{"id":161065,"date":"2025-05-09T17:45:00","date_gmt":"2025-05-10T01:45:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=161065"},"modified":"2025-05-24T16:56:26","modified_gmt":"2025-05-25T00:56:26","slug":"podcast-bros-and-brain-rot","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=161065","title":{"rendered":"Nathan Cofnas: &#8216;Podcast Bros and Brain Rot: The only thing worse than an expert is a non-expert&#8217;"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>One of the great things about psychotherapy is that you can get insights that end your petty obsessions. For example, after a year of therapy, in 1999, my therapist told me that the reason I was obsessed with writing about Dennis Prager is that he had such a profound effect on my life that I wanted to show him that I could affect his life.<\/p>\n<p>Dennis Prager didn&#8217;t come up in my therapy after that.<\/p>\n<p>Some people can&#8217;t handle having brilliant friends because the IQ disparity is too painful for the comparatively dim. I hope I&#8217;m not like that. I want to believe that I am at ease with the brilliance and success of my friends.<\/p>\n<p>But what if I am eaten up inside by petty jealousy?<\/p>\n<p>I go through life feeling like most people I know are smarter and more successful than I am. <\/p>\n<p>I want to believe that I am below average in envy. I don&#8217;t want to lash out from a place of pettiness. <\/p>\n<p>Please tell me this blog post is not petty. <\/p>\n<p>Every time I&#8217;ve taken an online IQ test, I&#8217;ve never scored above 125. <\/p>\n<p>By comparison, I suspect that my brilliant philosopher friend Nathan Cofnas is north of 140 IQ (just like Dennis Prager). <A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Desmond_Ford\">My father<\/a> tested at a 137 IQ.<\/p>\n<p>When Nathan Cofnas tackles a topic, he usually does such a thorough job that I have nothing to add. <\/p>\n<p>This time I have something to say because we&#8217;re not catching him at his best.<\/p>\n<p>The best tennis I&#8217;ve ever played was against tennis players far better than me. <\/p>\n<p>I&#8217;ve never shown athletic prowess. Only on the rarest of occasions has a girl I liked watched me play a sport, and the only one who stuck around for longer than two minutes was the woman who took my virginity and perhaps felt obliged. <\/p>\n<p>I have a painful admission &#8212; I&#8217;m thirstier for validation than is good for me due to my lack of success and credentials. The self-made man usually comes with weaknesses that are readily apparent in my words and in my life. <\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\nThe self-made man typically builds wealth, status, or success through entrepreneurial grit, resourcefulness, and determination, often without relying on inherited advantages or formal systems.<\/p>\n<p>Overconfidence and Ego: Success can breed a belief in their own infallibility, leading to risky decisions or dismissal of advice. They may overestimate their ability to handle unfamiliar domains.<\/p>\n<p>Difficulty Delegating: Having built their success independently, they often struggle to trust others with key responsibilities, leading to burnout or micromanagement.<\/p>\n<p>Limited Formal Education or Systems Thinking: While practical and street-smart, they may lack exposure to structured frameworks or academic rigor, which can hinder strategic planning or scalability in complex environments.<\/p>\n<p>Risk of Tunnel Vision: Their focus on immediate, tangible results can make them overlook long-term trends, ethical considerations, or broader societal impacts.<\/p>\n<p>Isolation or Weak Networks: Many self-made individuals prioritize work over relationships, resulting in limited access to diverse perspectives or influential networks that could amplify their success.<\/p>\n<p>Weaknesses of the Self-Taught Man<\/p>\n<p>The self-taught man acquires knowledge and skills independently, often outside formal education systems, through books, online resources, or trial and error.<\/p>\n<p>Knowledge Gaps: Without a structured curriculum, they may miss foundational concepts or advanced topics, leading to uneven expertise or blind spots in their field.<\/p>\n<p>Lack of Feedback or Mentorship: Self-teaching often lacks external validation or critique, which can result in unchecked errors, bad habits, or overconfidence in flawed methods.<\/p>\n<p>Inefficient Learning Paths: They may spend excessive time on less relevant material or struggle to prioritize what\u2019s most valuable, slowing their progress compared to guided education.<\/p>\n<p>Difficulty with Collaboration: Accustomed to solitary learning, they may struggle to work in teams or adapt to environments requiring formal credentials or standardized processes.<\/p>\n<p>Imposter Syndrome or Lack of Credibility: Without formal qualifications, they may face self-doubt or external skepticism, which can undermine their confidence or opportunities in professional settings.<\/p>\n<p>Shared Weaknesses<\/p>\n<p>Resistance to Authority or Structure: Both types often value independence, which can make them dismissive of established systems, rules, or expertise, sometimes to their detriment.<\/p>\n<p>Burnout Risk: Their relentless drive and self-reliance can lead to overwork, neglecting personal health or relationships.<\/p>\n<p>Confirmation Bias: Without diverse input, they may cling to self-reinforcing beliefs or strategies, missing alternative approaches.<\/p>\n<p>Context and Variation<\/p>\n<p>These weaknesses aren\u2019t universal and depend on the individual\u2019s personality, environment, and adaptability. For example, a self-made entrepreneur in tech might struggle with delegation but excel at networking, while a self-taught programmer might master collaboration but face imposter syndrome in corporate settings. Both can overcome these weaknesses through deliberate self-awareness, seeking mentorship, or supplementing their skills with formal or informal learning.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The quality that bugs me the most about pundits and public intellectuals is that their every pronouncement pushes for their own self-advancement. <\/p>\n<p>I don&#8217;t want to be like that. Why do I hate that stuff? Because I see it in my own words all too often and it embarrasses me. <\/p>\n<p>Like my father, I often sound supremely confident when I pronounce on things I know nothing about. <\/p>\n<p>If I have anything useful to say here, it is largely due to the excellence of my subject &#8212; the arguments of Nathan Cofnas. <\/p>\n<p>I am but a simple Jew from Cooranbong. Look mate, I come from the land of the uncircumsized. I am dust and ashes. I am a humble servant of the truth. If God wants to channel divine truth through my flawed vessel, who am I to say no? If G-d tells me to marry a hooker, as he instructed the <A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hosea\">prophet Hosea<\/a>, who am I to say no?<\/p>\n<p>L-rd, if it be Thy will, please make me a doormat for other people to brush their shoes on. Make me the speck of dirt that the universe revolves around. I don&#8217;t mind. I&#8217;m just a vessel. It&#8217;s not about me. Glory to G-d. <\/p>\n<p>Here I stand. I can do no other. So help me G-d.<\/p>\n<p>The children are our future. <\/p>\n<p>I&#8217;m all out of love. <\/p>\n<p>By the way, if you join my Youtube channel, you too can learn the lessons of the Holocaust (which just so happen to be the identical opinions about life I would hold even if there was never a Holocaust). <\/p>\n<p><A HREF=\"https:\/\/ncofnas.com\/p\/podcast-bros-and-brain-rot\">Nathan Cofnas writes on Substack May 5<\/a>: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>On April 17, researchers led by Nikku Madhusudhan at the University of Cambridge announced that they had detected dimethyl sulfide in the atmosphere of K2-18b, an exoplanet 120 light-years from Earth. On our planet, dimethyl sulfide is only produced by living organisms. It is emitted in large quantities by certain species of algae, and gives the ocean its special smell. The presence of this chemical on K2-18b might be the strongest evidence ever recorded for alien life.<\/p>\n<p>Candace Owens is one of the most popular podcasters in America. On April 17, she also had an announcement to make. She did her own research on astronomy and concluded that the moon landing was \u201cfake and gay.\u201d She told her millions of followers: \u201cYou need to learn the history of NASA, of the Apollo programs, which were a cult and satanic&#8230;.They just wanted people to believe in scientific advancement.\u201d Owens has come to similarly unorthodox conclusions on many topics including WWII, the history of communism, and, of course, Jews and Israel.<\/p>\n<p>Obviously, Candace Owens should have free speech to express her opinions. At the same time, a healthy society needs mechanisms to ensure that people like her don\u2019t have an outsize cultural influence. When it comes to astronomy, for example, the voice of Madhusudhan, not Owens, is the one that should be amplified. In some ways it is. Madhusudhan is a professor at Cambridge, publishes his views in peer-reviewed astronomy journals, and gets covered in the New York Times. Twenty years ago, that\u2019s all that would have mattered. But now, Owens, Joe Rogan, Bret Weinstein, or Russell Brand can go on Spotify, YouTube, or Twitter and reach a larger audience than the New York Times. They might even swing elections. Rogan &#038; Co.\u2019s support for Trump may have tipped the balance in his favor.<\/p>\n<p>People who don\u2019t trust \u201cexperts\u201d now look to podcasters and other alt-media figures\u2014many of whom (including Rogan and Brand) are comedians\u2014to decide what to believe about everything from WWII to vaccines to Ukraine to tariffs. The result has been a proliferation of ignorance with disastrous consequences for our culture and public policy.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>There&#8217;s a great essay on these topics inside of Nathan Cofnas waiting to come out. This isn&#8217;t it but it makes a modest contribution to stimulating a conversation among those <A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=vtIzMaLkCaM&#038;pp=ygUvaG93IHRvIHdyaXRlIGZvciBhY2FkZW1pYSB1bml2ZXJzaXR5IG9mIGNoaWNhZ28%3D\">tiny number of people who decide what is knowledge<\/a>. <\/p>\n<p>Knowledge, and <A HREF=\"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=155583\">the winning narrative<\/a>, are not decided by popularity but by power. A tiny number of people in every area of knowledge decide what is knowledge. If you don&#8217;t reference the people with power in an area, you don&#8217;t join the elite conversation that decides what is knowledge. Elites have a lingo. If you don&#8217;t use their lingo, and if you don&#8217;t cite their work, you can&#8217;t join their conversation about what is knowledge. <\/p>\n<p>Donald Trump is the most powerful man on earth, but he has been losing the narrative war over the past two months because his message has received universal contempt by those who decide what is knowledge. Trump&#8217;s representatives on the tariff war, such as Scott Bessent and Stephen Miran, have done an uneven job at representing Trump&#8217;s tariffs to the elite. On Liberation Day, Trump&#8217;s tariffs received withering universal contempt from elites. Now the elite reaction to Trump&#8217;s tariffs is more nuanced. The conversation has shifted, as <A HREF=\"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=160928\">I noted two weeks ago<\/a>, from &#8220;tariffs bad&#8221; to &#8220;how to implement tariffs effectively.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>We are wired by evolution to want the esteem of the herd, but the esteem of the herd is not always correlated with excellence. <\/p>\n<p>Crap has always received a wider audience than quality thought. People on average have average intelligence and they rarely love quality cognitive productions. <\/p>\n<p>I&#8217;ve never heard of a quality thinker who descended into nonsensical thought because of podcasts. <\/p>\n<p>Brilliant people sometimes watch porn, but they rarely change the character of their day job to match pornography. <\/p>\n<p>Brilliant people sometimes take drugs, but they rarely hang out with their drug dealer.<\/p>\n<p>Brilliant people sometimes bang hookers but they rarely introduce them to their peers. <\/p>\n<p>Brilliant people have their guilty pleasures, but they rarely make these pleasures their primary pursuit in life. <\/p>\n<p>Idiocy usually attracts idiots and quality attracts quality. <\/p>\n<p>There are exceptions. As Saul Lieberman said, &#8220;Jewish mysticism is nonsense, but the study of nonsense is scholarship.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Has there ever been a time when low brow culture attracted a smaller audience than high brow culture? <\/p>\n<p>People who don&#8217;t trust &#8220;experts&#8221; still choose them when it is in their demonstrable vital interest such as when they have a pressing medical, legal, or accounting problem. Alt-media consumers want the best pilots and air traffic control system for their planes. They want the best engineers for their buildings and bridges. <\/p>\n<p>You might say that people should want an expert theologian (or some other expert) because he is vital to their soul, but this is not a demonstrable argument in this life. <\/p>\n<p>When average IQ people want entertainment, we shouldn&#8217;t be shocked when they go low in their choices. More people will watch porn than read great books. <\/p>\n<p>People are hard to fool when it comes to their vital interests, such as where they live. Even those with an 80 IQ recognize the differences between a nice neighborhood and a dangerous one. People usually choose to live in the best possible place congruent with their interests. <\/p>\n<p>On the other hand, people are not incentivized to think deeply about world events including politics and economics, because they have next to no influence in these realms. They have no incentive for thinking clearly about matters not vital to their survival. <\/p>\n<p>I love trying to place people in their proper genre because once you do that, they rarely disappoint you. <\/p>\n<p>It is an error to have the same expectations for Candace Owens as you do for Nikku Madhusudhan. Joe Rogan, Bret Weinstein, Stephen Miran, and Russell Brand operate in different genres and it is a mistake to have identical expectations for each of them.<\/p>\n<p>Nobody tunes into Owens, Rogan, Weinstein and Brand as an act of optimizing for truth while otherwise thriving in life. If you think that Joe Rogan and Candace Owens are great sources of truth, you&#8217;re a loser. If you fall for some guru such as Dennis Prager, Jordan Peterson, or Tony Robbins, it&#8217;s because you are losing at some vital part of life that you think this guru can fix. <\/p>\n<p>You shouldn&#8217;t expect a game of cricket to operate like basketball, and you shouldn&#8217;t judge a rabbinic sermon by the standard of stand-up comedy. You don&#8217;t judge the quality of your tax return by the same standard you use to select a show on Netflix before falling asleep. <\/p>\n<p>Ben Shapiro became successful by talking online at maximum speed while taking the most conservative positions possible. It would be silly to judge him on the same standards of academic rigor that we use to judge Nikku Madhusudhan. Ben Shapiro has published many books but zero works of scholarship. Don&#8217;t judge him on scholarship just as you shouldn&#8217;t judge a pop song by the standards of great classical music. <\/p>\n<p>A silly little love song has its own beauty within its own genre. It&#8217;s not bad for being a silly little love song. A podcast for a mass audience with an average IQ of 100 is not bad for failing to be as sophisticated as a Nathan Cofnas interview of law professor Amy Wax. <\/p>\n<p>Sometimes great thinkers give up on producing great work because they can no longer do it (sometimes due to cognitive decline), or because the rewards of turning out nonsense are irresistible. Isaac Newton, for example, devoted much of his adult life to nonsense (the music of the spheres and religious speculation) because it gave him some internal reward that is hard to fathom in our secular age. Dennis Prager is brilliant (you can tell by how quick he is on his feet, reaction times correlate with IQ), but he has <A HREF=\"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=148127\">chosen to use his brilliance much of the time to bamboozle people<\/a>. <\/p>\n<p>I am not as smart as successful people, but I sometimes have something useful to add due to a combination of talent, experience and situation. <\/p>\n<p>Sometimes the boss is the boss, sometimes the janitor is the boss, but always the situation (ala the event) is the boss. Here&#8217;s a bloke in Greenland who&#8217;s become an unlikely political influencer due to circumstance. NYT: &#8220;<A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/05\/11\/world\/europe\/greenland-trump-biggest-fan.html\">Trump\u2019s No. 1 Fan in Greenland: A Bricklayer Turned Political Player<\/a>&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Every dog has his day (people have sometimes remarked that I give off a stray dog vibe who gets collected by saviors such as Dennis Prager and Cathy Seipp and various cults) though the smarter dogs have more dominant days than the dumber dogs. Battle doesn&#8217;t always go to the strong and the swift, but that is the way to bet. <\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu\/2012\/09\/12\/niall-ferguson-the-john-yoo-line-and-the-paradox-of-influence\/\">Statistician Andrew Gelman wrote September 12, 2012<\/a>:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>[A]cademia has what might be called the <a href=\"http:\/\/statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu\/2009\/05\/yoo_again\/\">John Yoo line<\/a>: the point at which nothing you write gets taken seriously, and so you might as well become a hack because you have no scholarly reputation remaining.<\/p>\n<p>John Yoo, of course, became a hack because, I assume, he had nothing left to lose. In contrast, historian Niall Ferguson has reportedly been moved to <a href=\"http:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/business\/archive\/2012\/08\/a-full-fact-check-of-niall-fergusons-very-bad-argument-against-obama\/261306\/\">hackery<\/a> because he has so much to <em>gain<\/em>.\n\t\t\t<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><A HREF=\"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=156725\">We did not evolve to be gullible when it concerns our vital interests<\/a>. We can be gullible with regard to what we believe about the topics Candace Owens talks about without jeopardizing our survival. Having accurate beliefs about the accomplishments of NASA or the relative quality of Tolstoy vs Dostoevsky vs Batman comics doesn&#8217;t affect our evolutionary fitness.<\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Alt-media\u2019s rise isn\u2019t just blind ignorance; it reflects real failures by experts and institutions. When \u201cexperts\u201d seem divided or when their predictions (e.g., post-2018 tariff impacts) don\u2019t fully materialize, trust erodes. Add in academic jargon or perceived elitism, and it\u2019s no shock people turn to Rogan\u2019s plain talk or Brand\u2019s outsider vibe. These figures fill a gap, offering explanations that feel intuitive, even if they\u2019re thin on evidence.<\/p>\n<p>The \u201cdisastrous consequences\u201d Cofnas mentions depend on the lens. Misinformed trade views could lead to bad policy\u2014like tariffs hiking consumer prices without delivering promised jobs. But alt-media can also amplify valid critiques, like how free trade hollowed out manufacturing towns, a point economists sometimes downplayed. The Ukraine conflict, another topic Cofnas cites, shows similar dynamics: podcasters might oversimplify or push conspiracies, but they also challenge mainstream narratives that gloss over NATO\u2019s role or sanctions\u2019 blowback.<\/p>\n<p>The danger Cofnas sees isn\u2019t just ignorance but the loss of a shared evidence-based framework. Yet dismissing alt-media wholesale ignores why people flock there: experts haven\u2019t always earned trust, and comedians often connect better emotionally.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><A HREF=\"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=156725\">We did not evolve to be gullible when it concerns our survival<\/a>. Nobody thoughtful is rotting their brain listening to Candace Owens, Joe Rogan, Bret Weinstein and Russell Brand. People who have lousy epistemics turn to people like Owens and Rogan to meet their needs for comfort or diversion. I&#8217;m unaware of any evidence that the podcast bros swung the election to Trump or created disasters for our culture and public policy. Where is the evidence that the podcast bros have proliferated ignorance? I&#8217;ve never met someone who was thoughtful prior to listening to these losers and then became an idiot. Overwhelmingly, idiots listen to idiots and the brilliant listen to the brilliant. <\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>No clear data shows podcasters \u201cswung\u201d 2024 for Trump. A 2024 Pew study found voters still relied heavily on traditional media (TV, news sites), but 20% of young voters cited podcasts as a key source. Rogan\u2019s Trump endorsement (Nov 2024) reached millions, and posts on X suggest it amplified MAGA enthusiasm, but exit polls don\u2019t quantify its impact.<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019 \u201cdisaster\u201d claim feels hyperbolic without granular data tying podcasters to specific outcomes. Still, their reach (e.g., Rogan\u2019s 14M monthly listeners) means they amplify simplified takes on complex issues like trade, which could muddy public understanding.