and where we\u2019re going\u2014together.<\/p>\n<p>Grok says: &#8220;A MAGA populist takeover, as envisioned through Turner\u2019s lens, would transform America into a centralized, nationalist state with diminished pluralism and elite influence. Political institutions would prioritize loyalty over diversity, economic policies would favor workers and small businesses over globalist corporations, and social cohesion would hinge on a narrow definition of &#8220;the people.&#8221; While this could initially unify non-elite groups, the suppression of pluralism risks long-term instability, as excluded factions and economic challenges threaten the populist coalition. America would become less pluralistic and globally engaged, with a new populist elite potentially replicating old power dynamics unless checked by grassroots accountability.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Gemini says: &#8220;Stephen Turner&#8217;s framework suggests that the intense polarization, institutional decay, and populist energy in America are not mere symptoms of incivility. They are the logical consequences of a crumbling elite consensus. The old, stable alliance between elites and the middle class is broken. In its place, we see a divided elite and the rise of two competing populist movements, each trying to build a new, unified, non-elite coalition. They are fundamentally anti-pluralist because they must be; their only path to success is to unite a large enough segment of the population to resist the elite&#8217;s classic strategy of dividing and ruling through shifting alliances. The future of American democracy likely depends on which of these forces prevails: a re-stabilization of elite rule through a new alliance, or the success of a populist movement in unifying &#8220;the people&#8221; and dismantling the system of elite control itself.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Turner writes: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>In this chapter, I will focus on the legal structures and quasi-legal regulatory structures that relate to academic freedom, in addition to the basic theory that applies to them. My aim is to explain (1) how changes in them affect academic freedom, (2) the legal properties of the new constraints under which those in the academy operate, and (3) the differences between this current situation and academic freedom as it has traditionally been understood. The primary issues I will be concerned with are discretionary legal and administrative power and the way that regulations, as implemented by universities, have expanded this power, as well as the enlarged role of contract law and employment contracts as protections of academic freedom. Academic freedom is undergoing a redefinition in the face of new legal circumstances. Its two traditional dimensions are the higher education institutions\u2019 autonomy from the state and the individual freedom of scholars. It was traditionally thought that independence from the state and the existence of strong faculty governance were the best guarantors of academic freedom (Tiede, 2015). The American Association of University Professors (MUP) fought for both. Academic freedom, however, is increasingly restricted by regulations implemented by universities, which can take the form of institutional review boards, research misconduct tribunals, and Title IX enforcement. Because many federal regulations governing institutions of higher education are themselves vague and broad, the specific rules created by these institutions are a result of discretionary power over academics that is inimical to the traditional notion of academic freedom as a well-defined right. The idea of university autonomy, similarly, has undergone important changes. It has been significantly compromised as a result of federal regulation of a kind that did not exist in the first half of the twentieth century. One effect of intensified federal regulation is self-monitoring within higher education institutions (often with the assistance of an internal bureaucratic office) that seeks not only to conform to these externally imposed rules but also to invent local variations that expand on them.<\/p>\n<p>* The university argued that educational institutions assume academic freedom as just one value that must be balanced against \u201cother values core to their mission.\u201d Some of those values, it said, include the obligation to \u201ctake care not to cause harm, directly or indirectly, to members of the university community\u201d; to \u201crespect the dignity of others and to acknowledge their right to express differing opinions\u201d; to \u201csafeguard the conditions for the community to exist\u201d; to \u201censur[e] colleagues feel free to explore undeveloped ideas\u201d; and to carry out \u201cthe concept of cura personalis,\u201d which involves working and caring \u201cfor all aspects of the lives of the members of the institution\u201d (McAdams, 2018: 69).This line of argument would have the effect of eliminating academic freedom as a contractual right and subjecting its exercise to a wide range of other, largely subjective considerations.<\/p>\n<p>* As all of these examples show, the present legal system produces an unequal conflict between academic freedom, which has only the most fragile and indirect legal basis, and employment law. The latter is backed by administrative law, which, in turn, is supported by the practice of judicial deference and the absence, in most cases, of statutory law providing for and defining academic freedom. A recent University of Texas lawsuit indicated how low on the legal hierarchy academic freedom is. A lawyer representing the state and the university affirmed the state\u2019s view that academic freedom was a \u201cworkplace policy,\u201d not a First Amendment right (Ellis, 2018). This is the language of standard employment law. If a university is allowed to define academic freedom as a workplace policy, then it has little legal significance. Policy is a prerogative of the employer. Employers have been reluctant to act on this prerogative, but they have been less hesitant in applying regulations backed by administrative law, which represent different policy values. In the cases we have discussed, academic freedom is considered to be one policy value among several and, therefore, subject to being balanced against other interests or public purposes.The effect of this new regime of administrative law, which holds employers responsible for fulfilling a vast array of policy desiderata, is to create an equally vast array of new discretionary powers for academic administrators and committees, such as IRBs. The mere existence of these powers marks the end of academic freedom as it was traditionally understood: both as a right, instead of an interest against which other interests are balanced, and as a concept superior to employment policy, rather than subject to it. Without clear demarcations and the legal priority of a right\u2015even if it is only an implied contractual right in employment law, with a defined meaning apart from the interpretation placed on it by universities\u2015it is impossible to defend traditional academic freedom against the ever-encroaching body of administrative law and university procedures.<br \/>\nOne may ask, however, whether there is much traditional academic freedom left to defend. The \u201cmarketplace of ideas\u201d image referred to in the classic legal defenses of academic freedom depended on the real autonomy of faculty members to pursue inquiry as they saw fit and to occasionally express their opinions in public without penalty. The present regime of science is governed by a grant system that ties a scientist to the judgments of peers through a brutal system of competition for funds. The rest of academia is bound to a competitive system of quantitative reputation assessment, to which our submission is, as Gloria Origgi (2017: 218) has called it, a form of voluntary epistemic servitude that has the same effects. This coincides with, and perhaps produces, a cultural change in the professoriate. The constituency for traditional academic freedom within a university would be the people who were exercising freedom in accordance with the liberal theory of science. This constituency barely exists today. It is noteworthy that of the university cases discussed here, three of them (at Texas, Duke, and Marquette) involved objections to either an ideologically dominant position or to practices enforcing ideological conformity. The suppression of one faculty member was supported by much of the rest of the faculty. Conformity has an active constituency. Indeed, for topics involving diversity, it has an institutionalized presence in the university, many means to enforce it, and enthusiastic support among the faculty. Academic freedom has only the few legal means outlined earlier. We have come full circle, culturally as well as legally, from the California loyalty oath case.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Here are some highlights from this 2023 book by Stephen Turner and George Mazur: * The term \u201cadministrative state\u201d is now being treated as an invention of the paranoid Right and a misunderstanding of the nature of the state itself. &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=162442\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[42718],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-162442","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-democracy"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO 4.9.9 - 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