{"id":126164,"date":"2019-02-14T12:55:58","date_gmt":"2019-02-14T20:55:58","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=126164"},"modified":"2019-02-14T12:57:02","modified_gmt":"2019-02-14T20:57:02","slug":"is-economics-a-science","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=126164","title":{"rendered":"Is Economics A Science?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>An academic emails me: &#8220;I didn&#8217;t read the book, but if Glaeser is describing it accurately then the authors have a very naive understanding of science&#8211;i.e., interminable disagreement means an activity isn&#8217;t science. Galeser points out that physicists disagree about some things in quantum mechanics, but disagreement is more extensive than that in physics and other recognized sciences. Many physicists think that string theory is untestable in principle and has no value. Ditto for supersymmetry. In evolutionary biology, behavioral genetics, linguistics, etc. researchers disagree about fundamental issues concerning theory and methodology, but few people deny that these are legitimate sciences.<\/p>\n<p>That being said, I think that under the rubric of economics you can find legitimate science, nonscience, and pseudoscience. You can use mathematics to model macroeconomic trends&#8211;that&#8217;s probably the most solid science. Economists who pass off their personal value judgments as &#8220;science&#8221; are engaged in nonscience, even if they use mathematics. Economists who take it as dogma that people make decisions according to rational choice theory, and come up with clever models to explain away all counterexamples, are probably engaged in pseudoscience.<\/p>\n<p>I always thought that it&#8217;s a bad idea to have a Nobel Prize in economics. (Of course there shouldn&#8217;t be Nobels for peace\/literature either, but for different reasons.) In physics\/medicine\/chemistry the Nobel seems to play a productive role, motivating scientists to make important discoveries. Economists don&#8217;t make discoveries in the same way&#8211;they propose theories giving tentative explanations of certain phenomena, and these theories that can become more or less influential. Then they win the prize if their work happens to be influential, which can reflect more on the politics\/sociology of the economics community than the intrinsic value of the work. Winning a Nobel also gives the economist extra authority to present his value judgments as science, which is unhelpful.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.manhattan-institute.org\/html\/prize-worth-celebrating-9347.html\">Harvard Economics professor Edward Glaeser writes in the WSJ<\/a>:<\/p>\n<p>The authors make two main arguments against the scientific status of<br \/>\neconomics. First, economists disagree about a lot. Second, economists<br \/>\nwrite fancy mathematical models that aren\u2019t empirically relevant.<br \/>\nThere is some truth to both statements. Economists do disagree, partly<br \/>\nbecause doctoral programs attract both liberals and conservatives.<br \/>\nMessrs. Offer and S\u00f6derberg point to surveys showing that economists<br \/>\ndisagree over statements like \u201cthe distribution of income should be<br \/>\nmore equal\u201d or \u201cthe redistribution of income is a legitimate role for<br \/>\ngovernment.\u201d They note that \u201cone would hardly expect such lack of<br \/>\nagreement over core issues in the application of physics, chemistry,<br \/>\nor biology.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Yet disagreements do not disbar a field from being scientific. In a<br \/>\nrecent poll of participants in a conference on quantum mechanics, for<br \/>\ninstance, 52% believed \u201cthat physical objects have their properties<br \/>\nwell defined prior to and independent of measurement,\u201d and 48%<br \/>\ndisagreed.<\/p>\n<p>Moreover, the authors have chosen questions whose answers depend far<br \/>\nmore on ideology than on economic knowledge. Economics can tell us<br \/>\nwhether higher tax rates will reduce labor supply or how to design a<br \/>\nmore effective tax system but not whether it is a good thing to take a<br \/>\ndollar from a rich man and give it to a poor man. Any social<br \/>\npreference for redistribution reflects ideology, not economics, and<br \/>\ndisagreements over ideology say nothing about whether economics is a<br \/>\nscience or not.<\/p>\n<p>More telling are the disagreements that the authors cite about core<br \/>\nissues in macroeconomics or about the disputes between two of the<br \/>\nfinancial economists\u2014Eugene Fama and Robert Shiller\u2014who shared the<br \/>\n2013 Nobel Prize with the far less disputatious Lars Hansen.<\/p>\n<p>In the case of finance, the public disputes reflect the relative<br \/>\nnewness of the field. Mr. Fama essentially founded the empirical<br \/>\nbranch of financial economics; he has long emphasized the efficiency<br \/>\nand rationality of markets. Mr. Shiller is the foremost modern analyst<br \/>\nof irrational exuberance. Today the mainstream of financial economics<br \/>\nhas moved toward a middle-ground consensus that accepts that markets<br \/>\nare not always perfectly rational, that arbitrage is difficult but not<br \/>\nimpossible, and that psychology does move markets.