<\/p>\n<p>You\u2019re likely correct that thoughtful people don\u2019t regress into idiocy from listening to podcasters. Cognitive psychology suggests critical thinkers are resilient to misinformation if they actively verify sources. <\/p>\n<p>Cofnas overreaches by blaming podcasters for cultural collapse without clear evidence. People aren\u2019t mindless drones; those drawn to Rogan or Owens often already distrust experts, as you suggest. Alt-media fills a trust gap left by flawed institutions, but it\u2019s not a one-way ticket to ignorance. Thoughtful people, as you note, don\u2019t just swallow it whole.<\/p>\n<p>Hugo Mercier\u2019s <A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Not-Born-Yesterday-Science-Believe\/dp\/0691178704\">Not Born Yesterday: The Science of Who We Trust and What We Believe<\/a> (2020) argues that humans are not as gullible as commonly assumed. His main point is that our cognitive mechanisms, shaped by evolution, make us naturally skeptical and discerning about the information we accept. Mercier suggests that if we were inherently gullible\u2014especially on matters critical to survival, like identifying threats or choosing reliable allies\u2014our species would not have thrived. Instead, we evolved &#8220;open vigilance,&#8221; a balance of cautious trust and critical evaluation, allowing us to navigate social environments where deception is a risk.<\/p>\n<p>Mercier\u2019s argument is compelling and aligns with evolutionary psychology. It challenges the narrative that humans are easily manipulated, pointing to evidence like our ability to detect inconsistencies, evaluate source credibility, and resist persuasion when stakes are high. For example, he cites studies showing people are more likely to reject misinformation if it conflicts with prior knowledge or comes from an untrustworthy source. This makes sense: a hominid who blindly trusted every signal would fall prey to predators or rivals.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Nathan Cofnas states his thesis: &#8220;Blind obedience to credentialed authority (associated with the left) or trust in a \u201cmarketplace of ideas\u201d that rewards brain-rotting infotainment (associated with the right) are both failed strategies.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Nobody argues for blind obedience to credentialed authority. The left-wing approach is more sophisticated. Similarly, nobody serious argues that high ratings equal winning in the marketplace of ideas. This is a bizarre claim from Cofnas that the marketplace of ideas is determined by the entertainment preferences of ordinary people. The marketplace of ideas, as I have understood it, has never revolved around popularity, it has revolved around the quality and influence of your ideas and their adherents. Neo-conservatives, for example, never had an electorate but they were influential for a time. <\/p>\n<p>Normal people don&#8217;t care much about ideas and they don&#8217;t have much to say about ideas. Few people can articulate a worldview. <\/p>\n<p>I&#8217;ve spent about eight hours of my weekend dissecting this Nathan Cofnas essay. That is not normal behavior. <\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The marketplace of ideas is a metaphor describing an open environment where ideas compete freely for acceptance through debate, discussion, and scrutiny. It assumes that the best ideas prevail through reason, evidence, and persuasion, much like products in a market. The concept, often tied to free speech principles, was popularized by thinkers like John Stuart Mill and later referenced in U.S. legal contexts, such as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.&#8217;s dissent in Abrams v. United States (1919).<\/p>\n<p>Winning in the Marketplace of Ideas<\/p>\n<p>While popularity can amplify an idea&#8217;s reach, other criteria often matter more for long-term success:<\/p>\n<p>Reason and Evidence: Ideas grounded in logic, verifiable data, and coherent arguments tend to withstand scrutiny better. For example, scientific theories like evolution prevail because of robust evidence, not just public approval.<\/p>\n<p>Clarity and Persuasiveness: Ideas that are clearly articulated and emotionally resonant often gain traction. <\/p>\n<p>Resilience to Critique: Ideas that survive rigorous debate and counterarguments are stronger. This is why academic peer review, despite flaws, is valued\u2014it tests ideas against criticism.<\/p>\n<p>Adaptability: Ideas that evolve in response to new evidence or contexts often outlast rigid ones. For instance, economic theories like Keynesianism have adapted over decades to remain relevant.<\/p>\n<p>Cultural and Social Fit: Ideas that align with prevailing values or address urgent societal needs can gain momentum. <\/p>\n<p>Amplification Mechanisms: While not the sole factor, reach matters. Ideas spread faster with access to platforms (media, X, public forums) or influential advocates. However, amplification without substance often fades\u2014think of viral fads versus enduring philosophies.<\/p>\n<p>Ratings vs. Other Criteria<\/p>\n<p>High ratings (e.g., likes on X or public polls) can signal short-term popularity but don\u2019t guarantee an idea\u2019s merit or longevity. Misinformation, for instance, often spreads rapidly due to emotional appeal or algorithmic boosts but falters under scrutiny. Conversely, ideas like heliocentrism (Copernicus) initially faced low &#8220;ratings&#8221; (widespread rejection) but won out through evidence and moral weight.<\/p>\n<p>Real-World Example<\/p>\n<p>On X, posts promoting conspiracy theories might get high engagement due to outrage or novelty, but they rarely &#8220;win&#8221; in the broader marketplace if they lack evidence and crumble under debate.<\/p>\n<p>Conclusion<\/p>\n<p>Winning in the marketplace of ideas hinges more on reason, evidence, resilience, and adaptability than on high ratings. Popularity can help spread an idea, but without substance, it\u2019s fleeting. The marketplace rewards ideas that endure scrutiny and resonate deeply, not just those with the loudest cheers.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Sam Harris says: &#8220;When [Joe Rogan] brings someone on to just shoot the shit about how the Holocaust is not what you think it was, or maybe Churchill\u2019s the bad guy in WWII, or he\u2019s got Dave Smith being treated as an expert on Israel and Palestine, and the history of that conflict&#8230;.[Smith is] a pure misinformation artist on top of many others&#8230;.Our society is as politically shattered as it is in part because of how Joe has interacted with information&#8230;.It\u2019s&#8230;avoidable. He could actually take the responsibility that really is his to take at this point to get his facts straight.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Dave Smith is primarily a comic. It&#8217;s not surprising that he falls short as an intellectual. <\/p>\n<p>Where&#8217;s the evidence that these idiots talking to other idiots for an audience of idiots is shattering America? <\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Your skepticism is warranted: Harris\u2019 claim is sweeping, and causation is murky. If Rogan\u2019s show were \u201cshattering\u201d America, we\u2019d expect clearer metrics\u2014say, a spike in polarization tied to his listener base. <\/p>\n<p>Harris, like Cofnas, overreaches by pinning societal fracture on Rogan without clear causation. You\u2019re right to demand evidence\u2014misinformation spreads, but \u201cshattering America\u201d needs more than anecdotes about Dave Smith.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Nathan writes: &#8220;[Douglas] Murray is the British face of Conservatism, Inc. He went to Oxford, writes books with footnotes, and hangs out with academics.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>I doubt there are many academics who hang out with Douglas Murray. There&#8217;s nothing remotely academic in Murray&#8217;s ouvre. <\/p>\n<p><A HREF=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/KRbz-sgysz0?t=1289\">May 25, 2023<\/a>, Dennis Prager called Douglas Murray his &#8220;favorite English thinker.&#8221; I largely agree with Douglas Murray and Dennis Prager, but only a fool thinks of these guys as great thinkers. They&#8217;re great talkers, but will their long-form conversations from the <A HREF=\"https:\/\/slate.com\/business\/2021\/11\/prager-bongino-covid-vaccines-right-wing-radio.html\">Relief Factor Pain-Free studio<\/a> <A HREF=\"https:\/\/decoding-the-gurus.captivate.fm\/episode\/douglas-murray-can-indulgent-dinner-conversation-save-our-civilisation\">save Western Civilization<\/a>? Count me skeptical. <\/p>\n<p><A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.reddit.com\/r\/samharris\/comments\/woq96v\/douglas_murrays_book_the_war_on_the_west_is\/\">Reddit user Koreanoir posted<\/a> a compelling critique of Murray&#8217;s 2022 book <em><A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/The-War-on-the-West\/dp\/B09HL8SBL2\/\">The War on the West<\/a><\/em>: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The book reads like a disorganized, amphetamine-driven rampage through a big folder of bookmarked webpages labeled \u201cWoke Stuff\u201d. Murray\u2019s approach is to breathlessly recount one anecdote after another, usually dedicating just a paragraph or two to each, and then sneer at the people in the center of it, all the while complaining that criticisms of \u201cThe West\u201d lack sufficient nuance and balance&#8230;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Polemicists of a feather flock together.  <\/p>\n<p>On a <A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.patreon.com\/DecodingTheGurus\/posts\">Patreon video called &#8220;The Confluence of the Gurosphere&#8221; released June 16, 2023<\/a>, Decoding the Gurus hosts Chris Kavanagh (anthropologist) talks to Matt Browne (psychologist) about &#8220;the&#8230;energies that cause the gurus to swirl together.&#8221; <\/p>\n<p>Matt: &#8220;They become intertwined. They find each other and a network is formed. When we covered all of the gurus, we covered them as isolated gems interesting in their own right. But then after covering them, and having identified them as fitting our Gurometer, they then inevitably seemed to find each other even with gurus with no apparent connection.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Chris: &#8220;<A HREF=\"http:\/\/www.pageaucarvings.com\/index.html\">Jonathan Pageau<\/a> just had <A HREF=\"https:\/\/decoding-the-gurus.captivate.fm\/episode\/jordan-hall-sensemaking\">Jordan Hall<\/a> on to discuss AI.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;What connects them is the narcissism, the belief that they have all these revolutionary insights. Jordan Hall enjoys that he can switch paradigms. He can run 70 to 90 paradigms at one time. If you want to talk about it in that kind of language, I can talk about it in terms of resurrections and graveyards&#8230; Your religious paradigms are just ten of his seventy.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Matt: &#8220;Jordan Peterson tells James Lindsay that <A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=bnrdyphape4&#038;t=3878s\">you can&#8217;t have science without the Logos<\/a>. It&#8217;s all based on Christianity.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Chris: &#8220;One of [Jordan&#8217;s] big ideas is that science is fundamentally Christian. It relies on Christianity because Christianity has at its heart that there is a Truth in the universe and if you have that orientation, that allows you to investigate the natural world. And if you don&#8217;t have that, science can&#8217;t develop. Richard Dawkins and all of them don&#8217;t realize that at heart they are deeply religious people.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;For James Lindsay, the <A HREF=\"https:\/\/journals.sagepub.com\/doi\/abs\/10.1177\/0309132515623368\">feminist glaciology paper<\/a> is central to his whole thing. It should be just a footnote, just an example that he sometimes returns to, but he now presents that as a turning point in his life. After reading it, he curled up in a ball unable to leave his room for three days because of the shock to the system that such a paper could be published in a prestigious scientific outlet. It&#8217;s a random geography journal, Progress in Human Geography. People like him and Jordan. They create this mythos around things that happen to them. I think they genuinely do experience weird manic moments, but the way that they retell it, it becomes part of this hero&#8217;s journey. It&#8217;s not &#8212; I heard a Jordan Peterson talk and it annoyed me. It&#8217;s &#8212; I heard a Jordan Peterson talk and it awakened a fire in me that I needed to reveal the charlatan world. I don&#8217;t think the authors of the feminist glaciology paper are still talking about it as much as James has. He endlessly talks about how he knows all these literatures but he constantly focuses on this single paper.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Matt: &#8220;If he has such a comprehensive understanding of all of that literature, why doesn&#8217;t he cite some other examples? There are millions of papers out there. He should be citing hundreds of them.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Chris: &#8220;It&#8217;s their susceptibility to narratives that are going to give them attention and make them feel that they are looking at things in a deeper way than normal people. That little hook &#8211; they are so easily led around by it.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Matt: &#8220;In the last 20 years, we&#8217;ve seen the rise of the political dimension you could call anti-institutional. You have lefty stuff like Occupy Wall Street and Russell Brand.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Chris: &#8220;Tim Pool.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Matt: &#8220;Just being against the current thing. You can frame it as globalism and international capitalism. Or you could frame it as the New World Order and the WEF (World Economic Forum). There&#8217;s a right wing version or a left wing one.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Chris: &#8220;And sometimes they cross over. <A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Gavin_McInnes\">Gavin McInnes<\/a> started as one of the founders of Vice and then became the reactionary leader of the Proud Boys. That seems like a helluva journey. It&#8217;s about the institutions are shit, we&#8217;re part of the edgy counter-culture. It&#8217;s not inevitable that people who aren&#8217;t part of the establishment get sucked to the extremes, but there is a greater vulnerability for people who like to style themselves that way. Focusing on the corruption of establishments can make people susceptible to swallowing conspiracism.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Matt: &#8220;I know several people in real life who are fans of Jordan Peterson. Fans of Trump. [Kinda] fans of Putin. They&#8217;re not right-wing Christians. They are lost boys. That&#8217;s the common denominator.&#8221; <\/p>\n<p>Lost boys are a big part of the guru fan base. <\/p>\n<p>Chris: &#8220;There is money sloshing around in the right-wing for promoting certain views. Peter Thiel hired Eric [Weinstein]. Provided money to <A HREF=\"https:\/\/decoding-the-gurus.captivate.fm\/episode\/74-eliezer-yudkowksy-ai-is-going-to-kill-us-all\">[Eliezer] Yudkowsky [the guy who claims AI will kill us]<\/a>. He also gave up on Eric eventually&#8230; The reason that Peter Thiel and Eric came together was that their worldviews aligned. Peter Thiel doesn&#8217;t care so long as someone is a wrecking force for institutions. These are narcissistic people who are led by praise and reward.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Matt: &#8220;It&#8217;s easy for them to align with their personal interest. They&#8217;re labile. It&#8217;s like Trump. He&#8217;d say anything for a round of applause and a million dollars. They do have a reactionary, anti-institutional worldview. And they&#8217;re self-interested narcissists.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Chris: &#8220;That grouping of people who come together for long-form podcasts to share anti-establishment positions and backpat each other and focus on what the progressive left is doing to destroy society. That grouping re-emerges and reformulates and you&#8217;ll see Douglas Murray cropping up across all of them.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Matt: &#8220;Why do they all accept the UFO story at face value?&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Chris: &#8220;Their epistemics are broken. The smarter ones tap danced on the edge. They wanted to say look at the official narratives collapsing but they were quick to say, it could all be just because they know it could all blow up. I heard Sam Harris taking victory laps &#8212; look at all those credulous fools for talking about UFOs. You were talking for months. You believed that someone had contacted you to release sacred information about UFOs.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Jordan Peterson praises James Lindsay constantly and occasionally James reciprocates. It&#8217;s this constant feeding of the ego. So you were studying maths? Why did you choose the difficult area? They both talk about how they are so principled and that is why they needed to leave academia. They could have been extremely successful if academia had retained its principles and recognized genius, but the fact that they are so successful outside of academia, doesn&#8217;t that prove they were right and they are better than all those irrelevant academics. Use your brains guys. It just means that you are selling something that can get you attention. Don&#8217;t you know there are lots of people in the world selling rank partisan conspiracy content who aren&#8217;t deep thinkers but can make a lot of money?&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Jordan thinks that because lots of people watch his content, that&#8217;s an indication that it is good and fundamentally correct. He gave the game away when he said that something had seven million views and seven million people agreed with me. He counted views as indicating agreement.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Matt: &#8220;Truth is not a popularity contest. Making money selling something that is attractive doesn&#8217;t make you a more virtuous person. Their egos are hungry and they&#8217;ll take it as evidence.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Matt: &#8220;The orthodox position is tedious. It&#8217;s a hard sell. Public health. Boring. It&#8217;s not going to grab you. If you are an online commentator, you&#8217;re going to feel an inexorable pull to stuff that will get the juices flowing.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Chris: &#8220;We&#8217;ll lose the attention ecosphere by saying stuff that people will agree with. It isn&#8217;t interesting to say that UFOs aren&#8217;t real. You have to add the hook to make it more appealing. We get feedback that if we want to add more listeners, we should touch on this topic. That way lies hell. That mindset of always getting bigger audiences and always jumping on the new thing makes you susceptible to take-itis.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Matt: &#8220;The vast majority of people who produce any content are susceptible because they&#8217;re obsessed with growing their audiences.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Chris: &#8220;Rebecca Lewis did a report [in 2018] saying there is an alternative influencer network [<A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Alternative_Influence:_Broadcasting_the_Reactionary_Right_on_YouTube\">Alternative Influence: Broadcasting the Reactionary Right on YouTube<\/a>]. It drove them all mad&#8230;that Sam Harris was on the same map with Stefan Molyneux and Gavin McInnes. But she was right. There are network effects. You can hear Sam Harris talk about them and wrestle with it when he says, it is hard to criticize people I go to dinner with. You hear <A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Konstantin_Kisin\">Konstantin [Kisin]<\/a> say to <A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Matthew_Goodwin\">Matt Goodwin<\/a>, you and I are at all the same parties.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Nathan Cofnas notes: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\nThere\u2019s a reason why people became tired of so-called experts. The \u201cexpert\u201d class face planted about five times in a row&#8230;.<\/p>\n<p>Joe Rogan wouldn\u2019t platform a rando with no serious training in martial arts to talk about MMA. If someone passed himself off as an MMA commentator, and his only credential was that he watched some old kung fu movies, Rogan would have no interest in hearing his opinion. But suppose the guy who learned kung fu from movies started fighting in the UFC, and beat the top Brazilian jiu-jitsu experts to win the Championship Belt? Rogan would definitely invite him onto his podcast! The podcast bros believe that they are in the position of that kung fu master outsider. You couldn\u2019t persuade Rogan not to interview the self-taught UFC champion by insisting that we need to honor the expertise of jiu-jitsu black belts.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Where precisely did the &#8220;expert&#8221; class face plant about five times in a row? Which &#8220;experts&#8221;? Were they experts or &#8220;experts&#8221;? An expert has valuable provable expertise. An &#8220;expert&#8221; is just a claim.<\/p>\n<p>Rogan chooses guests for his show who are compelling to a 100 IQ audience. There&#8217;s no magic formula for getting on Rogan. It&#8217;s not easy to get that opportunity to speak to his vast audience. It&#8217;s not easy being a prole whisperer. <\/p>\n<p>Nathan writes: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>At the height of our society\u2019s \u201cexpert\u201d worship, credentialed technocrats told a bunch of self-serving lies, imprisoned people in their apartments for two years, and then said that anyone who questioned them was a racist conspiracy theorist. Almost the entire academic and media establishment covered for them. On top of that, we are told that people with PhDs in how smells are racist are also \u201cexperts\u201d before whom we must genuflect.<\/p>\n<p>But the fact that some people with fancy credentials are corrupt, fallible, and\/or frauds doesn\u2019t mean that expertise isn\u2019t real. Some people have knowledge and training that make their opinion more credible and worthy of attention than the opinion of a rando comedian with a microphone.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Who worships &#8220;experts&#8221;? Do &#8220;experts&#8221; tell more lies than any other group? Did &#8220;experts&#8221; imprison people in their apartments or did politicians with popular support enact lockdowns?<\/p>\n<p>Nathan would never have written this sloppily for an academic publication. <\/p>\n<p>America has never worshiped experts but the left and the credentialed class put more weight on credentials than do conservatives, who put a higher value on common sense. Neither approach is clearly superior to the other. Sometimes common sense is superior to the claims of experts, and sometimes it is not. <\/p>\n<p>As society becomes more complicated, some people with demonstrable real world expertise have more power because non-experts can&#8217;t understand what they&#8217;re doing but sense that they need them.<\/p>\n<p>Most people want safe buildings, safe food, safe transportation, as well as clean air and water and we recognize there is a valuable expertise in these fields that we are glad to follow. <\/p>\n<p>Overall, our public health leaders did a good job during Covid. They were right in their main points &#8212; socially distance before you get the vaccine and if you must be inside around people, wear a mask. Once the vaccine is available, take it as directed by doctors.  <\/p>\n<p>Nobody in America, and nobody in the world, was imprisoned inside their apartment for two years because of covid. Australia was far more stringent with lockdowns compared to America, and partly as a result of that, in 2020, <a href=\"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/coronavirus-covid-19-at-a-glance-31-december-2020_0.pdf\">coronavirus-covid-19-at-a-glance-31-december-2020_0<\/a>Australia had about 1\/40th the per capita death rate of America<\/a>. But nobody in Australia was locked inside their apartment for a year let alone two. <\/p>\n<p>Nathan writes: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>But consumers of alt-media have largely given up on the notion of expertise, at least when it comes to politicized topics. When every credible economist on earth says that Trump\u2019s tariffs are going to be a disaster, they say, \u201cNate Silver failed to predict the 2016 election, so maybe Oren Cass (a lawyer), Batya Ungar-Sargon (a Marxist English major), and Catturd are just as likely to be right about tariffs as people who know how to draw supply and demand curves (whatever those are).\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The people who read Nathan Cofnas&#8217;s Substack are alt-media consumers. All Substack readers are alt-media consumers. You can&#8217;t make many generalizations about them. You certainly can&#8217;t credibly claim these people have given up on expertise. <\/p>\n<p>There is high IQ alt-media and low-IQ alt-media just as there is high-IQ mainstream media and low-IQ mainstream media. <\/p>\n<p>Nobody aiming for credibility would state: &#8220;When every credible economist on earth says that Trump\u2019s tariffs are going to be a disaster&#8230;&#8221; It is an obviously untrue statement.<\/p>\n<p>Supporters of MAGA comprise all elements of the IQ spectrum. A high-IQ supporter of MAGA will make high-IQ arguments and low-IQ supporters will make low-IQ points. That there are idiotic supporters of MAGA no more disqualifies MAGA than low IQ members of the resistance to MAGA discredit the resistance.<\/p>\n<p>High IQ MAGA supporters do not claim that people without valuable expertise are as likely to be right as people with valuable expertise. Cofnas is using a straw man argument. No high IQ MAGA supporter is citing Catturd. <\/p>\n<p>Oren Cass is not an economist, but he has some relevant expertise. Economists are not the only group with trade-related expertise. <\/p>\n<p>There is no practical reason why ordinary people should care about expertise in areas such as public policy over which they have nearly no influence. There&#8217;s no pragmatic self-interested reason that ordinary people should pay attention to politics because there&#8217;s nearly nothing they can do about it. <\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>No, not every credible economist labels Trump\u2019s tariffs a disaster, though a strong majority express serious concerns. Based on recent analyses, most economists highlight risks like higher inflation, reduced GDP growth, and trade disruptions. <\/p>\n<p>However, some economists, like Arthur Laffer, a Trump adviser, see tariffs as a tool to negotiate freer trade, though he acknowledges risks if prolonged. These views are outliers, as most data-driven analyses (e.g., Tax Foundation\u2019s $1,300\/household tax hike estimate) lean negative.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>I don&#8217;t think consumers of alt-media have given up on expertise. They still seek out experts in medicine or law or accounting when their life is at stake.<\/p>\n<p>When it comes to podcasts for fun and comfort, they turn to different experts than the mainstream experts. Who do they turn to? Those who meet their needs for feeling right and superior.  <\/p>\n<p>If every credible economist said in 2016 that Trump&#8217;s tariffs were going to be a disaster, how did that prediction turn out? I don&#8217;t remember a disaster. Trump had a good economy prior to Covid.<\/p>\n<p>If every credible economist said in 2025 that Trump&#8217;s tariffs are going to be a disaster, how&#8217;s that going? I don&#8217;t see a disaster. As of May 9, 2025, there is no empirical evidence that Trump&#8217;s tariff plans a disaster. The stock market, for example, is higher than it was before Liberation Day. The only way to declare Trump&#8217;s tariff plans a disaster is to speak from a position of faith unchained from reality. <\/p>\n<p>I wonder if there are too many variables in foreign trade for any one academic discipline, including Economics, to be expert. <\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p> Foreign trade is a beast with countless variables\u2014supply chains, geopolitics, currency fluctuations, cultural preferences, labor dynamics, and more\u2014that no single discipline, including economics, can fully master. Economics provides rigorous tools like trade models (e.g., Ricardian or Heckscher-Ohlin) and data on tariffs\u2019 impacts (e.g., Penn Wharton\u2019s GDP projections), but it often leans on simplifying assumptions that miss real-world messiness. For instance, economists might predict tariff-induced price hikes, but political motives or unexpected supply chain shifts can skew outcomes.<\/p>\n<p>Other disciplines\u2014political science (for power dynamics), sociology (for cultural impacts), or logistics (for supply chain mechanics)\u2014each catch angles economics misses. Even within economics, trade experts disagree because models can\u2019t capture every variable, like how China might retaliate to tariffs or how consumer behavior adapts. Interdisciplinary approaches, blending economics with geopolitics or behavioral science, get closer to the truth but still fall short of total expertise.<\/p>\n<p>The complexity suggests humility is warranted. No one field owns trade; it\u2019s why policymakers lean on diverse advisors. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Nathan writes that &#8220;the virus posed almost no serious risk to otherwise healthy young people.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Not true. Grok notes: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>According to the CDC, approximately 2,000 Americans under age 18 died from COVID-19 from January 2020 through December 2024. This number is based on provisional data and may be subject to underreporting due to testing limitations and variations in death certification practices. For context, a 2023 study from the University of Oxford reported over 1,300 deaths among those aged 0\u201319 from 2021 to 2022, indicating that pediatric deaths were rare but significant enough to rank COVID-19 as a leading cause of death from infectious disease in this age group. <A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.newsweek.com\/covid-death-update-2024-virus-chart-2003132\">Source<\/a> <A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.ox.ac.uk\/news\/2023-01-31-covid-19-leading-cause-death-children-and-young-people-us\">Source<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>How many millions of American children have long negative health consequences from contracting Covid? <\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Approximately 2.2\u20139.1 million American children under 18 who contracted COVID-19 may have experienced negative long-term health effects, with a mid-range estimate of 4.35 million. <A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.nih.gov\/news-events\/news-releases\/long-term-study-children-covid-19-begins\">Source<\/a> <A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.nature.com\/articles\/s43856-024-00657-x\">Source<\/a> <\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>These millions of people do not strike me as insignificant. It is not true that covid &#8220;posed almost no serious risk to otherwise healthy young people.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Nathan writes: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>On May 16, 2021, after the Covid vaccine became available, Fauci went on television and said that it would provide \u201cwell over 90% [protection] against the disease,\u201d \u201cit is very unlikely that a vaccinated person&#8230;would transmit [Covid] to someone else,\u201d and vaccinated people are \u201ca dead end to the virus.\u201d Around the same time, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) director Rochelle Walensky said: \u201cOur data from the CDC today suggests&#8230;that vaccinated people do not carry the virus, don\u2019t get sick, and that it\u2019s not just in the clinical trials but it\u2019s also in real world data.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>The government\u2019s internal documents showed that there was no scientific basis for these claims. A report by the Food and Drug Administration published in December 2020 stated: \u201cData are limited to assess the effect of the vaccine against transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from individuals who are infected despite vaccination.\u201d This was still the state of our knowledge in May 2021. Apparently, Fauci and Walensky exaggerated the known benefits of the vaccine in order to encourage people to get the shot. As it turned out, the vaccine lowered the risk of serious illness but had only a modest effect on transmission rates.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>True. People in public health often need to promote policies that are understandable for varieties of IQ levels, and so they simplify and exaggerate and sometimes they lie. Overall, most of what Fauci said was consistent with the science at the time he said it. We shouldn&#8217;t expert scientific rigor from public health pronouncements any more than we should expect scholarly rigor when politicians appeal for votes. <\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Anthony Fauci\u2019s statements during the COVID-19 pandemic were often grounded in the evolving scientific understanding available at the time, but this claim needs nuance. Science is iterative, and early knowledge about the virus was limited, leading to shifts in guidance as new evidence emerged. For example:<\/p>\n<p>Masks: In early 2020, Fauci downplayed the need for universal masking, reflecting initial WHO and CDC skepticism about their efficacy for the general public, partly to preserve supplies for healthcare workers. By mid-2020, as studies showed masks reduced transmission, he strongly advocated for them.<\/p>\n<p>Asymptomatic spread: Early on, Fauci and others underestimated asymptomatic transmission, consistent with initial data suggesting symptomatic cases drove spread. Later studies confirmed significant asymptomatic spread, prompting updated guidance.<\/p>\n<p>Lab leak hypothesis: Fauci initially dismissed the lab leak as unlikely, aligning with early scientific consensus favoring natural origin. While he didn\u2019t rule it out, his stance reflected the limited evidence for a lab origin at the time. The hypothesis remains unresolved, with no definitive evidence either way.<\/p>\n<p>Vaccine efficacy: Fauci\u2019s optimism about vaccines reducing transmission was based on early trial data showing strong protection. Breakthrough infections and waning immunity, especially with variants like Delta and Omicron, later showed vaccines were less effective at preventing transmission, though they remained effective against severe outcomes.<\/p>\n<p>Critics argue Fauci\u2019s communication sometimes lacked transparency about uncertainties or overstated confidence, like on vaccine mandates or school closures, where evidence was mixed or politicized. Supporters counter that he navigated unprecedented uncertainty, balancing science with public health pragmatism.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Nathan writes: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>(2) The experts largely got it right\u2014they just lied<\/p>\n<p>Scientists, not Joe Rogan, sequenced Covid\u2019s genome, developed a way to test for the disease, created an effective vaccine, derived the antiparasitic medication ivermectin from avermectin (a substance produced by a soil bacterium), and figured out that ivermectin doesn\u2019t cure viruses. So why are we supposed to be impressed with Rogan but not scientists? Scientists told some noble and not-so-noble lies. That might be morally bad, but it doesn\u2019t mean the scientists were wrong.<\/p>\n<p>&#8230;From day one, many scientists knew\u2014or at least strongly suspected\u2014that Covid came from a lab. In the end, real evidence for the lab leak wasn\u2019t discovered by Joe Rogan, who knows nothing about viral phylogenetics or furin cleavage sites. The first high-profile figure to publicly make the case for a lab leak was Nicholas Wade. Wade has a degree in natural sciences from Cambridge, worked as an editor at Nature and Science, and was a science editor and reporter at the New York Times for many years. He got his information about Covid\u2019s origins from professional virologists.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The lab leak hypothesis for COVID-19&#8217;s origin remains divisive. Most virologists lean against it, favoring natural emergence due to evidence like SARS-CoV-2\u2019s genetic similarity to bat coronaviruses and historical zoonotic spillovers (e.g., SARS, MERS). Studies, like the 2020 Nature Medicine paper by Andersen et al., argue the virus\u2019s features are consistent with natural evolution, not engineering. Wet markets, particularly in Wuhan, are seen as plausible transmission hubs, supported by early case clusters.<\/p>\n<p>Non-virologists, including some scientists and public figures, often cite circumstantial factors: the Wuhan Institute of Virology\u2019s proximity to the outbreak, its bat coronavirus research, and gain-of-function studies. Declassified U.S. intelligence and FBI\/WHO reports from 2021-2023 suggest a lab accident is plausible, though unproven. Public skepticism also stems from distrust in institutions, amplified by initial Chinese opacity.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Nathan writes: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>(3) Podcast bros largely got it wrong\u2014except when they had the relevant expertise<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>True. <\/p>\n<p>Nathan writes: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>I publicly stated that \u201cIt seems highly likely that the coronavirus leaked from a lab studying bat viruses\u201d on April 17, 2020\u2014five months before Rogan. But you didn\u2019t need to be an expert in virology to make this call. You just needed to look at publicly available evidence, and have the social intelligence to see the hallmarks of a coverup. It took journalists a long time to catch on because most of them lack basic critical thinking skills, and their heuristic is to trust people in positions of authority (especially scientists) even when they have obvious conflicts of interest. Rogan may lack critical thinking skills, too, but at least he has a reasonable degree of social intelligence and skepticism\u2014i.e., he has the qualifications needed to spot an obvious lie. Ultimately, neither Rogan nor I made a scientifically informed case for the lab leak&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>It\u2019s not that a (near) expert consensus can never be wrong. But, if it is, this will be discovered by someone who knows at least as much as the experts, not someone who is ignorant of basic facts. <\/p>\n<p>&#8230;[Robert] Malone makes many claims that intelligent non-experts can evaluate, and he\u2019s often wildly inaccurate. Since there is clearly something wrong with his reasoning ability, it\u2019s rational to defer to the consensus of the experts whose minds are not obviously impaired. (I would make similar comments about the revisionist historian David Irving, who appears to be the source of many of Darryl Cooper\u2019s ideas.) An epistemically healthy society would ignore Robert Malone.<\/p>\n<p>&#8230;Experts in aeronautics have tangible accomplishments like airplanes that can fly, so you can be confident that aeronautics isn\u2019t totally made up. On the other hand, critical theorists produce zero evidence that they have special insight into anything, and they make obviously wrong claims about observable reality (for example, about sex differences). Critical theory falls on the fake end of the spectrum. Most fields will occupy some intermediate position, perhaps closer to one end or the other.<\/p>\n<p>&#8230;All things being equal, the non-expert should assign a higher probability to the dominant view, because that has a stronger pull on the majority of people who know what they\u2019re talking about. <\/p>\n<p>In a large community, it\u2019s inevitable that there will be an occasional crackpot who acquires some credential and then veers off into la-la land. For example, there are perhaps several thousand Americans with serious economics bona fides. They include individuals from across the political spectrum. They disagree on many issues large and small. They vote Republican, Democrat, and libertarian. They have different views on gun control, tax policy, and immigration. However, virtually all of them say with one voice that Trump\u2019s tariffs are moronic and will fail to achieve their aims. The two apparent exceptions are Peter Navarro and Stephen Miran, both of whom have Ph.D.s in economics from Harvard and support the tariffs. Navarro is notorious for being incoherent and angry during interviews. In six of his books, he cites a fictional economist named \u201cRon Vara\u201d (an anagram of \u201cNavarro\u201d) for support because he struggles to find actual authorities who agree with him. Miran has a single, coauthored publication in a second-tier economics journal, and is not a genuine expert at all. In such cases, it is appropriate to dismiss the cranks&#8230;.<\/p>\n<p>We now know who is rewarded in an unregulated marketplace of ideas\u2014at least on the right. It\u2019s people who appeal to the intuitions of the lowest common denominator in the most entertaining way. Winning ideas include anti-Semitism, Holocaust denial, WWII revisionism, drinking unpasteurized milk, vaccine denial, moon landing conspiracy theories, fascism, the notion that Americans would be happier working in factories, and the theory that America is being \u201cscrewed\u201d by Madagascar because we spend more on their vanilla beans than they spend on food and medicine from us. Some of these bad ideas are being implemented into policy by the Trump administration. Three-and-a-half months of what Alex Kaschuta calls \u201cgovernment by meme\u201d has destroyed trillions of dollars in American wealth, irreparably harmed our global status and influence, and set the stage for a global left-wing backlash.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Where are the trillions of dollars in American wealth that have been destroyed? On what basis can you claim that Trump has &#8220;irreparably harmed our global status and influence&#8221;? America&#8217;s power rests upon having the strongest military in the world and the strongest economy in the world. They are both as dominant as ever. Where is the global left-wing backlash? Do you mean Canada and Australia? They both re-elected center-left parties after the right-wing parties were ahead in the polls before Trump took office. That&#8217;s hardly a massive global backlash. <\/p>\n<p>Trump II is many things, but it is not government by meme. This new Trump administration is operating on plans developed over years by smart people (such as Project 2025 which accounts for about half of Trump&#8217;s current agenda). The hundreds of executive orders Trump has signed are not memes. Trump II is chaotic and messy (such as with tariffs). More than any other politician I can think of, Trump &#8220;<A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.ft.com\/content\/f22c96ac-ed0e-4cda-b531-20f1168c7554\">weaponizes uncertainty<\/a>.&#8221; Sometimes that works out in America&#8217;s interests and sometimes it does not and sometimes it is not clear. <\/p>\n<p>Publishing in elite journals or failing to publish in them doesn&#8217;t do much either way to establish expertise. Plenty of what is published in elite journals is nonsense (think of the <A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Replication_crisis\">replication crisis<\/a>) and plenty of experts focus on other things than publishing. The phrase &#8220;publish or perish&#8221; refers to getting ahead in academia, which is not co-equal with expertise. <\/p>\n<p>Here&#8217;s <A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Stephen_Miran\">Stephen Miran&#8217;s Wikipedia<\/a>: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Stephen Ira Miran is an American economist, currently serving as chair of the Council of Economic Advisers since March 2025. He is a senior strategist at Hudson Bay Capital Management, a co-founder of the asset management firm Amberwave Partners, and an adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute.  