<\/p>\n<p>In the case of macroeconomics, the fundamental problem is data. We<br \/>\ndon\u2019t have an enormously large set of recessions matched with<br \/>\nrandomized governmental responses to those downturns. Yet we would<br \/>\nneed such randomized control trials if we were to definitively settle<br \/>\nthe long-standing disputes between Keynesians and their opponents.<\/p>\n<p>Science is ultimately about method, not the degree of certainty.<br \/>\nEconomics is a science whenever economists use the scientific method,<br \/>\nwhich I understand to mean Karl Popper\u2019s process of starting with<br \/>\nparticular facts, producing refutable hypotheses and then seeing<br \/>\nwhether the data reject those hypotheses. Yet the public unfortunately<br \/>\ntakes the word science to mean \u201ccertitude,\u201d and economists (including<br \/>\nmyself) have too often been guilty of wrapping ourselves in our<br \/>\nscientific mantles to make ideological pronouncements seem more<br \/>\ncompelling. Messrs. Offer and S\u00f6derberg suggest that \u201cpolicy requires<br \/>\nmore humility\u201d and that economists should face \u201csome downgrading of<br \/>\nauthority, but not all the way.\u201d I agree with the need for humility<br \/>\nbut would point out that politicians, pundits and ideologues of all<br \/>\nstripes regularly make statements with far less factual basis than<br \/>\nmost economists.<\/p>\n<p>In the book, all this discussion of economics as a science is tied up<br \/>\nwith the authors\u2019 discussion of the internal politics of Sweden itself<br \/>\nand the country\u2019s occasional deviations from social-democratic<br \/>\northodoxy. Assar Lindbeck, a distinguished Swedish economist who the<br \/>\nauthors claim \u201cdominated the Nobel awards\u201d for years, is something of<br \/>\na villain in \u201cThe Nobel Factor.\u201d The authors\u2019 criticism of the Nobel<br \/>\nPrizes given to pro-market economists during the Lindbeck years is<br \/>\nlinked to their antagonism toward Sweden\u2019s own market reforms during<br \/>\nthe early 1990s. Even more strangely, they blame the pro-market<br \/>\npolicies pushed by Washington-based entities like the International<br \/>\nMonetary Fund and the World Bank for \u201ca tide of corruption which<br \/>\nwelled up in the borrowing countries.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>My own view is that Sweden\u2019s sensible economic reforms produced a<br \/>\ncountry with both economic dynamism and a welfare state. Germany and<br \/>\nthe Netherlands have managed the same balancing act. The social<br \/>\ndemocracies of Europe that did not reform, including France, Greece,<br \/>\nItaly and Spain, are in far worse shape. The idea that market-friendly<br \/>\nreforms lead to corruption seems implausible, especially considering<br \/>\nthat corruption plagued the developing world long before there was a<br \/>\nNobel Prize in economics.<\/p>\n<p>The best role for the Nobel Prize in economics is not to advance an<br \/>\nideology but rather to reinforce the requirement that economists<br \/>\nshould play by the same rules as scientists. Many economists,<br \/>\nparticularly Marxist economists, once disagreed with this view,<br \/>\nfavoring dialectic over evidence. That perspective has weakened,<br \/>\nperhaps partially because the Nobel Prize has consistently rewarded<br \/>\neconomists who really advanced human knowledge. This is something<br \/>\nworth celebrating in Sweden, and the Hart-Holmstrom prize is yet<br \/>\nanother example of the committee supporting superb social science.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>An academic emails me: &#8220;I didn&#8217;t read the book, but if Glaeser is describing it accurately then the authors have a very naive understanding of science&#8211;i.e., interminable disagreement means an activity isn&#8217;t science. Galeser points out that physicists disagree about &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/?p=126164\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[162],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-126164","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-economics"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/126164","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=126164"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/126164\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":126165,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/126164\/revisions\/126165"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=126164"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=126164"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/lukeford.net\/blog\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=126164"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}