In December 2024, president-elect Donald Trump named Miran as his nominee for chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>Miran served as an advisor of economic policy for the Department of the Treasury from 2020 to 2021, during Steven Mnuchin&#8217;s tenure as secretary of the Treasury. <\/p>\n<p>&#8230;Miran was critical of Federal Reserve chair Jerome Powell&#8217;s recommendation of a major stimulus package in 2020. <\/p>\n<p>In July 2024, Miran co-authored a paper with Iranian-American economist Nouriel Roubini accusing the Department of the Treasury of reducing the share of long-term notes and bonds, lowering yields, and prolonging inflation. <\/p>\n<p>In November 2024, Miran published A User&#8217;s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System,  examining tools for reshaping international trade following Donald Trump&#8217;s reelection. The paper analyzes tariffs and currency strategies in the context of dollar overvaluation, presenting potential market consequences. Analysts have hypothesized that the tariffs in the second Trump administration could be following this paper to end in the so-called &#8220;Mar-a-Lago Accord&#8221;. <\/p>\n<p>Miran&#8217;s views align with the protectionist economic philosophy of Trump, and he has espoused the use of tariffs as a tool to reduce trade deficits and induce currency revaluations against the dollar. Miran has asserted that the &#8220;economic consensus&#8221; against tariffs is &#8220;wrong,&#8221; and claims that most tariff models do not account for trade deficits.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Miran seems impressive to me even though he hasn&#8217;t published in elite journals. <\/p>\n<p>How much respect does Miran command from economists? <\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Stephen Miran\u2019s standing among economists is a mixed bag, shaped by his credentials, unconventional views, and association with Trump\u2019s protectionist policies. His academic pedigree\u2014PhD from Harvard under Martin Feldstein, a respected economist\u2014earns him baseline respect for intellectual rigor. His roles as a senior strategist at Hudson Bay Capital, fellow at the Manhattan Institute, and former Treasury advisor during Trump\u2019s first term add professional credibility. <\/p>\n<p>However, Miran\u2019s advocacy for tariffs and a weaker dollar, detailed in his 2024 paper \u201cA User\u2019s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System,\u201d has drawn sharp criticism. Many economists view his tariff optimism as at odds with empirical evidence and free-market principles. For instance, Arnaud Costinot and Andres Rodriguez-Clare, whose work Miran cited to justify 20% tariffs, called it a \u201cvery bad idea\u201d that would harm the U.S. Paul Krugman labeled Trump\u2019s tariff plans, which Miran supports, \u201cmonstrously destructive.\u201d A May 2025 Financial Times report noted bond investors at a closed-door meeting found Miran\u2019s tariff defense \u201cincoherent,\u201d branding him \u201cout of his depth.\u201d <\/p>\n<p>Miran\u2019s ideas, like the proposed \u201cMar-a-Lago Accord\u201d to devalue the dollar, are seen as bold but risky, earning admiration from some for challenging orthodoxy but skepticism from others who prioritize global trade stability. Critics, including Pictet economists, question his overvaluation theories and warn of destabilizing effects. His claim that other nations, not U.S. consumers, would bear tariff costs has been undermined by a declining dollar, contrary to his predictions.<\/p>\n<p>Among Trump-aligned economists, Miran commands significant respect for articulating a protectionist vision. Among mainstream economists, his standing is lower, with many viewing his policies as misguided or politically driven. The divide reflects ideological differences more than a universal judgment of his competence.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>How much does Wall Street respect Trump&#8217;s Treasury secretary Scott Bessent?<\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Wall Street\u2019s respect for Scott Bessent has shifted from high enthusiasm in late 2024 to significant skepticism by May 2025. His initial appeal as a market-savvy, stabilizing force has been undermined by his alignment with disruptive tariff policies and inability to prevent market turmoil. While he retains admiration among Trump-aligned investors and those who value his debt focus and geopolitical expertise, many on Wall Street now view him as a disappointing ideologue who prioritizes political loyalty over market stability.<\/p>\n<p>In contrast, Stephen Miran commands less respect due to his limited market experience and the broader rejection of his economic theories. Bessent\u2019s deeper financial roots and ongoing role in high-stakes negotiations keep him a more respected, if polarizing, figure. For the latest sentiment, DeepSearch could analyze recent X posts or market reports, but the current picture suggests Bessent\u2019s reputation hangs in a delicate balance, contingent on his ability to deliver results in tariff talks and debt management.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>I love this point by Robert Lighthizer in his 2023 book <A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Fight-Inside-Wildest-Battle-White\/dp\/006343864X\">No Trade Is Free: Changing Course, Taking on China, and Helping America\u2019s Workers<\/a>: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Rather than envisioning the type of society desired and then, in light of that conception of the common good, fashioning a trade policy to fit that vision, economists tend to do the opposite: they start from the proposition that free trade should reign and then argue that society should adapt. Most acknowledge that lowering trade barriers causes economic disruption, but very few suggest that the rules of trade should be calibrated to help society better manage those effects. On the right, libertarians deny that these bad effects are a problem, because the benefits of cheap consumer goods for the masses supposedly outweigh the costs, and factory workers, in their view, can be retrained to write computer programs. On the left, progressives promote trade adjustment assistance and other wealth \u2013 transfer schemes as a means of smoothing globalization\u2019s rough edges.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\nLighthizer argues that economists and policymakers often treat free trade as an ideological default, assuming its benefits (e.g., lower consumer prices, economic efficiency) justify its disruptions (e.g., job losses, community decline). He sees this as backward: trade policy should serve a predefined societal vision, not dictate it. <\/p>\n<p>Strengths of Lighthizer\u2019s Critique<\/p>\n<p>Society-First Approach: Lighthizer\u2019s call to prioritize a societal vision over trade dogma resonates with those who see globalization as eroding local communities and industries. By framing trade policy as a tool to serve the common good, he appeals to a pragmatic, values-driven governance model.<\/p>\n<p>Bipartisan Critique: He effectively highlights flaws in both libertarian and progressive approaches. The libertarian reliance on market self-correction ignores real-world frictions, while progressive wealth-transfer programs often fail to restore dignity or economic stability to displaced workers.<\/p>\n<p>Realism About Disruption: Lighthizer acknowledges that lowering trade barriers causes significant economic and social upheaval, a point often minimized in free trade advocacy. Studies, like Autor et al. (2016), show that China\u2019s integration into global trade led to persistent job losses and wage stagnation in U.S. manufacturing regions, supporting his concern about disruption.<\/p>\n<p>Weaknesses and Counterarguments<\/p>\n<p>Vague Vision of the Common Good: Lighthizer\u2019s proposal to align trade policy with a societal vision assumes consensus on what that vision entails. In a polarized society, defining the \u201ccommon good\u201d is contentious\u2014does it prioritize industrial workers, urban consumers, or emerging tech sectors? Without clarity, his framework risks being subjective or politically manipulated.<\/p>\n<p>Risk of Protectionism: Critics of Lighthizer\u2019s approach might argue that calibrating trade rules to shield society from disruption leans toward protectionism, which can raise consumer prices and stifle innovation. For example, tariffs on Chinese goods during the Trump administration (where Lighthizer served as U.S. Trade Representative) increased costs for U.S. consumers and businesses, per studies from the National Bureau of Economic Research (2020).<\/p>\n<p>Global Interdependence: Lighthizer\u2019s focus on national interests may undervalue the benefits of global trade networks. Free trade has lifted millions out of poverty globally (e.g., in China and India) and fueled technological advancements through supply chain integration. A retreat from open trade could disrupt these gains and strain international alliances.<\/p>\n<p>Broader Implications<\/p>\n<p>Lighthizer\u2019s argument reflects a broader populist and nationalist push to reassert control over globalization\u2019s impacts, evident in policies like tariffs and \u201creshoring\u201d initiatives. His critique aligns with a growing skepticism of laissez-faire economics, as seen in posts on X, where users debate the hollowing out of manufacturing towns and the cultural costs of cheap goods.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Nathan Cofnas concludes his essay: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8230;huge numbers of people are going to latch onto disastrously wrong ideas unless elites exercise some paternalistic control over their informational environment&#8230;.<\/p>\n<p>Social status on the right is determined mainly by how much attention you can generate, regardless of the quality of that attention. People who appeal to the lowest common denominator rise to the top. The right won\u2019t be able to attract large numbers of cognitive elites\u2014and therefore won\u2019t be successful\u2014if it doesn\u2019t create alternative tracks for people and ideas to gain influence. Nietzsche says: \u201cFar from the marketplace and from fame happens all that is great.\u201d I think there are occasional exceptions to that principle. But, when it comes to ideas, the marketplace rewards \u201cspace is fake and gay\u201d a lot more than \u201cthere\u2019s dimethyl sulfide on the exoplanet K2-18b.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>There&#8217;s not one marketplace. There are marketplaces for humor and another for entertainment and another for ideas for people with IQs over 120. The ideas marketplace for the high IQ has no time for arguments that &#8220;space is fake and gay.&#8221; People who like that argument are looking for laughs, not scholarship. Getting upset about it is like getting upset about the movie Animal House. &#8220;The film is about a trouble-making fraternity whose members challenge the authority of the dean of the fictional Faber College.&#8221; (<A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Animal_House\">Wikipedia<\/a>)<\/p>\n<p>Intellectuals have always been dismayed by the wrong ideas of the masses. Has there ever been a society where elites exercised effective control over the information environment? I don&#8217;t think that is possible. Policing people&#8217;s information choices generally seems silly to me though I am all for restricting information about the production of dangerous weapons. Also, society has an interest in discouraging self-harm and anti-social behavior. <\/p>\n<p>Social status is not determined only by popularity. Steve Sailer is as high status a thinker as you can find in certain circles even though most Americans have never heard of him. Status is domain specific. The great basketball player has high status in the world that loves basketball but his ball skills create no status for him in the world of economics. <\/p>\n<p>People who appeal to the lowest common denominator can rise to the top of certain social hierarchies but they have no chance for status in high IQ hierarchies.<\/p>\n<p>This version of Donald Trump has attracted far more high IQ support than Trump I. Precisely because the right was deplatformed from the social media oligarchy between 2016-2021, they created their own social media (Elon Musk bought X, and we had the rise of Substack and Rumble and podcasts). <\/p>\n<p>Rarely has cognitive labor of any ideological stripe paid for itself. With few exceptions, the great artists and thinkers have always had to have day jobs to support themselves or they have had to depend upon a patron. <\/p>\n<p>Nathan Cofnas is right that the right needs to fund more intellectuals. By moving the Republican party down market, Donald Trump won two of three presidential elections. Trump&#8217;s low-IQ message resonated with enough of the people to take power. Populists such as Trump win elections but they rarely govern effectively because effectiveness requires expertise. <\/p>\n<p>The right needs to its own expertise. <\/p>\n<p>Great TV such as <A HREF=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/The_Sopranos\">The Sopranos<\/a> contain scripts with appeal for many different levels of IQ. People with an average IQ can enjoy The Sopranos and people with a genius IQ can enjoy The Sopranos. The right needs to be like The Sopranos.<\/p>\n<p>Trump at his best is like The Sopranos. He&#8217;s attracted some formidable talent such as JD Vance, Scott Bessent, Susie Wiles, and Stephen Miran. Trump needs to listen to JD Vance, Scott Bessent, Susie Wiles, and Stephen Miran. <\/p>\n<p><iframe width=\"560\" height=\"315\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/nRFGFxllWxQ?si=OpSENg2YsSSJQtkm\" title=\"YouTube video player\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share\" referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p>Trump has shown the ability to grow. His 2024 campaign was far more professional than his previous runs. <\/p>\n<p>I asked Grok to analyze Nathan&#8217;s essay: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Strengths<\/p>\n<p>Clear Thesis and Timely Topic<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas articulates a clear central argument: while expertise is real and valuable, the public\u2019s distrust of experts\u2014fueled by their failures and the rise of alt-media\u2014has led to a proliferation of ignorance with significant cultural and political consequences. This is a timely issue, given the growing influence of figures like Joe Rogan, Candace Owens, and Dave Smith, and the essay effectively taps into broader debates about misinformation, trust, and authority in the digital age.<\/p>\n<p>Engaging Use of Examples<\/p>\n<p>The essay uses vivid, well-chosen examples to illustrate its points, such as the contrast between Nikku Madhusudhan\u2019s dimethyl sulfide discovery and Candace Owens\u2019s conspiratorial claims about the moon landing. These examples ground the abstract discussion in concrete, relatable cases, making the argument more accessible and persuasive. The discussion of Covid-19, including Fauci\u2019s \u201cnoble lies\u201d and the lab-leak hypothesis, is particularly effective in highlighting the complexities of expertise and public trust.<\/p>\n<p>Balanced Perspective<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas avoids a simplistic defense of expertise or a blanket dismissal of alt-media. He acknowledges the failures of the \u201cexpert class\u201d (e.g., Fauci\u2019s lies, the suppression of the lab-leak theory) while arguing that expertise remains essential. This balanced approach strengthens his credibility, as he engages with the arguments of both sides rather than preaching to one camp. His critique of both left-wing \u201cblind obedience to credentialed authority\u201d and right-wing faith in an unregulated \u201cmarketplace of ideas\u201d is particularly incisive.<\/p>\n<p>Strong Case for Expertise<\/p>\n<p>The essay makes a compelling case for the value of expertise, particularly through analogies like Joe Rogan\u2019s respect for martial arts experts. Cofnas effectively argues that while self-taught individuals can occasionally outperform experts (e.g., the hypothetical kung fu master), this is the exception, not the rule. His discussion of fields like aeronautics versus critical theory as a spectrum of \u201creal\u201d to \u201cfake\u201d expertise is a useful heuristic for evaluating claims.<\/p>\n<p>Call for Institutional Reform<\/p>\n<p>The essay\u2019s conclusion, advocating for new institutions to enforce intellectual standards, is a constructive proposal that moves beyond mere criticism. By suggesting that figures like Sam Harris and Douglas Murray should build alternative platforms rather than rely on Rogan to self-correct, Cofnas offers a forward-looking solution to the problem of misinformation.<\/p>\n<p>Weaknesses<\/p>\n<p>Overgeneralization of Alt-Media Figures<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas lumps together a wide range of alt-media figures\u2014Joe Rogan, Candace Owens, Dave Smith, Bret Weinstein, Russell Brand, and Darryl Cooper\u2014without sufficiently distinguishing their approaches or credibility. For example, Rogan\u2019s platform is more about open-ended conversation than dogmatic assertions, whereas Owens often makes definitive, conspiratorial claims. This broad brush risks oversimplifying the alt-media landscape and weakening the critique by failing to account for nuances in their influence and methods.<\/p>\n<p>Selective Use of Evidence<\/p>\n<p>While Cofnas provides detailed examples to support his critique of alt-media (e.g., Dave Smith\u2019s errors on Churchill and NATO expansion), he is less rigorous in scrutinizing the expert class beyond Covid-related failures. For instance, his discussion of economists\u2019 consensus on Trump\u2019s tariffs dismisses Peter Navarro and Stephen Miran as \u201ccranks\u201d without engaging with their arguments or acknowledging that economic consensus can be shaped by political or institutional pressures. This selective focus risks appearing biased toward establishment narratives on non-Covid issues.<\/p>\n<p>Ambiguity in Defining Expertise<\/p>\n<p>The essay struggles to define what constitutes legitimate expertise, particularly in complex, multidisciplinary issues like the Israeli\u2013Palestinian conflict. Cofnas suggests that opinions worth sharing require \u201cintellectual seriousness\u201d and \u201csome claim to expertise,\u201d but these criteria are vague. For example, he criticizes Rogan for lacking expertise on Gaza but doesn\u2019t clarify who qualifies as an expert on such a multifaceted issue. This ambiguity undermines the practicality of his proposed standards.<\/p>\n<p>Dismissive Tone Toward the Public<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s argument that the public is too easily swayed by charismatic alt-media figures (e.g., citing the survey about the Black Plague) can come across as elitist. While he draws on Garett Jones\u2019s work to argue for \u201cless democracy,\u201d this stance risks alienating readers who value democratic principles or believe in the public\u2019s capacity for discernment. A more nuanced discussion of how to empower the public to evaluate information critically would strengthen the essay.<\/p>\n<p>Underdeveloped Solutions<\/p>\n<p>The call for new institutions to enforce intellectual standards is intriguing but underdeveloped. Cofnas doesn\u2019t specify what these institutions would look like, how they would avoid the same biases as existing ones, or how they would gain traction in a media landscape dominated by attention-driven platforms. Without concrete proposals, the solution feels aspirational rather than actionable.<\/p>\n<p>Additional Observations<\/p>\n<p>Tone and Audience<\/p>\n<p>The essay\u2019s tone is polemical yet scholarly, blending sharp critiques (e.g., \u201cpodcast bros\u201d) with academic references (e.g., Plato, Nietzsche). This makes it appealing to an educated audience but potentially alienating to readers who sympathize with alt-media figures. The use of phrases like \u201cbrain-rotting infotainment\u201d and \u201cgovernment by meme\u201d is rhetorically effective but may polarize readers who see value in alt-media\u2019s challenge to establishment narratives.<\/p>\n<p>Philosophical Underpinnings<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s reference to Plato\u2019s \u201cphilosopher kings\u201d and \u201cnoble lies\u201d adds philosophical depth but is underexplored. A deeper engagement with the ethics of lying for the public good (e.g., Fauci\u2019s mask and vaccine claims) could strengthen the essay\u2019s intellectual rigor, especially given its critique of both expert dishonesty and alt-media misinformation.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>This bit by Nathan Cofnas is far outside of expert opinion and damages his essay: &#8220;At the height of our society\u2019s \u201cexpert\u201d worship, credentialed technocrats told a bunch of self-serving lies, imprisoned people in their apartments for two years, and then said that anyone who questioned them was a racist conspiracy theorist. Almost the entire academic and media establishment covered for them. On top of that, we are told that people with PhDs in how smells are racist are also \u201cexperts\u201d before whom we must genuflect.&#8221; <\/p>\n<p>What is a better and more expert way of making his point here? I think our covid experts were more right than wrong at the time and overall they did a good job and we should be grateful.<\/p>\n<p>Grok says:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Nathan Cofnas\u2019s critique in the quoted passage aims to challenge the authority of certain experts during the COVID-19 pandemic, but it does so with hyperbolic language and broad generalizations that undermine its credibility. His point seems to be that expert opinion can sometimes be flawed, self-serving, or overly dogmatic, and that public trust in experts was strained by perceived overreach or inconsistencies. However, his phrasing\u2014dismissing experts as liars, exaggerating lockdown measures, and mocking academic credentials\u2014lacks nuance and alienates readers who might otherwise engage with his argument. Below, I\u2019ll reframe his point in a way that aligns more closely with expert discourse, acknowledges the complexities of the pandemic response, and respects your view that COVID experts were more right than wrong while still addressing potential shortcomings.<\/p>\n<p>Revised Version<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;During the COVID-19 pandemic, public health experts faced unprecedented challenges in managing a rapidly evolving crisis with limited data. While many of their recommendations, such as social distancing and vaccination campaigns, were grounded in the best available evidence and saved countless lives, some policies\u2014like prolonged lockdowns or inconsistent messaging on issues like mask efficacy\u2014sparked legitimate debate. The tendency of certain institutions to dismiss skepticism as misinformation, rather than engaging with it transparently, eroded public trust in expertise. Additionally, the elevation of niche academic fields as authoritative voices on complex social issues sometimes muddled public discourse. A more humble, transparent approach to expertise, one that acknowledges uncertainty and invites constructive critique, would strengthen public confidence in scientific guidance.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Key Improvements<\/p>\n<p>Acknowledges Expert Successes: The revised version credits experts for their life-saving work, aligning with your view that they were more right than wrong. It recognizes the difficulty of decision-making under uncertainty, which was central to the pandemic response.<\/p>\n<p>Critiques Specific Issues: Instead of blanket accusations of &#8220;self-serving lies,&#8221; it points to specific areas of contention\u2014like prolonged lockdowns or inconsistent messaging\u2014where experts faced challenges or lost public trust. This is more precise and grounded.<\/p>\n<p>Avoids Hyperbole: Terms like &#8220;imprisoned people in their apartments&#8221; or mocking PhDs in niche fields are replaced with measured language that critiques without dismissing entire professions or institutions.<\/p>\n<p>Emphasizes Transparency and Humility: The critique focuses on how experts and institutions handled dissent, suggesting that greater openness could rebuild trust. This aligns with expert discussions on science communication (e.g., Nature\u2019s 2021 editorial on trust in science).<\/p>\n<p>Maintains the Core Point: The revision preserves Cofnas\u2019s concern about overreliance on experts and the risks of dogmatic authority, but frames it in a way that invites dialogue rather than confrontation.<\/p>\n<p>Supporting Context<\/p>\n<p>Expert Performance During COVID-19: Most public health experts relied on evolving data, and measures like vaccinations and social distancing significantly reduced mortality (e.g., a 2021 Lancet study estimated vaccines prevented millions of deaths). However, policies like extended school closures or initial resistance to lab-leak hypotheses faced criticism for lacking flexibility or transparency (e.g., a 2022 BMJ article on lockdown harms).<\/p>\n<p>Public Trust: Surveys (e.g., Pew Research, 2022) show trust in scientists declined during the pandemic, partly due to perceived politicization or inconsistent messaging. This supports Cofnas\u2019s concern but requires a nuanced discussion of causes.<\/p>\n<p>Niche Expertise: Cofnas\u2019s jab at \u201cPhDs in how smells are racist\u201d likely refers to fringe academic fields. While some studies in critical theory can seem disconnected from practical concerns, dismissing them wholesale ignores the broader value of academic inquiry. A better critique would focus on how such fields are sometimes misapplied in policy debates.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>This is a weak argument by Cofnas: &#8220;But consumers of alt-media have largely given up on the notion of expertise, at least when it comes to politicized topics. When every credible economist on earth says that Trump\u2019s tariffs are going to be a disaster, they say, \u201cNate Silver failed to predict the 2016 election, so maybe Oren Cass (a lawyer), Batya Ungar-Sargon (a Marxist English major), and Catturd are just as likely to be right about tariffs as people who know how to draw supply and demand curves (whatever those are).\u201d&#8221; <\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The passage is flawed by its sarcastic tone, overgeneralization of alt-media audiences, and failure to acknowledge the nuanced reasons behind skepticism toward experts. A more accurate and effective version would recognize the selective nature of this skepticism, address its root causes (e.g., distrust in institutions), and engage with the tariff debate more substantively, while avoiding mockery.<\/p>\n<p>Revised Version<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Some alt-media consumers have grown skeptical of mainstream expertise, particularly on politicized issues like trade policy, where they perceive biases or inconsistencies in institutional narratives. For instance, when economists widely criticize Trump\u2019s proposed tariffs as likely to raise consumer prices and disrupt global trade, some dismiss these warnings, pointing to past failures of predictive models, like polling errors in the 2016 election. They may turn to voices like Oren Cass or Batya Ungar-Sargon, who, despite lacking formal economic training, offer compelling narratives that resonate with their worldview. This skepticism isn\u2019t universal\u2014many of these same individuals trust experts in fields like medicine or law for personal needs. The challenge lies in bridging this selective distrust by fostering transparent, evidence-based discussions that address public concerns without condescension, while emphasizing the value of specialized knowledge, such as the economic principles behind supply and demand.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Why the Original is Weak<\/p>\n<p>Overgeneralization: Cofnas implies alt-media consumers wholly reject expertise, ignoring that many selectively distrust experts in politicized domains while relying on professionals elsewhere (as you noted). This weakens his credibility by misrepresenting the audience\u2019s behavior.<\/p>\n<p>Sarcastic Tone: Mocking alt-media figures like Catturd or dismissing supply and demand curves as \u201cwhatever those are\u201d alienates readers who might sympathize with skepticism about experts. It comes off as elitist rather than persuasive.<\/p>\n<p>Lack of Nuance on Tariffs: The passage doesn\u2019t engage with the tariff debate itself, missing a chance to explain why economists oppose them or why alt-media voices gain traction. This makes the critique feel shallow.<\/p>\n<p>Strawman Argument: By citing Nate Silver\u2019s 2016 polling error as the basis for rejecting economists, Cofnas exaggerates the reasoning of alt-media consumers, ignoring deeper issues like distrust in institutions or media.<\/p>\n<p>Improvements in the Revision<\/p>\n<p>Acknowledges Selective Skepticism: The revised version reflects your point that alt-media consumers don\u2019t reject all expertise, noting their trust in fields like medicine or law. This makes the argument more accurate and relatable.<\/p>\n<p>Explains Root Causes: It points to institutional distrust and perceived biases as drivers of skepticism, grounded in real phenomena (e.g., Pew Research 2022 showed declining trust in media and experts). This adds depth without excusing irrationality.<\/p>\n<p>Engages with the Tariff Issue: The revision briefly explains why economists criticize tariffs (higher prices, trade disruptions), showing respect for specialized knowledge while acknowledging the appeal of alt-media narratives.<\/p>\n<p>Constructive Tone: Dropping sarcasm makes the argument more professional and persuasive, inviting dialogue rather than confrontation.<\/p>\n<p>Calls for Better Communication: It suggests experts address public concerns transparently, aligning with expert recommendations on rebuilding trust (e.g., Nature\u2019s 2021 editorial on science communication).<\/p>\n<p>Supporting Context<\/p>\n<p>Tariff Debate: Most economists oppose broad tariffs due to evidence they increase consumer prices and disrupt trade (e.g., a 2018 study on Trump\u2019s tariffs by the National Bureau of Economic Research estimated a $1,400 annual cost per U.S. household). However, figures like Oren Cass argue tariffs protect domestic industries, resonating with audiences skeptical of globalization\u2019s impacts.<\/p>\n<p>Alt-Media Skepticism: Distrust in experts often stems from perceived media bias or institutional failures (e.g., Edelman Trust Barometer 2023 showed 43% of Americans distrust media). Yet, as you noted, people still seek expert advice for personal needs, suggesting skepticism is context-specific.<\/p>\n<p>Alt-Media Figures: Oren Cass (a policy analyst, not just a lawyer) and Batya Ungar-Sargon (a journalist) have nuanced views that Cofnas oversimplifies. Engaging with their actual arguments would strengthen the critique.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>I think this is a weak paragraph by Cofnas. How would you improve it? &#8220;In a large community, it\u2019s inevitable that there will be an occasional crackpot who acquires some credential and then veers off into la-la land. For example, there are perhaps several thousand Americans with serious economics bona fides. They include individuals from across the political spectrum. They disagree on many issues large and small. They vote Republican, Democrat, and libertarian. They have different views on gun control, tax policy, and immigration. However, virtually all of them say with one voice that Trump\u2019s tariffs are moronic and will fail to achieve their aims. The two apparent exceptions are Peter Navarro and Stephen Miran, both of whom have Ph.D.s in economics from Harvard and support the tariffs. Navarro is notorious for being incoherent and angry during interviews. In six of his books, he cites a fictional economist named \u201cRon Vara\u201d (an anagram of \u201cNavarro\u201d) for support because he struggles to find actual authorities who agree with him. Miran has a single, coauthored publication in a second-tier economics journal, and is not a genuine expert at all. In such cases, it is appropriate to dismiss the cranks.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>While the paragraph makes a valid point about the near-unanimous expert opposition to tariffs, it is weakened by several issues: its dismissive tone, personal attacks on Navarro and Miran, lack of substantive engagement with their arguments, and failure to explain why tariff opposition is so uniform among economists. These flaws make the argument less persuasive and overly combative, risking alienation of readers who might be open to a more reasoned critique. Below, I\u2019ll revise the paragraph to improve its accuracy, effectiveness, and alignment with expert discourse, while addressing your concern that the original is weak.<\/p>\n<p>Revised Version<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;In any large academic field, a few credentialed individuals may hold outlier views that diverge from the consensus. Consider the case of Trump\u2019s proposed tariffs, which aim to protect domestic industries but are criticized by nearly all economists\u2014across political and ideological lines\u2014for likely increasing consumer prices, disrupting global trade, and failing to achieve their goals. This consensus reflects decades of research on trade policy, including studies showing the costs of protectionism. Two economists, Peter Navarro and Stephen Miran, both with Harvard Ph.D.s, are notable exceptions in supporting the tariffs. However, their arguments have faced scrutiny: Navarro\u2019s work often lacks engagement with mainstream economic evidence, and Miran\u2019s limited publication record raises questions about his expertise in trade policy. While dissenting voices can sometimes spark valuable debate, the overwhelming evidence against broad tariffs suggests caution in prioritizing these outliers over the broader consensus. Engaging with their arguments critically, rather than dismissing them outright, can help clarify why the consensus holds.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Why the Original is Weak<\/p>\n<p>Dismissive and Inflammatory Tone: Calling Navarro and Miran \u201ccrackpots\u201d or \u201ccranks\u201d and mocking Navarro\u2019s use of a pseudonym (\u201cRon Vara\u201d) undermines the argument\u2019s professionalism. It shifts focus from substantive critique to personal attacks, reducing credibility.<\/p>\n<p>Lack of Substantive Engagement: The paragraph doesn\u2019t explain why economists oppose tariffs or address Navarro and Miran\u2019s actual arguments (e.g., Navarro\u2019s focus on protecting manufacturing). This makes the critique feel shallow and one-sided.<\/p>\n<p>Overemphasis on Credentials: While questioning Miran\u2019s expertise based on a single publication is relevant, it\u2019s not enough to dismiss him outright. Similarly, Navarro\u2019s Harvard Ph.D. and extensive policy experience deserve more nuanced consideration, even if his arguments are flawed.<\/p>\n<p>Missed Opportunity to Explain Consensus: The paragraph notes the near-universal opposition to tariffs but doesn\u2019t clarify why economists agree, missing a chance to educate readers on trade economics.<\/p>\n<p>Fails to Acknowledge Dissent\u2019s Value: By advocating for dismissing outliers, Cofnas ignores that minority views can sometimes drive progress, even if Navarro and Miran\u2019s arguments are weak.<\/p>\n<p>Improvements in the Revision<\/p>\n<p>Professional Tone: The revision avoids inflammatory terms like \u201ccrackpot\u201d or \u201cmoronic,\u201d focusing on evidence and reasoning. This makes the argument more persuasive and respectful, aligning with expert discourse.<\/p>\n<p>Explains the Consensus: It briefly outlines why economists oppose tariffs (higher prices, trade disruptions) and ties this to research on protectionism, grounding the critique in evidence (e.g., a 2018 NBER study on Trump\u2019s tariffs estimated significant consumer costs).<\/p>\n<p>Engages with Navarro and Miran: Rather than personal attacks, the revision critiques their work substantively\u2014Navarro\u2019s lack of engagement with mainstream evidence and Miran\u2019s limited expertise\u2014while acknowledging their credentials.<\/p>\n<p>Acknowledges Dissent\u2019s Potential: It recognizes that outlier views can spark debate, but emphasizes the strength of the consensus based on evidence, striking a balanced tone.<\/p>\n<p>Encourages Critical Engagement: Instead of dismissing \u201ccranks,\u201d it advocates for evaluating arguments critically, which is more constructive and invites readers to think for themselves.<\/p>\n<p>Supporting Context<\/p>\n<p>Economist Consensus on Tariffs: Surveys (e.g., IGM Chicago Booth, 2018) show near-unanimous agreement among economists that tariffs harm economic welfare, based on evidence like higher consumer prices and reduced trade efficiency. Studies (e.g., Fajgelbaum et al., 2020) estimated Trump\u2019s 2018 tariffs cost U.S. consumers billions annually.<\/p>\n<p>Navarro\u2019s Arguments: Navarro, a former Trump advisor, argues tariffs protect U.S. manufacturing and reduce trade deficits. Critics note his work often ignores standard economic models and empirical data, but his focus on industrial policy resonates with some audiences.<\/p>\n<p>Miran\u2019s Profile: Stephen Miran\u2019s limited publication record (one coauthored paper) and role as a policy advisor rather than academic economist suggest less expertise in trade, but dismissing him solely on this basis oversimplifies his contributions.<\/p>\n<p>Role of Outliers: Scientific progress sometimes comes from dissenters (e.g., Barry Marshall\u2019s initially controversial work on H. pylori), but outliers must provide robust evidence. Navarro and Miran\u2019s arguments lack this, but their views reflect real concerns about globalization\u2019s impact.<\/p>\n<p>How Cofnas Could Further Improve<\/p>\n<p>Cite Specific Evidence: Reference studies or data (e.g., tariff cost estimates) to strengthen the case against tariffs and show why the consensus matters.<\/p>\n<p>Address Navarro\u2019s Appeal: Acknowledge why Navarro\u2019s focus on manufacturing jobs gains traction, then counter with evidence of tariffs\u2019 broader harms.<\/p>\n<p>Balance Credential Critique: Recognize Navarro\u2019s policy experience while noting his divergence from economic orthodoxy, and avoid overemphasizing Miran\u2019s publication record as the sole measure of expertise.<\/p>\n<p>Highlight Expert Disagreement: Note that economists disagree on many issues (e.g., tax policy), but their tariff consensus reflects unusually strong agreement, underscoring its significance.<\/p>\n<p>This revision makes Cofnas\u2019s point more accurately by focusing on evidence, engaging with dissenting views, and adopting a professional tone. It respects the complexity of the tariff debate and the role of expertise without alienating readers.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Please compare and contrast this Nathan Cofnas essay with his other body of work. I don&#8217;t understand why he&#8217;s so sloppy here when he is usually thoughtful and careful.<\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Cofnas is a philosopher and researcher known for his work in moral psychology, race and intelligence, and critiques of ideological bias in academia. His publications span peer-reviewed journals, books, and public-facing essays. Key themes include:<\/p>\n<p>Race and Intelligence: In articles like \u201cResearch on Group Differences in Intelligence\u201d (Philosophical Psychology, 2020), Cofnas argues that genetic factors may contribute to group differences in IQ, challenging what he sees as dogmatic rejection of this hypothesis. These works are heavily cited, data-driven, and engage with empirical studies.<\/p>\n<p>Critiques of Ideology: Essays like \u201cWhy We Need to Talk About the Science of Race\u201d (Quillette, 2018) criticize academic censorship of controversial topics. These pieces are provocative but typically structured with clear premises, evidence, and responses to counterarguments.<\/p>\n<p>Public Engagement: On platforms like Substack and Quillette, Cofnas writes for broader audiences, often addressing cultural or political issues (e.g., free speech, cancel culture). These essays are less formal but still aim for logical clarity and evidence-based claims.<\/p>\n<p>His scholarly work is characterized by:<\/p>\n<p>Precision: He engages with primary sources, cites studies, and anticipates counterarguments.<\/p>\n<p>Provocation: He tackles taboo topics (e.g., race, IQ) but grounds claims in data or philosophical reasoning.<\/p>\n<p>Clarity: Even in public essays, he avoids hyperbole, focusing on logical structure.<\/p>\n<p>Comparison and Contrast<\/p>\n<p>Similarities<\/p>\n<p>Skepticism of Orthodoxy: Like his other work, \u201cPodcast Bros\u201d challenges established narratives. His critique of \u201cfake and\/or corrupt\u201d experts echoes his arguments against academic dogmas (e.g., rejection of race-IQ research). Both reflect his belief that truth is obscured by ideological or institutional biases.<\/p>\n<p>Cultural Commentary: The essay\u2019s focus on media and public discourse aligns with his public-facing writings, such as Quillette essays on cancel culture or academic bias. He often analyzes how ideas spread and influence society.<\/p>\n<p>Provocative Tone: The essay\u2019s sharp language (\u201cbrain rot,\u201d \u201cuneducated podcast bros\u201d) is consistent with his willingness to provoke, seen in his challenges to progressive taboos on race or free speech.<\/p>\n<p>Differences<\/p>\n<p>Argumentative Rigor:<\/p>\n<p>Podcast Bros: The essay is light on evidence, relying on anecdotes (e.g., Hunter Biden laptop) and analogies (e.g., MMA expertise). It doesn\u2019t cite studies or provide data to support claims about \u201cproliferation of ignorance\u201d or podcast influence. The term \u201cbrain rot\u201d is catchy but undefined, weakening the argument.<\/p>\n<p>Other Work: His academic papers (e.g., on IQ) are dense with citations, statistical analyses, and responses to critics. Even public essays like those in Quillette typically reference studies or specific events with clarity. For example, his 2020 paper on group differences cites over 50 sources, meticulously engaging with opposing views.<\/p>\n<p>Tone and Style:<\/p>\n<p>Podcast Bros: The tone is sarcastic and hyperbolic, with phrases like \u201cmagic shortcut to knowledge\u201d and \u201cface planted about five times in a row.\u201d This contrasts with his usually measured, academic style, even in polemical essays.<\/p>\n<p>Other Work: While provocative, his scholarly and public writings maintain a formal or semi-formal tone. For instance, his Quillette essays use sharp critiques but avoid slang or mockery, focusing on reasoned arguments.<\/p>\n<p>Depth of Analysis:<\/p>\n<p>Podcast Bros: The essay is broad, covering WWII, vaccines, Ukraine, and tariffs in a single sweep without delving deeply into any. It asserts that podcast bros \u201chave not outperformed actual experts\u201d on Covid but doesn\u2019t substantiate this with data or examples.<\/p>\n<p>Other Work: Cofnas typically focuses narrowly on specific issues (e.g., IQ heritability, academic censorship), providing detailed evidence. His book on moral psychology, for instance, builds a cumulative case over chapters, integrating evolutionary theory and empirical studies.<\/p>\n<p>Audience and Intent:<\/p>\n<p>Podcast Bros: Written for a Substack audience, it seems aimed at sparking discussion or virality. The casual, meme-like term \u201cbrain rot\u201d and lack of citations suggest a focus on engagement over scholarship.<\/p>\n<p>Other Work: His academic papers target philosophers and scientists, aiming for rigor and impact within scholarly debates. His public essays balance accessibility with intellectual depth, appealing to educated lay readers.<\/p>\n<p>Why \u201cPodcast Bros\u201d Seems Sloppy<\/p>\n<p>Your perception of sloppiness likely stems from the following:<\/p>\n<p>Lack of Evidence: Unlike his data-driven work on IQ or moral psychology, this essay makes sweeping claims without substantiation. For example, asserting that podcast bros\u2019 influence has \u201cdisastrous consequences\u201d lacks specific examples or metrics. His scholarly work, by contrast, is meticulous, often preempting criticisms with evidence.<\/p>\n<p>Hyperbolic Tone: The sarcastic, dismissive language (\u201cuneducated podcast bros,\u201d \u201cbrain-rotting infotainment\u201d) is atypical. His usual tone, even in public essays, is assertive but restrained, avoiding mockery. This shift may feel careless or pandering to a populist audience.<\/p>\n<p>Broad Scope: Covering multiple complex topics (vaccines, geopolitics, Covid) in a short essay dilutes focus. His other work tackles single issues with depth, making \u201cPodcast Bros\u201d seem scattershot.<\/p>\n<p>Platform and Context: Substack encourages informal, timely commentary. Cofnas may have prioritized speed and engagement over rigor, unlike his peer-reviewed papers or carefully edited Quillette essays. The essay reads like a hot take, not a polished argument.<\/p>\n<p>Possible Intent: The essay might be an experiment in reaching a broader, less academic audience. The catchy \u201cbrain rot\u201d framing and polemical style align with viral online discourse, but they sacrifice the nuance of his typical work.<\/p>\n<p>Critical Reflection<\/p>\n<p>While Cofnas\u2019 critique of podcast culture and expert distrust is consistent with his skepticism of institutional narratives, the execution feels rushed. His claim that podcast bros underperform experts on Covid, for instance, ignores cases where non-experts (e.g., Rogan\u2019s guests like Dr. Robert Malone) raised valid concerns about vaccine mandates or lockdowns before mainstream acknowledgment. This omission undermines his argument and contrasts with his usual fairness to opposing views. However, his core point\u2014that neither blind trust in experts nor charisma-driven media yields truth\u2014aligns with his broader emphasis on critical inquiry.<\/p>\n<p>Conclusion<\/p>\n<p>\u201cPodcast Bros and Brain Rot\u201d shares Cofnas\u2019 hallmark skepticism and cultural critique but diverges in its lack of rigor, hyperbolic tone, and broad scope. It feels sloppy because it prioritizes engagement over evidence, unlike his meticulous academic papers or structured public essays. This may reflect the Substack platform\u2019s demand for quick, provocative content or an intentional shift to a more populist style. To align with his usual thoughtfulness, Cofnas could have narrowed the focus, provided data (e.g., podcast listenership stats, expert error rates), and tempered the sarcasm. If you\u2019re puzzled by this departure, it\u2019s likely because the essay sacrifices his typical depth for accessibility, a trade-off that doesn\u2019t fully suit his strengths.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Please analyze <A HREF=\"https:\/\/x.com\/nathancofnas\">Nathan&#8217;s output on X<\/a>, contrast it with his academic rigor, and let me know if you think this medium suits his strengths and if it might lead him to be sloppy. <\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\nContrasts with X Output:<\/p>\n<p>Rigor:<\/p>\n<p>X: Posts are brief, often asserting claims without evidence due to platform constraints. For example, his NYU comment on \u201cwokism\u201d lacks data or elaboration, relying on Substack links for context.<\/p>\n<p>Academic Work: Papers and essays provide extensive evidence, such as statistical analyses of IQ data or historical records in his MacDonald critiques.<\/p>\n<p>Tone:<\/p>\n<p>X: Sarcastic and polemical (e.g., \u201cwokism,\u201d \u201cbrain rot\u201d). This aligns with his Substack essay \u201cPodcast Bros\u201d but feels less controlled than his academic tone.<\/p>\n<p>Academic Work: Assertive but formal, even when provocative. His Quillette essays critique ideology with clarity, not mockery.<\/p>\n<p>Depth:<\/p>\n<p>X: Broad, scattershot commentary (e.g., jumping from ivermectin to DEI). Posts lack the space for nuanced arguments.<\/p>\n<p>Academic Work: Narrow, in-depth focus. His book on moral psychology builds a cumulative case over chapters, unlike the fragmented nature of X posts.<\/p>\n<p>Does X Suit Cofnas\u2019 Strengths?<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019 strengths lie in:<\/p>\n<p>Analytical Rigor: His ability to dissect complex issues (e.g., race-IQ debates) with data and logic.<\/p>\n<p>Provocative Clarity: Framing controversial topics accessibly while grounding them in evidence.<\/p>\n<p>Interdisciplinary Insight: Combining philosophy, biology, and psychology to address ethical and scientific questions.<\/p>\n<p>Suitability of X:<\/p>\n<p>Strengths Leveraged:<\/p>\n<p>X allows Cofnas to reach a wide audience, amplifying his critiques of academia, media, and ideology. His posts on DEI and podcast culture resonate with followers skeptical of institutional narratives, aligning with his public essays\u2019 goals.<\/p>\n<p>The platform\u2019s immediacy suits his provocative style, letting him comment on current events (e.g., NYU hack) and promote his Substack.<\/p>\n<p>Limitations:<\/p>\n<p>Character Limits: X\u2019s brevity (280 characters) restricts his ability to provide evidence or nuance, undermining his strength in detailed argumentation. Posts like his \u201cwokism\u201d comment appear as assertions, not arguments, contrasting with his academic depth.<\/p>\n<p>Tone Amplification: X\u2019s informal, combative culture encourages sarcasm and hyperbole (e.g., \u201cbrain rot\u201d), which can overshadow his analytical clarity. This mirrors the \u201csloppy\u201d tone of \u201cPodcast Bros.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Does X Contribute to Sloppiness?<\/p>\n<p>Your concern about sloppiness in \u201cPodcast Bros and Brain Rot\u201d likely stems from its hyperbolic tone, lack of citations, and broad scope, which diverge from Cofnas\u2019 academic rigor. X may exacerbate this in several ways:<\/p>\n<p>Platform Incentives:<\/p>\n<p>X rewards attention-grabbing, concise posts, encouraging provocative language over evidence. His \u201cPodcast Bros\u201d post uses terms like \u201cbrain rot\u201d to hook readers, mirroring X\u2019s viral style but sacrificing precision.<\/p>\n<p>The platform\u2019s fast-paced nature may pressure Cofnas to produce quick takes, as seen in his NYU comment, which lacks the depth of his Quillette essays.<\/p>\n<p>Tone Shift:<\/p>\n<p>X\u2019s informal, combative tone (e.g., users calling out \u201cwokism\u201d) may influence Cofnas to adopt a more polemical style, as seen in both his X posts and \u201cPodcast Bros.\u201d This contrasts with his academic restraint, where even provocative claims are measured.<\/p>\n<p>Fragmented Arguments:<\/p>\n<p>X\u2019s character limit forces Cofnas to fragment arguments across posts or rely on Substack links, leading to incomplete ideas. For example, his ivermectin comment in the \u201cPodcast Bros\u201d post lacks context without the full essay, appearing less rigorous than his academic work.<\/p>\n<p>This fragmentation may carry over to Substack, where \u201cPodcast Bros\u201d covers multiple topics (vaccines, WWII, DEI) without the depth of his journal articles, contributing to perceived sloppiness.<\/p>\n<p>Reduced Accountability:<\/p>\n<p>Unlike peer-reviewed journals, X and Substack lack formal gatekeeping. While this allows free expression, it may enable Cofnas to publish less polished work, as seen in \u201cPodcast Bros\u201d lacking citations compared to his 2020 IQ paper.<\/p>\n<p>Audience Expectations<\/p>\n<p>X\u2019s audience, often polarized and anti-establishment, may expect bold, simplified takes, pushing Cofnas toward rhetoric like \u201cbrain rot\u201d or \u201cwokism.\u201d This aligns with \u201cPodcast Bros\u201d but departs from his academic nuance, where he carefully qualifies claims (e.g., rejecting \u201cblacks are inferior\u201d stereotypes).<\/p>\n<p>Conclusion<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019 X output aligns with his provocative, anti-orthodox stance but sacrifices the rigor and depth of his academic work. The platform suits his ability to reach wide audiences and promote his ideas but doesn\u2019t fully leverage his strengths in detailed, evidence-based argumentation. X\u2019s incentives for brevity, provocation, and virality likely contribute to the sloppiness you perceive in \u201cPodcast Bros,\u201d as its hyperbolic tone and lack of citations echo X\u2019s style. To better suit his strengths, Cofnas could use X to teaser rigorous arguments, directing followers to detailed Substack essays, and engage critics to refine his public work, as he does academically. While X offers visibility, it risks diluting his scholarly precision unless balanced with his usual care.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>What typically happens when academics post regularly on social media? How does it affect their status and their intellectual direction? Are there certain temptations that might prove disastrous?<\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Risk to Professional Reputation:<\/p>\n<p>Poorly judged posts (e.g., overly controversial or unprofessional content) can damage credibility. Academics are often held to higher standards of rigor and decorum, and missteps can be amplified online.<\/p>\n<p>For instance, a 2018 case involved a professor whose inflammatory tweet led to public backlash and institutional scrutiny, affecting their career trajectory.<\/p>\n<p>Effects on Intellectual Direction<\/p>\n<p>Public Feedback and Idea Refinement:<\/p>\n<p>Social media provides real-time feedback, which can sharpen arguments or spark new research questions. Engaging with diverse perspectives may broaden an academic\u2019s intellectual scope.<\/p>\n<p>However, the pressure to simplify complex ideas for social media can lead to oversimplification or dilution of scholarly rigor.<\/p>\n<p>Shifting Priorities:<\/p>\n<p>Regular posting may divert time from research, teaching, or publishing in traditional academic outlets. The instant gratification of likes and retweets can tempt academics to prioritize viral content over substantive work.<\/p>\n<p>Studies (e.g., a 2020 survey in Nature) suggest that early-career researchers, in particular, feel torn between building an online presence and meeting traditional academic metrics like publication counts.<\/p>\n<p>Echo Chambers and Polarization:<\/p>\n<p>Social media algorithms often reward polarizing or sensational content, which can subtly steer academics toward more extreme positions to maintain engagement.<\/p>\n<p>This can lead to intellectual rigidity, where academics cater to their audience\u2019s biases rather than pursuing objective inquiry.<\/p>\n<p>Temptations and Potential Disasters<\/p>\n<p>Chasing Clout:<\/p>\n<p>The lure of followers and influence can tempt academics to prioritize attention-grabbing content over nuanced scholarship. This may erode their credibility among peers if they\u2019re seen as \u201cselling out.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Example: An academic who shifts from rigorous analysis to clickbait-style posts risks alienating their scholarly community.<\/p>\n<p>Engaging in Online Feuds:<\/p>\n<p>Social media\u2019s combative culture can draw academics into public arguments that devolve into personal attacks, damaging their professionalism. A 2021 study in Higher Education noted that online harassment is a significant deterrent for academics on social media.<\/p>\n<p>Example: A poorly handled Twitter spat can escalate, attracting trolls and creating a lasting negative impression.<\/p>\n<p>Premature Sharing or Misrepresentation:<\/p>\n<p>Posting preliminary research findings or unverified claims can lead to misinformation or premature criticism, especially if the work is taken out of context.<\/p>\n<p>In 2020, several academics faced backlash for sharing COVID-19-related claims on social media that later proved inaccurate, harming their credibility.<\/p>\n<p>Institutional and Legal Risks:<\/p>\n<p>Controversial posts may conflict with institutional policies or attract legal scrutiny, especially on sensitive topics like politics or identity. Tenure doesn\u2019t always protect against public or institutional backlash.<\/p>\n<p>Example: A professor\u2019s tweet criticizing a university policy could lead to disciplinary action if deemed to violate codes of conduct.<\/p>\n<p>Mitigating Risks<\/p>\n<p>Strategic Posting: Academics can focus on sharing peer-reviewed work, engaging in constructive dialogue, and maintaining a professional tone to balance visibility with credibility.<\/p>\n<p>Time Management: Setting boundaries for social media use helps prioritize core academic responsibilities.<\/p>\n<p>Media Literacy: Understanding platform dynamics (e.g., algorithms, audience expectations) can prevent falling into traps like polarization or sensationalism.<\/p>\n<p>Institutional Support: Universities can offer training on navigating social media to help academics avoid pitfalls while maximizing benefits.<\/p>\n<p>Conclusion<\/p>\n<p>Regular social media engagement can significantly boost an academic\u2019s visibility, influence, and public impact, but it comes with trade-offs. It can enrich intellectual direction through diverse feedback but also risks diluting rigor or skewing priorities toward popularity. Temptations like chasing clout, engaging in feuds, or sharing unverified claims can lead to reputational or professional disasters. Strategic use, grounded in scholarly values, is key to harnessing social media\u2019s benefits while minimizing its risks.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Nathan Cofnas\u2019s essay, Podcast Bros and Brain Rot, critiques the rise of alternative media figures, particularly podcasters like Joe Rogan, Candace Owens, and Dave Smith, who he argues spread misinformation and wield significant cultural influence despite lacking expertise. He contrasts their influence with that of traditional experts, acknowledging the failures of the expert class (e.g., during COVID-19) but defending the value of expertise. Cofnas suggests that the unregulated \u201cmarketplace of ideas\u201d rewards sensationalism and misinformation, leading to societal harm, and calls for alternative institutions to enforce intellectual standards. Hugo Mercier\u2019s Not Born Yesterday: The Science of Who We Trust and What We Believe provides a cognitive and evolutionary framework for understanding trust, belief formation, and resistance to persuasion, which can be used to analyze Cofnas\u2019s arguments. Below, I evaluate Cofnas\u2019s essay through Mercier\u2019s lens, focusing on key themes: gullibility, trust, expertise, and the spread of misinformation.<\/p>\n<p>1. Gullibility and Open Vigilance Mechanisms<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s Perspective: Cofnas implies that the public is susceptible to misinformation from podcasters due to a lack of critical evaluation, particularly when distrust in experts pushes people toward alternative media. He cites examples like Candace Owens\u2019s moon landing conspiracy and Darryl Cooper\u2019s WWII revisionism, suggesting that audiences uncritically accept these claims, especially when amplified by charismatic figures like Joe Rogan. However, he also acknowledges that the public\u2019s distrust in experts stems from real failures (e.g., COVID-19 misinformation from authorities), complicating the notion of widespread gullibility.<\/p>\n<p>Mercier\u2019s Framework: Mercier challenges the notion of human gullibility, arguing that people are not credulous by nature. Instead, they possess open vigilance mechanisms\u2014cognitive tools that evaluate communicated information based on plausibility, source reliability, and alignment with existing beliefs (Mercier, pp. xv-xvii). These mechanisms make persuasion difficult, as people are skeptical of messages that conflict with their priors or come from untrusted sources. Mercier cites historical and experimental evidence (e.g., the limited impact of Nazi propaganda, p. 129) to show that mass persuasion rarely succeeds unless it aligns with preexisting beliefs or intuitive ideas.<\/p>\n<p>Analysis: Cofnas\u2019s portrayal of the public as swayed by podcast \u201cbros\u201d aligns partially with traditional views of gullibility that Mercier critiques. Mercier would likely argue that listeners are not blindly accepting Owens\u2019s or Cooper\u2019s claims but are selectively trusting them because their messages resonate with existing distrust in institutions or intuitive biases (e.g., skepticism of official narratives). For instance, Owens\u2019s moon landing conspiracy might appeal to those already suspicious of NASA or government narratives, not because listeners are gullible but because the claim fits their worldview (Mercier, p. 47). However, Cofnas\u2019s examples of extreme beliefs (e.g., Cooper\u2019s Churchill-as-villain narrative) challenge Mercier\u2019s optimism, as they suggest some ideas gain traction despite lacking plausibility. Mercier might counter that such beliefs are often reflective (held superficially for social reasons, p. 152) rather than deeply believed, explaining their spread without requiring gullibility. Cofnas\u2019s call for institutional standards assumes the public needs protection from misinformation, which Mercier might see as underestimating people\u2019s ability to filter information, though he acknowledges that modern information environments can strain vigilance mechanisms (p. xvii).<\/p>\n<p>2. Trust and Source Evaluation<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s Perspective: Cofnas argues that podcasters gain trust by exploiting distrust in experts, positioning themselves as authentic outsiders. He contrasts this with experts like Nikku Madhusudhan, whose credentials and peer-reviewed work should command greater trust. However, he notes that experts like Anthony Fauci eroded trust through lies (e.g., about masks or vaccine efficacy), justifying some public skepticism. Cofnas suggests that trust in podcasters is misplaced, as they lack the expertise to evaluate complex issues like COVID-19 or history.<\/p>\n<p>Mercier\u2019s Framework: Mercier emphasizes that trust is not blind but based on cues about a source\u2019s competence, benevolence, and accountability (pp. 78-94). People assess sources using heuristics like past performance, reputation, and alignment of incentives. When trust in traditional authorities falters, people turn to alternative sources that appear more benevolent or competent in context (p. 84). Mercier also notes that trust is fragile and context-dependent, with people more likely to reject information from sources with misaligned interests (p. 269).<\/p>\n<p>Analysis: Mercier\u2019s framework explains why audiences trust podcasters over experts. Fauci\u2019s \u201cnoble lies\u201d (Cofnas\u2019s term) and the expert class\u2019s failures (e.g., dismissing the lab-leak hypothesis) signal misaligned incentives, reducing trust in credentialed authorities (Mercier, p. 84). Podcasters like Rogan, despite lacking formal expertise, gain trust by appearing transparent, relatable, or skeptical of institutional narratives, which aligns with listeners\u2019 intuitions about benevolence (p. 90). Cofnas\u2019s example of Rogan\u2019s COVID-19 stance (e.g., promoting ivermectin) illustrates this: listeners trusted Rogan not because of his expertise but because his skepticism mirrored their own distrust in public health officials. Mercier would argue that this trust is rational within the listeners\u2019 informational environment, where experts appeared untrustworthy. However, Cofnas\u2019s point that podcasters often get facts wrong (e.g., Rogan\u2019s ivermectin claims) aligns with Mercier\u2019s warning that trust in the wrong people can lead to false beliefs, especially when sources lack competence (p. 240). Cofnas\u2019s proposed institutions might restore trust in expertise by ensuring accountability, aligning with Mercier\u2019s view that trust requires reliable signals of competence and benevolence (p. 87).<\/p>\n<p>3. Expertise and Cultural Learning<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s Perspective: Cofnas defends expertise, arguing that figures like Madhusudhan, with rigorous training and peer-reviewed output, deserve more influence than podcasters. He uses the analogy of Rogan\u2019s respect for martial arts experts to suggest that expertise matters in technical domains. However, he acknowledges that the expert class\u2019s failures (e.g., COVID-19 misinformation, politicized science) have fueled distrust, giving podcasters an opening. Cofnas critiques the \u201cmarketplace of ideas\u201d for rewarding non-experts like Dave Smith, who spread historical inaccuracies, and calls for mechanisms to amplify credible voices.<\/p>\n<p>Mercier\u2019s Framework: Mercier argues that humans evolved to learn from others selectively, using heuristics like success bias (copying successful individuals) and prestige bias (copying those admired by others) (pp. 11-13). However, these heuristics are not blind; people evaluate sources based on competence and relevance (pp. 63-77). Mercier suggests that expertise is valued when it demonstrates tangible success or aligns with intuitive reasoning, but modern environments complicate this, as people encounter information from distant or unverifiable sources (p. xvii). He also notes that cultural learning is not passive absorption but an active process guided by vigilance (p. 258).<br \/>\nAnalysis: Cofnas\u2019s defense of expertise aligns with Mercier\u2019s view that people value competence when it\u2019s demonstrable (e.g., Madhusudhan\u2019s peer-reviewed work vs. Owens\u2019s conspiracies). Mercier\u2019s success bias explains why Rogan is trusted: his podcast\u2019s popularity and perceived authenticity signal competence to audiences, even if his factual accuracy is lacking (p. 11). Cofnas\u2019s martial arts analogy supports Mercier\u2019s point that people defer to experts in domains where competence is clear (p. 65). However, Mercier would likely argue that the public\u2019s rejection of experts during COVID-19 reflects vigilance, not irrationality, as experts\u2019 failures (e.g., Fauci\u2019s mask reversal) undermined their perceived competence (p. 83). Cofnas\u2019s critique of non-experts like Smith spreading inaccuracies overlooks Mercier\u2019s insight that people may accept such claims reflectively, for social signaling, rather than as deeply held beliefs (p. 152). Cofnas\u2019s proposed institutions could align with Mercier\u2019s idea of improving cultural learning by ensuring sources demonstrate reliable expertise, but Mercier might caution that enforcing standards risks alienating vigilant audiences who already distrust top-down authority (p. 269).<\/p>\n<p>4. Spread of Misinformation<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s Perspective: Cofnas argues that podcasters spread misinformation (e.g., ivermectin as a COVID-19 cure, WWII revisionism) because the unregulated internet rewards sensationalism and appeals to the \u201clowest common denominator.\u201d He cites examples like Cooper\u2019s WWII claims gaining millions of views, suggesting that charismatic delivery and large platforms amplify false ideas. He attributes societal harm (e.g., economic losses from Trump\u2019s policies) to this misinformation, advocating for institutional gatekeeping to curb it.<\/p>\n<p>Mercier\u2019s Framework: Mercier argues that misinformation spreads not because people are gullible but because it aligns with intuitive beliefs, preexisting views, or social goals (pp. 260-261). He distinguishes between intuitive beliefs (deeply held, based on experience) and reflective beliefs (superficial, often for signaling) (p. 152). Misinformation like rumors or conspiracy theories spreads when it seems minimally plausible or serves social purposes, but people rarely act on extreme beliefs (pp. 153-154). Mercier also notes that mass persuasion is notoriously ineffective, citing failures of propaganda and advertising (pp. 143-144).<\/p>\n<p>Analysis: Mercier\u2019s framework challenges Cofnas\u2019s claim that podcasters\u2019 misinformation spreads due to public gullibility. Instead, Mercier would argue that ideas like ivermectin or WWII revisionism gain traction because they align with listeners\u2019 distrust in institutions or intuitive skepticism of official narratives (p. 47). For example, Cooper\u2019s Churchill narrative might appeal to those already critical of Western historical accounts, making it minimally plausible (p. 160). Mercier\u2019s distinction between reflective and intuitive beliefs explains why such ideas spread without necessarily driving action: listeners may profess these views to signal affiliation or skepticism, not because they deeply believe them (p. 196). Cofnas\u2019s concern about societal harm (e.g., Trump\u2019s tariffs) assumes misinformation directly influences policy, but Mercier\u2019s evidence suggests persuasion is weak, and public opinion often resists top-down influence (p. 268). Cofnas\u2019s call for gatekeeping conflicts with Mercier\u2019s view that people\u2019s vigilance makes persuasion difficult; institutional control might backfire by reinforcing distrust (p. 269). However, Cofnas\u2019s point about sensationalism aligns with Mercier\u2019s observation that modern media environments amplify intuitive or emotionally charged ideas (p. 215).<\/p>\n<p>5. Solutions and Institutional Reform<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s Perspective: Cofnas proposes creating alternative institutions to enforce intellectual standards, amplify credible voices, and counter the \u201cmarketplace of ideas\u201d that rewards misinformation. He criticizes the right\u2019s reliance on attention-driven status, suggesting that cognitive elites won\u2019t join a movement lacking rigor. He rejects Sam Harris\u2019s suggestion that Rogan self-regulate, arguing that systemic change is needed.<\/p>\n<p>Mercier\u2019s Framework: Mercier is skeptical of top-down solutions to misinformation, arguing that people\u2019s vigilance makes them resistant to persuasion, even from credible sources (p. 144). He suggests that mistaken beliefs persist due to intuitive appeal or social incentives, not a lack of gatekeeping (p. 260). Improving belief formation requires aligning information with people\u2019s existing knowledge and ensuring sources are seen as trustworthy, rather than imposing external standards (p. 258).<\/p>\n<p>Analysis: Cofnas\u2019s institutional solution assumes that structural changes can restore trust in expertise, but Mercier\u2019s framework suggests this may be challenging. People\u2019s vigilance makes them wary of top-down authority, especially after expert failures (p. 269). Mercier would likely argue that Cofnas\u2019s institutions must demonstrate competence and benevolence to gain trust, rather than relying on credentials alone (p. 87). For example, amplifying voices like Madhusudhan requires showing their relevance to public concerns, not just their academic pedigree. Cofnas\u2019s rejection of self-regulation aligns with Mercier\u2019s view that individual responsibility (e.g., Rogan\u2019s fact-checking) is insufficient for systemic issues (p. 259). However, Mercier\u2019s emphasis on intuitive beliefs suggests that combating misinformation requires addressing why ideas like conspiracies are appealing, rather than suppressing them, which Cofnas\u2019s gatekeeping might attempt. Mercier\u2019s optimism about vigilance implies that Cofnas\u2019s fears of widespread harm may be overstated, as people often reject or limit the impact of false beliefs (p. 261).<\/p>\n<p>Synthesis and Conclusion<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s essay and Mercier\u2019s book offer complementary yet contrasting perspectives on trust, belief, and misinformation. Cofnas highlights the dangers of alternative media\u2019s influence and expert failures, advocating for institutional reform to restore credible voices. Mercier\u2019s cognitive framework counters the assumption of public gullibility, emphasizing that people\u2019s open vigilance mechanisms make persuasion difficult and that misinformation spreads due to intuitive appeal or social incentives, not credulity. Mercier explains why podcasters gain trust (alignment with distrustful audiences) and why their influence may be overstated (reflective beliefs have limited impact). However, Cofnas\u2019s examples of extreme misinformation challenge Mercier\u2019s optimism, suggesting that modern media environments amplify harmful ideas in ways that vigilance struggles to counter.<\/p>\n<p>Key Agreements:<\/p>\n<p>Both recognize that expert failures (e.g., COVID-19 lies) erode trust, driving people to alternative sources.<\/p>\n<p>Both acknowledge that misinformation spreads when it aligns with preexisting beliefs or social goals.<\/p>\n<p>Both see the modern information environment as challenging for accurate belief formation.<\/p>\n<p>Key Disagreements:<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas assumes greater public susceptibility to misinformation than Mercier, who emphasizes vigilance.<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas advocates top-down institutional solutions, while Mercier trusts bottom-up cognitive mechanisms.<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas focuses on societal harm from misinformation, while Mercier argues that false beliefs rarely drive action.<\/p>\n<p>Implications: Mercier\u2019s framework suggests that Cofnas\u2019s concerns about podcast-driven misinformation may overstate its impact, as people\u2019s vigilance limits deep belief in extreme ideas. However, Cofnas\u2019s call for institutions aligns with Mercier\u2019s insight that trust requires reliable signals of competence, provided those institutions avoid alienating skeptical audiences. To address misinformation, both perspectives suggest focusing on restoring trust in credible sources by demonstrating their relevance and accountability, rather than relying on credentials or suppression.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>Philosopher Stephen Turner wrote the book on expertise &#8212; <A HREF=\"https:\/\/www.amazon.com\/Liberal-Democracy-Published-association-Culture\/dp\/0761954694\">Liberal Democracy 3.0: Civil Society in an Age of Experts<\/a> (2003). Here are some of my favorite bits:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\n* If we imagine a historian in the distant future faced with the task of explaining, in a few lines, the significance of the twentieth century, and specifically the task of identifying what remarkable and consequential transformations occurred within it, two particular changes would stand out. One is the development of science and technology. It would be noted that, for the first time in technical history, science and technology became closely linked.<\/p>\n<p>* Our imagined historian would see that the obvious questions to ask would be these: what are the connections between these two developments, and what were the consequences for science and liberalism of having their dramatic turns of fortune occur more or less simultaneously? To answer these questions she might first attempt to study the writings of influential political thinkers of twentieth century liberalism and democracy, especially in the period after the Second World War, to see what they had to say about the connections and about science and science-related technology. What would she find? <\/p>\n<p>The Silence of Political Theory<\/p>\n<p>Our historian would be astonished by the absence of any discussion of science.<\/p>\n<p>* If one instead turns to the key documents of American liberalism, something equally astonishing can be found: the greatest single work of liberal political philosophy of the late twentieth century, John Rawls\u2019s A Theory of Justice (1971), is utterly devoid of any mention of science&#8230; Even the influential American critics of Rawls, such as Robert Nozick and the communitarians, find it possible to write passionately and seriously about contemporary politics as though science contained absolutely nothing of relevance to political life.<\/p>\n<p>* In his classic formulation, The Torment of Secrecy, Edward Shils demonstrated how perplexing and ultimately insoluble was the problem posed by the fact that liberal democracies, which were premised on open discussion, were nevertheless also forced to defend themselves and, in the course of doing so, to keep secrets (1956). The detailed measures governing secrecy cannot themselves be subject to public discussion, without making them ineffective. But if people in authority use the legal powers given to them to classify as \u2018secrets\u2019 things that ought properly to be part of genuine \u2018government by discussion,\u2019 public discourse quickly becomes a sham, for all that is discussed is that which governmental secret-keepers permit to be discussed.<\/p>\n<p>The parallels with expertise are clear: experts are needed by liberal democracy, but only experts understand what they are talking about and what is a matter of expert knowledge; to allow them to decide what belongs in the expert domain means that experts might place topics that should be subject to public discussion in the domain of \u2018expert knowledge.\u2019<\/p>\n<p>* The Left has had, historically, a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward expertise.<\/p>\n<p>* One assumption of meaningful discussion is some degree of mutual comprehension. But in the case of expert knowledge, there is very often no such comprehension and no corresponding ability to judge what is being said and who is saying it, and consequently no possibility of genuine \u2018discussion.\u2019 So expertise poses a problem that goes to the heart of liberalism.<\/p>\n<p>* Expertise is a kind of violation of the conditions of rough equality presupposed by democratic accountability. Some activities, such as genetic engineering, are apparently out of reach of democratic control, even when these activities, because of their dangerous character, ought perhaps to be subject to public scrutiny and regulation, precisely because of imbalances in knowledge. As such we are faced with the dilemma of capitulation to \u2018rule by experts\u2019 or democratic rule that is \u2018populist\u2019; that valorizes the wisdom of the people even when \u2018the people\u2019 are ignorant and operate on the basis of fear and rumor.<\/p>\n<p>* Scientific research on the genetic background of criminals has been denounced as \u2018racist\u2019 and government agencies have been intimidated into withdrawing support. Studies of race and intelligence similarly have been attacked as inherently racist, which is to say \u2018non-neutral.\u2019 A letterwriter to Newsweek wrote that \u2018theories of intelligence, the test to measure it and the societal structures in which its predictions come true are all developed and controlled by well-off white males for their own benefit\u2019 (Jaffe 1994: 26). This idea is commonplace, even a matter of consensus in some academic fields, while it is treated as absurd in others. The idea that science itself, with its mania for quantification, prediction and control is merely an intellectual manifestation of racism and sexism \u2013 that is to say, is non-neutral \u2013 is widespread. A more general problem for liberalism is this: if the liberal state is supposed to be ideologically neutral, how is it to decide what is and is not ideology as distinct from knowledge?<\/p>\n<p>* The claims about the nature of intelligence to which the letter-writer to Newsweek objected, curiously, produced a similar kind of collective letter signed by a large number of prominent psychologists, designed to correct what they saw to be the alarming disparity between what was presented by journalists and commentators as the accepted findings of psychological research on intelligence and what psychologists in fact accepted, namely that there were persistent differences in scores. Here the issues were different: the accepted facts were simply not known to the journalists, who seemed to assume that the facts fit with their prejudices.<\/p>\n<p>* Gunnar Myrdal\u2019s An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (1944) was a classic of social science expertise. It was made possible by lavish funding by the Carnegie Corporation, which conceived the project and paid the researchers whose specialist reports were given to Myrdal to write the text. The promotion of the book was subsidized by the Carnegie Corporation. All this was concealed. Myrdal was chosen because he was not an American, and therefore could not be immediately dismissed as non-neutral, as either a northerner or a southerner. The aims of the funders were not neutral, but they were well-hidden.<\/p>\n<p>* To treat experts as authorities in this sense requires us, in an act of faith, to believe that they do indeed possess some special cognitive powers analogous to those of charismatic leaders speaking prophetically of religious truths. In the case of prophets, of course, the \u2018reasoning\u2019 is hidden because it is God\u2019s reasoning \u2013 the prophets simply pass on His commands. In the case of science, it is hidden because it is meaningful only to scientists, and, similarly, scientists report the results, not the grounds for them. The results are accepted as the sayings of the prophets are, as a matter of faith in the powers of the scientists or experts, not as a result of the reasoning that led to the results, which is not accessible, because it is not understandable.<\/p>\n<p>* The evidence of risk of contracting HIV from ordinary heterosexual contact in the general United States\u2019 population has always been clear both to epidemiologists and to health care professionals with substantial experience with AIDS cases. The risk level is negligible, in contrast to the risk level in relation to certain \u2018homosexual\u2019 practices and IV drug use. But the fear of political pressure from AIDS activists, and the desire of AIDS activists to prevent AIDS from being treated merely as a disease of homosexuals and IV drug users, led the Center for Disease Control in the United States to endorse propaganda about AIDS and about the possibility of contracting AIDS from heterosexual contact that was highly misleading. What is striking about this case is not simply that a respected institution would lie, but that it would lie for the higher purpose of preserving the appearance of neutrality.<\/p>\n<p>* The neutral, objective, or scientific facts may be insufficient to be much of a constraint on decisions. However, the desire to move a topic out of political discussion and into the hands of experts may nevertheless be strong, because doing so may facilitate rational persuasion, and lead to a decision that is accepted as legitimate. Indeed, this is the logical core of the political phenomenon that will be discussed in subsequent chapters. One of the central devices of liberal democracy is to delegate discussion and remove issues from particular institutions of discussion and give them to others. In nineteenth century America, for example, discussions of public health measures against cholera were transferred, by acts of state legislatures, from the hands of city councils and the boards of health they appointed, to other boards and commissions. In the twentieth century, monetary decisions \u2013 an important topic of political debate \u2013 were delegated to the Federal Reserve Bank. In both cases, there was relevant expert knowledge. In neither case were the problems well-structured. They were problems in which the science or expertise at hand were necessary to full understanding of the discussions, but which were not structured in such a way that the science was sufficient to identify the solutions.<\/p>\n<p>* The physician or expert is not simply acting within a domain of expertise, applying technical considerations in a scientific or objective way directly to the decision in question.<\/p>\n<p>* Scientists were asked when it would be safe for farmers to return sheep to particular fields that had been polluted with radioactivity. Based on their empirical experience with, and understanding of, the causal process in a particular kind of soil, they estimated that the effects would dissipate in three weeks. In fact they were wrong. The kinds of soil that the sheep were grazing on contained a great deal of clay, and the clay retained the radioactivity much longer than the scientists had predicted (1996: 63-4). Wynne uses this example to make the point that scientists are often ignorant of the truth about the things that they confidently make pronouncements on.<\/p>\n<p>* Climatologists select the variables in their models and analogize and simplify a real world which, it is certain, will behave differently than the model, just as the lawyer simplifies a complex situation to select those features which are legally relevant. It is a further decision \u2013 a decision to accept a casuistic extension \u2013 to accept these simplifications or their implications and to act politically on them.<\/p>\n<p>* Delegating powers to a body that claims to represent, or is constituted to represent, is a familiar governmental device. Indeed it is a form of rule: in Rome, as Carl Schmitt pointed out, the institution of the dictator was a legal form, in which an individual was delegated dictatorial powers for a limited period to deal with a particular crisis. In this case the dictator\u2019s commission was a means of preserving the form of state that gave the commission&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>* Much of what governs our daily life is the product of commissions of various kinds. The labels on the food we eat, the standards for the air we breathe, and much else is the product of collective decision-making by bodies of this sort, and when the standards or practices are contested, they are contested by other bodies. To take a very simple example of the hidden power of these organizations, consider the simple artifact of the child\u2019s playground. In the US, the standards for playgrounds were produced by a knowledge movement subsidized by the Russell Sage Foundation during the first part of the twentieth century. The standards it defined were made an issue in Social Surveys of various kinds promoted by reform groups, promoted by playground associations in each city, and taken up by civic betterment associations, and in a short time accepted by cities as normal (Sealander 1997). This led to a certain uniformity of product, and therefore of experience in the daily life of children \u2013 the life-world. Yet this movement was in large part a \u2018Commission from Below\u2019. No powerful governmental agency authorized it. Its political success depended on the acceptance and endorsement of local leaders and community activists, who pressured municipalities to live up to the standards&#8230;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Nathan Cofnas\u2019s essay, Podcast Bros and Brain Rot, critiques the influence of non-expert podcasters like Joe Rogan and Candace Owens on public discourse, arguing that their large platforms amplify misinformation, particularly when contrasted with the expertise of trained professionals like Nikku Madhusudhan. Cofnas contends that while some \u201cexperts\u201d have faltered (e.g., during COVID-19), expertise remains essential, and the unregulated \u201cmarketplace of ideas\u201d often rewards sensationalism over accuracy. He calls for a balance where expertise is respected but not blindly worshipped, advocating for institutional mechanisms to elevate credible voices.<\/p>\n<p>Stephen Turner\u2019s Liberal Democracy 3.0: Civil Society in an Age of Experts provides a theoretical framework to evaluate Cofnas\u2019s arguments, focusing on the tension between expertise and liberal democracy\u2019s core principle of \u201cgovernment by discussion.\u201d Turner argues that the rise of expert-driven governance\u2014where technical knowledge dominates decision-making\u2014challenges democratic ideals by limiting public participation in discussions requiring specialized knowledge. He proposes \u201cliberalizing expertise\u201d through contentious public debate to hold experts accountable without undermining their authority.<\/p>\n<p>Below, I evaluate Cofnas\u2019s essay through Turner\u2019s lens, focusing on key overlapping themes: the problem of expertise in democracy, the role of public discussion, and proposed solutions.<\/p>\n<p>1. The Problem of Expertise in Democracy<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s View: Cofnas highlights a societal shift where non-experts (e.g., Rogan, Owens) wield significant influence, often surpassing credentialed experts. He argues that this stems from public distrust in experts, fueled by instances of corruption or failure (e.g., Anthony Fauci\u2019s COVID-19 missteps). However, he defends expertise\u2019s value, asserting that trained professionals like Madhusudhan provide more reliable insights than self-taught \u201cpodcast bros.\u201d Cofnas sees the unchecked influence of non-experts as a cultural and policy disaster, citing examples like WWII revisionism and vaccine denialism.<\/p>\n<p>Turner\u2019s Perspective: Turner frames expertise as a fundamental challenge to liberal democracy, which relies on generally intelligible public discussion. He argues that expert knowledge, being inaccessible to most citizens, creates a divide where only a few can meaningfully participate in technical debates (e.g., on global warming or drug efficacy). This risks transforming democracy into a system where expert bodies (commissions) supplant electoral processes, reducing \u201cgovernment by discussion\u201d to topics non-experts can grasp. Turner likens this to historical religious conflicts, where neutrality was adopted to manage intractable disputes, suggesting expertise may require similar political strategies.<\/p>\n<p>Evaluation: Cofnas\u2019s concerns align closely with Turner\u2019s diagnosis. Both recognize that expertise poses a democratic problem: Cofnas by illustrating how non-experts exploit distrust to gain influence, and Turner by theorizing how expert dominance sidelines public discourse. Cofnas\u2019s examples (e.g., Rogan\u2019s ivermectin advocacy) concretize Turner\u2019s abstract worry that specialized knowledge undermines democratic participation. However, Cofnas\u2019s focus on alt-media figures as the primary threat contrasts with Turner\u2019s emphasis on systemic shifts toward expert governance. Turner might argue that Cofnas underestimates how structural changes (e.g., reliance on expert commissions) erode democracy more than individual podcasters, who are symptoms of a broader issue.<\/p>\n<p>2. The Role of Public Discussion<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s View: Cofnas laments the degradation of public discourse, where platforms like Spotify and YouTube amplify charismatic non-experts over rigorous experts. He critiques the \u201cmarketplace of ideas\u201d for rewarding \u201cbrain-rotting infotainment\u201d and suggests that public discussion is often swayed by emotional appeals rather than facts (e.g., Dave Smith\u2019s charisma in debates). Yet, he acknowledges that experts like Fauci have damaged trust through lies, complicating efforts to restore faith in expertise. Cofnas implies that discussion should be informed by credible voices, though he struggles to define who qualifies (e.g., questioning what makes an \u201cexpert\u201d on the Israeli\u2013Palestinian conflict).<br \/>\nTurner\u2019s Perspective: Turner sees public discussion as the cornerstone of liberal democracy but notes that expertise disrupts it by requiring technical comprehension beyond most citizens\u2019 reach. He draws parallels with secrecy, where classified information limits open debate, arguing that expertise similarly restricts discussion to expert domains. Turner advocates for \u201cliberalizing expertise\u201d by subjecting expert claims to public scrutiny through contentious debate, ensuring experts justify their conclusions in accessible terms. He cites James Conant\u2019s view that citizens need not master science but should understand its processes to engage meaningfully.<\/p>\n<p>Evaluation: Cofnas\u2019s critique of alt-media\u2019s dominance echoes Turner\u2019s concern that expertise can exclude the public from meaningful discussion. Both see a disconnect between specialized knowledge and democratic ideals, with Cofnas focusing on non-experts filling the void and Turner on experts monopolizing discourse. Cofnas\u2019s call for elevating credible voices aligns with Turner\u2019s push for public scrutiny of experts, but Cofnas is less clear on how to achieve this. Turner\u2019s \u201cliberalizing expertise\u201d offers a mechanism\u2014contentious debate\u2014that Cofnas could adopt to address his concerns about misinformation. However, Cofnas\u2019s emphasis on alt-media\u2019s emotional appeal highlights a practical challenge Turner underplays: the public\u2019s preference for engaging, if inaccurate, narratives over dry expertise.<\/p>\n<p>3. Proposed Solutions<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s View: Cofnas proposes that society needs mechanisms to amplify credible experts over non-experts, though he avoids specifying legal restrictions, emphasizing moral responsibility. He suggests that figures like Sam Harris and Douglas Murray should build institutions enforcing intellectual standards, applying rigor consistently across political lines. Cofnas rejects blind trust in experts, advocating a critical approach where expertise is respected but scrutinized, using COVID-19 as a case study where experts were right on technical matters (e.g., vaccines) but wrong on communication.<\/p>\n<p>Turner\u2019s Perspective: Turner proposes \u201cliberalizing expertise\u201d by integrating expert knowledge into public discourse through mechanisms like commissions that are subject to debate, ensuring accountability without requiring universal expertise. He draws on Conant\u2019s idea that citizens should understand science\u2019s social role, not its technical details, to participate in policy discussions. Turner also critiques nostalgic ideals like Habermas\u2019s civil society, arguing that expertise demands new political strategies, not a return to universal participation.<\/p>\n<p>Evaluation: Cofnas\u2019s call for new institutions aligns with Turner\u2019s push for structural solutions to manage expertise, but Turner provides a more developed framework. Turner\u2019s \u201cliberalizing expertise\u201d via public debate directly addresses Cofnas\u2019s desire to elevate credible voices while maintaining democratic principles. Cofnas\u2019s suggestion that Harris and Murray enforce standards risks elitism, which Turner avoids by emphasizing broad public engagement. Both agree on the need for accountability, but Turner\u2019s approach is more systemic, addressing how expertise is governed, while Cofnas focuses on cultural influence. Cofnas could strengthen his argument by incorporating Turner\u2019s mechanisms, such as expert commissions subject to public scrutiny, to counter alt-media\u2019s sway.<\/p>\n<p>4. Critical Reflections<\/p>\n<p>Strengths of Cofnas\u2019s Essay: Cofnas effectively illustrates the real-world impact of non-expert influence through vivid examples (e.g., Rogan\u2019s COVID-19 claims, Owens\u2019s moon landing conspiracies). His acknowledgment of expert failures (e.g., Fauci\u2019s lies) adds nuance, avoiding a simplistic defense of expertise. His focus on alt-media\u2019s cultural impact complements Turner\u2019s theoretical concerns, grounding them in contemporary issues.<\/p>\n<p>Weaknesses in Light of Turner: Cofnas\u2019s essay lacks a clear structural solution, relying on vague calls for institutional reform. Turner\u2019s detailed analysis of commissions and public debate offers a more actionable path. Additionally, Cofnas\u2019s focus on individual podcasters risks missing Turner\u2019s broader point that expertise\u2019s dominance is a systemic issue, not just a cultural one. Cofnas also underplays the political nature of expertise, which Turner emphasizes as inherently tied to power and legitimacy.<\/p>\n<p>Turner\u2019s Relevance: Turner\u2019s framework enriches Cofnas\u2019s analysis by providing a historical and theoretical context for the expertise-democracy tension. His concepts of neutrality and liberalizing expertise offer tools to address Cofnas\u2019s concerns about misinformation without resorting to authoritarian measures. However, Turner\u2019s abstract approach may feel detached from Cofnas\u2019s urgent, example-driven critique.<\/p>\n<p>Conclusion<\/p>\n<p>Nathan Cofnas\u2019s Podcast Bros and Brain Rot compellingly diagnoses the dangers of non-expert influence in an era of declining trust in expertise, resonating with Stephen Turner\u2019s concerns in Liberal Democracy 3.0 about expertise\u2019s threat to democratic discussion. Both authors grapple with balancing expertise\u2019s necessity with democracy\u2019s participatory ideals, but Turner provides a more robust theoretical and structural framework through \u201cliberalizing expertise.\u201d Cofnas\u2019s strength lies in his vivid, contemporary examples, but his solutions lack the systemic depth Turner offers. Integrating Turner\u2019s mechanisms\u2014such as expert commissions subject to public debate\u2014could strengthen Cofnas\u2019s call for elevating credible voices, offering a path to counter misinformation while preserving liberal democracy\u2019s core principles. Conversely, Cofnas\u2019s focus on alt-media\u2019s cultural impact highlights a practical challenge Turner understates: the public\u2019s attraction to engaging narratives. Together, their works underscore the urgent need to navigate expertise in a democratic society, with Turner providing the blueprint and Cofnas the rallying cry.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Nathan writes in the comments section of his essay: &#8220;First, Americans don&#8217;t want manufacturing jobs. There are already half a million manufacturing job openings in the US, and Americans won&#8217;t show up for them. Second, even if we build more factories in the US, they are quickly becoming automated, so the jobs will disappear anyway. Third, no one is going to start building a new factory given that no one knows what the tariff policies will be when it&#8217;s completed. Fourth, your question seems to assume that reshoring manufacturing is a worthwhile goal. But we&#8217;re much better off importing stuff from China while we focus on services, technology, education, etc.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Grok says: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>1. &#8220;Americans don\u2019t want manufacturing jobs. There are already half a million manufacturing job openings in the US, and Americans won\u2019t show up for them.&#8221;<br \/>\nAnalysis:<\/p>\n<p>Data Support: Cofnas\u2019s claim about manufacturing job openings aligns with recent data. As of late 2024, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported approximately 500,000 job openings in manufacturing, consistent with a tight labor market. Job vacancy rates in manufacturing have remained elevated, with a 2022 peak of 4.3% (around 600,000 openings) and slightly lower but persistent vacancies since.<\/p>\n<p>Why Americans Aren\u2019t Taking These Jobs: Several factors may explain this:<\/p>\n<p>Wages and Conditions: Manufacturing jobs often pay less competitively compared to sectors like technology or services. For example, the median hourly wage for production workers in manufacturing was $22.82 in 2024, compared to $31.48 for software developers (BLS data). Additionally, factory work can involve demanding schedules, physical labor, or less desirable working conditions.<\/p>\n<p>Geographic Mismatch: Many manufacturing jobs are in rural or industrial areas, while workers may prefer urban centers with better amenities or job diversity.<\/p>\n<p>Cultural Shifts: Younger generations prioritize flexibility, work-life balance, and career growth, which manufacturing roles may not always offer.<\/p>\n<p>Skills Gap: Some openings require specialized skills (e.g., CNC machining, robotics), and training programs haven\u2019t kept pace with demand.<\/p>\n<p>Counterargument: It\u2019s not necessarily that Americans universally reject manufacturing jobs but that employers may not be offering competitive incentives. Programs like apprenticeships or higher wages could attract workers, as seen in some European countries with strong manufacturing sectors (e.g., Germany). Additionally, immigration policies could address labor shortages, as foreign workers have historically filled manufacturing roles.<\/p>\n<p>Assessment: Cofnas\u2019s point is partially valid\u2014there\u2019s clear evidence of unfilled manufacturing jobs\u2014but it oversimplifies the issue by implying Americans are inherently uninterested. Structural factors like wages, training, and job appeal play significant roles.<\/p>\n<p>2. &#8220;Even if we build more factories in the US, they are quickly becoming automated, so the jobs will disappear anyway.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Analysis:<\/p>\n<p>Automation Trends: Cofnas is correct that automation is transforming manufacturing. The International Federation of Robotics reported that the U.S. installed 34,700 industrial robots in 2023, with automation growing fastest in sectors like automotive and electronics. McKinsey estimates that 30% of current manufacturing jobs could be automated by 2030 due to advancements in robotics, AI, and IoT.<\/p>\n<p>Impact on Jobs: Automation reduces demand for low-skill, repetitive jobs (e.g., assembly line work) but increases demand for high-skill roles (e.g., robot maintenance, programming). For example, a 2023 study by the National Bureau of Economic Research found that automation displaced 2.6 million U.S. manufacturing jobs from 2000 to 2015 but created new roles in tech and services.<\/p>\n<p>Implications for Reshoring: If factories are built, the job creation potential may be limited compared to historical manufacturing booms. However, automation could make U.S. manufacturing more competitive by lowering production costs, potentially offsetting reliance on imports.<\/p>\n<p>Counterargument: Automation doesn\u2019t eliminate all jobs; it shifts the labor market. Investments in workforce retraining could prepare Americans for higher-skill manufacturing roles, as seen in countries like Japan, where automation coexists with a robust manufacturing workforce. Additionally, even automated factories require ancillary jobs (e.g., logistics, maintenance, R&#038;D), which could benefit local economies.<\/p>\n<p>Assessment: Cofnas\u2019s point is well-supported by automation trends, but it overlooks the potential for job creation in adjacent fields and the economic benefits of automated manufacturing. The net effect depends on policy and investment in skills development.<\/p>\n<p>3. &#8220;No one is going to start building a new factory given that no one knows what the tariff policies will be when it\u2019s completed.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Analysis:<\/p>\n<p>Policy Uncertainty: Cofnas highlights a real issue: regulatory and trade policy uncertainty deters long-term investment. Building a factory can take 2\u20135 years, and fluctuating tariff policies\u2014such as those proposed during the 2024 U.S. election cycle (e.g., 10\u201320% universal tariffs)\u2014create financial risks. A 2024 survey by the National Association of Manufacturers found that 68% of manufacturers cited trade policy uncertainty as a top concern for expansion.<\/p>\n<p>Economic Impact: Tariffs increase costs for imported materials and components, which many U.S. manufacturers rely on. If tariffs change mid-project, profitability models could collapse, discouraging investment. For example, the 2018\u20132019 U.S.-China tariffs raised costs for 78% of manufacturers, per a Federal Reserve study.<\/p>\n<p>Counterargument: Some companies are already reshoring despite uncertainty, driven by geopolitical risks (e.g., U.S.-China tensions) and supply chain disruptions (e.g., COVID-19). The CHIPS Act (2022) and Inflation Reduction Act (2022) provide billions in subsidies for domestic manufacturing, incentivizing factory construction. Firms like TSMC and Intel have committed to new U.S. plants, suggesting that incentives can outweigh tariff concerns. Stable, long-term policies could further reduce uncertainty.<\/p>\n<p>Assessment: Cofnas\u2019s point is valid\u2014uncertainty is a major barrier\u2014but it underestimates the role of government incentives and strategic reshoring driven by non-tariff factors. Clear policy signals could mitigate this issue.<\/p>\n<p>4. &#8220;Your question seems to assume that reshoring manufacturing is a worthwhile goal. But we\u2019re much better off importing stuff from China while we focus on services, technology, education, etc.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Analysis:<\/p>\n<p>Comparative Advantage: Cofnas invokes the economic principle of comparative advantage, suggesting the U.S. should specialize in high-value sectors like tech and services, where it has a global edge, while importing low-cost manufactured goods from China. In 2023, the U.S. service sector accounted for 77% of GDP, compared to 12% for manufacturing, supporting his view that services drive economic growth.<\/p>\n<p>Benefits of Importing: Importing from China keeps consumer prices low (e.g., electronics, clothing) and allows U.S. firms to focus on innovation. For example, Apple\u2019s outsourcing to China enables massive R&#038;D investment, with $26 billion spent in 2023.<\/p>\n<p>Downsides of Reshoring: Reshoring could raise production costs due to higher U.S. wages and regulations, potentially increasing prices. A 2023 Brookings Institution study estimated that fully reshoring electronics manufacturing could raise consumer prices by 15\u201320%.<\/p>\n<p>Counterargument: Overreliance on imports poses risks:<\/p>\n<p>Supply Chain Vulnerability: The COVID-19 pandemic exposed weaknesses in global supply chains, with 80% of U.S. manufacturers reporting disruptions in 2020\u20132021. Reshoring critical goods (e.g., semiconductors, pharmaceuticals) enhances resilience.<\/p>\n<p>National Security: Dependence on China for strategic goods (e.g., rare earths, chips) raises geopolitical concerns. The U.S. Department of Defense has flagged this as a priority, driving policies like the CHIPS Act.<\/p>\n<p>Economic Equity: Manufacturing jobs, even if fewer, support middle-class communities in regions hit hard by deindustrialization. The Rust Belt\u2019s economic decline since the 1980s illustrates the social costs of offshoring.<\/p>\n<p>Innovation Synergy: Domestic manufacturing can drive innovation by keeping R&#038;D and production close, as seen in Germany\u2019s high-tech manufacturing sector.<\/p>\n<p>Assessment: Cofnas\u2019s argument aligns with economic theory but downplays strategic and social benefits of reshoring. The U.S. can pursue a hybrid approach\u2014specializing in high-value sectors while selectively reshoring critical industries.<\/p>\n<p>Overall Evaluation<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas\u2019s comment is cogent and grounded in economic realities, particularly regarding labor market challenges, automation, and policy uncertainty. His skepticism of reshoring reflects a free-market perspective prioritizing efficiency and specialization. However, his arguments are somewhat one-sided:<\/p>\n<p>Strengths: He accurately identifies barriers to reshoring (labor shortages, automation, uncertainty) and leverages comparative advantage to question its value.<\/p>\n<p>Weaknesses: He overlooks government incentives, national security concerns, and the potential for targeted reshoring to complement service\/tech sectors. His dismissal of manufacturing\u2019s social and economic role feels overly simplistic.<\/p>\n<p>Broader Context<\/p>\n<p>Reshoring is a complex issue tied to trade policy, geopolitics, and domestic priorities. Recent U.S. policies (e.g., CHIPS Act, IRA) signal a shift toward selective reshoring, driven by security and resilience rather than blanket protectionism. Cofnas\u2019s view reflects a globalized, market-driven mindset, but critics argue this approach has eroded industrial capacity and left the U.S. vulnerable.<\/p>\n<p>Conclusion<\/p>\n<p>Cofnas raises valid concerns about the practicality and wisdom of reshoring manufacturing, supported by data on job openings, automation, and trade dynamics. However, his arguments undervalue the strategic, social, and economic case for selective reshoring.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>One of the great things about psychotherapy is that you can get insights that end your petty obsessions. For example, after a year of therapy, in 1999, my therapist told me that the reason I was obsessed with writing about &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=161065\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[16281,42922],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-161065","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-college","category-guru"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/161065","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=161065"}],"version-history":[{"count":66,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/161065\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":161432,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/161065\/revisions\/161432"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=161065"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=161065"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=161065"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}